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PRICING CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
ROBERT R. KUEHNt
ABSTRACT
Some blame the cost of clinical legal education for high law school
tuition. They argue that, regardless of the educational and employment
benefits to students, clinical legal education, and law clinics in particular,
are too expensive to expand or require for all students in a time of de-
creasing law school enrollments and revenues. This Article is an empiri-
cal examination of these claims.
Reviewing tuition, curricular, and enrollment data from all law
schools, this Article demonstrates that 84% of law schools already have
the capacity to provide a clinical experience to every student without
adding courses or faculty, although only 18% presently require or guar-
antee that training. It finds there is no effect on the tuition and fees that
students pay from requiring or guaranteeing every student a clinical ex-
perience and no difference in tuition between schools that already have
sufficient capacity to provide a clinical experience to each student and
those that do not. In addition, there is no tuition growth associated with
the increased availability of experiential or law clinic courses for stu-
dents or the increased participation of students in law clinics, in spite of
the higher costs many associate with clinics. These findings demonstrate
that clinical courses have not cost, and need not cost, students more in
tuition. The Article concludes that providing a clinical experience to eve-
ry student is more a question of a school's will to provide that education-
al experience than of cost.
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INTRODUCTION
Law lags far behind other comparable professions in the practice-
based education requirements for its new licensees. While other profes-
sions require that at least one-quarter to one-half of a student's education
be in clinical or practice courses, the minimum requirement for profes-
sional skills education in law schools was only recently increased to just
six credit hours.' For decades, reports have called for more clinical train-
ing in law school so that graduates, in addition to learning to think like a
lawyer, would be prepared to carry on the day-to-day tasks of lawyers
upon graduation.
In the midst of discussions about the need for more hands-on legal
training, students, legal educators, politicians, and the bar have expressed
concerns over the high cost of legal education. Law school tuition has
increased rapidly, and average law student debt has soared. At the same
time, the economic recession has resulted in reduced law firm hiring and
dismal employment prospects for many recent graduates. Recent statis-
tics show that slightly more than half obtained permanent lawyer posi-
tions nine months after graduation.2 "The overall employment rate for
the class of 2012 was the lowest since 1994";3 the rate for the class of
2013 showed almost no improvement.4
Many believe the failure of law schools to graduate "practice ready
lawyers" exacerbates the employment problems of graduates.5 Law firms
complain that students are graduating unprepared for practice and that
clients are growing reluctant to pay the billing time of inexperienced
associates.6 Partners explain that an increased need for their own billing
1. See infra Appendix A (listing the clinical requirements for various professional schools);
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR Ass'N, REVISED STANDARDS
FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 303(a)(3) (2014) [hereinafter ABA ACCREDITATION
STANDARDS]; Tony Mauro, ABA Delegates Approve Law School Reforms, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 11,
2014, http://www.nationallawjoumal.com/id=1202666475781/ABA-Delegates-Approve-Law-
School-Reforms (reporting on the ABA House of Delegates' adoption of revised accreditation stand-
ards).
2. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, 2013 LAW
GRADUATE EMPLOYMENT DATA (2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legaleducation/resources/statistics.html.
3. TASK FORCE ON NEW LAWYERS IN A CHANGING PROFESSION, N.Y. C. BAR ASS'N,
DEVELOPING LEGAL CAREERS AND DELIVERING JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 17 (2013).
4. Karen Sloan, "Very Modest" Jobs Growth Seen for Law School Graduates, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 9, 2014, http://www.nationallawjoumal.com/law-school-
news/id=l 202650371787/Very+Modest+Jobs+Growth+Seen+For+Law+School+Graduates%3Fmco
de=1202615496822&curindex=4 (reporting increase in full-time, long-term jobs that require bar
passage from 56.2% in 2012 to 57% for 2013).
5. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
6. See Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in Hard Times: The Recession, Practical
Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 598, 606 (2010); David Segal, What
They Don't Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at Al (explaining that
clients are forcing law firms to bear the costs of training new associates, and stating that, "a survey
by American Lawyer found that 47 percent of law firms had a client say, in effect, 'We don't want to
see the names of first- or second-year associates on our bills."'); see also Patrick G. Lee, Law
Schools Get Practical, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2011, at B5 (quoting the head of lawyer recruitment for
2 [Vol. 92:1
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and further client acquisition has "decreased the amount of time [they]
are willing to spend mentoring young attorneys." As a result, law firms
increasingly prefer to hire more experienced lawyers over graduating law
students.8 The depressed job market has led to a significant increase in
the number of law graduates forced into solo practice, with the percent-
age of those practicing solo doubling between 2007 and 201 .9
In reaction to the news about reduced employment, applications to
law schools have dropped dramatically, leading to lower enrollments and
a significant loss of income at many schools. According to the Law
School Admission Council, the number of applicants to law schools
dropped by 12.3% from fall 2012 to fall 2013 and individual applications
by 17.9%.1o In just four years, the number of applicants dropped by
38%." The number of persons taking the Law School Admissions Test
(LSAT) is down over 38% since 2009, and is the lowest since 1998.12
a law firm stating, "This is a push from clients saying, 'Why are we going to pay this kind of mon-
ey? We don't want to train new lawyers."'); Katy Montgomery & Neda Khatamee, What Law Firms
Want in New Recruits; Business Acumen, A Greater Focus on Global Issues, Management Skills and
the Ability to Write Well, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 27, 2009, at 11 (reporting a hiring partner's comment that
current economic conditions "make it more imperative that new associates hit the ground running,
and operate efficiently and effectively from day one").
7. Thies, supra note 6, at 606.
8. Id. at 605. The founder of a legal placement firm testified before an Illinois state bar
committee that "much of the problem in the legal job market is not oversupply of lawyers, but inad-
equate training." SPECIAL COMM. ON THE IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT ON THE DELIVERY OF
LEGAL SERVS., ILL. STATE BAR ASS'N, FINAL REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 28 (2013) [hereinafter
IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT, ILL. STATE BAR].
9. See Marie P. Grady, Economy Spurs Recent Law Grads to Go Solo, CONN. L. TRIBUNE,
Aug. 31, 2011, (on file with author); see also IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT, ILL. STATE BAR, supra
note 8, at 21. One-half of all private-practice lawyers practice solo, with almost two-thirds in either




10. End of Year Summary: ABA Applicants, Applications, Admissions, Enrollment, LSATs,
CAS, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://www.1sac.org/1sacresources/data/Isac-volume-
summary (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) [hereinafter End of Year Summary]. Fall 2014 applicants were
down 6.7% and applications down 8.2% from even the low levels of 2013. Three-Year ABA Volume
Comparison, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://www.isac.org/Isacresources/datalthree-year-
volume (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Three- Year Comparison].
11. End of Year Summary, supra note 10 (indicating 87,500 applicants for fall 2010); Three-
Year Comparison, supra note 10 (indicating 54,527 applicants for fall 2014); see also Ethan
Bronner, Law Schools'Applications Fall as Costs Rise and Jobs Are Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2013,
at Al.
12. LSA Ts Administered-Counts and Percent Increases by Admin and Year, LAW SCHOOL
ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://lsac.org/1sacresources/datallsats-administered (last visited Sept. 24,
2014) (indicating 105,532 LSATs administered in 2013-14 and 171,514 in 2009-10); see also Debra
Cassens Weiss, LSAT Test-Takers Continue to Decline; October Number is at Lowest Point Since
1998, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 4, 2013, 11:35 AM),
http://www.abajoumal.com/mobile/article/Isat-testtakerscontinuetodeclineoctobernumber-is
atlowest point sinc.
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First-year law school enrollment in fall 2013 was down 28% since 2010
and is now at 1977 levels.13
Some schools have responded to decreased enrollments by cutting
faculty and staff, and most schools are looking for ways to operate with
less revenue and reduced operating expenses. One school notified its
faculty that it plans to eliminate one-third of its full-time faculty posi-
tions, regardless of tenure or seniority, within one year.14 Meanwhile, a
myriad of other law schools have offered professors buyouts, restruc-
tured contracts, and early retirement deals, as schools adjust to lower
enrollment numbers by reducing full-time faculty.'5
State bars have taken note of the crisis in legal education. The State
Bar of California recently adopted a task force recommendation that the
rules for admission to the bar be amended to require that prior to admis-
sion, a student must have taken at least fifteen units of practice-based,
experiential course work designed to develop law practice competencies
or have participated in a bar-approved externship, clerkship, or appren-
ticeship.'6 The chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals has an-
nounced an early bar exam program where third-year students, after
completion of the February bar exam, would spend their final three
months of legal education providing full-time pro bono assistance
through externships and law clinic programs developed by their
schools. 17 The American Bar Association's (ABA) Council of the Sec-
13. End of Year Summary, supra note 10 (indicating enrollment of 39,700 in fall 2013 and
52,500 in 2010); see also Jennifer Smith, U.S. Law School Enrollments Fall, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,
2013, at BI.
14. Paul L. Caron, New England Law Faculty Face 8-Course Teaching Loads, Mandatory
Office Presence (M-F, 9-5) Unless 35% Accept Buyouts, TAXPROF BLOG (Oct. 25, 2013),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/2013/10/new-england-.html.
15. Ashby Jones & Jennifer Smith, In Rare Step, Law Schools Shrink Faculty, WALL ST. J.,
July 16, 2013, at Bl. Among those affected are twenty-one law professors who accepted buyout
packages at Widener University School of Law, seven professors who agreed to early retirement
packages at the University of Dayton School of Law, and eight professors at Vermont Law School
who accepted offers to restructured their contracts, take pay cuts, or give up tenure. Id; see also
Karen Sloan, Big Slump for LSAT; The Decline Means Hard Choices for Law Schools, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 4, 2013,
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNU.jsp?id=1 202626211107&BigSlumpforLSAT&slretur
n=20131017131755 (identifying additional schools shedding faculty to adjust to smaller enroll-
ments).
16. TASK FORCE ON ADMISSIONS REGULATION REFORM, STATE BAR OF CAL., PHASE I FINAL
REPORT 15-16 (2013) [hereinafter TASK FORCE ON ADMISSIONS, PHASE I REPORT]. The Task
Force's recommendation was adopted unanimously by the State Bar of California Board of Trustees
and implementation rules are now being developed. TASK FORCE ON ADMISSIONS REGULATION
REFORM, STATE BAR OF CAL., PHASE It IMPLEMENTATION (2014), available at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs/BoardofTrustees/TaskForceonAdmissionsRegulationReform.asp
x.
17. JONATHAN LIPPMAN, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 2014: VISION AND ACTION IN OUR
MODERN COURTS 3-6 (2014). The chief judge explained that the pro bono work "will take place
through educational programs developed by law schools and their clinics, and in partnerships with
legal service providers, corporations, and law firms." Id. at 4. At the time of the announcement, a
New York State Bar Association's Committee on Legal Education was studying whether skills
training should be required for admission to its bar. See Adele Bernhard, Should Skills Training Be
Requiredfor Licensing?, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., Sept. 2013, at 53, 53-54.
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tion of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, spurred into action
by a petition to amend law school accreditation standards to require not
just fifteen academic credits in experiential courses but hat each J.D.
student must ake a law clinic or externship prior to graduation, recent-
ly increased its professional skills requirement from a single course to six
semester credit hours. But the ABA refused the request to require a clini-
cal experience for all students and the new requirement will not apply to
graduating students until 2019.19
The conventional wisdom is that clinical courses, defined as law
clinics and externships, are expensive. Thus, it is argued that, even if
important to the professional education of students and their employment
prospects, a clinical experience cannot be required for all students in a
time of decreasing enrollments and revenue.20 In addition, as schools
search for ways to cut costs, many are concerned that schools, dominated
by faculties that do not teach clinical courses, will single out clinical
programs, resulting in reduced clinical offerings for students or the tar-
geted layoffs of clinical faculty.
Putting aside the value of clinical courses to a student's training for
law practice and employment marketability, existing data do not demon-
strate what effect a school's clinical legal education program has on tui-
tion and, therefore, how its availability may affect what students pay and
how much debt they incur. Even if the costs per student or academic
credit are higher in lower-enrollment clinical courses than in large lecture
courses, no research has addressed whether or not providing more clini-
cal legal education results in students paying higher tuition.
18. See CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. Ass'N, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (CLEA)
COMMENT ON DRAFT STANDARD 303(A) (3) & PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENT TO EXISTING
STANDARD 302(A) (4) To REQUIRE 15 CREDITS IN EXPERIENTIAL COURSES, (2013), available at
http://cleaweb.org/Resources/Documents/2013-01-07%20CLEA%201/5%20credits.pdf; see also
Mark Hansen, Clinical Law Profs Solicit ABA Legal Ed Council to Require 15 Credit Hours in
Practice-Based Courses, A.B.A. J. (Jul. 2, 2013, 8:56 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/CLEA_15_credit-hoursaccreditation-abasection.
19. See ABA ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard 303(b)(1) (requiring
only that schools provide students with "substantial opportunities" for law clinics or field place-
ments); Memorandum from Barry Currier, Managing Dir., Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions
to the Bar to Council, Am. Bar Ass'n, (July 20, 2014) (on file with author) (explaining that curricu-
lum changes in the revised standards will apply to J.D. students entering law school in 2016-17).
20. See, e.g., Letter from Paul G. Mahoney, Dean, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, to Hon. Solomon
Oliver, Jr., Chairperson, Council of the Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, Am. Bar
Ass'n, & Barry A. Currier, Managing Dir. of Accreditation and Legal Educ., Section of Legal Educ.
and Admissions to the Bar, Am. Bar Ass'n, (Jan. 30, 2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legaleducation and admissions-to th
ebar/council reports andresolutions/comments/201401_comment std 303a3_paul_g_mahoney.a
uthcheckdam.pdf; Letter from Michael H. Schill, Dean, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., to Hon. Solomon
Oliver, Jr., Chairperson, Council of the Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, Am. Bar
Ass'n, & Barry A. Currier, Managing Dir. of Accreditation and Legal Educ., Section of Legal Educ.
and Admissions to the Bar, Am. Bar Ass'n (Jan. 30, 2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal education-andadmissions-to-th
e_bar/council reports andresolutions/comments/201401 comment std_303a3_michael hschill.a
uthcheckdam.pdf.
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This Article is an effort to address this lack of data and determine
how the availability of clinical legal education for students may affect
tuition pricing at law schools. After reviewing information on the rising
cost of legal education and calls for more clinical experiences for law
students, it examines studies on the costs of clinical legal education. The
Article then provides empirical data not on the instructional costs of law
clinics or externships, but on the pricing of clinical legal education
through tuition. With this pricing data, it seeks to determine if schools
requiring or providing greater clinical education opportunities for their
students pass on possible increased instructional costs from those courses
through higher tuition charges. Based on an analysis of current enroll-
ment, curricula, and tuition data submitted by all law schools, it con-
cludes that there is no relationship between providing a clinical education
experience for every student, or providing more opportunities for stu-
dents to participate in law clinics, and tuition. The evidence supports the
claim that providing more clinical opportunities, and even ensuring or
requiring an opportunity for every graduating J.D. student, has not and
need not cost students more through higher tuition charges.
I. THE RISING COST OF LEGAL EDUCATION
Legal educators, the bar, students, and even politicians are con-
cerned about the rising costs of legal education. The average tuition and
fees at private law schools in 2013 was $41,985, with public laws
schools charging $23,879 for in-state residents.21 Although lower than
the tuition at other professional schools such as medicine, dentistry, and
22veterinary, present law school tuition represents a 64% rise at private
law schools and 123% rise at public schools since 2003.23 Average pri-
vate law school tuition rose 2.6 times the national rate of inflation, with
public school resident tuition growing by over 5.5 times the inflation
rate.24
The result of this steep rise in tuition has been a substantial increase
in the average debt of graduating law students. For the class of 2013, law
school graduates incurred over $4 billion in debt.25 The average debt of
21. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, LAW SCHOOL
TUITION (1985-2013; PUBLIC/PRIVATE) (2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal education/resources/statistics.html [hereinafter LAW
SCHOOL TUITION (1985-2013)].
22. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-20 HIGHER EDUCATION: ISSUES
RELATED TO LAW SCHOOL COST AND ACCESS 16 (2009).
23. LAW SCHOOL TUITION (1985-2013), supra note 21.
24. Tuition Tracker, LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY,
http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/reform/projects/Tuition-Tracker (last visited Sept. 25,
2014).
25. Federal Investment in Legal Education: Class of 2013, LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY,
http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/reform/projects/Law-School-Financing (last visited Sept.
25, 2014); see also Matt Leichter, 2010 Law School Grad Debt at $3.6 Billion, THE LAW SCHOOL
TUITION BUBBLE (Oct. 11, 2011), http://lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com/2011/10/11/2010-
law-school-grad-debt-at-3-6-billion.
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private law school graduates reached over $122,000 in 2012, a 74% in-
crease from the average debt just ten years prior.2 6 Meanwhile, public
school graduates owed an average of $84,600, an increase of 82%.27
This debt can prove devastating to recent law graduates, as a mere
57% could claim permanent full-time lawyer jobs nine months after
graduation.2 8 These weak employment numbers underscore the problems
recent graduates have in paying back debt. The standard monthly pay-
ment on a $125,000 debt load is over $1,400.29 According to Professor
Brian Tamanaha' s calculations, "[t]o manage monthly payments this
large (after taxes, rent, and other basic expenses) requires a salary in ex-
cess of $100,000, which less than 15 percent of graduates nationwide
obtained."30
The causes for the rise in tuition are likely many, with no consensus
on which factor is most significant. Many believe that the increased size
and rising salaries of faculty, driven in part by reduced teaching loads
and competition among schools for the best faculty, are important causes.
The average law school had 37% more full-time professors in 2012 than
it did in 1999, even though full-time J.D. enrollment was only 2% higher
and total law school enrollment was only 13.5% higher.3 1 Student/faculty
ratios at an average-sized law school decreased by 28% during the 10-
year period from 2002 to 2012.32 Professor Peter Joy concluded, after
looking at the dramatic fall in teaching loads at law schools, that "the
most significant long-term drivers of rising legal education costs are
lower teaching loads and higher salaries for law faculty." 33A National
Jurist study estimated that 48% of the tuition increase from 1998 to 2008
34was attributable to increased faculty size and higher salaries. As one
26. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, AVERAGE
AMOUNT BORROWED (2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.htmi (reporting average
amount borrowed for academic years 2001-2002 through 2011-2012).
27. Id.
28. Sloan, supra note 4.
29. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Problems with Income Based Repayment, and the Charge of
Elitism: Responses to Schrag and Chambliss, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521, 523 (2013).
30. Id. at 523-24.
31. See Matt Leichter, Stealth Layoffs Revealed?, THE LAW SCHOOL TUITION BUBBLE (Nov.
13, 2013), http://lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com/2013/11/13/stealth-layoffs-revealed; see
also SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, FIRST-YEAR-
ENROLLMENT/TOTAL ENROLLMENT/DEGREES AWARDED (2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legaleducation/resources/statistics.html [hereinafter
ENROLLMENT AND DEGREES AWARDED].
32. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR Ass'N, STUDENT-
FACULTY RATIO (2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html (reporting ratios from
academic years 1978-79 to 2012-13); see also ENROLLMENT AND DEGREES AWARDED, supra note
31 (indicating average law school enrollments of approximately 750 J.D. and other students).
33. Peter A. Joy, The Cost of Clinical Legal Education, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 309, 316
(2012).
34. Jack Crittenden, Why Is Tuition Up? Look at All the Profs, NAT'L JURIST, Mar. 2010, at
40, 40.
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commentator observed, law schools have chosen more professors over
reduced tuition.35
Additionally, the cost of legal education is substantially higher be-
cause of the large subsidy students pay, via their tuition, for faculty
scholarship. Professor Richard Neumann estimates that with faculty
spending 30% to 50% of their time producing scholarship, the cost of
writing one law review article per year may be as high as $88,000.36
Dean Ed Rubin similarly noted that at most research-oriented law
schools, which includes more than half of all law schools, the general
rule is that faculty are expected to spend 40% of their time on research.37
He calculated that "if faculty were not expected to conduct research, they
could teach twice as much, thus reducing the faculty cost of providing
the same number of courses by 40 to 50%," resulting in tuition savings to
students in the same proportion.38 Dean Rubin explained that, alterna-
tively, by ceasing to support or reward faculty research, schools "could
offer a more intensive educational program, with individualized training
in specific legal skills, while still maintaining the same tuition." 39 A re-
port by the Illinois State Bar Association on law school debt similarly
observed that "the focus on academic scholarship prevents law schools
from focusing on the time-intensive instruction techniques that are nec-
essary to educate new lawyers."40
Competition for students to enhance a school's U.S. News & World
Report ranking also plays an important part in the rising cost of legal
education. Most schools today seek to obtain the best students (defined in
U.S. News by higher LSAT scores and college GPAs) by offering merit-
based scholarships. A 2002 ABA report found that the greatest increase
in law school expenditures between academic years 1993-1994 and
1999-2000 was in financial aid, increasing over 87% in just six years, a
140% greater increase than the rise in salaries and benefits.4 1 The report
attributed the increase in financial aid expenditures to efforts to relieve
35. See Leichter, supra note 31.
36. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Distorted Resource Allocations in Legal Education 6-7, (Oct.
28, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Karen Sloan, Legal Scholarship
Carries a High Price Tag, NAT'L L.J. (Apr. 20, 2011),
http://www.nationallawjoumal.com/id=1202490888822?.
37. Edward Rubin, Should Law Schools Support Faculty Research?, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 139, 142 (2008).
38. Id. at 142-43; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Write?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 881, 881
(2009) ("In fact, if law professors wrote much less, teaching loads could increase, faculties could
decrease in size, and tuition could decrease substantially."). The rise of centers and institutes to
support faculty scholarship and programs also have likely contributed to the increased cost of law
school. See JAMES VESCOVI, WHY DOES LAW SCHOOL COST SO MUCH?, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL
REPORT (2006), available at
http://www.law.columbia.edullaw-school/communications/reports/summer)6/lawschoolcost.
39. Rubin, supra note 37, at 148.
40. IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT, ILL. STATE BAR, supra note 8, at 37.
41. John A. Sebert, The Cost and Financing of Legal Education, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 516,
519-20 (2002). More current comparative data on aggregate law school spending is not available
from the ABA.
[Vol. 92:18
PRICING CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
student debt burdens and "increased competition for entering students
(and U.S. News rankings) through increased merit scholarships."42 In the
twelve years after that report, the total amount spent on financial aid at
law schools rose even faster at 258%,43 thus supporting the view that
schools are engaged in an expensive arms race for students and rankings.
Dean Rubin explains the effect of this aggressive merit-based ap-
proach to financial aid: "This can be understood as a cross-subsidy from
the tuition-paying students to the scholarship students, because if all stu-
dents were required to pay full tuition, the tuition-paying students would
need to pay less to support the law school's educational program."44 Pro-
fessor Tamanaha determined that "if you spread that money across the
class, [instead of using it for merit scholarships] you would immediately
reduce tuition by 30 percent."45 In fact, when the University of La Verne
College of Law recently eliminated merit-based scholarships and insti-
tuted a flat-rate tuition system for all students, it was able to lower its
tuition by over 37%.46
The costs of new buildings cannot be overlooked. Seeking to ex-
plain the rapid rise in tuition, the New York Times observed that as other
industries closed offices and downsized plants during the most recent
economic downturn, there has been a "law school construction boom."47
It noted that in the midst of rising concerns about the cost of tuition and
employability of graduates, a number of schools were constructing new
buildings costing more than $100 million.48 Highlighted was New York
Law School's 235,000 square-foot expansion, a massive addition at a
school ranked in the bottom third of all law schools yet charging more in
tuition than Harvard.49 It is not clear how these building costs have af-
42. Id. at 520. The ABA report concluded that "competition by law schools for students
(through increased admissions recruiting and increased merit scholarships) and for reputational
ranking (for example, through glossy publications)" were more significant causes of the increase in
law school expenditures during the 1990s than ABA accreditation standards, which required more
skills training and reduced student/faculty ratios or increased financial aid to address the problem of
student debt. Id at 524.
43. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N. INTERNAL
GRANT AND SCHOLARSHIPS TOTAL DOLLAR AMOUNTS AWARDED 1991-2012 (2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal education and admissions to th
e bar/statistics/intemalgrants scholarshipsawarded.authcheckdam.pdf.
44. Rubin, supra note 37, at 143.
45. Jack Crittenden, How to Cut Tuition, NAT'L JURIST, Mar. 2013, at 22, 23 (alteration in
original) (internal quotation mark omitted).
46. Karen Sloan, La Verne Offers Flat-Rate Law School Tuition, NAT'L LJ. (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://www.nationallawjoumal.com/id=1202648544187/La-Veme-Offers-Flat-Rate-Law-School-
Tuition (announcing that the new tuition would be S 14,900 less than the existing $39,900 list tuition
price).
47. David Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at BUI.
48. Id. (noting Fordham Law School's $250 million, 22-story building, the University of
Baltimore and University of Michigan's buildings costing more than $100 million, and Marquette
University's $85 million project).
49. Id.; see also THOMAS JEFFERSON LAW SCHOOL, A NEW ERA IN LEGAL EDUCATION 2
(2013), available at http://www.tjsl.edu/sites/default/files/files/TJSL-Handout-v7-07271 1-Edit-
opt.pdf (touting the school's $90 million, eight-story, 305,000 square-foot new law facility).
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fected the tuition schools charge, but at some schools it has likely been
substantial."o
Tuition costs also have been driven upwards by an increase in ad-
ministrators and student services. The 2002 ABA report on costs found
that expanded administrative costs rose significantly more than the rate
for total law school expenditures, noting that expenditures on administra-
tive salaries showed the largest increase within the salaries and benefits
category, exceeding the rise in instructional salaries by 50%.5' The report
observed that this rise was consistent with the impression that schools
had greatly expanded support services such as career services, academic
support, admissions staffing, and technology support.5 2
Another tuition driver is the payments that law schools are required
to make to their universities, sometimes significantly more than the
school's proportionate share of university overhead costs. As one writer
found, "law schools toss off so much cash they are sometimes required to
hand over as much as 30 percent of their revenue to universities, to sub-
sidize less profitable fields."5 The University of Baltimore was reported
to have taken about 45% of the money generated by the law school from
tuition, fees, and state subsidies.54 Catholic University's budget relied so
heavily on extra income generated by its law school that the university
recently asked deans in other schools to cut their operational expendi-
tures by 20% because a decline in law school revenue from decreased
enrollment had severely impacted the university's budget and necessitat-
ed cuts in other academic departments.55
A 2009 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study
sought to determine the factors affecting the cost of law school for stu-
dents.56 Law school officials told the GAO that increases in resource-
intensive approaches to education and competition among schools for
higher U.S. News rankings appear to be the primary influences on in-
50. See Joy, supra note 33, at 316 (observing that "a major expense not analyzed is the cost of
new law school buildings"); Paul Campos, Thomas Jefferson School of Law Slashes Jobs, Salaries,
and Budget, LAWYERS, GUNS & MONEY BLOG (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/?s=TJSL&x=10&y-10 (describing Thomas Jefferson
School of Law's financial difficulties and "extremely expensive and very heavily leveraged new law
building").
51. Sebert, supra note 41, at 520 ("Total instructional salaries increased only 31.8 percent,
while total expenditures on administrative salaries showed the largest increase, 47.5 percent.").
52. Id.
53. Segal, supra note 47.
54. Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Dean Hits University Tuition Grab in Widely Distributed
Resignation Letter, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 1, 2011, 10:30 AM),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/law-dean-hits universitytuition grab in widelydistribut
ed resignation let.
55. Clair Finnegan, Law School Enrollment Dropoff Causes Departmental Budget Cuts,
TOWER, Apr. 12, 2013, at 3, available at
http://tower.lib.cua.edu/Default/Skins/CatholicUniversity/Client.asp?skin=CatholicUniversity&AW
=1411758798353&AppName=2 (follow Browse Archives and input date of publication).
56. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 22, at 2.
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creased costs, while public law schools reported that decreases in state
funding also contributed to their rise in tuition. Some officials believed
that increased emphasis on clinical experiences and skills-based courses,
more diverse course offerings, and enhanced student support (e.g., aca-
demic support, career services) were contributing factors.5 ' No effort was
made to verify if or how much increased clinical experiences had driven
up costs or tuition.
School officials also believed that competition among schools for
higher U.S. News rankings were pressuring schools to "offer clinics and
diverse elective courses to compete for students," thus contributing to the
rise in cost.59 Indeed, there may be good reason for schools to enhance
their clinical programs when competing for students. A 2012 Law School
Admission Council (LSAC) survey found that when applicants were
asked what factors were most important in influencing them to apply to
particular law schools they listed "[c]linics/intemships" third, behind
only location and employment of recent graduates, and as important as
bar success.60 When admitted applicants were later asked to identify the
factors that ended up being the most important in their decision to enroll
at a particular school, they listed clinics/internships second, behind only
location.61 Trailing in importance in an admitted student's final decision
about where to enroll were reputation, bar success, employment of recent
graduates, cost, reputation of faculty, and rankings. In a recent survey of
pre-law students, 97% favored a law school model that incorporates clin-
ical experiences for students.6 2 Many schools recognize the importance
of their clinical course offerings by heavily promoting them to prospec-
tive students, and alumni, through brochures, magazines, and other mate-
rials.63
The listing by admitted students of the importance of clinics and ex-
ternships ahead of reputation and ranking, qualities that schools expend
tremendous resources to enhance, raises a question about whether some
of the costs outlined above are being misdirected and could be better
57. Id. at 11.
58. Id. at 24.
59. Id. at 25.
60. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, LAW SCHOOL APPLICANT STUDY 9 (2012).
61. Id at 46.
62. Press Release, Kaplan Test Prep, What Pre-Law Students Want: Kaplan Test Prep Survey
Finds that Tomorrow's Lawyers Favor a Two-Year Law Sch. Model and Want Significant Changes
in Legal Educ. (Feb. 11, 2014), available at http://press.kaptest.com/press-releases/what-pre-law-
students-want-kaplan-test-prep-survey-finds-that-tomorrows-lawyers-favor-a-two-year-law-school-
model-and-want-significant-changes-in-legal-education.
63. See, e.g., GEORGETOWN LAW, EXPERIENTIAL EDUCATION AT GEORGETOWN LAW availa-
ble at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/clinical-
programs/upload/Experiential-Education-Brochure-2014.pdf (last visited September 26, 2014); Clint
Willis & Suzanne Barlyn, Bringing the Law to Life: NYU's Clinical Program Helps Students
Change the World-One Case at a Time, LAW SCHOOL, Autumn 2007, at 21, 21-3 1, available at
http://issuu.com/nyulaw/docs/2007?mode=embed&layout=http%3A%2F%2Fskin.issuu.com%2Fv%
2Flight%2Flayout.xml&showFlipBtn=true (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
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spent on increasing the availability and quality of a school's clinical
course offerings. Thus, even if it were to cost a school more to develop a
quality clinical program, that added cost may ultimately persuade, not
dissuade, prospective students from attending, even if those costs were
passed on through increased tuition (a point addressed below). 64
Some argue that clinical courses, because of their perceived higher
costs compared to lecture courses, should be among the first cut when a
school needs to reduce expenditures.65 However, the above discussion
illustrates that there is a wide range of causes for the high tuition that
students face and many expenditures appear to dwarf the amount of
money a school may be spending to provide students with a clinical edu-
cation experience. Rather than fixating on the notion that tuition is driven
by the cost of clinical education courses, schools must consider their full
range of expenses when looking for ways to reduce costs and tuition.6
Arguing for a broader examination of all law school costs and how
they benefit students is not meant to dismiss the advantage of lower stu-
dent-faculty ratios, the societal value of legal scholarship, the importance
of enhancing a school's reputation, or the need for appropriate buildings
and administrative support staff. But discussions that excessively focus
on cutting clinical courses both miss other more significant contributors
to the high cost of legal education and fail to consider fully the relative
64. After Washington and Lee School of Law adopted a new experiential learning curriculum
in the third year, including a law clinic or externship, its number of applicants increased by 33%,
compared to a decline nationwide of 19%. William D. Henderson, Washington & Lee is Biggest
Legal Education Story of 2013, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2013/01/biggest-legal-education-story-of-
2013.html. Surveys of its incoming students in 2011 and 2012 ranked the new third-year curriculum
as the school's top strength, ahead of ranking/prestige and national reputation. James Molitemo, On
W&L Law's Third Year Curriculum, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Feb. 13, 2013),
http://law.wlu.edu/faculty/facultydocuments/molitemoj/legalwhiteboardfinal.pdf. As one expert on
legal education concluded, "[a] sizeable number of prospective students really do care about practi-
cal skills training and are voting with their feet. W&L has therefore become a big winner in the race
for applicants." Henderson, supra.
65. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, The Unseen Costs of Cutting Law School Faculty, N.Y. TIMES
(July 9, 2013, 3:46 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/the-unseen-costs-of-cutting-law-
school-faculty (arguing that rather than reducing the size of the tenure-track faculty to shrink a
school's budget, "[c]linics can be closed," and suggesting that law clinics were expendable because
they are not "profit centers").
66. Professor Tamanaha rgues that tuition pricing is not driven solely by costs. He quotes a
former college president, stating, "'[p]ricing is a marketing, not a cost accounting decision.' 'Tuition
in the private higher-education industry is a classic example of price leadership-the "top players"
define the sticker price and all others follow suit."' BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS
130 (2012) (quoting Henry Riggs, the former president of Harvey Mudd College). Tamanaha ex-
plains:
Tuition varies in relation to prestige-not costs-because the perceived value of the ed-
ucation affects how much students (and their parents) are willing to pay for it. As long as
a sufficient pool of purchasers of higher education continue to believe that degrees from
elite institutions provide the best opportunities, elite schools can, and will, raise their
prices. Nonelite schools raise tuition as well, keeping a price separation one level below,
to pick up the remaining demand for higher education.
Id; see also infra notes 196-199 and accompanying text.
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importance of various expenditures on a student's preparation for the
practice of law.
II. THE CALLS FOR MORE CLINICAL EDUCATION
The calls for more clinical education as a way to better prepare stu-
dents for the practice of law are not a recent phenomenon. Over 30 years
ago, the ABA's Report and Recommendation of the Task Force on Law-
yer Competency: The Role of Law Schools (the Crampton Report) pro-
posed that law school curricula pay more attention to providing profes-
sional experiences.67 The ABA's 1983 Task Force on Professional Com-
petence shared this perspective and recommended that the ABA make
enhanced law school training in lawyering skills a top priority.6' A dec-
ade later, the 1992 ABA Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and
the Profession (the MacCrate Report) focused on the value to law stu-
dents from practice-oriented instruction in courses such as law clinics,
externships, and simulations.69 The ABA's recent Task Force on the Fu-
ture of Legal Education's report noted that much of what it "heard from
recent graduates reflects a conviction that they received insufficient de-
velopment of core competencies that make one an effective lawyer, par-
ticularly those relating to representation and service to clients."7 0 Re-
sponding to this deficiency, the task force concluded that legal education
needed to shift still further from doctrinal instruction toward more fo-
cused preparation for delivering legal services to clients.71 The ABA's
Young Lawyers Division passed a unanimous resolution in 2013 calling
on the ABA and law schools to require at least one academic grading
period of practical legal skills clinical experiences or classes as a gradua-
tion requirement, noting that "a J.D. degree alone does not make a law-
yer."72
67. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW
SCHOOLS 17 (1979).
68. AM. BAR Ass'N, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON
PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE 11-12(1983).
69. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 260-61, 328 (1992)
[hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT].
70. TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 26 (2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/taskforceonthefuturelegaleducation.
html.
71. Id. at 3. The Task Force took the position that:
The educational programs of a law school should be designed so that graduates will
have (a) some competencies in delivering (b) some legal services. A graduate's having
some set of competencies in the delivery of law and related services, and not just some
body of knowledge, is an essential outcome for any program of legal education.
Id. at 26.
72. YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, AM. BAR ASS'N, RESOLUTION I YL (2013) (on file with
author); see also E-mail from Daniel Thies, Liaison to the Council of the ABA Section of Legal
Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, ABA Young Lawyers Division, to author (Dec. 12, 2013, 8:53
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Besides the ABA, the 2007 Carnegie Foundation report on legal ed-
ucation stressed the need for law students to engage in an "apprentice-
ship of practice" while in law school, contrasting legal education's min-
imal training with that provided in other professions such as medicine.73
The report highlighted the "crucial role of practice experience in the de-
velopment of expertise," observing that "[d]ecades of pedagogical exper-
imentation in clinical-legal teaching, the example of other professional
schools, and contemporary learning theory all point toward the value of
clinical education as a site for developing not only intellectual under-
standing and complex skills of practice but also the dispositions crucial
for legal professionalism."74 That same year, the Best Practices for Legal
Education report argued that it was critical for students to have super-
vised practice experiences while in law school: "In the United States, it is
only in the in-house clinics and some externships where students' deci-
sions and actions can have real consequences and where students' values
and practical wisdom can be tested and shaped before they begin law
practice.""
State bars, too, are pressing for more practice-based training in law
school, especially in this era when students are finding it so difficult to
market their skills to employers. An Ohio State Bar Association task
force on legal education reform called on the Ohio Supreme Court to
adopt a rule requiring that a student, prior to taking the bar exam, com-
plete a law clinic or externship in law school or a practice experience
through a bar association program that involves law school faculty and
the practicing bar.76 The court has announced that a task force will ex-
AM) (on file with author) (explaining that the Resolution was adopted unanimously by the delegates
at the Division's 2013 Annual Meeting).
73. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 99 (2007). A much earlier Carnegie Foundation report on legal education make
a strikingly similar observation: "The failure of the modem American law school to make any ade-
quate provision in its curriculum for practical training constitutes a remarkable educational anoma-
ly." ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA 281 (1921). The 1921
Carnegie report observed that there was no "foreign country in which education for the practice of
law is so largely theoretical as it is in America" and argued that putting theoretically educated stu-
dents into contact with actual law practice was so important that it should be insisted upon as a law
school requirement. Id. at 281, 287. Although the ABA had requested the 1921 Carnegie study, the
ABA ignored its recommendations and issued its own report endorsing the structure of legal educa-
tion as it still exists today. See AM. BAR ASS'N, Report of the Special Committee to the Section of
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association, in REPORT OF THE
FORTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING 679, 679-80 (1921) (reprinting the report of the Special Com-
mittee to the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association
on conditions that will tend to "strengthen[] the character and . . . improv[e] the efficiency of those
admitted to the practice of law").
74. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 73, at 119-20.
75. ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 155 (2007).
76. TASK FORCE ON LEGAL EDUC. REFORM, OHIO STATE BAR ASS'N, REPORT 4 (2009).
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plore how a rule requiring all bar applicants to have completed a law
clinic or externship experience might be implemented by law schools.n
In announcing a new early bar exam program in New York, the
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals noted the growing reali-
zation that law students have "insufficient opportunities to receive neces-
sary training in practical legal skills" and the program's overarching goal
to provide students with "valuable legal skills that will prepare them for
the practice of law."78 An earlier New York State Bar Association report
noted that fundamental changes in the practice of law required new ap-
proaches to the education of lawyers, including law school curricular
initiatives designed to enhance the development of practice ready gradu-
ates.79 The Bar Association followed up its report with a proposed reso-
lution, passed by the ABA House of Delegates, calling on "legal educa-
tion providers to implement curricular programs intended to develop
practice ready lawyers including, but not limited to[,] enhanced capstone
and clinical courses that include client meetings and court appearanc-
es.',so
A Massachusetts Bar Association report in 2012 on the problem of
underemployment among recent law graduates concluded that students
needed more marketable real-world experience in order to be of greater
value in today's more competitive market for lawyers.8 ' The report
called on schools to increase the focus and emphasis they place on prac-
tical training options for third-year students and specifically encouraged
schools to expand law clinics and similar offerings "to ensure that a slot
exists for every student who wishes one."82
A 2013 Illinois State Bar Association report focused on law school
debt and concluded that "the training that law students receive in law
77. Letter from Maureen O'Connor, Chief Justice, Sup. Ct. of Ohio, to Patrick F. Fischer,
Ohio State Bar Ass'n (Sept. 26, 2012) (on file with author).
78. LIPPMAN, supra note 17, at 3-4. In a 2008 survey, federal and state judges were asked
what change would most benefit law schools. See Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judg-
es Think ofthe Quality ofLegal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REv. 317, 338 (2011). By an over three
to one margin, judges chose "more coursework oriented to instilling practice-oriented skills" over
the second most popular response (expansion of the core curriculum). Id at 335-36, 338 (reporting
that 59% of judges identified more practice-oriented skills coursework as the most beneficial re-
form).
79. TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N,
REPORT 6 (2011). A 2013 report by a New York City Bar Task Force, which included deans from
seven New York law schools, similarly stated: "Tomorrow's lawyers need more practical experi-
ence, skill development, and problem-solving practice, in addition to analytical skills honed by more
traditional methods of instruction." TASK FORCE ON NEW LAWYERS IN A CHANGING PROFESSION,
supra note 3, at 8.
80. H.D., N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, RES. 10B, at 1 (2011). The resolution called on the ABA's
constituent bodies to keep these necessary requirements for the success of future lawyers in mind as
they carry out their ABA responsibilities. Id.
81. TASK FORCE ON LAW, THE ECONOMY AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT, MASS. BAR ASS'N,
REPORT 5 (2012).
82. Id. at 5-7.
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school today is increasingly not worth its high cost."83 It recommended
that law schools prioritize, and make available to every student, "simula-
tions courses, live-client clinics, and other courses that give students the
opportunity to learn and apply legal principles in the context of real life
problems."8 4
The State Bar of California's recommendation that all students
seeking admission to the bar must either have taken fifteen units of law
school course work in practice-based experiential courses or participated
in a bar-approved externship, clerkship, or apprenticeship is before the
California Supreme Court for adoption.85 In calling for a shift of priori-
ties toward more clinically-based education, the state bar explained that
it was motivated to act now because the economic climate and demands
of clients for trained lawyers meant that "fewer and fewer opportunities
are available for new lawyers to gain structured competency training
early in their careers."86 It observed that law graduates were now enter-
ing the profession as solo practitioners "without the solid foundation
necessary to represent clients in a competent manner and with nowhere
to turn to build that foundation. From the standpoint of regulatory policy,
this situation presents serious issues of public protection that cannot be
ignored."87
Following up on these proposals, in 2013 the Clinical Legal Educa-
tion Association (CLEA) petitioned the Council of the ABA Section of
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar to adopt an accreditation
standard requiring every J.D. student to complete the equivalent of at
least fifteen semester credit hours after the first year of law school in
83. IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT, ILL. STATE BAR, supra note 8, at 3.
84. Id. at 5.
85. See Board of Trustees Approves Competency Skills Training Requirements, CAL. B.J.
(Dec. 2014), available at http://www.calbarjoumal.com/December2014/TopHeadlines/TH5.aspx. If
adopted by the California Supreme Court, the requirement for 15 units of practice-based coursework
would go into effect in 2017. Don J. DeBenedictis, State Bar Panel Adopts Plan to Require Law
Students Have Skills Training Before Admission, DAILY J. (June 12, 2013) (on file with author).
86. TASK FORCE ON ADMISSIONS, PHASE I REPORT, supra note 16, at 1. Echoing this lack of
preparation from their legal education, a 2011 survey of over 33,000 law students found that forty
percent "felt that their legal education had so far contributed only some or very little to their acquisi-
tion ofjob- or work-related knowledge and skills." LAW SCH. SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT,
NAVIGATING LAW SCHOOL: PATHS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 9 (2011)
87. TASK FORCE ON ADMISSIONS, PHASE I REPORT, supra note 16, at 1. As part of its effort to
increase the competency training of bar applicants, California also has proposed that applicants must
devote 50 hours to pro bono or modest means clients. Id. at 13-17 (noting that the pro bono require-
ment would help prospective lawyers increase core competencies). New York has already adopted a
50-hour pro bono requirement for applicants to the bar in part because it "helps prospective attorneys
build valuable skills." ADVISORY COMM. ON N.Y. STATE PRO BONO BAR ADMISSION
REQUIREMENTS, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND THE PRESIDING
JUSTICES OF THE FOUR APPELLATE DIVISION DEPARTMENTS 1 (2012) (describing the goal of helping
prospective attorneys build valuable skills as just as important as the goal of addressing the crisis in
access to justice); see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 520.16 (2013); see also N.J. COURTS,
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE PROPOSED PREADMISSION PRO BONO REQUIREMENT 6
(explaining that one of the primary goals of a proposed preadmission pro bono requirement for
applicants to the New Jersey bar is to "give students real-world work experience").
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practice-based, experiential courses, with at least one course in a law
clinic or externship.88 The petition pointed out that the accreditation
standard at the time only required schools to provide one credit of pro-
fessional skills training and only "substantial opportunities" for "live-
client or other real-life practice experiences."8 9 CLEA compared these
requirements with the pre-licensing education requirements of other pro-
fessions, which require at least one-quarter, and in some cases over one-
half, of a student's education to be in clinical courses.90 Appendix A
summarizes the practice-based and clinical education requirements for
other professional schools and contrasts those with the minimal require-
ment for law students.91
The lack of practice-based training in law school can have signifi-
cant consequences for graduates. As noted in the Massachusetts Bar As-
sociation report, some commentators argue that "major post-graduate
employers such as law firms (and their paying clients) are now less will-
ing to pay for new lawyers who do not possess any skills related to the
actual day-to-day practice of law or any awareness of the legal needs of
clients."92 Similarly, the Illinois Bar reported that it had received testi-
mony that the tight job market faced by recent law grads "may have-at
least in part-resulted from the inadequate training of law students for
the jobs that are available."9 3 It explained that because recent law gradu-
ates are not adequately prepared for practice, law firm hiring partners
have become less willing to hire new lawyers and instead prefer hiring
those with several years of experience.94 It concluded, "[t]he inadequate
'practice ready' skills of new graduates has apparently contributed to the
reality that only 55% of the law school class of 2011 had full time, per-
88. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. AsS'N, supra note 18, at 1-4. The author helped draft the petition
and prepared the chart on the education requirements of other professions that was attached to the
petition.
89. Id. (referring to then-Standard 302(a)(4)); see also Am. Bar Ass'n, Consultant's Memo # 3
(Mar. 2010) (advising that one credit of skills training would be sufficient to satisfy the "substantial
instruction" in professional skills requirement in prior Standard 302(a)(4)). In August 2014, the
ABA adopted a new 6-credit experiential course requirement. See supra note 1. The ABA has not
explained what constitutes "substantial opportunities" for live-client or other real life practice expe-
riences in Standard 303(b)(1), but there are ABA-accredited schools with capacity in their law clinic
and externship courses for less than one-third of their graduating J.D. students. See infra note 168
(explaining method for calculating a law school's capacity to provide its J.D. students with a law
clinic or externship experience).
90. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. ASS'N, supra note 18, at 3-4.
91. See infra app. A. In addition to the mandatory practice-based training in medical, veteri-
nary, pharmacy, dentistry, social work, architecture, and nursing schools set out in the appendix,
"[s]ome amount of clinical training or internship is also a regular part of the education of teachers
and members of the clergy. Engineering students must demonstrate their abilities to design function-
ing projects." SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 73, at 88.
92. TASK FORCE ON LAW, THE ECONOMY AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT, supra note 81, at 5; see
also TASK FORCE ON ADMISSIONS, PHASE I REPORT, supra note 16, at 5 ("Big law firms and gov-
ernment agencies had in the past done trainings to provide that sophisticated knowledge [necessary
for successful transition into practice]. Now, clients no longer want to pay for that training and are
refusing to do so.").
93. IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT, ILL. STATE BAR, supra note 8, at 3.
94. Id.
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manent jobs that require a JD nine months after graduation."95 The State
Bar of California explained that its proposal to require greater practice-
based coursework was "designed to improve the employability of law
school graduates," noting that critics of its proposal "fail to consider the
role that inadequate practice-readiness among new lawyers has had in
contributing to the difficult job market that these lawyers face."9 6
Beyond enhancing job prospects, recent law graduates understand
the importance of practice-based training in law school to their later suc-
cess as attorneys. The After the JD study surveyed lawyers two to three
years into their new careers.97 It asked them to rate the importance of
certain experiences and courses during law school in helping them suc-
cessfully transition to practice. Clinical courses were rated the third most
helpful experience, trailing only summer and school year legal employ-
ment; legal writing and internships followed law clinics.98 Behind those
practice-based experiences were the traditional doctrinal courses that
dominate most of a law student's legal education.99 Law graduates in
other surveys have similarly endorsed the importance of, and need for,
enhanced clinical training in law school.0 0
95. Id.
96. TASK FORCE ON ADMISSIONS, PHASE I REPORT, supra note 16, at 21.
97. NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH AND EDUCATION & AM. BAR FOUND.,
AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 13 (2004).
98. Id. at 81.
99. See Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 57, 88
(2009) (observing that new lawyers in the survey "were significantly more likely to say that clinical
training was 'extremely helpful' for making the transition to practice than they were to make the
same assessment of legal writing training, upper-year lecture courses, course concentrations, pro
bono service, the first year curriculum and legal ethics training").
100. Two studies by the National Association of Legal Career Professionals (NALP) asked
lawyers to rate the usefulness of law school experiential learning opportunities in preparing for the
practice of law. Lawyers in nonprofit and government legal positions rated law clinics extremely
high, with clinics rated 3.8 using a scale of I ("not useful at all") to 4 ("very useful") and extern-
ships/field placements 3.6, both ahead of skills courses (3.3) and pro bono work (3.2). NALP &
NALP FOUND., 2011 SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES AND
BENEFITS: RESPONSES FROM GOVERNMENT AND NONPROFIT LAWYERS 26, 27 graph 12 (2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/201 I ExpLearningStudy.pdf. Law firm associates rated law clinics and
externships not quite as high (3.4 out of 4), but ahead of skills course (3.1) and pro bono work (2.2).
NALP & NALP FOUND., 2010 SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES
AND BENEFITS 27 graph 12 (2011), available at
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/2010ExperientialLeamingStudy.pdf
Law graduates, applicants to law school, and law school admissions officers all want to
see the focus of legal education changed. In a survey, 87% of 2013 law graduates agreed that the
"legal education system needs 'to undergo significant changes to better prepare future attorneys for
the changing employment landscape and legal profession'; 97% favored a "law school model that
incorporates clinical experience" in the third year. Press Release, Kaplan Test Prep, Kaplan Bar
Review Survey: 63% of Law School Graduates from the Class of 2013 Believe that Law School
Education Can Be Condensed to Two Years (Sept. 10, 2013), available at
http://press.kaptest.com/press-releases/kaplan-bar-review-survey-63-of-law-school-graduates-from-
the-class-of-2013-believe-that-law-school-education-can-be-condensed-to-two-years. In a survey
asking transactional lawyers their degree of support for efforts to mandate minimum
skills/competencies training for law students, positive support outweighed negative by four to one.
ERIC L. TALLEY, THE BERKELEY CENT. FOR LAW, BUS. AND THE ECON., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY,
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III. EXAMINING THE COSTS OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
Although the bar, and especially new lawyers, appreciate the value
of more practice-based education,101 some are concerned about the costs
of providing clinical education to more students, especially in a time of
escalating student debt and financial crisis at many law schools.
In issuing its recommendation that every student be required to
complete a law clinic or externship, two members of the Ohio task force
worried that such a mandate would likely increase tuition for students.'02
The California State Bar Task Force similarly expressed initial concern
over the potential cost burden of its recommendation but believed that
schools could shift their priorities toward incorporating more clinically-
based, experiential education into the curriculum in a way that need not
drive tuition up. o3 A special committee of the ABA Section on Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar recently opined that "[a]lthough
there are still a few dissenters regarding the value of experiential educa-
tion in law school, the primary obstacle to requiring a clinical experience
for every student is cost."'0 Even the Carnegie and Best Practices re-
ports, though calling for more clinical legal education, acknowledged the
THE BERKELEY TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE PROJECT: COMPETENCIES / SKILLS SURVEY; 2014, at 14
(2014), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edulfiles/bclbe/CalBarAssnDeckFinal.pdf As
noted above, delegates to the ABA Young Lawyers Division's 2013 Annual Assembly unanimously
supported a resolution calling on the ABA and law schools to require at least one academic grading
period of clinical experiences or classes. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
Seventy-nine percent of students who had taken a Law School Admissions Test prepara-
tion course similarly agreed on the need for significant changes to better prepare students for prac-
tice, as did 78% of law school admissions officers. Press Release, Kaplan Test Prep, Kaplan Test
Prep Survey: Today's Pre-Law Students Want Changes in Legal Education, Are Looking for Non-
traditional Employment Opportunities, Favor Mandatory Pro Bono Work, and Value Racial Diversi-
ty (July 29, 2013), available at http://press.kaptest.com/press-releases/kaplan-test-prep-survey-
todays-pre-law-students-want-changes-in-legal-education-are-looking-for-nontraditional-
employment-opportunities-favor-mandatory-pro-bono-work-and-value-racial-diver; Press Release,
Kaplan Test Prep, Kaplan Test Prep Survey: Law Schools Cut Their Incoming Classes and Increase
"Practice Ready" Curricula (Oct. 1, 2013), available at http://press.kaptest.com/press-
releases/kaplan-test-prep-survey-law-schools-cut-their-incoming-classes-and-increase-practice-
ready-curricula.
101. IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT, ILL. STATE BAR, supra note 8, at 37 ("Many [new] law-
yers testified at the hearings that law school did not provide them adequate tools to succeed, and that
they needed more instruction in the skills that are required in practice."); TASK FORCE ON THE
FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 70, at 26 (reporting on statements from recent
law graduates that they received insufficient development of competencies relating to representation
and service to clients); LEXISNEXIS, STATE OF THE LEGAL INDUSTRY SURVEY: COMPLETE SURVEY
FINDINGS 7 (2009), available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/document/state of thelegal industrysurveyfindings.pdf (reporting
that 90% of corporate counsel and private practice attorneys say that law school fails to teach the
practical skills needed to practice law in today's economy).
102. OHIO STATE BAR Ass'N, REPORT, supra note 76, at 5-6.
103. TASK FORCE ON ADMISSIONS, PHASE I REPORT, supra note 16, at 21.
104. COMM. ON THE PROF'L EDUC. CONTINUUM, AM. BAR ASS'N, TWENTY YEARS AFTER THE
MACCRATE REPORT: A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LEGAL EDUCATION CONTINUUM
AND THE CHALLENGES FACING THE ACADEMY, BAR, AND JUDICIARY 9 (2013).
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potential costs of implementation, at least when compared to large lec-
ture classes.o"
Efforts to calculate the true cost of clinical legal education, howev-
er, have proved challenging, and until this study there has been no at-
tempt to determine if those costs may have resulted in higher tuition for
students. One difficulty in determining actual costs is that salaries for
clinical professors vary between schools, and at many schools clinical
faculty are paid significantly less than non-clinical faculty. In addition,
student/teacher atios for clinical courses, as well as the number of aca-
demic credits awarded, differ between and even within schools, as does
the practice of clinical faculty also teaching larger enrollment non-
clinical courses or assuming administrative responsibilities.'0 6
ABA prohibitions on access to school-by-school, or even aggregate,
information on instructional costs frustrate efforts to determine the fac-
tors driving law school tuition and the possible influence of clinical
courses.0 7 Even in the limited, and now dated, instances where reliable
data have been available, those reports do not show that widespread clin-
ical education is financially infeasible but simply state the obvious-that
lower enrollment law clinics have higher per academic credit instruction-
al costs than large enrollment classes.
An extensive 1980 study of the cost aspects of clinical programs ex-
amined ABA annual questionnaire responses from eighty-three repre-
sentative schools to calculate median salaries for full-time faculty, in-
cluding clinical teachers.0 8 Based on staffing and teaching loads at the
time, the authors calculated that the average cost per student credit hour
for a typical fifteen-student seminar was, not surprisingly, triple that of a
fifty-six-student classroom course (the national average), and that a law-
school supervised clinical course was about seven times that of a tradi-
105. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 75, at 189; MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 69, at 254 n.36.
106. See generally Deborah J. Merritt, Core Faculty, LAW SCHOOL CAFE (Mar. 24, 2013, 8:58
PM), http://www.lawschoolcafe.org/thread/core-faculty (noting lower pay for clinical faculty);
DAVID A. SANTACROCE & ROBERT R. KUEHN, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF APPLIED LEGAL
EDUCATION: THE 2010-11 SURVEY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION 16-18 (2011) (reporting on
differences in student teacher ratios and academic credits in clinical courses).
107. AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS 2013-2014, r. 25, 27(b) (2013); see also E-mail from Barry Currier, Managing Director,
ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, to author (Oct. 29, 2013, 3:07 PM) (on
file with author) (denying access to school-specific information on instructional costs, even with a
pledge of confidentiality).
108. Peter deL Swords & Frank K. Walwer, Cost Aspects of Clinical Education, in CLINICAL
LEGAL EDUCATION: REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLs-AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 133, 135-36 (1980).
At the time, the ABA's annual questionnaire asked each school to report the median salary paid to
full-time teachers who devote all their instructional time to clinical teaching; another question asked
for salary data for all teachers. Id. at 135. After a 1995 settlement of an antitrust lawsuit brought by
the U.S. Department of Justice, the ABA stopped asking for information on faculty salaries. See
generally David Zaring, A Conspiracy of Paper-Pushers, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 28, 2006),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/03/a conspiracy of.html#comments.
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tional, large enrollment course.09 Field-placement courses, enrolling
twenty-five students per term for three academic credits, were found to
be cheaper per student credit than the average fifty-six-student course.1o
The authors assumed that a clinic faculty member would teach be-
tween fourteen to twenty-four students per year, compared to 224 for a
"[t]raditional" classroom teacher."' Although this may have reflected the
teaching responsibilities of clinical teachers at the time, a recent survey
of clinical faculty found that most teach doctrinal and other applied skills
courses (e.g., trial practice) in addition to their clinical courses, usually
without relief from their clinical teaching obligations.112 The 1980 cost
estimate for clinical courses, therefore, overstates the differences found
today between the teaching loads of clinical and non-clinical law faculty
at many schools. Yet in spite of the instructional cost differences found
at that time between clinical and other courses, the authors demonstrated
that the curriculum could be restructured to give every student a faculty-
supervised clinical experience without changing the size of the faculty,
though "significant changes would of course need to be made in what
law schools expected of a good number of their teachers.""3
Dean John Kramer, also using ABA annual questionnaire data,
compared the major items in law school budgets over the ten-year period
from 1978 to 1988. He found that, even though this was a period of sig-
nificant clinical program expansion, clinical education costs in
1987-1988 were a small proportion of a school's overall expenditures,
constituting only 3.1% of the total operating budget and an even smaller
percentage if capital outlays and required payments to university budgets
were included.114 Clinical education's percentage of overall law school
expenditures actually decreased during that period by almost one-
third."' While clinical education expenditures, like all other budget cate-
gories, did increase over that ten-year period, it was only 2.8% of the
total increase in law school expenditures and less than the overall per-
centage increase in tuition revenue.16 Kramer concluded, "Although
clinics are undeniably more expensive to run than Socratic or lecture
109. Swords & Walwer, supra note 108, at 177 & n.69.
110. Id. at 153.
111. Id. at 146.
112. SANTACROCE & KUEHN, supra note 106, at 29. "Approximately 79% of [clinical faculty]
are permitted to teach doctrinal courses," while "[n]early 86% . . . are permitted to teach non-
doctrinal 'skills' courses." Id. However, "over 70% [of those clinical faculty who teach both doctri-
nal and skills courses] are not relieved of their clinical teaching obligations" when teaching these
non-clinical courses. Id.
113. Swords & Walwer, supra note 108, at 184-85.
114. John R. Kramer, Who Will Pay the Piper or Leave the Check on the Table for the Other
Guy, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 655, 661 tbl.D, 663 (1989).
115. Clinical education's percentage of law school budgets dropped during the ten-year period
from 4.5% to 3.1%. Id. at 661 tbl.D.
116. Id. at 658 tbl.B, 666-67.
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classrooms because of the personpower required, our commitment to
them may be somewhat overstated."'17
The ABA's MacCrate Report in 1992 strongly advocated for greater
skills training in law schools and extolled the virtues of law clinics. It
estimated in a footnote that providing a live-client, in-house clinic expe-
rience to all students (rather than to the then one-third of students) would
represent an increase approaching 10-15% of a school's overall law
school budget in 1987-1988."'
Four recent studies have focused on the comparative costs of clini-
cal education to a school's other instructional expenditures. David Chav-
kin at American University's Washington College of Law examined the
proportionate tuition generated in the courses taught by clinical faculty at
his school and determined that it came very close to meeting the actual
instructional costs of law clinics to the school.'l9 He included in his
analysis an assumption that the clinical faculty member, in addition to
teaching in a law clinic with an 8:1 student/teacher atio, would teach
one other non-clinical course per year, reflecting today's clinical faculty
teaching practices at most schools.2 0
Chavkin concluded that although clinical education was not a "fi-
nancial cash cow" like large classes, it is "far more financially feasible
than some make it out to be." 2 1 He argued that it was significant that his
private school could afford expanded clinical education opportunities:
"Since our tuition fees are comparable to other institutions that provide
far fewer clinic experiences, the issue in large part is one of will and not
of impossibility." 22
Professors Nancy Maurer and Liz Ryan Cole posed the question:
"How Much Do Field Placement Courses Cost?" 2 3 Using assumptions
about salaries and student/faculty ratios in various types of law school
courses, they determined that the typical cost per credit hour of a field
placement course, although higher than large and mid-sized classes of
fifty students or more, was lower than the cost of a twenty-student class
and significantly less than a typical twelve-student seminar.12 4 They con-
cluded that when examined simply from a cost perspective, unless a
school is going to argue that it is too expensive to offer a three-credit
117. Id. at 666. At some point after 1988, the ABA's Annual Questionnaire stopped including a
question about clinical education expenditures.
118. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 69, at 254 n.36.
119. David F. Chavkin, Experiential Learning: A Critical Element ofLegal Education in China
(and Elsewhere), 22 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 3, 13-14 (2009).
120. Id at 14. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
121. Chavkin, supra note 119, at 14.
122. Id. at 13-14.
123. Nancy M. Maurer & Liz Ryan Cole, Design, Teach and Manage: Ensuring Educational
Integrity in Field Placement Courses, 19 CLINICAL L. REv. 115, 155 (2012).
124. Id. at 157-58.
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class for 20 students or a seminar for twelve, "there is no fact-based rea-
son to suggest that a field placement course with a manageable facul-
ty/student ratio and a budget for travel and other support is too expen-
sive."l25
An article examining a "legal studio" approach to teaching core
lawyering skills compared a range of instructional costs for law clinics,
seminars, and lecture courses.126 Based on estimates of instructor sala-
ries, number of students in a course, and credit hours per course, it de-
ternined that the cost of instruction for a typical law clinic course is
slightly less per credit per student than for a seminar with fifteen stu-
dents. 127
Most recently, Dean Martin Katz proposed a model to compare the
costs of experiential education to traditional classroom courses.12 8 As-
suming that the law clinic is taught by a tenured member of the faculty
and paid the same as a non-clinical "podium" faculty member and that
the clinic instructor only teaches two courses per year, compared to three
and one-half courses per year for a non-clinical faculty member, his
"basic model" estimates that the faculty cost per student credit for a law
clinic is about 9% higher than the cost for a seminar.12 9 Extemships,
which the model assumes are taught by lower paid non-tenure-line facul-
ty, are one-third the cost of seminars and almost one-half as expensive as
twenty-student classroom courses. In estimating costs per credit, the
model does not account for any offsetting of law clinic expenses through
attorney's fees, grants, donations, or other income.
Like the 1980 study of relative teaching costs, Dean Katz's basic
model uses assumptions that do not reflect the majority of today's law
clinics. A 2014 survey of over 500 clinical faculty revealed that only
27% of full-time law clinic faculty are either tenured or on tenure track,
125. Id. at 158.
126. Cody Thornton, Note, Shared Visions of Design and Law in Professional Education, 6
NE. U. L.J. 21, 70, 79-80 (2013) (basing cost of instruction data on conversations with administra-
tion officials at Northeastern University School of Law and assuming that the salaries for clinic
course instructors were the same as the salaries for seminar and lecture course instructors).
127. Id. at 80. The instructional costs for a law clinic and seminar of median class size were
both about 300% of the cost of a 50-student lecture course. Id.
128. Martin J. Katz, Understanding the Costs of Experiential Legal Education, I J.
EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING (forthcoming 2014).
129. Id at 117-32. The basic model also assumes that a law clinic will spend $45,000 per year
on outside attorneys for summer coverage (even with the model's charge of $74,000 for in-house
staff attorneys or fellows) and $95,205 per year on litigation expenses (discovery costs and expert
fees). Id. at 116-17. Because most law clinics do not incur such large additional costs, these added
expenses have not been included in determining the relative faculty labor costs of clinics. See
SANTACROCE & KUEHN, supra note 106, at 7-8 (reporting that in the 2010-11 CSALE survey only
two of the ten most prevalent law clinics were of a type that might incur significant litigation ex-
penses).
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with most in lower-paid contract or at will positions. 130 The survey also
determined that two-thirds of clinical faculty teach non-clinical courses,
including traditional podium courses, averaging over one additional
course per year.' 3 When the basic model is adjusted to include these
more realistic assumptions, the faculty labor cost for a law clinic is re-
duced by over 57% and is half the cost of a seminar and less than the cost
of a traditional twenty-student class.132 This reanalysis suggests that the
wide variety of clinical faculty salaries, teaching loads, and student-
teacher ratios, found not just across but even within law schools, will
confound any cost model that lumps all of a school's law clinics together
or assumes a common labor cost even within categories of experiential
courses.
Professor Peter Joy reviewed the causes behind the rising law
school costs and the role of clinical education in educating law stu-
dents.133 He argued that a legal education must include a combination of
doctrinal and experiential courses and that schools, particularly in deal-
ing with current budgetary challenges, need to weigh the relative costs
and merits of clinical learning against other law school operations.13 4 He
cautioned against overemphasis on the cost of law clinics and efforts to
simply weigh the costs of clinics against the costs of simulation and ex-
ternship courses without also considering the goals of legal education
and needs of students.'35 Noting the rapid increases in law school ex-
penses outside the clinical program, he concluded that "[u]ntil there is a
better understanding of how to measure the benefits of the various as-
pects of legal education, simply considering the cost of in-house clinical
education or other components of legal education may not do service to
law students, their future clients, or employers." 36
130. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION, 2013-14 CSALE SURVEY OF
APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION: PHASE Ill FACULTY SUB-SURVEY pt. B: Individual Characteristics
Ques. 3 (forthcoming 2014) (survey responses on file with author).
131. Id at Ques. 16-17 (survey responses on file with author). Over 78% of those clinical
faculty teach non-clinical courses without any relief from their law clinic or externship teaching
responsibilities; 19% are relieved in part from their clinical obligations while teaching the non-
clinical course; and only 3% are full relieved from those obligations. Id.
132. Using the model's non-tenure-line faculty labor costs and conservatively assuming that
the faculty member would only teach an additional 0.5 non-clinical courses per year with 20 students
at 3 credits, reduces the law clinic faculty member's labor costs from $2,078 to $881 per student
credit, below even the $950 cost of a "small podium" 20 student course. Assuming one additional
non-clinical small podium course per year reduces the cost to $712 per student credit, 66% less than
the basic model's projected law clinic faculty labor cost.
133. See Joy, supra note 33, at 315, 320.
134. Id. at 327-28.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 330. Professor Joy also argued for a cost-benefit analysis of all law school costs in
an earlier article:
Upon closer examination, the cost criticism of real-client clinical education is usually
myopic. The comparative high costs of seminar classes, supervised research, upper class
writing requirements, or maintaining high volume count law school libraries in the com-
puter age are often left out of the cost critique. Moreover, to evaluate effectively any of
these programs, one has to look at the benefits of each program in light of their costs.
[Vol. 92:124
PRICING CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
Professor Mark Tushnet made a similar observation about the need
to consider the value clinical education provides:
When faculties feel pressure to reduce budgets or to restrain rates of
increase, they look first to, and often not beyond, the clinical curricu-
lum. The reason given is clinical education's unusually high cost. In
making budgetary decisions, however, the relevant figure is not cost
but the cost-benefit ratio. Yet, observing that clinical education is ex-
pensive says nothing about the cost-benefit ratio.137
IV. THE EFFECT OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION COURSES ON TUITION
Any debate over the costs of clinical legal education needs to focus
on the knowledge, skills, and values students should obtain while in law
school to prepare them for the effective, ethical practice of law and on
how schools can best provide instruction in those areas. Because of the
many variables contributing to the high cost of legal education and the
need to contain tuition, schools should be asking which expenditures
most benefit students and are most worthy of preserving or enhancing
and which benefit others and perhaps should not be so heavily subsidized
by student tuition. Simply saying that clinical education costs more than
other modes of instruction and should not be increased, or should be
among the first items cut to reduce expenses, shortchanges students by
failing to consider the costs and benefits to students from how their tui-
tion dollars are spent.
Another issue is resource allocation. As noted, an early study con-
cluded that schools could restructure their existing curricula to give every
student a faculty-supervised law clinic experience without changing the
size of the faculty but merely through reassignments of teaching respon-
sibilities.13 8 Given the wide array of expenditures and course offerings
that a school could reduce or estructure, a reallocation of resources to-
ward more focus on training students for practice need not mean in-
creased costs for students. Although many recent reports present two
major concerns-containing tuition and increasing the practice readiness
of students-as being in tension,'3 9 they need not be if a school makes a
choice to allocate resources more toward practice readiness and away
from other expenditures that do not as directly contribute to a student's
preparation for practice.
An array of schools, in fact, already have made the choice to pro-
vide clinical experiences to all of its J.D. students and have done so
without noticeable impacts on tuition. At the City University of New
Peter A. Joy, The MacCrate Report: Moving Toward Integrated Learning Experiences, I CLINICAL
L. REv. 401, 404 (1994).
137. Mark V. Tushnet, Scenes from the Metropolitan Underground: A Critical Perspective on
the Status of Clinical Education, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 272, 273 (1984) (footnote omitted).
138. Swords & Walwer, supra note 108, at 184-85.
139. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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York School of Law (CUNY), all students must take a twelve- to six-
teen-credit faculty-supervised law clinic or field placement prior to grad-
uation.14 0 CUNY provides over 140 positions annually in supervised law
clinic courses for entering J.D. classes of around 110 students and charg-
es $14,472 in tuition (plus any annual fees), significantly less than the
average public law school resident tuition of approximately $24,000.141
When asked by the authors of the Carnegie Report on legal education
how the school could afford such resource-intensive instruction, CUNY
administrators answered, "We cannot afford not to do it."' 4 2
Students at the University of the District of Columbia David A.
Clarke School of Law (UDC-DSCL) similarly must enroll in a seven-
credit law clinic in their second year and a second seven-credit clinic in
their third year.14 3 UDC-DSCL provides almost 200 faculty-supervised
law clinic positions for its entering classes of about sixty full-time and
fifty part-time students.'" Yet, UDC-DSCL charges only $11,265 in
tuition, the second lowest in the country outside Puerto Rico. 145
One of the more publicized efforts to revamp curriculum to require
more experiential education was by Washington and Lee University
School of Law (W&L) in 2008, a school with a 2013 entering class of
around 110 students and tuition of $44,707.146 The school's new third-
year curriculum now requires twenty academic credits in simulated or
real-practice experiences that include at least one law clinic or extern-
140. Curriculum & Course Descriptions, CUNY SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/courses/curriculum.html (last visited July 23, 2013).
141. Unless otherwise noted, the data on law schools analyzed herein is from each school's
2013 Standard 509 Information Report, available at http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org (report-
ing data from the ABA 2013 Annual Questionnaire completed in fall 2013 that reflect academic year
2012-13 courses and fall 2013 tuition (plus annual fees) and entering J.D. class statistics) [hereinaf-
ter ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information Reports].
The ABA's Annual Questionnaire requires the dean of each school to certify:
I have reviewed the Annual Questionnaire and know its contents. I have made an appro-
priate and thorough inquiry so as to satisfy myself that the information contained in this
Annual Questionnaire has been properly collected and is fully and accurately reported. I
represent that this Annual Questionnaire is true, accurate, complete and not misleading.
I understand that the provision of false, inaccurate, incomplete or misleading infor-
mation in this Annual Questionnaire could subject the law school to the imposition of
sanctions under Rule 16 of the Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools.
ABA Questionnaires - Annual Questionnaire, AM. BAR ASS'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal education/resources/questionnaire.html (last visited Apr.
22, 2014) (quoting from Dean's Signature Page). This certification requirement minimizes the possi-
bility of reporting error in the information included in the school's Standard 509 Information Report.
142. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 73, at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Curriculum: Full-time J.D. Program, UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DAVID
A. CLARKE SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.udc.edul?page=FullTimeCurriculum (last visited July
23, 2013).
144. ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information Reports, supra note 141 (using 2013 data for UDC-
DCSL).
145. See id. (using 2013 data, sorting the resident tuition for all public law schools).
146. See id. (using 2013 data for Washington and Lee).
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ship.14 7 Since the new curriculum was adopted by the faculty, the school
has more than doubled the number of positions available to students in
law clinic courses, increased its externship placements by 87%, and ex-
panded its simulation courses by 63%. 148
The professor overseeing the program explained that a review of the
first few years and the costs of the new curriculum showed that "it is no
more expensive to run than our first or second years."l4 9 Adoption of the
additional experiential courses also has not resulted in tuition increases
disproportionate to other private law schools, as W&L's tuition has in-
creased by 29% since 2007-2008 while the median increase for all pri-
vate law schools over the same time period was 27%. 150 This at a school
where about half of the students in their third year take a year-long law
clinic for ten credits and the remainder take a one-semester clinic or ex-
ternship for five credits.' 5 '
What is significant about these examples, in addition to the admin-
istration and faculty's commitment to mandate clinical education, is that
the three schools reflect the range of the 202 ABA-accredited law
schools. They include schools that are: public and private; ranked as "the
top schools" and unranked ("second tier") by U.S. News; in urban and
rural areas; graduating students that seek employment primarily locally
and students looking across the country; offering a part-time degree pro-
gram; and charging high and low tuitions.15 2
To consider further the effect that the availability of clinical courses
has on the cost to students for their legal education and, therefore, the
financial feasibility of more clinical education, I examined the effect of
147. Washington and Lee's New Third Year Reform, WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.wlu.edu/thirdyear (last visited July 23, 2013).
148. These data collected from the school's reported information in LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS
COUNCIL & AM. BAR Ass'N., ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS
ARCHIVES (2006-2014) [hereinafter ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE], available at
http://www.1sac.org/Isacresources/publications/official-guide-archives. Compare 2014 W&L ABA-
LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE, available at http://www.Isac.org/docs/default-source/official-guide-
2014/aba5887.pdf (listing positions available to W&L students in experiential courses during 2011-
12 academic year), with 2010 W&L ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE, available at
http://www.Isac.org/docs/default-source/official-guide-20 I /aba5887.pdf (listing positions available
in W&L's experiential courses during 2007-08 academic year).
149. James E. Molitemo, A Way Forward for an Ailing Legal Education Model, 17 CHAP. L.
REV. 73, 78 (2013). Professor Moliterno explained that the new third-year curriculum was less
expensive "in large measure because of the contributions of part-time professors from several major
Virginia law firms." E-mail from James Moliterno, Professor, Washington & Lee School of Law, to
Jon Streeter, Chair, Task Force on Admissions Regulation Reform, California State Bar (May 30,
2013) (on file with author).
150. Compare 2014 W&L ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE, supra note 148 (listing W&L's
tuition and fees for school year 2012-13), and2010 W&L ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE, supra note
148 (listing W&L's tuition and fees for school year 2007-08), with LAW SCHOOL TUITION (1985-
2013), supra note 21 (listing median tuition and fees at private law schools).
151. E-mail from Professor James Moliterno, supra note 149.
152. See ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information Reports, supra note 141; 2013 U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS) 76-80 (2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter U.S.
NEWS, BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS].
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providing or requiring clinical legal education courses on tuition using
data reported by each school to the ABA for the 2012-2013 academic
year and fall 2013 J.D. entering class.153 Because the call for more clini-
cal education (i.e., law clinic and externship courses) is often part of a
broader call for more practice-based experiential education (which in-
cludes law clinic, externship, and simulation courses),15 4 I first examined
the possible relationship between the availability of experiential courses
and the tuition and fees paid by law students. The State Bar of Califor-
nia's Task Force on Admissions Regulation Reform noted that many
concerns about requiring more practice-based experiential coursework
for bar applicants "are rooted in the idea that for law schools to offer
more practice-based experiential education will be enormously costly,
that law schools will inevitably pass those increased costs along to their
students by increasing tuition, and that this will only add to the challeng-
es that recent law graduates face.""ss
It is initially clear from analyzing ABA data that a school's public
or private status greatly affects what a full-time J.D. student pays in tui-
tion and fees, with private schools charging, on average, about $19,000
more, holding other influences on tuition constant.156 U.S. News ranking
of law schools also is significantly related to tuition and fees-schools
on average charge their students about $1,000 more for each ten place
increase in ranking.'57 In addition, schools in geographic areas with
153. Enrollment, curricular, and tuition data was obtained from each school's ABA Standard
509 Information Reports, as noted in supra note 141. Earlier analyses based on data for the 2010-11
and 2012-13 academic year and fall 2011 and 2012 entering class, when entering class sizes were
larger at many law schools, yielded results that were consistent with those reported here for students
entering in 2013.
154. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 75, at 166 (describing "[e]xperiential education" as
including simulation-based courses, law clinics, and externships); see also ABA ACCREDITATION
STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard 303(a)(3) (defining an experiential course as a simulation
course, a law clinic, or a field placement).
155. Memorandum from John Streeter, Chair, Task Force on Admissions Regulation Reform,
to State Bar of Cal. B. Comm. on Operations and Bd. of Trs. 5 (Oct. 12, 2013), available at
http://board.calbar.ca.gov/docs/agendaltem/Public/agendaiteml000011266.pdf.
156. Comparing tuition and fees data from each school's ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information
Reports, supra note 141, when holding U.S. News ranking and cost of living constant. For public
schools, resident tuition and fees were used. See U.S. NEWS, BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS, supra note
152.
157. Comparing tuition and fees data in ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information Reports, supra
note 141, with law school rankings in U.S. NEWS, BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS, supra note 152 at 76-
80 (excluding 46 schools for which rank is not published (referred to as "second tier") and six
schools indicated as "not ranked"). Note that U.S. News analyzes 200 law schools while the ABA
2013 Standard 509 Information Reports include data on 202 schools, listing Widener University's
Delaware and Pennsylvania campuses separately and including Belmont University, a new provi-
sionally-accredited school. See ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information Reports, supra note 141; U.S.
NEWS, BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS, supra note 152.
The influence of ranking on tuition is most pronounced within the upper quartile of ranked
law schools, where an improvement in ranking from the second quartile of law schools (ranked
between 53-98) to the first quartile (between 1-48) results in an average increase in tuition of
around $140 per ranking position. In contrast, schools ranked in the lowest quartile (second tier)
charge more, on average, than schools ranked between 102-144, primarily because of a greater
proportion of higher-priced private law schools in the lowest quartile.
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higher costs of living on average charge higher tuition than schools in
lower cost of living locales.'5 8 The relationships of these three variables
to tuition and fees are illustrated in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
RELATIONSHIP OF CONTROL VARIABLES TO TUITION
Variable Estimate (Std. Error) p-value
Private School 19054.93 (±961.32) <0.001
Ranked (U.S. News) -93.93 (±9.37) <0.001
Cost of Living 95.66 (±17.61) <0.001
The adjusted R-squared value with these variables is 0.74. Thus,
these three variables alone explain about three-quarters of the total varia-
tion in tuition and fees among ABA accredited law schools.
When the public-private, U.S. News ranking, and cost of living vari-
ables are then controlled to measure just the relationship between certain
coursework and tuition, there is no statistically significant relationship
between the availability of experiential education courses and the tuition
and fees students pay.'59 As the Figure 2 scatterplot with standard error
bars illustrate, there is no increase in the tuition students pay, and even a
statistically insignificant average decrease of $60, as opportunities to
enroll in experiential courses are made more available to those stu-
dents.160
158. Using data from the U.S. Census Bureau in the 2012 Statistical Abstract of the United
States. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 479-80 (2012). The
observed relationship between cost of living and tuition is primarily among schools charging in
excess of $35,000.
159. The ABA Annual Questionnaire defines three types of experiential courses: "Simulation
courses are those courses in which a substantial portion of the instruction is accomplished through
the use of role playing or drafting exercises, e.g., trial advocacy, corporate planning and drafting,
negotiations, and estate planning and drafting." SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, 2014 ANNUAL QUESTIONNAIRE INSTRUCTIONS PART 1: SCHOOL
INFORMATION 6 (2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dami/aba/administrative/legal education-and-admissions to th
e bar/govemancedocuments/2014_aqpartl.authcheckdam.pdf. "Faculty-supervised law clinics are
programs in which students advise or represent one or more actual clients [individuals or organiza-
tions], in which students are supervised by a faculty member (full-time or adjunct), and which in-
clude a classroom instructional component." Id. "Field placements are externships or internships
(typically off-site) that are field supervised by persons not employed by the law school for which
students receive credit and which may or may not include a classroom component." Id; see also
ABA ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard 303(a)(3) ("An experiential course
must be a simulation course, a law clinic, or a field placement.").
160. See ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information Reports, supra note 141 (comparing each
school's ratio of the sum of "[niumber of positions available in simulation courses" plus "[n]umber
of positions available in faculty supervised clinical courses" plus "[n]umber of field placement
positions filled," full-time and part-time, to "J.D. Enrollment - First-Year Total" with tuition and
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FIGURE 2
RELATIONSHIP OF AVAILABILITY OF EXPERIENTIAL COURSES TO
TUITION
These data strongly suggest that proposals to mandate more prac-
tice-based experiential coursework need not result in increased tuition.
This finding should not be surprising. Simulation courses, which make
up the bulk of practice-based experiential courses at most schools, are
largely taught by adjunct faculty, who law schools pay very modestly.1 61
Examining just simulation courses, no statistically significant relation-
fees). On average, tuition decreases by $60.50 for each additional position in an experiential course
that is made available to a student (p-value 0.76).
All results are compared to the 95% (p-value 0.05) and 90% (p-value 0.10) confidence
levels to judge statistical significance. The shaded area in the scatterplots indicates the upper and
lower boundaries of the 95% confidence interval. Two results from the 2013 reported data were
significant to the 80% (p-value 0.20) confidence level and showed that as clinical course availability
to students increased, tuition decreased. See infra note 174, Figure 4.
161. See David A. Lander, Are Adjuncts a Benefit or a Detriment?, 33 U. DAYTON L. REV.
285, 288-89 (2008) (reporting on a survey showing that at most courses a majority of trial advocacy
courses are taught by adjuncts and describing adjuncts a  providing instruction "at bargain basement
rates").
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ship was found between the availability of positions in simulation cours-
es at a school and the tuition a school charges.162
Even when excluding low-cost simulations and focusing just on
more resource intensive clinical education courses, the data still do not
show a relationship between law clinic and externship courses and the
tuition students pay. Looking first at schools that have a clinical experi-
ence mandate, twenty-two schools currently require that each J.D. stu-
dent must take a credit-bearing law clinic or externship as a graduation
requirement.16 3 Those schools do not, on average, charge higher tuition
than schools that do not have such a requirement, as illustrated below in
the comparison of law school tuitions. In fact, schools that mandate a
clinical experience charge around $800 less than schools that do not, but
the estimate is not statistically significant. 164
Examining the fourteen other schools that guarantee, but do not re-
quire, each J.D. student the ability to take a credit-bearing law clinic or
externship prior to graduation yields a similar result-guaranteeing a
clinical experience to every student does not show a statistically signifi-
cant relationship to the tuition and fees charged those students. Schools
guaranteeing a clinical experience charge, on average, approximately
$200 more in tuition and fees than schools that do not, but the relation-
ship is not statistically significant.165 Together, the schools that either
require or guarantee a clinical experience charge $400 less in tuition than
schools that do not, but, again, the relationship is not statistically signifi-
cant. 166
Therefore, the thirty-six schools that either already mandate or
guarantee a clinical experience to every student are not charging their
students more than schools that do not require or guarantee that oppor-
tunity. Although those schools might be incurring additional instructional
costs over schools not providing those law clinic and externship experi-
ences, tuition pricing does not reflect those costs, and students are not
being asked to pay more for those educational experiences. These
162. See ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information Reports, supra note 141 (comparing for each
school the ratio of the "[n]umber of positions available in simulation courses" to "J.D. Enrollment -
First-Year Total" with tuition and fees). Schools on average charge approximately $48 more in
tuition for each simulation course position made available to a student, but the result is not statisti-
cally significant (p-value 0.84).
163. See Karen Tokarz et al., Legal Education at a Crossroads: Innovation, Integration, and
Pluralism Required!, 43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 11, 45-46, 45 n.154 (2013) (identifying law schools
with mandatory clinical education requirements based on a fall 2013 survey). The University of
Hawaii was subsequently removed from this list; hence, only 22 schools are analyzed.
164. As with other comparisons, tuition data were obtained from ABA 2013 Standard 509
Information Reports, supra note 141. On average, schools with a clinical education requirement
charge $796.08 less in tuition and fees than schools without a requirement (p-value 0.60).
165. Tokarz et al., supra note 163, at 46-47, 46 n.155 (identifying schools that guarantee a
clinical experience). Schools guaranteeing a clinical experience charge, on average, $195.19 more in
tuition and fees than schools without a guarantee (p-value 0.91).
166. The thirty-six schools charge, on average, $402.61 less in tuition and fees than the schools
without a requirement or guarantee (p-value 0.74).
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schools show that clinical legal education can be made a priority without
a resulting increase in tuition when the school is willing to make a choice
to allocate its resources toward those courses.
These thirty-six schools with clinical requirements or guarantees are
not the only evidence that a clinical education requirement can be im-
plemented without increasing tuition. According to data each school cer-
tifies to the ABA as "true, accurate, complete, and not misleading,"167
170 of 202 law schools (84%) already have the law clinic or externship
course capacity to provide each of their J.D. students who entered in fall
2013 with a clinical experience (Figure 3).168
FIGURE 3
PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOLS WITH CLINICAL EXPERIENCE CAPACITY




Thus, although the ABA requires each school to offer "substantial
opportunities" for live-client or other real-life practice experiences,169
only 18% of law schools (36 of 202) presently require or guarantee a
167. ABA Questionnaires - Annual Questionnaire, supra note 141 (quoting from Dean's Signa-
ture Page).
168. See ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information Reports, supra note 141 (comparing for each
school the sum of "[n]umber of positions available in faculty supervised clinical courses" plus
"[n]umber of field placement positions filled," full-time and part-time, with "J.D. Enrollment - First-
Year Total"). Sixty-one schools (30%) have sufficient capacity in their existing law clinic courses
for every J.D. student to take a law clinic prior to graduation. See id (comparing "[n]umber of posi-
tions available in faculty supervised clinical courses" with "JD Enrollment - First-Year Total"). Yet,
only five schools presently require a law clinic as a condition of graduation; one additional school
guarantees a law clinic experience. Tokarz et al., supra note 163, at 45 n.154.
169. See ABA ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard 303(a)(3).
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clinical experience.7 0 The ABA has failed to ensure more than "oppor-
tunities" even though a clinical experience could be provided today to
every J.D. student at 84% of schools at no additional expense or new
faculty.7 1
When comparing the tuition at these 170 schools with sufficient law
clinic and field placement positions for each student with schools that do
not presently offer enough positions, there is no statistically significant
difference in the amount of tuition charged to make these law clinic and
externship positions available to all students.172 So, not only are nearly
seven out of eight schools already capable of providing a clinical educa-
tion experience to each of their students without adding any additional
courses or instructors, they are able to do so without charging their stu-
dents more in tuition than schools presently without sufficient positions
to provide every student with that experience.
Moreover, upon adoption of a clinical education requirement or
guarantee, schools do not raise their tuition at a rate higher than schools
that do not require or provide those courses. Examining a school's rate of
tuition increase from the time its clinical mandate or guarantee was
adopted to its current tuition, the rate of increase at three-quarters of
those schools was actually less than the national average of other schools
over that same time period; only one-eighth of those schools increased
their tuition at a rate greater than the national average.
These data suggest that the schools adopting a clinical experience
mandate or guarantee already may have had sufficient capacity for a uni-
versal clinical experience and did not need to change their course offer-
170. Compare Tokarz et al., supra note 163, at 45 n.154, 46 n.155 (identifying the thirty-six
schools that require or guarantee a clinical experience) with ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information
Reports, supra note 141 (providing information on 202 schools). The most recent Law School Sur-
vey of Student Engagement found that 43% of third-year students had never participated in a clinical
or pro bono project as part of a course or for academic credit. LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT
ENGAGEMENT, EVALUATING THE VALUE OF LAW SCHOOL: STUDENT PERSPECTIVES ANNUAL
RESULTS 2013 8 (2013), available at http://lssse.iub.edu/pdf/2013/LSSSE_2013_AnnualReport.pdf.
171. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. Using enrollment data for J.D. students enter-
ing in fall 2011 and 2012, when entering class sizes were larger, yielded similar results; 79% of
schools in fall 2012 had sufficient capacity to provide a clinical experience to every entering J.D.
student and over 69% did in fall 2011. See supra note 153.
172. Comparing tuition and fees at schools where the sum of the "[nlumber of positions availa-
ble in faculty supervised clinical courses" plus "[n]umber of field place positions filed," full-time
and part-time divided by "J.D. Enrollment - First-Year Total" is 1.0 or greater with the tuition and
fees at schools with smaller ratios. See ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information Reports, supra note
141. On average, schools with sufficient law clinic or field placement course capacity for every
graduating J.D. student charge approximately $778 more in tuition and fees than schools without that
capacity, but the estimate is not statistically significant (p-value 0.54).
173. Compare Tokarz, supra note 163, at 45-46, 45 n.154 (listing schools with a clinical
mandate or guarantee and the respective dates of adoption) with 2014 ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE,
supra note 148 (using data for fall 2012 tuition); 2006-2009 ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE, supra
note 148; 2010-2013 ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE, supra note 148. Because access to archived
tuition amounts is limited, rates of tuition increase were only analyzed for schools adopting a man-
date or guarantee since 2005. The results of these calculations are on file with the author.
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ings upon adoption of the new curricular policy. The data could alterna-
tively suggest that implementation of the new clinical education provi-
sion did not impose increased costs on the schools or, if it did, schools
reallocated existing resources and did not pass on any increased costs to
students through higher tuition pricing.
Looking just at the enhanced availability of clinical courses, even if
not presently sufficient to provide a clinical experience to every student,
again there is no relationship between the increased availability of law
clinic and field placement courses for students and the tuition they are
charged. Instead, as the ratio of combined positions in law clinics and
field placement courses to the number of first-year students increases,
schools charge approximately $700 less in tuition (Figure 4). 174
FIGURE 4
RELATIONSHIP OF CLINICAL COURSE AVAILABILITY TO TUITION
Law clinics in particular, compared to clinical legal education more
generally (which includes both low student/teacher atio law clinics and
typically higher enrollment field placement courses), often are the focus
174. See ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information Reports, supra note 141 (comparing for each
school the ratio of the sum of "[n]umber of positions available in faculty supervised clinical courses"
plus "[n]umber of field placement positions filled," full-time and part-time, to "J.D. Enrollment -
First-Year Total" with tuition and fees). On average, tuition decreases by $702.57 for each additional
position in a clinical course that is made available to a student (p-value 0.18).
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of the claim that clinical legal education costs too much.'75 Here too,
even with the higher instructional costs per student for low enrollment
law clinic courses, the data do not show that the increased availability of
law clinic positions for students results in higher tuition. Comparing the
availability of positions for students in faculty supervised law clinic
courses to the size of the first-year J.D. class, schools with higher ratios
of clinic positions to students (i.e., law clinic courses are more available
to students) do not charge statistically higher tuition than schools that
provide fewer law clinic opportunities for their students.17 6
Further, examining the difference between the sixty-one schools
with sufficient present capacity for every J.D. student to participate in a
law clinic course before graduation and the schools that do not presently
have that law clinic capacity, schools that have sufficient law clinic ca-
pacity charge around $1,500 less in tuition, on average, than the schools
without that capacity.177
The relative proportion of law clinic to field placement positions
available for students at a school similarly shows no relationship to the
tuition those students are required to pay. Examining the ratio of law
clinic course positions to field placement course positions for students,
schools with a higher ratio of law clinic to field placement positions (i.e.,
providing a greater proportion of law clinic to field placement opportuni-
ties for students) do not have statistically significant higher tuitions than
schools with lower ratios of law clinics to field placement course posi-
178
tions.
Nor does a school's percentage of students that participate in a law
clinic show an effect on tuition. A 2010-2011 survey by the Center for
the Study of Applied Legal Education (CSALE) asked clinical program
directors at each law school to identify the percentage of students that
will participate in a live-client law clinic at their school before gradua-
tion.179 Comparing law clinic participation with tuition shows that
schools with a greater percentage of students participating in a law clinic
175. See Joy, supra note 33, at 309 (noting that when discussing the cost of legal education,
some suggest that in-house law clinics should be eliminated because they require more faculty
resources than classroom courses); see also Fleischer, supra note 65 (calling for the closure of law
clinics to bring law school budgets in balance).
176. See ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information Reports, supra note 141 (comparing for each
ABA-approved law school the ratios of the "[n]umber of positions available in faculty supervised
clinical courses" to "J.D. Enrollment - First-Year Total" with tuition and fees).
177. See id. (comparing tuition and fees at schools with ratios of "[n]umber of positions availa-
ble in faculty supervised clinical courses" to "J.D. Enrollment - First-Year Total" 1.0 or greater with
tuition and fees at schools with smaller ratios).
178. See id. (comparing the ratios of the "[n]umber of positions available in faculty supervised
clinical courses" to "[n]umber of field placement positions filled" with tuition).
179. 2010 CSALE SURVEY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF
APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION 8 (2010), available at http://www.csale.org/files/2010-
I .Complete.Survey.Instrument.pdf, see also SANTACROCE & KUEHN, supra note 106, at 9-10.
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before graduation do not charge higher tuition than schools with a lower
participation percentage.
Therefore, like the relationships between the availability of experi-
ential courses and tuition and of clinical education courses and tuition,
providing more law clinic course opportunities for students, and even
providing a law clinic experience for every student, is not associated with
higher rates of tuition. Figure 5 shows the lack of a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between the availability of law clinic courses and tui-
tion for any of the four law clinic capacity and participation variables.
FIGURE 5
RELATIONSHIP OF LAW CLINIC AVAILABILITY & PARTICIPATION TO
TUITION
Independent Variable Estimate (Std. Error) p-value
Law Clinic Positions/# 1Ls -969.77 (+918.71) 0.29
Sufficient Clinic Capacity -1505.04 (±1003.49) 0.14
Law Clinics/Field Placements -1.46 (±1.46) 0.32
% Participate Law Clinic -20.26 (±24.67) 0.41
The enhanced placement of students in externships likewise shows
no relationship to tuition. Schools with a greater percentage of students
participating in field placements on average charge around $650 less in
tuition than schools with proportionately fewer of its students in extern-
ships, but the relationship is not statistically significant.180 Similarly,
schools with a greater percentage of its students participating in a field
placement before graduation charge less than schools with lower per-
centages, but this estimate also is not statistically significant.'
The data do show differences in approaches toward clinical educa-
tion based on a school's ranking by U.S. News.182 No law school ranked
in the top ten mandates or guarantees a clinical education, even though
all but three have sufficient capacity to provide every graduating J.D.
180. See ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information Reports, supra note 141 (comparing the ratios of
the "[nlumber of field placement positions filled" to "J.D. Enrollment - First-Year Total" with tui-
tion and fees; p-value 0.35).
181. See id; SANTACROCE & KUEHN, supra note 106, at 9-11; see also 2010 CSALE SURVEY
OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 179. On average, schools with greater field placement
participation charge approximately $29 less in tuition than schools with lower participation (p-value
0.24).
182. Analyzing the relationship between U.S. News ranking and clinical legal education does
not suggest any endorsement of the validity or importance of the rankings. However, many current
discussions of student educational opportunities do reference the rankings. The data is provided
herein only to inform those discussions.
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student with that experience.'8 3 Similarly, only one school ranked in the
top twenty mandates or guarantees a clinical education, though seventeen
have the capacity to do so.184 By contrast, one-quarter of schools ranked
in the bottom quartile (referred to by U.S. News as second tier) mandate
or guarantee a clinical education for their students.85
On the other hand, even though a disproportionate number of
schools with lesser rankings in U.S. News are requiring or guaranteeing
their students a clinical experience, twenty-five percent more schools in
the top quartile already offer enough clinical positions to provide every
graduating J.D. student with a clinical experience than do schools in the
bottom quartile.'86 That is, students in the bottom quartile are offered less
opportunity to obtain legal training through a law clinic or externship
course than students at schools ranked in the top quartile.
Looking at actual enrollment, as opposed to availability of positions
within courses, the CSALE survey of clinical programs indicates that
while 43% of students at the top quartile of law schools take a law clinic,
only 25% of students at second-tier schools enroll in a clinic.87 By con-
trast, participation in field placement courses shows only small differ-
ences across U.S. News ranking quartiles.
Furthermore, having a highly regarded clinical program is not relat-
ed to tuition pricing. In addition to annually ranking law schools, U.S.
News ranks specialty programs, including "clinical training," based on
votes by the director of clinical programs at each law school. Comparing
schools ranked best in clinical training by U.S. News with schools not
ranked shows no significant difference in tuition.'88 Therefore, students
at schools with more highly regarded clinical programs are not outwardly
paying more for their quality programs.
The lack of any relationship between the availability of or participa-
tion in experiential, field placement, or law clinic courses also holds true
when examining the ABA Annual Questionnaire data submitted by
schools one year earlier in fall 2012. Although the three control variables
183. Comparing U.S. News ranking of law schools, supra note 152 and accompanying text,
with listing of schools requiring or guaranteeing a credit-bearing law clinic or externship in Tokarz
et al., supra note 163, at 45 n.154, 46 n.155.
184. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
186. Comparing U.S. News ranking of law schools, supra note 152 and accompanying text,
with supra note 168 and discussion in accompanying text.
187. See SANTACROCE & KUEHN, supra note 106, at 9-11 (including survey results from
questions seeking estimate of percentage of students that participate in a law clinic or in a field
placement program before graduation). Each school's CSALE survey responses are on file with the
author.
188. See U.S. NEWS, BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS, supra note 152, at 80 (ranking of top 15
clinical training programs). Clinical programs ranked in the top 15 charge approximately $46 less in
tuition and fees, on average, than schools that are not ranked (p-value 0.98). The online U.S. News
edition ranks the top 29 clinical programs and they too do not show a statistically significant rela-
tionship with tuition (estimate $774.52; p-value 0.59). See id.
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of public-private, U.S. News law school ranking, and cost of living again
were related to the tuition charged in 2012, none of the experiential or
clinical variables from 2012 showed any statistically significant relation-
ship to tuition. 189
Using discounted or net tuition amounts for law schools, rather than
the published or list tuition, likewise failed to demonstrate that experien-
tial or clinical courses are related to higher tuition for students. Because
of discounting through scholarships and grants, a school's advertised
tuition amount does not correspond to the net tuition the school receives.
Prior to 2013, the ABA only required schools to report their median
grant amount, so reliable calculations of tuition discount rates and the
average net tuition paid by students were not possible. However, begin-
ning with the fall 2013, schools must also report their seventy-fifth and
twenty-fifth percentile amounts of aid. Using the twenty-fifth, fiftieth,
and seventy-fifth percentiles and the percent of full-time students receiv-
ing grants, a discount rate, estimated to within around one percent the
actual discount rate, and net tuition amount was calculated for each pri-
vate school.190
Using discounted tuition, ten relationships between simulation, law
clinic, and extemship course availability and discounted tuition were
examined.19' The availability of four types of experiential courses was
significantly related to the net tuition a school receives; six types of
courses were not. All four course types that were significant showed,
surprisingly, an inverse relationship with net tuition-as the availability
of experiential courses for students increased, average net tuition at pri-
vate law schools decreased in amounts ranging from $420 to $1,915.192
189. 2014 ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE, supra note 148 (examining data for each school based
on fall 2012 tuition and AY2011-12 courses). The relationship between the ratio of law clinic posi-
tions to field placements filled was significant at the 85% confidence level (p-value 0.14), but only
showed an $11.50 increase in tuition for each 1.0 increase in the ratio.
190. Using each school's grant and scholarship information in ABA 2013 Standard 509 Infor-
mation Reports, supra note 141, a weighted median was calculated by summing the 25th, twice the
50th, and the 75th percentiles and dividing by four. A discount rate was then calculated by multiply-
ing the weighted median times the percent of full-time students receiving grants divided by the
tuition and fees for academic year 2013-14. Finally, the net tuition amount was calculated by multi-
plying the difference between 1.0 and the discount rate times the 2013-14 tuition.
To check the validity of the weighted median discount tuition methodology, admissions
officers at three private schools compared their actual discount rate with the rate predicted by using
the weighted median. Two stated that the estimated discount rate was within 1% of their actual rate;
the other said the estimated rate was "pretty close" but would not state a percentage. The weighted
median method also was validated by La Verne College of Law's recent announcement hat it was
no longer going to discount tuition. See Sloan, supra note 46 and accompanying text. The school, in
tum, reduced its tuition list price by 39.3%; the weighted median model predicts La Verne's dis-
count rate as 39.75%.
191. For discounted tuition data, see supra note 190; for simulation, law clinic, and externship
course availability data, see supra note 141 and accompanying text.
192. An increase in experiential course positions is associated with a $669.66 decrease in
tuition; an increase of 1.0 in the ratio of law clinic to field placement positions is associated with a
$1,359.11 decrease in tuition; and increases in the availability of positions in simulation and field
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Although the absence of reported mean grant amounts and reliable in-
formation on public law schools cautions against drawing too strong a
conclusion from these inverse relationships, they are further evidence
that the availability of experiential or clinical courses is not related to
what law students are paying in tuition.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion of Swords and Walwer's early study of clinical
course costs turned out to be accurate-in spite of potentially higher
costs for some clinical courses, a school's curriculum can be structured
to give every J.D. student a clinical experience without having to charge
students more in tuition. 93 The new empirical evidence presented herein
demonstrates that 84% of schools already have the capacity to provide
each student with clinical training prior to graduation without adding any
new law clinic or externship courses or slots within existing courses, yet
only 18% require or guarantee that experience. On the issue of tuition
pricing, the evidence does not show any relationship between the tuition
and fees students are charged and whether their school requires or guar-
antees every student a clinical experience. In addition, the evidence does
not show any relationship between the tuition at schools that already
have sufficient capacity to provide a clinical experience to each graduat-
ing student and at those that do not have that capacity. Nor do the data
show any relationship between tuition and the increased availability of
law clinics or increased participation of students in law clinics, or from
offering students a highly regarded clinical education program.
Notwithstanding the higher instructional costs of some forms of
clinical education, students that are provided more clinical opportunities,
or even required or assured of a chance to enroll in what are identified as
more costly law clinics, are not charged more in tuition for those en-
hanced educational opportunities. Stated alternatively, students that re-
ceive fewer clinical education opportunities from their schools, or are not
offered law clinic training, do not benefit financially from this lost edu-
cational opportunity by paying less in tuition and fees. Contrary to what
is sometimes claimed, this study, and the examples at a number of
schools, show that providing or even requiring clinical training in law
school need not cost students more in tuition.
The reasons for the absence of any relationship between the availa-
bility of clinical courses and tuition are not discernible in this study, but a
number of explanations are possible. If tuition is sensitive to costs, per-
haps the instructional costs for clinical courses are not more than, or not
significantly more than, the costs for non-clinical courses and, therefore,
placement courses are associated with decreases in tuition of $696.87 and $1,915.64, respectively.
All are significant at the 95% confidence level (p-value <0.05).
193. See Swords & Walwer, supra note 108, at 184-86.
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are not influencing tuition sufficiently to be captured by the model used
herein. The lower salaries of clinical faculty at many schools, clinical
faculty workloads that include non-doctrinal courses for which those
faculty are not additionally compensated, the use of inexpensive fellows
and staff attorneys in some law clinics, and income through grants, attor-
ney fees, and donations can contribute to lower than expected instruc-
tional costs for clinical courses at many schools.
It is also possible that although clinical courses do have higher per
credit instructional costs, the overall amount of those costs is small in
comparison to the many other substantial law school costs identified in
Section I. Dean John Kramer's study of legal education expenses found
that the relative cost of clinical education was quite low compared to
overall law school expenditures and increased at a smaller rate than most
other costs.194 The data reported herein show that public-private status,
U.S. News ranking, and cost of living explain three-fourths of the vari-
ance in tuition between schools. Thus, perhaps even if the enhanced
availability of clinical courses may increase instructional costs, clinical
courses' small contribution to overall law school expenses do not result
in measurable effects on tuition pricing.
Schools alternatively could be incurring higher costs from increased
clinical courses but are unable to pass on those added expenses through
higher tuition because prospective students do not value those enhanced
courses and are unwilling to pay for that educational feature. While un-
der normal rules of price setting law schools would charge higher tuition
when providing more expensive clinical courses, it is possible that lack
of demand by applicants for those courses restrains chools from passing
on those added costs. No published study has examined what students
would pay for certain educational services. Numerous surveys do show,
however, that applicants value clinical courses and schools heavily pro-
mote them in their application materials. 195 Contending that schools do
not charge more for the additional costs of clinical courses because stu-
dents do not sufficiently value them assumes that normal rules of pricing
apply to legal education, which is almost exclusively comprised of not-
for-profit institutions. Yet, educators and economists warn that "educa-
tion is an 'industry' in which the normal rules of competition, productivi-
ty and price-setting don't apply."1 96
194. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 60-63, 100 and accompanying text.
196. Edward B. Fiske, How Tuition Costs Are Set: An Education in Itself N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
1987, at B13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/14/us/how-tuition-costs-are-set-an-
education-in-itself.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; see also Daniel L. Bennett, Competitive Nature,
CAREER COLL. CENT., Nov. 2011, at 32, 32-33, available at
http://www.careercollegecentral.com/magazine/nov2011/index.html ("[K]ey assumptions of the
theory of competition leading to lower prices are violated in the current structure of the higher edu-
cation marketplace.").
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A final possibility is that law school tuition is not sensitive to costs
but largely driven by demand. That is, schools set prices to reflect the
prestige of the school and perceived value of the degree to prospective
applicants, not based on the cost to provide the educational services. 11
Under this theory, schools allocate expenditures within a defined tuition
range that mirrors what their competitors are charging. As one university
official explained, "[t]he goal of pricing is to get into a pack. You want
to be part of a group, not an aberration." 98 "Once tuition is set, costs are
controlled-or permitted to grow-to match the maximum revenues each
institution believes it can get."l 9 9
Evidence of this insensitivity of tuition to costs is that no relation-
ship was found in the ABA-reported data between what a law school
charges students in tuition and fees and the school's student/faculty ratio,
a surrogate variable for increased instructional costs.200 In addition, no
relationship was found between the amount a school spends on library
materials per J.D. student and its tuition.20'
Higher instructional expenditures for clinical courses therefore may
be treated as just one necessary cost of operating a law school, especially
with the high student interest in such courses, which schools do not seek
to pass on in tuition but instead reallocate existing resources to provide.
Schools that offer fewer clinical education opportunities end up spending
197. See TAMANAHA, supra note 66, at 130 ("Tuition varies in relation to prestige-not
costs-because the perceived value of the education affects how much students (and their parents)
are willing to pay for it."). One pricing strategy consultant encouraged nonprofits "to base their
pricing on the value of the services they provide rather than on what it costs them to provide their
services." Norah McVeigh, Setting Prices for Nonprofit Services, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 29,
2010, 2:50 PM), http://philanthropy.com/blogs/money-and-mission/setting-prices-for-nonprofit-
services/27586 (referencing advice from Rafi Mohammed in a June 2010 Stanford Social Innovation
Review blog); see also Jacob Gershman, Tuition Cuts are a Risky Bet for Law Schools, Moody's
Warns, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (May 7, 2014, 6:45 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/05/07/tuition-
cuts-are-a-risky-bet-for-law-schools-moodys-warns (observing that despite their desire for greater
value, many law students still associate tuition price with the quality of the school); Kathy Kurz &
Jim Scannell, Setting Tuition: Key Factors to Consider: Higher Ed, Like Any Business, Must Listen
to the "Voice of the Customer" in Pricing Considerations, U. Bus., May 2005, at 26, 26, available
at http://www.universitybusiness.com/article/setting-tuition-key-factors-consider (observing that
unlike in the past, universities no longer set price based on what is necessary to balance the budget);
Matt Leichter, Relaxed Accreditation Rules Unlikely to Reduce Law School Tuition, L. SCH. TUITION
BUBBLE (Aug. 20, 2013), http://lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com/2013/08/20/relaxed-
accreditation-rules-unlikely-to-reduce-law-school-tuition (arguing that reforms that reduce the costs
of instruction are unlikely to reduce tuition because "[s]tudents are paying for the law degree's
signaling value-not the marginal cost of learning various legal doctrines").
198. Fiske, supra note 196 (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Henry E. Riggs, Editorial, The Price ofPerception, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2011, at ED33.
200. See ABA 2013 Standard 509 Information Reports, supra note 141 (using school specific
data on "[s]tudent faculty ratio" and "J.D. Enrollment Total"). Tuition for 2013 slightly increases as
the student/faculty ratio rises by 1.0 (estimate $150.25), the opposite of what would be expected, but
the result is not statistically significant (p-value 0.42). Reviewing 2012 data, tuition decreased slight-
ly ($23.71) as the student/faculty ratio rose (p-value 0.16).
201. 2014 ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE, supra note 148 (using school specific data on "[t]otal
amount spent on library materials" and "JD Enrollment - Total"). There is the smallest increase in
tuition as library materials expenditures per student rise (estimate $0.24), but the relationship is not
statistically significant (p-value 0.66).
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any resulting costs savings on other budget categories and do not pass on
those savings to their students.
Of course some of each theory could be occurring. Clinical courses
may not be as expensive as often thought and may constitute a relatively
small part of the law school expenditures that influence tuition. At the
same time, price setting among similarly situated schools reduces the
influence of costs on tuition so schools generally choose to reallocate
resources when confronted with higher clinical course costs. Whatever
the reasons, contrary to popular belief, enhanced clinical courses, even if
more costly to schools, are not a measurable factor in what students are
charged in tuition.
Although the costs of instruction are part of any curriculum design,
these empirical data support the argument that the costs of clinical cours-
es do not justify the failure of law schools to provide students with more
clinical training. Rather, the debate over law school curricula and costs,
including discussions about where cuts might be made to reduce ex-
penditures, should focus on the value of certain educational programs,
what students need to learn in school to begin the practice of law, and
how best it can be taught. If the focus is kept on students and what they
should obtain from their professional education and their tuition pay-
ments, available resources can be allocated to provide a clinical experi-
ence for every student without raising tuition. If the will is truly there
among law schools and the legal profession to refocus the curriculum of
legal education to provide students with more practice-based, clinical
coursework, the price of clinical legal education will not impede schools
from providing that training for all of its graduates.
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APPENDIX A
Practice-Based and Clinical Education Requirements for Pro-
fessional Schools
Law Medical Veterinary Pharmacy
6 credits in 2 of 4 years of Minimum 1 of 300 hours in
experiential clinical practi- 4 years in din- first 3 years &
courses; ca or clerk- ical settings"' 1,440 hours (36
no clinical ships20 3  weeks) in last
requirement2 0 2  year in clinical
settings"s
1/14 1/2 1/4+ 1/4+
of total education of total education of total education of total education
Dentistry Social Work Architecture Nursing
57% of educa- 900 hours (18 50 of 160 Varies by state,
tion in actual of 60 required credits in stu- e.g., California:
patient care206 credits) in dio courses 18 of 58 credits
field education (nat'l licens- in clinical prac-
courses207 ing board's tice; Texas: 3
calculation of to 1 ratio of
minimum clinical to
needed for classroom
licensure)208  hours2 09
1/2+ 1/3 1/3 1/3+
of total education of total education of total education of total education
202. ABA ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standards 303(a)(3), (b)(1). This
does not include the required first-year writing experience, which may be as few as two credits, or
upper-class writing experience, which is not required to be and generally is not a practice-based
course.
203. MOLLY COOKE ET AL., EDUCATING PHYSICIANS: A CALL FOR REFORM OF MEDICAL
SCHOOL AND RESIDENCY 21 (2010).
204. AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass'N, ACCREDITATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THE
AVMA COUNCIL ON EDUCATION § 7.9, Standard 9 (2012).
205. ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR PHARMACY EDUC., ACCREDITATION STANDARDS AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROFESSIONAL PROGRAM IN PHARMACY LEADING TO THE DOCTOR OF
PHARMACY DEGREE, at Guidelines 14.4, 14.6 (2011).
206. COMM'N ON DENTAL ACCREDITATION, AM. DENTISTRY Ass'N, ACCREDITATION
STANDARDS FOR DENTAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, at Standards 2-8, 2-23 (2010); see also TASK
FORCE ON LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT, supra note 81, at 4.
207. COUNCIL ON SOCIAL WORK EDUC., EDUCATION POLICY AND ACCREDITATION
STANDARDS, at Edue. Policy 2.3, Accreditation Standard 2.1.3 (2012).
208. NAT'L COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURAL REGISTRATION BDS., NCARB EDUCATION
STANDARD 24 (2012) ("The NCARB Education Standard is the approximation of the requirements
of a professional degree from a NAAB-accredited degree program.").
209. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 1426(c) (2013); 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 215.9(c) (2013).
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THE IDEOLOGY BEHIND BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:
POLITICAL PARTIES AND "JURISPRUDENTIAL BUNDLING"
STUART CHINN'
ABSTRACT
Brown encompassed the start of a transformative period of political
change, where the federal judiciary and Congress succeeded in disman-
tling Jim Crow. Yet, the question of why Brown occurred, when it did,
continues to lack a satisfying answer despite all of the scholarly com-
mentary devoted to it.
This paper illuminates a set of ideological influences behind the
Brown ruling that help explain why the Court took the direction that it
did, when the opportunity to do so arose. My claim is that the result in
Brown might be partly understood as emanating from certain core ele-
ments of American political party ideology. These four elements were (a)
the acceptance of a "class political" ideal, or the belief that law and pub-
lic policies should promote the interests of certain social groups; (b) a
commitment to federal governmental statism, or the use of federal gov-
ernmental power to promote desirable social goals; (c) the acceptance of
a non-southern orientation toward class politics; and (d) a principled ac-
ceptance of the Supreme Court fulfilling, at times, a "rationalizing" func-
tion with respect to established legal doctrines.
These four ideas were core components of New Deal Democratic
Party ideology that, I argue, provided a conceptual foundation for both
the Brown decision in 1954 and the New Deal Democratic commitment
to a form of economic liberalism in the 1930s. These four ideological
elements thus allowed New Deal economic liberalism to be "jurispruden-
tially bundled" with racial liberalism among the Brown Court members.
After laying out these four ideological elements, I discuss several
significant implications that stem from illuminating the links between
these two historical periods. The most important implication is my pro-
posal of "jurisprudential bundling" as a general theory of judicial behav-
ior and constitutional development. The paper concludes by suggesting,
t B.A., J.D., Ph.D, Yale; Associate Professor, Kenneth J. O'Connell Senior Fellow, Univer-
sity of Oregon School of Law. For comments and feedback on prior drafts, the author thanks Andy
Coan, Mary Dudziak, Bob Gordon, Mark Graber, Tara Grove, Terri Peretti, Steve Skowronek, Brad
Snyder, Dan Tichenor, Robert Tsai, Adrian Vermeule, Bill Wiecek, Emily Zackin. This Article
benefitted from presentations at the Con Law Schmooze at the University of Wisconsin, and the
Wayne Morse Center Faculty Colloquium at the University of Oregon. The author also thanks the
Donald Walker-Norman Wiener Fund for research support.
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more broadly, how ideas are capable of exerting autonomous influence
upon the development of constitutional doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Brown v. Board of Education' marked the beginning of a federal ju-
dicial and congressional dismantling of Jim Crow, a system of social
relations that had been facilitated and validated in a number of signifi-
cant Supreme Court rulings decades before. Rather than following be-
hind the actions of the elected branches, the Court in 1954 occupied a
"vanguard role" in this social transformation.2 Thus, notwithstanding
some prior leftward movement in the doctrine,3 the Brown ruling is right-
ly viewed as a critical juncture in American constitutional development.
Yet, despite the xtensive literature devoted to it, Brown remains in some
ways the most enduring oddity in twentieth-century constitutional devel-
opment. The question of why a decision like this occurred when it did
continues to lack a satisfying answer, despite all of the scholarly com-
mentary devoted to it.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 343 (2004).
3. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641-42
(1950); see also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631-32, 635-36 (1950).
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We have learned that the Brown ruling can be explained by, among
other things, elements of the litigation strategy chosen by the NAACP;4
an increase in the political power of African-Americans due to their
northward migration out of the South and a fortuitous (for them) set of
emergent partisan alignments;' greater sympathy for African-Americans
in elite and mass white public opinion;6 presidential-institutional influ-
ences upon the Court;7 and U.S. foreign policy considerations in counter-
ing Soviet propaganda on American racism in Third World nations.8
Each of these explanations is indeed valuable in illuminating different
pieces of the Brown puzzle. Each illuminates how Brown might be un-
derstood as a response to discrete political and institutional circumstanc-
es, and each plausibly demonstrates ome degree of congruence between
Brown and "external" social and political forces upon the Court. Still,
what remains either unexamined or under-theorized in each of these ex-
planations is another facet of the ruling: how Brown might have been
understood within broader political party themes and political ideals by
the Justices themselves.
The absence of greater in-depth examination on this point is con-
spicuous, given that such political party-focused analyses have long been
at the center of scholarly examinations of judicial behavior and legal
development. Indeed, the task of linking political party commitments to
shifts in legal doctrine is the core concern of "appointments" theories of
judicial behavior in which, as the label implies, a changed composition
on the Court is seen to drive major doctrinal shifts.9 When, for example,
left-leaning Presidents and left-leaning Senators are able to appoint a
number of more left-leaning Justices, presumably we should expect con-
stitutional doctrine to shift to the left as well. The appointments thesis
has much to commend it including not only its simplicity, but also its
identification of the institutional link between broader political, institu-
tional, and social changes on the one hand, and actual changes in the
doctrine on the other. For this reason, it is able to convincingly explain
many critical junctures in American constitutional history including the
New Deal era transformations in Substantive Due Process and Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence. For this reason, the appointments thesis
4. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD oF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 290-94, 553-55 (1975); see also
MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-
1950, at 160-63 (1987).
5. See DAVID KAROL, PARTY POSITION CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS: COALITION
MANAGEMENT 103-06 (2009); KLARMAN, supra note 2, at 100-02.
6. KLARMAN, supra note 2, at 102, 309-10.
7. KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE PRESIDENCY
PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN 7-8 (2004).
8. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 100, 104-07 (2000).
9. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066-68 (2001); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Su-
preme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 284-86 (1957).
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remains one of the dominant general theories of judicial behavior and
legal development.
However, there is perhaps an equally conspicuous reason why par-
ty-ideological and appointments analyses of Brown have been under-
emphasized as well. With respect to the transformative change contem-
plated in the Brown ruling, the appointments thesis strikingly fails to
satisfy. There is strong, overlapping scholarly agreement that neither
Roosevelt nor Truman primarily selected their Supreme Court appointees
because of a nominee's support for racial equality.10 The same holds true
for Eisenhower's appointment of Chief Justice Earl Warren." Given that
five of the Supreme Court Justices participating in the Brown decision
were FDR appointees,12 this shortcoming focuses our attention specifi-
cally on the appointments calculus of Franklin Roosevelt. Given the fact
that, as McMahon states, "there is no clear evidence that FDR nominated
jurists with a specific desire to advance African American rights,"
3 what
are we to make of the Brown decision from the standpoint of party ideol-
ogy and appointments?
Changes in African-American political power, changes in mass and
elite opinion, and urgent foreign policy considerations certainly made a
decision like Brown more plausible in the mid-1950s by offering new
motives and opportunities for the Court to move more directly against
Jim Crow. However, given the absence of direct presidential considera-
tion of the race issue in making the Brown Court appointments and the
absence of any established, clearly defined broader "political regime" on
the race issue in the early 1950s,14 how these new motives and opportuni-
ties were interpreted, conceptualized, and rationalized within the array of
party ideological commitments present on that Court is not apparent. Or
at the very least, the connections between these motives and opportuni-
10. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 160, 181-82 (1999). To be
sure, a nominee's relative liberalism and concern for less fortunate social groups did factor into
appointments calculations, at least for FDR. Id. at 160-61. As such, race possibly factored into these
appointments, but only to the extent that it was ancillary to more central New Deal concerns such as
a concern for allowing governmental regulation and a liberal concerned with aiding less fortunate
social classes. See id; McMAHON, supra note 7, at 73, 142-43. On how a concern for less fortunate
social classes arose as a positive factor in FDR's appointments considerations, see also Robert Harri-
son, The Breakup of the Roosevelt Supreme Court: The Contribution of History and Biography, 2
LAW & HIST. REV. 165, 173-74, 178-182, 186, 191, 195 (1984).
I1. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 192-94.
12. See id. at 159-60.
13. MCMAHON, supra note 7, at 142. 1 should note, McMahon's book is devoted to offering
an explanation of how the Brown decision was the result of a broader presidential strategy by FDR
concerning the courts. I further discuss McMahon's argument below.
14. "Regime" theories of judicial behavior posit that many of the Court's actions are respon-
sive to the interests and needs of the dominant governing regime. See Mark A. Graber, The Nonma-
joritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36-38, 41-
44 (1993); Keith E. Whittington, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Supports for the Exer-
cise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCL REV. 583, 583-85
(2005).
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ties and party ideology is less apparent here than it is for, say, rulings by
the post-New Deal Courts on federal economic regulation in the early
1940s-where the latter rulings issued by the Court were directly related
to prior appointments considerations for a majority of that Court's mem-
bers.
The goal of this paper is to illuminate a set of ideological influences
behind the Brown ruling that might aid in explaining why the Court took
the direction that it did, when the opportunity to do so arose. As dis-
cussed below, I speculate that these ideological influences operated on
the Brown Court indirectly through the appointments mechanism. Thus
judicial appointments dynamics factor into my account, albeit in a man-
ner distinct from their typical application in the scholarly literature. The
starting point for my own analysis is Brown's unanimous ruling, and the
fact that all nine Justices were appointed in the midst or near-immediate
aftermath of the New Deal revolution. Further, with the exception of
Chief Justice Warren himself, all of the Justices on the Brown Court
were appointed by New Deal Democrats. Given this noteworthy con-
nection between the New Deal Democratic Party and the Brown Court
composition, the natural suspicion arises that there might be some ideo-
logical connection between New Deal Democratic Party ideology, and
the constitutional principles that animate the Brown decision.'6
My general claim is that the result in Brown might be partly under-
stood as emanating from certain core elements of American political
party ideology. This is not to say the previously mentioned explanations
for Brown's outcome are incorrect or invalid. To the contrary, and as I
elaborate on below, I view these broader political and institutional influ-
ences to be quite significant in operating in tandem with ideological
forces to bring about the Brown result.'7 Most importantly, I believe par-
ty ideology provided a conceptual foundation from which the Supreme
Court could interpret, conceptualize, and orient the new demands of Af-
rican-American political power, newly emerging social beliefs from po-
litical elites and the masses, and emerging federal governmental impera-
tives to combat the negative image of American racism abroad. Crucial-
ly, party ideological commitments also provided a conceptual foundation
15. See ABRAHAM, supra note 10, app. C at 380.
16. For another argument about Brown that attempts to link it to the New Deal "higher law-
making" principle of federal governmental activism, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 108-09, 145-50 (1991).
17. See infra Part Il.A. While I make no claim that these ideational links wholly determined
Brown, I would also avoid any claim that the conception of minority civil rights contained within
Brown was the only plausible outgrowth of these ideational elements in the post-New Deal era
either. Indeed Goluboff discusses an alternative, more labor and economic-centric form of civil
rights for racial minorities that ultimately failed to become as entrenched as the Brown regime for a
variety of reasons; this alternative conception of civil rights that she illuminates would, of course,
have also been consistent with the ideational elements discussed here. See RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE
LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 1-15 (2007).
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for the Court to begin to construct new doctrines of equality in the post-
WWII era as well.
My specific claim is that there are four aspects of New Deal Demo-
cratic Party ideology that provided a conceptual foundation for both the
Brown decision in 1954 and the New Deal Democratic commitment to a
form of economic liberalism.18 Thus, because New Deal era Supreme
Court appointments were (of course) made with the latter themes in
mind, an ideological basis was established with these appointments for
not just New Deal economic liberalism, but also for a subsequent racial
liberalism as well. These four ideological commitments were in turn, (a)
an acceptance of "class politics"; (b) a commitment to federal govern-
mental statism, or the use of federal governmental power to promote
desirable social goals; (c) a (relatively) non-southern orientation to class
politics; and (d) a principled acceptance of the Supreme Court fulfilling a
"rationalizing" function with respect to revising established legal doc-
trines.
In fleshing out the ideological connections between the New Deal
and Brown, this paper seeks to advance three distinct inquires. First, the
argument seeks to illuminate another facet of the Brown ruling as an in-
stance of constitutional development and to shed light on how the Justic-
es themselves may have understood or situated their own actions at the
more abstract level of party ideology. Certain ideas helped to facilitate
the Brown result by providing a conceptual foundation upon which judg-
es could interpret and understand broader political forces and events.
Implied within this claim is a subsidiary claim: the ideas underlying
Brown exerted sufficient force, and had sufficient substantive content,
that judicial actors were able to converge on their meaning and applica-
tion in the discrete circumstance of school desegregation in 1954.19
Second, the argument also seeks to illuminate the broader connec-
tions between the New Deal and the subsequent "rights revolution" of
the mid to late-twentieth century. There is a common belief that New
Deal progressivism had something to do with the Court's notable protec-
tion of noneconomic rights in the 1950s and 1960s. Indicative of this
belief is the fact that scholars have often turned to Footnote Four of
18. By saying that there was a New Deal commitment to "economic liberalism," I mean this
in only a relative sense compared to the policies that preceded the New Deal. As others have noted,
there were certainly limits to the liberalism that emerged from the New Deal. See ALAN BRINKLEY,
THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 3-4, 7-10 (1st Vintage
Books ed. 1996). 1 would offer the same qualification for my use of the term "racial liberalism" as
well.
19. Thus the structural influence of these ideas on legal development is suggested, in part, by
the unanimity of the Brown ruling, and the prevalence of these ideas within equal protection doctrine
in subsequent decades. For another account of how political ideas interact with changes in legal
doctrine, though with a greater focus on the presidency than my account, see Robert L. Tsai, Recon-
sidering Gobitis: An Exercise in Presidential Leadership, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 363, 377-78 (2008).
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United States v. Carolene Products Co.20-authored by then-Associate
Justice Stone in 1938-as a historical explanation and justification for
much of the Court's subsequent work in the post-New Deal era.2' While
Footnote Four is a valuable start and while its themes are consistent with
the ideological themes I highlight, I believe the connections between
these two historical eras might be illuminated in greater depth and speci-
ficity by focusing on party-ideological links.
Third, and finally, by focusing on this single case study of the New
Deal and Brown, I also hope to offer a preliminary analysis of "jurispru-
dential bundling" as a distinct theory of judicial behavior and constitu-
tional development. The dynamic, stated simply, is that if two bodies of
doctrine are linked firmly enough by a common set of ideological pre-
sumptions, judicial appointments made with any eye to changing doc-
trine in one area of the law will have consequences for the other body of
doctrine. In this sense, those two bodies of law could be described as
"bundled," at least with respect to judicial appointments considerations.22
As will be implied from the discussion below, a significant amount of
constitutional development fails to be captured within a conventional
appointments-centered analysis. Though the argument offered here might
be reconciled with that and other well-known theories of judicial behav-
ior, I would assert that a focus on party ideologies and jurisprudential
bundling in their own right may point toward more fruitful avenues in the
study of judicial behavior and legal development.
After laying out the four ideological elements in Part I, in Part II I
will then discuss in greater detail how those ideas intersected with the
decision making in the Brown ruling. Finally, in Part III, I will discuss
several conceptual and historical implications that stem from illuminat-
ing the ideological connections between New Deal economic liberalism
and the Brown decision.
I. FOUR ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTY IDEOLOGY
My primary task in this Part is to identify and flesh out four ideo-
logical elements that link New Deal Democratic Party ideology and the
Brown ruling. In explicating these ideological elements, it will be appar-
ent that their origins lie largely before the New Deal itself. Thus, what
gave the New Deal its distinct ideological orientation was not so much
the articulation of wholly original ideas, but more the combination of
20. 304 U.S. 144, 145, 152 n.4 (1938).
21. As Powe states it, "Footnote Four is the principal justification offered for the role of the
Supreme Court in post-New Deal American politics." L.A. Powe, Jr., Does Footnote Four De-
scribe?, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 197,213 (1994). Ultimately, however, Powe is much more measured
in his evaluation of the descriptive power of Footnote Four. Id. at 197.
22. Thus, I use the term "jurisprudential" in line with conventional definitions of the word:
"[judicial precedents considered collectively" and "la] system, body, or division of law." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 858 (7th ed. 1999).
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already-present ideas that had been reshaped in new and significant
ways. In thus highlighting some of the ideological roots of the New Deal,
a notable continuity emerges between the Brown ruling and these older
party-ideological elements.
A. Class Politics: Conflicting Classes in Society and the Governmental
Promotion of Class Interests
By "class," I refer to enduring societal differentiations in the Amer-
ican polity according to any number of social characteristics including
not just economic class, but also differentiation by race, gender, profes-
sion, or various other social characteristics or particular special interests.
In emphasizing this component of American party ideology, my focus is
less on any particular dimension of societal differentiation and more on
the recognition of differentiation itself.
An ideological commitment to class politics has two main compo-
nents. The first is a recognition and acceptance of enduring and conflict-
ing class interests in society. Beyond just the mere recognition of social
differentiations, a class political vision recognizes that such class differ-
entiations could be quite permanent and entrenched. For example, while
Republican free-labor ideologies may have conceived of different eco-
nomic classes, they also envisioned a degree of fluidity to one's member-
ship in a particular economic or professional class that, in part, precluded
that party's ideological affinity with a class political vision.23 In addition,
a class political vision was also informed by recognition and acceptance
of the fact that class interests may be in conflict; it was not informed by
harmonious visions of society, where benefits accruing to one class
would reliably and automatically filter to others. The second element of a
class political vision lies in the proper governmental response to such
conflicting interests. Rather than ignoring them or leaving them to be
mediated by market forces or status quo arrangements, a class political
view endorsed the notion of certain class interests being promoted and
protected through law and public policy.
Such themes are apparent in the Brown ruling. The ruling recog-
nized the centrality of racial identity in American politics, and that racial
differentiations were more durable, more persistent, and laden with more
social meaning than many other sorts of social distinctions. Further, and
consistent with Carolene's Footnote Four24 notions of constitutional and
democratic fairness (which I discuss below), the Brown ruling recog-
nized persistent political disabilities attached to African-American identi-
ty that demanded federal judicial intervention against Jim Crow in the
South.
23. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 15-17,20 (1995).
24. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
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And yet, through American political history there has been an am-
bivalence, if not an outright antipathy at times, towards a vision of class
politics. The recognition of entrenched class differentiations and the con-
struction of policy and jurisprudential visions around such differentia-
tions is largely absent from much of nineteenth century party ideology.
For example, the Whig Party's programmatic vision of an economy aid-
ed and promoted by governmental policies such as a national bank, the
tariff, and governmental subsidies25 was pitched as a program that carried
benefits for all portions of American society.26 Further, the "Whigs in-
sisted that there was no such thing as class conflict, that the different
economic classes . . . were interdependent, and [that] . . . class member-
ship was fluid." 27
Likewise, the Republicans of the Gilded Age were seen at the time,
28and are still seen, as the party of business and corporate interests. Yet,
at least in their party ideology, they appealed to "labor" in general-
which, in theory, would encompass not only business elites, but also in-
dustrial labor and agrarian workers as well.29 And they saw their pre-
ferred policies as having a correspondingly positive effect on all sectors
of society.30 In this, the Gilded Age Republicans were drawing upon the
free-labor ideology of their pre-Civil War roots in orienting their pro-
grammatic vision around a very broadly defined conception of labor and
a harmony of interests between distinct economic classes.3 1
To the extent a robust notion of class existed in nineteenth century
party ideology, one might look toward Jacksonian Democratic ideology.
The Jacksonian focus on checking and opposing what they viewed as
entrenched economic and political elites-a pernicious social class-was
one of the cornerstones of this party ideology.3 2 Still, the Jacksonians
were not spokesmen for a vision of continual class competition and con-
flict either. A truly competitive pluralism was not accepted as an ines-
capable fact for them, nor were persistent class differentiations a compo-
nent of the Jacksonian-preferred form of society. As commentators on
Jacksonian party ideology have noted, most of their appeals were to "the
people" at large, and not to any particular, or permanently marked-out
classes. The Jacksonian normative vision was one of a society that, if
kept free of the corruption of economic and political elites, could be a
25. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 583-84 (2007).
26. LEWIS L. GOULD, GRAND OLD PARTY: A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICANS 11 (2003).
27. HOWE, supra note 25, at 544; see also SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 486 (2005) (discussing the Whig belief in class harmony).
28. JOHN GERRING, PARTY IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA, 1828-1996, at 117 (1998) (discussing
the pro-business reputation of Gilded Age Republicans).
29. See id at 60, 62-64.
30. Id. at 74; GOULD, supra note 26, at 91-92.
31. FONER, supra note 23, at 15, 19-21.
32. HOWE, supra note 25, at 380-81, 501, 582; WILENTZ, supra note 27, at 513-14; JULES
WITCOVER, PARTY OF THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THE DEMOCRATS 138-39 (2003).
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relatively classless, egalitarian constitutional order (at least for white
males).33
Jacksonian era themes of an aversion to special classes or interests
played an extremely prominent role in American legal thought. In the
jurisprudential context, such ideas enjoyed a longer shelf life than the
Jacksonians themselves. As Gillman has argued, the notion of rejecting
legislation that "was designed to advance the special or partial interests
of particular groups or classes" informed and drove the economic rights
decisions of the Court during the Lochner era-more so, he argues, than
any sort of judicial commitment to an "unrestrained free-market" ideolo-
34
gy.
Even in the context of race, a similar ambivalence to recognizing
entrenched differentiations-and constructing policy upon those terms-
was present in the nineteenth century. Reconstruction Republicans
passed a host of constitutional and legislative enactments aimed largely
(though not entirely) at benefiting African-Americans. In this, there was
certainly a class ideological component. Yet for many Republicans, the
purpose of such measures was to raise the freedmen to a level of formal
civil and political equality with white males so that special legal protec-
tions would not be needed going forward.
For example, for some portion of Republicans, this was one of the
strongest motives for enacting the Fifteenth Amendment. Its passing at
the close of Reconstruction was seen as a low-hassle, less federally intru-
sive means of consolidating the gains of Reconstruction for the freed-
men, since with the right to vote, they would supposedly be capable of
fending for themselves.35 Likewise, Justice Bradley expressed a similar
sentiment in his majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases,36 where the
Court struck down the equality of public accommodations provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875.37 As Justice Bradley stated toward reaching
this conclusion:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he
33. See GERRING, supra note 28, at 196 (noting that Jacksonian Democrats spoke of the
people at large, rather than referencing a subset of "ordinary Americans" as did Bryan or Truman
(internal quotation marks omitted)); WILENTZ, supra note 27, at 516-I7; WITCOVER, note 32, at 139
(discussing economic elites as a "cancer on the body politic"). In practice, of course, the Jacksonian
coalition was composed of farmers, southern planters, and the wage-earning constituencies in the
North. HOWE, supra note 25, at 544-45.
34. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 10 (1993).
35. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at
448-49 (1988); WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 162 (1965).
36. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
37. Id. at 25-26.
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takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite
of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be pro-
tected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protect-
ed.38
One could argue, however, that Brown, like some of the Republican
Party sentiment in the Reconstruction Era, recognized class-differences
based upon race, but did so with the goal or purpose of ultimately reach-
ing a society that would be color-blind. Such an argument, however,
minimizes at least three notable divergences between Brown and some
Reconstruction Republican sentiment. First, the notion of equality pre-
sented in Brown was more robust and more cognizant of inherent class-
differences; Chief Justice Warren's opinion pressed for a conception of
substantive equality that went far beyond where the median Republican
voter would have preferred in the 1860s. Second, and relatedly, specific
language in the opinion-namely, Chief Justice Warren's reference to
how segregation affected African-American children in a way such that it
"generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be un-
done"39-evoked class politics in a direct manner that was absent in the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which were characterized by
more formalistic equality concerns.4 0 Finally, the particular judicial solic-
itude for African-Americans as a group that is hinted at in Brown was
confirmed and repeatedly demonstrated in the Court's subsequent deseg-
regation and Equal Protection cases, where racial classifications assumed
a special status in the doctrine that allowed for vigorous judicial protec-
tion of racial minorities.4 '
As a matter of party ideology, Brown's recognition of persistent
class differentiation, and its endorsement of beneficial class-specific le-
gal rules and policies, probably stems from the Populists and Progressive
42Era Democrats. Within the appeals to reform that emanated from the
38. Id. at 25.
39. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
40. With respect to the motives behind the Fourteenth Amendment specifically, the limited
Republican concern with class was reflected in their concern with protecting both African-
Americans and Northern or Republican whites against southern persecution-as indicated by the
general equality guarantees in the text. See FONER, supra note 35, at 257-58. The Reconstruction
Republican concern with a more generalizable notion of equality was present in the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 as well. See id. at 243-47, 250-51; MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A
COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869, at
163-65 (1974).
41. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213-14 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 9-11, 27-28 (1971); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
441-42 (1968); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
42. This is not to say that all Progressives employed a class-based perspective on politics. As
Sidney Milkis notes in describing the ideology of Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party in
the 1912 election, they displayed-for the most part-an aversion to class politics and hoped to
transcend class differences. See SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE PROGRESSIVE
PARTY, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 189, 211, 247, 258 (2009); see also
OTIS L. GRAHAM, JR., AN ENCORE FOR REFORM: THE OLD PROGRESSIVES AND THE NEw DEAL 37-
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Democratic Party under the leadership of William Jennings Bryan and
Woodrow Wilson, there was clearly a concern about how certain eco-
nomic classes had been negatively impacted by American industry and
economic elites.43 Further, by the time of WWI, and especially in the
post-WWI era, Progressive intellectuals had also moved toward a more
supportive stance of factional politics in their support of labor interests.44
And this very same strain of thought was central to New Deal party ide-
ology. It undergirded the passage of, among other things, the Wagner
Act, which was premised upon the recognition of labor as a distinct so-
cial class worthy of federal governmental protection and called for con-
gressional oversight of labor relations in order for free market forces to
operate upon a more rational and orderly basis.45
During the New Deal era, the most noteworthy judicial statement
that reflected a class political sentiment, and that also explicitly empha-
sized race as a significant social class, was Justice Stone's Footnote Four
in Carolene Products.4 6 The footnote explicitly contemplated the possi-
ble need for sustained judicial intervention in defense of "discrete and
insular" minorities.4 7 Presumably, the need for such judicial intervention
was due to the durability of certain social cleavages and the possibility of
those cleavages freezing certain social groups out of the interplay of plu-
ralistic politics. Bixby has emphasized the significance of certain politi-
cal events in the late 1930s-particularly the rise of fascism in Europe-
as being enormously consequential in driving the emergence of a new
38 (1967); MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920, at 134-35, 138 (2003). Milkis links this ambivalence to a
similar Progressive Party ambivalence on the issue of African-American rights at the time. MILKIS,
supra at 166, 176, 211. In this, perhaps, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party demonstrated
a continuity with then-prevailing Republican Party ideological aversion to class politics. See infra
notes 28-3 1. Graham sees the ambivalence of the Theodore Roosevelt Progressives toward class
politics as a significant point of distinction between their ideological outlook, and that of the later
New Deal. GRAHAM, supra at 38, 69-70, 180-81.
43. See MICHAEL KAZIN, A GODLY HERO: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN, at xviii-
xix, 45 (2006) (discussing Bryan's views on the moral obligations of government). Hence, as
Gerring notes, the party ideology of the Democrats from 1896 through the mid-twentieth century
employed class themes-though based on economic differences-that were more prominent relative
to the old Jacksonian appeals to the broader polity. GERRING, supra note 28, at 196-97.
44. Yet, it should be emphasized that these intellectuals supported factional politics in the
service of a larger, familiar pre-WW1 Progressive goal of a more communal, above-faction political
order. See MARC STEARS, DEMANDING DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN RADICALS IN SEARCH OF A NEW
POLITICS 48-55, 63 (2010).
45. Gerring does argue that even though the Democrats of this era engaged in class politics,
they still sometimes refused to fully admit that they were doing so. GERRING, supra note 28, at 196-
98.
46. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In light of Footnote Four's anticipation of the new ways
that class political ideas would be applied by the judiciary nearly twenty years later in the mid-20th
century rights revolution, Bixby locates the beginnings of a shift in jurisprudential thinking about
classes or groups at the earlier post-New Deal period of 1935-1945. David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt
Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90
YALE L.J. 741, 743 (1981). During this time, he argues, the Court began to evidence a new concern
with protecting classes defined by racial, religious and ethnic identity. Id. at 761-79.
47. Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
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judicial solicitude for racial minorities in the post-New Deal era.48 While
he is undoubtedly correct, it is also worth emphasizing that the class po-
litical themes present in Brown and Footnote Four have a lineage that
extends back to before the 1930s.49 Footnote Four and the emergence of
a tentative concern for racial minorities during the post-New Deal era
also clearly drew upon a background understanding of persistent social
differentiation that, by 1938, had been well established in progressive
political ideologies.
As a final point, the mere recognition of entrenched and conflicting
social divisions in American society does not necessarily take one all the
way to the outcome in Brown. The Populists and Progressives of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were also cognizant of social
divisions, but their elaboration on these divisions led to a focus on eco-
nomic cleavages rather than racial ones.50 Further, to the extent that they
did focus on racial cleavages, it led many of them to accept prevailing
notions of racial inegalitarianism that sat diametrically opposed to the
anti-discrimination norms present in Brown.5 '
Thus, the mere endorsement of a class political vision was insuffi-
cient to dictate the outcome of Brown. Rather, the judicial recognition of
class differentiation was a necessary component of the Brown result,
where the Court singled out a particular social group for "special" legal
protections that went beyond the formal legal equality embodied within
Jim Crow "separate but equal" laws.52  While the Reconstruction
Amendments aimed to place the freedman on an equal footing with
whites with respect to formal civil and political equality, Brown, and
especially the subsequent judicial statements on school desegregation in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, clearly aimed to do more.5 3 The judicial
48. See Bixby, supra note 46, at 753-59, 763-64.
49. Though he is less inclined to emphasize these ideological continuities, Bixby also nods to
this point. See id. at 761, 778.
50. While the Populists perhaps did not promote a version of class politics as stark as what
would appear in mid-twentieth century politics, they did recognize the existence of distinct economic
classes and oriented their policy proposals toward those that would favor agrarians and other "pro-
ducing" and laboring classes. See LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT: A SHORT
HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLT IN AMERICA 85-86, 90-92, 107-10, 172-73, 211-12 (1978);
see also MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 34-35 (1995);
CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION 224-25 (2007).
51. POSTEL, supra note 50, at 18-19, 174, 176, 202. Yet Postel also notes how the role of the
populists in facilitating greater political competition also led to "cracks open[ing] in the walls of
racial oppression." Id. at 202. For a discussion on the racial policies of the southern Democrats of the
Progressive Era, see KAZIN, supra note 43, at 149. See also DAVID SARASOHN, THE PARTY OF
REFORM: DEMOCRATS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 17-21 (1989).
52. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
53. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) ("[A] finding of intentional-
ly segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system . . . creates a ....
prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities, [which] shifts to
those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also
the result of intentionally segregative actions."); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (holding that broad and flexible judicial authority may be invoked where schools
fail in their affirmative obligation to convert segregated schools to a unitary system); Green v. Cnty.
57
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
acceptance of persistent class differentiations also underlay the Court's
elaboration on Footnote Four themes in subsequent decades, with its
protection for other "disfavored" social groups beyond the racial context,
in the gender54 and sexual orientation5 5 contexts.
B. A Commitment o Federal Governmental Statism
Brown's reliance on an ideological commitment to federal govern-
mental statism is hard to miss, and hard to dispute. The Brown Court,
whether fully consciously or not, was building upon Reconstruction era
notions (in both the Reconstruction Amendments, and especially the Re-
construction era civil rights statutes) that saw racial discrimination at the
local and state governmental level as appropriate for federal correction.
Implicit in this view of federal governmental statism, as applied to race,
was the notion that social conventions should not be allowed to reign
simply because they were well-established, contrary to Justice Brown's
statement on the matter in Plessy v. Ferguson. Likewise, Brown also
indicated that local governmental norms should not be allowed to trump
federal norms when it came to race-an idea contrary to the views of
southern Democrats and more conservative northemers in the post-
Reconstruction era, and to the views of southern Democrats in the New
Deal era.
The concept of federal statism was an ideological commitment with
relatively clear roots in nineteenth century party politics. In contrast to
their ambivalence toward class ideologies,5 7 the Whig and Republican
Parties, at least relative to the Democratic Party, were favorably disposed
to harnessing federal governmental power towards the promotion of pub-
lic policy goals. The Whig program was centrally based upon the need
for federal governmental intervention into economic affairs,58 and the
Gilded Age Republicans, though identified with a strain of laissez-faire
in some policy contexts, promoted a very federal governmental-friendly
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968) (holding that New Kent School Board's plan allowing students
to choose which public school to attend was not a sufficient step to effectuate a transition to a unitary
system mandated under Brown).
54. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976). In his dissent Chief Justice Burger
stated "[tihough today's decision does not go so far as to make gender-based classifications 'sus-
pect,' it makes gender a disfavored classification." Id. at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion) (holding that classifications
based upon sex are inherently suspect and subjected to strict judicial scrutiny).
55. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (refusing to uphold a "law that singled
out homosexuals 'for disfavored legal status'); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding
Colorado amendment that prohibited any legislative, executive, and judicial action designed to
protect homosexuals violated Equal Protection Clause).
56. 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896). Notably, Jim Crow segregation was hardly an age-old
custom by 1896. The assertion that a flux in southern race relations persisted into the 1880s is the
"Woodward Thesis." See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 82-83
(Commemorative ed. 2002).
57. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
58. HOWE, supra note 25, at 583-84, 612, 835. See also GOULD, supra note 26, at 11;
wILENTZ, supra note 27, at 492.
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vision of economic nationalism.9 Gilded Age Republicans sought to use
federal governmental authority to promote the construction of the rail-
roads, the construction of internal improvements, and to aid domestic
production through a commitment to the tariff.60 In addition, Bensel
notes that the economic/regulatory decisions of Republican appointees
on the Supreme Court during the Gilded Age dovetailed quite nicely with
this vision of economic nationalism, since as a consequence of these rul-
ings the Court was able to create a national market unencumbered by
antagonistic regulations implemented at the state level.6 1 To the Gilded
Age Republicans, the benefits of this economic nationalistic vision were
meant to accrue to all sectors of American society.62
In contrast, since Jefferson, the Democrats were historically the par-
ty of skepticism toward federal governmental power.63 The Jacksonians
favored a weaker federal government and a more open market economy
since they were inclined to think the federal government would inevita-
bly be subject to the control of special economic and political interests.6
In contrast to the Republican commitment to the tariff, which was argua-
bly the central defining feature of that party through the Gilded Age,
the Democrats were long the party of free trade and tariff reform.6 6 Fur-
ther, in the post-Civil War years, the Democrats were the party of greater
skepticism toward federal governmental intrusion in the South.
However, near the turn of the century, the Democrats began to ex-
hibit a changed perspective on the benefits of federal governmental in-
tervention. A positive stance on federal governmental statism can be
traced running from William Jennings Bryan, extending through Wilson,
and finding its culmination in FDR's New Deal.67 And that same com-
mitment was apparent in some civil rights rulings by the Court in the
decades immediately preceding Brown. In the Court's attack on white
primaries in Smith v. Allwright 8 and Terry v. Adams,69 and in the Court's
59. GERRING, supra note 28, at 65-66, 68-69, 83; GOULD, supra note 26, at 485-86.
60. GOULD, supra note 26, at 83-84, 138, 485-86.
61. RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900, at 7-8, 321-36 (2000).
62. GERRING, supra note 28, at 74; GOULD, supra note 26, at 91-92, 486.
63. GERRING, supra note 28, at 166-71; see also WITCOVER, supra note 32, at 67, 86-87.
Jefferson did become friendlier to the exercise of federal governmental power, however, once in
office, and later in life. See WITCOVER, supra note 32, at 91-93; HOWE, supra note 25, at 83-84;
WILENTZ, supra note 27, at 135-36.
64. GERRING, supra note 28, at 171-72; HOWE, supra note 25, at 380-81, 501, 582-83, 835;
WILENTZ, supra note 27, at 438. The prominent exception to this anti-federal governmental statism,
as Howe notes, was the Jacksonian interest in utilizing federal governmental power for national
territorial expansion. HOWE, supra note 25, at 583, 707-08.
65. GOULD, supra note 26, at 90-91. On the tariff serving as the key linchpin of the Republi-
can coalition during the Gilded Age, see BENSEL, supra note 61, at 8-10.
66. GERRING, supra note 28, at 167.
67. See id. at 204-08, 224-30; see also KAZIN, supra note 43, at xviii-xix, 45-46 (2006)
(discussing Bryan).
68. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
69. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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ruling against racially restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer,70 for
example, a new jurisprudential view of society could be gleaned even in
the 1940s. In this jurisprudential view, the zones of "private" activity that
were free of federal oversight-but where racial discrimination might
occur-were clearly shrinking.7' Thus, the commitment to federal stat-
ism marks another point of continuity between Brown and the New Deal.
C. A Relative Non-Southern Orientation to Class Politics
Though this point may be largely implicit in the preceding sections,
a third ideological element also joins the New Deal and Brown; beyond
their common acceptance of class politics, both also embodied, at least in
part, the promotion of particular class or group interests that aligned with
the sympathies of the non-southern wing of the New Deal and post-New
Deal Democratic Party. This ideological characteristic was relatively
more subdued during the New Deal. But from at least 1928 through to
the early 1950s, a broader, incremental, relative shift of the Democratic
Party away from its historic southern base underlay the electoral compo-
sition and the ideological orientation of the Democratic Party during both
the New Deal and the rights revolution of the mid-twentieth century.
Thus, there is a common sectional slant to both historical contexts; with-
in the class political visions of each period, the concept of class was be-
coming relatively less moored to the southern constituencies that had
historically been privileged by the Democratic Party. Rather than focus-
ing on only southern agrarians, the New Deal and post-New Deal Party
also conceived of a form of class politics prominently centered around
groups such as organized labor7 2 and racial minorities.
This ideological element is not, strictly speaking, a wholly distinct
element. More accurately, the relative, non-southern sectional outlook of
the New Deal and the Brown Court is a description or an elaboration on
the class differentiation idea. Further, among the various ideological el-
ements discussed in this Part, it is the one that is most directly tied to the
dynamics of partisan politics. By way of fleshing it out, the remainder of
this section offers a brief historical overview of two related political de-
velopments from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twenti-
eth century: (a) the declining importance of the South for Democratic
presidential nominees and (b) the changing, and increasingly less-
southern, conceptions of class reflected in Democratic legislative efforts
70. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
71. See Terry, 345 U.S. at 469-71; Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20-21; Allwright, 321 U.S. at 664-67.
72. As Katznelson, Geiger, Kryder, and Farhang discuss, in addition to their antipathy to
African-American interests in the New Deal and post-New Deal eras, the southern wing of the
Democratic Party also had an increasingly hostile orientation to labor interests in the 1940s. Ira
Katznelson, Kim Geiger & Daniel Kryder, Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress,
1933-1950, 108 POL. Sci. Q. 283, 285-86, 288-89, 292-94, 297-99 (1993); Sean Farhang & Ira
Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal, 19
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1, 7,21 (2005).
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during this time. These political developments reflect, in turn, two more
general points: first, a "dynamic" political understanding of class politics
within the Democratic Party, as the favored classes within this ideology
changed over time. Second, and, equally importantly, these political de-
velopments also illuminate the continuity or durability of the grammar of
class politics within the Democratic Party.
A rather conventional periodization of the post-Civil War Demo-
cratic Party locates key break-points in its orientation during these presi-
dential elections: 1876, 1896, 1912, 1920, and 1932. A plausible starting
point is 1876, since it effectively marked the culmination of "Redemp-
tion" within the former Confederate states.73 From 1876 to 1896, the
Democratic Party was a relatively competitive national force, winning
two presidential elections with Cleveland in 1884 and 1892.74 Its political
power stemmed from the "solid" and very reliable South75 and support
from several states in the Northeast76-the most important of which was
New York. As a simple and somewhat crude marker for gauging the rela-
tive influence of the South on the Democratic Party at a given moment in
time, consider the percentage of electoral votes garnered by a Democrat-
ic presidential candidate from the southern states. In examining the five
presidential elections during this span of years, the average percentage of
electoral votes contributed by the southern states was 51.1%.77
A notable shift occurred, however, with Bryan's ascendency in
1896 to the first of his three presidential nominations (the other two were
in 1900 and 1908). From 1896 to 1908, the Democratic Party became
unmistakably more southern. The average percentage of electoral votes
contributed by the South across those four presidential elections rose to
73.9%7 8-a product of the South's extreme reliability for the Democrats
and a likely consequence of the declining influence of the northeastern
wing of the party.79
73. The consequences of the highly disputed 1876 elections were not sorted out, however,
until early 1877. FONER,supra note 35, at 580-82.
74. CQ PRESS, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1789-2004, at 218, 220 (2005) [hereinafter
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS]. All references to presidential elections and electoral vote totals in this
paragraph and for the remainder of this section are drawn from PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, supra at
216-34.
75. In referring to "the South," I am following one scholarly convention of applying this term
to the eleven states of the ex-Confederacy: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. For an example of one prom-
inent work that follows this convention, see V.0. KEY, JR. WITH ASSISTANCE OF ALEXANDER
HEARD, SOUTHERN POLITICS: IN STATE AND NATION 7 (1949). There is, however, some scholarly
variation in which states are included under the heading of "the South." See, e.g., Katznelson, Geiger
& Kryder, supra note 72, at 284 n.3.
76. LEWIS L. GOULD, REFORM AND REGULATION: AMERICAN POLITICS, 1900-1916, at 8
(1978).
77. See PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 74.
78. See id.
79. See ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN
STATE, 1877-1917, at 160 (1999); WITCOVER, supra note 32, at 286-87.
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In addition, Bryan's ascendency also marked a noteworthy shift in
the Democratic Party's approach to class politics and federal governmen-
tal statism. Notwithstanding the party's nomination of the more con-
servative Alton Parker in 1904, Bryan's emphatic representation of
southern and western rural interests in 1896 elevated a new set of radical,
Populist or agrarian-inspired ideas to the spiritual and intellectual center
of the Democratic Party in the Progressive Era.80 The party of states'
rights in the nineteenth century suddenly and conspicuously found ideo-
logical space for a form of federal governmental statism,81 symbolized in
more extreme fashion by Bryan's endorsement of government ownership
of the railroads in 1906.82 The party unabashedly endorsed a vision of
class politics anchored in the interests of agrarians, and secondarily
concerned with the interests of northern labor constituencies as well.84
In the early Progressive Era, this ideological orientation was most
strongly reflected in persistent calls by the Democrats to expand the In-
terstate Commerce Commission's authority85 and in legislative achieve-
ments toward this goal-undertakings that benefitted southern and west-
ern agrarian-shippers. Prominent examples include the Hepburn Act of
1906,86 and the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910,87 where southern Democratic
support for regulation was particularly strong. With respect to the latter,
Sanders' conclusion after analyzing the various votes surrounding the
Mann-Elkins bill and amendments is that:
These votes clearly reveal the sectional locus of the reform
drive .... Democratic support for expanding the scope of regulation
and maintaining or strengthening antitrust prohibitions was nearly
unanimous. On the typical strengthening amendment, sixteen to
eighteen Democratic votes, all but two or three coming from periph-
ery [southern and western] senators, constituted the bulk of the re-
form vote. To that base would be added the votes of four or five di-
verse-area Republicans and seven or eight periphery Republicans.
This was the hard core of the reform group in the Senate.88
80. SANDERS, supra note 79, at 154-58, 412-13; SARASOHN, supra note 51, at x-xi, xiv.
81. See SARASOHN, supra note 51, at x; Dewey W. Grantham, The Contours of Southern
Progressivism, 86 AM. HIST. REv. 1035, 1041, 1045-46 (1981); Anne Firor Scott, A Progressive
Windfrom the South, 1906-1913, 29 J. S. HIST. 53, 58-59, 69 (1963).
82. KAZIN, supra note 43, at 145-48; SANDERS, supra note 79, at 211; SARASOHN, supra note
51, at 23.
83. SANDERS, supra note 79, at 4, 118, 131, 139, 412-13; Grantham, supra note 81, at 1041;
Arthur S. Link, The Progressive Movement in the South, 1870-1914, 23 N.C. HIST. REv. 172, 173
(1946); Scott, supra note 81, at 54.
84. SANDERS, supra note 79, at 97-98; SARASOHN, supra note 51, at xi, 18.
85. SANDERS, supra note 79, at 198-99.
86. Hepburn Act of 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906); SANDERS, supra note 79, at 199-202;
SARASOHN, supra note 51, at 3-10; Scott, supra note 81, at 55-57.
87. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910); SANDERS, supra note 79, at 203-
08; SARASOHN, supra note 51, at 77-80.
88. SANDERS, supra note 79, at 205-06. It is noteworthy, however, that provision for a new
Commerce Court in the bill-which could potentially counteract the regulations imposed by the
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Wilson's ascendency to the presidency in 1912 marked a new high
for this agrarian-inspired progressivism and indicated its broader elec-
toral appeal. The average percentage of electoral votes contributed by the
South during the 1912 and 1916 presidential elections was only 37.3%.89
While maintaining his southern base, Wilson also recaptured the north-
eastern votes that had departed from the Democrats with Bryan's nomi-
nation in 1896 (although Wilson would also lose these votes in his 1916
reelection), and won in the Mid-West, Mountain-West, and West.
Passage of legislation such as the Underwood Tariff (1913),90 which
included an income tax, 91 the Federal Reserve Act (1913),92 a more pro-
gressive income tax-relative to the 1913 tax-in the Revenue Act of
1916,93 and the Federal Farm Loan Act (1916), marks a clear line of
continuity between the Democrats of the Wilson era and the agrarian
ideology of Bryan. Wilson's decidedly conservative outlook on race also
spoke well for him to the southern core of the party.95
In addition, however, the party's adoption of a more progressive
outlook and rhetoric on economic-related reforms also aided the Demo-
crats in appealing to labor and other left-leaning progressive constituen-
cies.96 Legislative achievements during Wilson's tenure reflecting such
outreach included limiting of the federal injunction for labor disputes in
the Clayton Act (1914)," the Seamen's Act (1915),98 worker's compen-
sation for federal employees in 1916,99 and the Adamson Act (1916)
providing for maximum hours for railroad workers.100 These legislative
achievements in the labor context underscored the expansiveness of the
Interstate Commerce Commission-apparently led to most Democrats not voting in support of the
bill on the final vote. Id. at 208-09.
89. See PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 74.
90. Underwood TariffAct of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
91. SANDERS, supra note 79, at 226-30; SARASOHN, supra note 51, at 181.
92. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913); SANDERS, supra note 79, at 256-
59.
93. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756 (1916); SANDERS, supra note 79, at 230-31;
SARASOHN, supra note 51, at 187.
94. Federal Farm Loan Act, ch. 245, 39 Stat. 360 (1916); SANDERS, supra note 79, at 260-61;
SARASOHN, supra note 51, at 186-87.
95. SARASOHN, supra note 51, at 170-72; Stephen Skowronek, The Reassociation of Ideas
and Purposes: Racism, Liberalism, and the American Political Tradition, 100 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
385, 391 (2006).
96. SARASOHN, supra note 51, at 22, 26-27, 205-07, 225-27.
97. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914); SANDERS, supra note 79, at 344-45,
359.
98. Seamen's Act of 1915, ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1164 (1915); SANDERS,supra note 79, at 353-55,
365-67.
99. SANDERS, supra note 79, at 376-77; SARASOHN, supra note 51, at 187-88.
100. Adamson Act, ch. 436, 39 Stat. 721 (1916); SANDERS, supra note 79, at 379-82;
SARASOHN, supra note 51, at 188-89.
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Democrats' agrarian ideology and foreshadowed future, more dramatic
changes in the progressive ideologies of the party.101
While Wilson's turn to some of these progressive measures may
have been instrumental and belated,10 2 these sorts of reforms were wholly
consistent and conversant with the broader party's ideological preoccu-
pation with class politics and federal governmental statism (at least on
economic matters).0 3 Sarasohn states that:
Certainly, Wilson was a key progressive leader, but he also had the
advantage of having determined progressive followers, who some-
times had to wait for their leader to catch up with them. Wilson's
leftward shift in 1916, like similar shifts he made in 1910 and 1912,
was toward positions already held by the rest of his party.1
04
Following Wilson's two terms, the Democratic Party's electoral
vote totals collapsed almost entirely to its southern base in 1920, 1924,
and 1928-a region that was itself somewhat unreliable for the Demo-
crats-and accordingly, they lost badly.'05 The average percentage of
electoral votes contributed by the South during these three presidential
elections was a conspicuously high 85.4%.106 Notwithstanding these per-
centages, a more contextual examination of the period also suggests that
with the 1928 election, the northern, urban wing of the Democratic Par-
ty-defined by labor, immigrant, and eventually African-American con-
stituencies-was gaining in strength.07
Building upon the expansion of the urban Democratic vote with Al
Smith's candidacy in 1928,'0o FDR's election in 1932 marked the emer-
gence of a new, broad-based Democratic coalition that proved to be very
durable. FDR's coalition was essentially the same one, geographically,
that had elected Wilson-though with slightly more Midwestern support.
From 1932 to Truman's election in 1948, the percentage of electoral
votes contributed by the South to the electoral vote totals of the Demo-
cratic nominee in these elections reached its lowest point at 23.7% (in
101. For a full list of the many legislative items, enacted from 1910-1916, that Sanders deems
the "agrarian statist agenda" see SANDERS, supra note 79, at 174 tbl.II. 1. It should be noted, howev-
er, that in terms of electoral support, labor was a fickle partner for the Democrats during this period,
though it was helpful to Wilson in winning Ohio and California in his reelection in 1916. Id. at 77-
78; SARASOHN, supra note 51, at 22, 26-27, 54-55, 89, 205-06, 225-27.
102. On Wilson's belated shift on the Federal Farm Loan Act, see SARASOHN, supra note 51,
at 122, 184-86. On his lack of involvement in the income tax in the Revenue Act of 1916, see id. at
144, 187.
103. SARASOHN, supra note 51, at xvi, 167, 189.
104. Id. at 189.
105. See PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 74.
106. Id.
107. DAVID BURNER, THE POLITICS OF PROVINCIALISM: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN
TRANSITION, 1918-1932, at xi, 79-80, 251-52 (1967).
108. Id. at 228-31, 242-43; DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945, at 102 (1999).
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1936) and never exceeded 29.4% (in 1944).19 As early as FDR's reelec-
tion in 1936, he could seriously contemplate making urban constituencies
such as labor, immigrants, and African-Americans the base of a trans-
formed Democratic Party.o Although the effort ultimately failed, it is no
surprise in light of these electoral dynamics that Roosevelt attempted to
purge conservative Democrats, several from the South, in 1938.'
In addition to these shifts in the electoral supports of the Democratic
Party, the beginnings of a de-southernization of the party could also be
gleaned, if only faintly, in the changing shape of public policy that
emerged from the New Deal. Several key points of continuity did exist
between the early New Deal and early Southern Progressivism. The New
Deal era conception of class encompassed the agrarian interests at the
heart of Populism and Southern Progressivism, as evidenced by the focus
on relief for rural interests in the form of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act in 1933.112 And largely in alignment with ideology of Southern Pro-
gressivism, the programs of the New Deal posed little challenge to the
racial hierarchy of the South. This was underscored by the absence of
any civil rights legislation during FDR's terms, FDR's ambivalence on
federal anti-lynching legislation in 1938,'13 and the exclusionary con-
tours and administration of key New Deal programs."14
Yet, furthering trends that might have been glimpsed as early as
Wilson's tenure, the New Deal and post-New Deal deployment of class
politics was colored by a heightened significance of northern, urban con-
stituencies-sometimes in opposition to the preferences of southern
Democrats. This was reflected by labor legislation in the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act's § 7(a),"'5 the Wagner Act,' 16 and the Fair Labor
Standards Act"'7-the latter of which garnered conservative southern
Democratic opposition."8 It was also reflected in social welfare legisla-
109. See PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 74.
110. KENNEDY, supra note 108, at 341-42; see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940, at 184-85 (1963).
111. See KENNEDY, supra note 108, at 348-49; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 110, at 266-68;
Richard Polenberg, The Decline of the New Deal, 1937-1940, in I THE NEW DEAL 246, 258 (John
Braeman, Robert H. Bremner & David Brody eds., 1975).
112. KENNEDY, supra note 108, at 141-44; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 110, at 51-52.
113. KENNEDY, supra note 108, at 342-43; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note I10, at 185-86.
114. With respect to the last point, the most notable example was the Social Security Act of
1935, where explicit limits on the Act's coverage with respect to old-age insurance worked to the
marked disadvantage of racial minorities. See KENNEDY, supra note 108, at 269; ROBERT C.
LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE 7-8 (1998).
115. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, sec. 7(a), 48 Stat. 195, 198 (1933); KENNEDY,
supra note 108, at 151; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note I10, at 57-58.
116. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note I10, at 150-52.
117. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012)).
118. KENNEDY, supra note 108, at 344-45; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note I 10, at 262-63.
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tion like the Social Security Act," 9 and public works programs-both of
which were identified with the interests of urban Democrats.120
More transformatively, the New Deal conception of class was also
inching its way toward inclusion of African-Americans as a preferred
class-a development hat embodied a clear break with the southern pro-
gressive roots of class politics. Even during the New Deal, the inclusion
of African-Americans within some relief programs, their symbolic inclu-
sion within the governing coalition,'2 1 FDR's (grudging) executive order
prohibiting racial discrimination against defense industry and govern-
ment workers, and his creation in that same order of the Fair Employ-
ment Practices Committee (FEPC) all pointed to the growing political
significance of this northern constituency.122 A Civil Liberties Unit was
also very notably created within the Department of Justice during FDR's
second term in 1939, which intervened on behalf of minority rights in the
South.123
These developments continued with Truman's administration,
which recognized the political significance of the northern African-
American vote. 124 The inclusion of African-Americans within the ambit
of Democratic class political concerns was demonstrated by Truman's
executive orders to desegregate the armed forces and to prohibit racial
discrimination in federal employment, his advocacy of a permanent
FEPC, his appointment of a special committee on civil rights (which
issued the "To Secure These Rights" report), and by Truman's request
for a robust package of civil rights legislation in 1948.125 His Department
of Justice also intervened as amicus curiae in key civil rights cases2 6
such as Shelley v. Kraemer,127 Sweatt v. Painter,128 and McLaurin v. Ok-
lahoma State Regents for Higher Education.129 Thus even if the Demo-
cratic Party held fast to the concept or ideology of class politics, its con-
ceptions of class were clearly shifting.
119. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. ch. 7 (2012)).
120. KENNEDY, supra note 108, at 99, 128, 264-65; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 110, at 131-
33.
121. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note I10, at 186 (referencing the inclusion of African-Americans
within some relief programs); KLARMAN, supra note 2, at 110-11 (referencing the symbolic inclu-
sion of African-Americans).
122. KENNEDY, supra note 108, at 766-68.
123. GOLUBOFF, supra note 17, at 111, 114-21, 126-31; MCMAHON, supra note 7, at 144-47.
124. ALONZO L. HAMBY, BEYOND THE NEw DEAL: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND AMERICAN
LIBERALISM 188 (1973); JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES,
1945-1974, at 148-49, 151 (1996).
125. HAMBY, supra note 124, at 188-90, 247, 342-44; MCMAHON, supra note 7, at 178;
PATTERSON, supra note 124, at 149-51.
126. DUDZIAK, supra note 8, at 91-92, 94-96; MMAHON, supra note 7, at 188, 193-94.
127. 334 U.S. I (1948).
128. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
129. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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And yet, by the late 1940s and early 1950s, this shift was unmistak-
ably only partial-hence the initial puzzle posed by the occurrence of
Brown. Durable and intense southern opposition to African-American
rights prompted Truman's ambivalence on the civil rights platform in the
1948 election, influenced Truman against introducing an omnibus civil
rights bill in 1948, and ensured the lack of success for the creation of a
permanent FEPC in 1949 and 1951.130 While the heart and soul of the
Democratic Party was no longer in the South by the mid-twentieth centu-
ry, southern Democrats would remain a powerful force to be reckoned
with for decades to come, as evidenced by the fights over civil rights
legislation up until the 1960s.
In sum, the changing orientation of the Democratic Party from the
late nineteenth century to the post-New Deal reflects one discontinuity
and one continuity. The discontinuity was a marked de-southernization
of the party, and the continuity was the persistence of a grammar of class
politics. The ideological continuity-when combined with the political
developments that had reduced the partisan influence of the South-
subsequently allowed a new vision of class politics to emerge that reso-
nated with the newer elements of the New Deal coalition. The intersec-
tion of these two political developments thus gave rise to a concept of
persistent class differentiation that allowed the Brown Court and the
Northern elements of the New Deal coalition to conceptualize class along
racial as well as economic lines-in marked opposition to the orientation
of their ideological forebears from the South."'
Emphasizing the significance of this sectional slant on class politics
in Democratic Party ideology is informative for Brown in two specific
ways. First, and most obviously, it indicates how a Court composed of
Democratic appointees (with the exception of Chief Justice Warren)
could have mounted an assault on perhaps the core component of south-
ern regional identity in school segregation. Though Justices Black, Reed,
and Clark were all at least nominally southern Democrats (as well as
Chief Justice Vinson, who participated in deliberations on Brown in
1952), by the early 1950s, they were affiliated with a political party that
was quite different from the one that had existed more than a decade
before. Second, a focus on sectional themes also helps to explain the
timing of Brown as well. As the New Deal coalition grew to be increas-
ingly non-southern in the decades following the New Deal, this trend
130. HAMBY, supra note 125, at 214, 243-44, 344-46, 445-46; PATTERSON, supra note 124, at
150-51.
131. With regard to subsequent decades, Powe views the Warren Court as aligned with mid-
20th century Democratic (i.e., Kennedy and Johnson) liberalism. See LUCAs A. POWE, JR., THE
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 489, 494 (2000). In line with the argument in this sec-
tion, he sees most of that Court's work as an assault on the sectionally distinctive value system of the
South. Id. at 490-93. Powe does note a couple of exceptions to this sectional interpretation of the
Warren Court's work, however-the most prominent being the Court's cases on contraception and
obscenity that emanated from, and targeted, areas of urban Catholic dominance. Id. at 491-92.
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aids in explaining why Brown occurred at the time that it did, and not a
decade or more earlier.' 32
D. Judicial Rationalization of the Law
A fourth connection between New Deal Democratic Party ideology
and the Brown Court was a principled acceptance, within both, of at least
the possibility of the Supreme Court fulfilling a "rationalizing" function
with respect to established legal doctrines. Under this rationalizing func-
tion, (a) the Court could, under certain conditions, appropriately take the
initiative to (b) revise or discard established legal doctrines to make the
law better reflect changing social facts and social values.'33
Consider the "b" element first: the notion of the government acting
as an agent to rationalize social, economic, and political life extended at
least to the Progressive Era, and was a dominant theme of the New Deal
programmatic reforms themselves.134 The emergence of a commitment to
judicial rationalization in the post-New Deal era owed much to these
political developments. Yet, as an intellectual matter, this idea was spe-
cifically rooted in the ideas of progressive era legal thinkers and the legal
realists-the latter of which were, in turn, formulated as critiques of late
nineteenth and early twentieth century legal formalism.13 5
To briefly summarize this background, within the jurisprudential vi-
sion of legal formalism, the lodestars for legitimate legal reasoning were
appeals to general principles and clearly defined legal categories.'36 So
long as these elements structured legal analysis, the belief was that they
would help maintain a posture of neutrality for the judiciary and the
state, and prevent the judiciary from falling into the trap of results-
oriented modes of reasoning.'3 7 Contrary to this view, the legal realists
and earlier Progressive legal thinkers critiqued formalism as being de-
132. KLARMAN, supra note 2, at 310-11 (reflecting skepticism that a Brown-like ruling could
have happened even ten years before Brown).
133. Relatedly, on this point, Powe has also asserted that the Court in the post-New Deal era
was "combining with the Federal Government and Northern elites to create a set of national norms,
eradicating in the process that which was different or backward." Powe, supra note 21, at 197. See
also POWE, supra note 131, at 489-94.
134. In summing up the New Deal, David Kennedy states:
Roosevelt's dream was the old progressive dream of wringing order out of chaos, seeking mas-
tery rather than accepting drift, imparting to ordinary Americans at least some measure of the
kind of predictability to their lives that was the birthright of the Roosevelts and the class of pa-
trician squires to which they belonged.
KENNEDY, supra note 108, at 247.
135. Legal realism, at the very least, converged with New Deal programmatic aims in sharing a
common critique of the pre-New Deal legal order. BRINKLEY, supra note 18, at 108-10; see also
MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 3, 188 (1992).
136. See HORWITZ, supra note 135, at 16-17; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE
MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953, at 14 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter WIECEK, MODERN CONSTITUTION].
137. HORWITZ, supra note 135, at 16-17, 20, 199; WIECEK, MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra
note 136, at 15; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW
AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 4-7 (1998) [hereinafter WIECEK, LOST WORLD].
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tached from social reality and advocated the opposite-a mode of legal
reasoning that could be responsive to social facts and that could be in-
strumentalist (i.e., evaluated by the results that followed from the legal
rules themselves).38
The legal realist advocacy for a more instrumentalist form of legal
reasoning ultimately influenced, in one form or another, a significant
portion of post-New Deal constitutional jurisprudence.'39 And in hind-
sight, perhaps this should not be too surprising. Once legal reasoning was
divorced from any supposed anchor in either natural law or fundamental
legal concepts in the post-New Deal era,14 0 the attractiveness of other
anchors for legal reasoning that were external to the law itself-such as
social facts and social values-must have increased. And once the door
was opened to this latter perspective, it in turn allowed for corollary
views to emerge such as thinking of the law as more malleable, as more
policy-like in orientation,141 and as subject to a relatively greater degree
of legitimate revision by state actors-ideological commitments that
spoke to a judicial rationalizing function.
That this rationalizing perspective ultimately served progressive
goals in both the economic sphere during the New Deal and in the realm
of southern race relations decades later is also unremarkable. In the same
way that industrialization and a changing economy created enormous
disconnect between social conditions and the economic doctrines of the
legal formalists,142 changing social facts and values likewise opened an
increasing disconnect between social reality and the doctrines of Jim
Crow.143 One committed to the tenets of legal realism would thus be in-
clined toward revision of the law in both cases.
To be sure, the formalists themselves were not uniformly hostile to
judicial revision of the law and were hardly defenders of rigid stare deci-
sis; their goal of a greater systemization of the law was often aided by
138. See HORWITZ, supra note 135, at 187-90, 194-95, 209; WIECEK, LOST WORLD, supra
note 137, at 192-93, 199-200.
139. ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 275-77
(1982) (discussing legal instrumentalism generally); WIECEK, MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note
136, at 46-47. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE
RULE OF LAW (2006); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 952-65 (1987) (connecting the rise of instrumentalist legal reasoning in the New
Deal era to the subsequent proliferation of balancing tests in constitutional law).
140. WIECEK, LOST WORLD, supra note 137, at 89-92.
141. See generally Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, The Policy State: A Developmental
Synthesis 6-7 (Aug. 17, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Orren and Skowronek
further define "policy" as a distinctive mode of governance which encompasses "the commitment to
[both] a goal or designated course of action, made authoritatively on behalf of a given entity or
collectivity, and to guidelines rationally aimed at its accomplishment." Id. at 6. The authors further
assert that policy modes of thought in governance are "unified in the sense that they share the theme
of the future: commitment, long- or short-term goals, problem-solving, change in direction." Id. at 7.
142. See HORWITZ, supra note 135, at 4, 30.
143. See infra notes 174-181 and accompanying text.
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discarding "bad" precedents.'" Doctrinal revision was plausibly compat-
ible with both legal formalism and post-New Deal jurisprudence. Where
they diverged, however, was in their respective bases or justifications for
doctrinal revision. The goal for a post-New Deal era actor in revising the
doctrine was not to clarify or purify general legal principles, but was
instead a rationalizing goal. Revisions in the doctrine would be driven or
anchored in considerations of how changing social values and facts com-
pelled or made more attractive corresponding changes in legal rules.
One who was even somewhat sympathetic to these tenets of legal
realism could easily be led to a corollary endorsement for a more ener-
getic judiciary-as the institution which might undertake such revisions.
Prominent examples of just such a perspective on the Stone Court would
be Chief Justice Stone himself, along with Justices Rutledge and Mur-
phy.145 Still, to credit the orientation of the post-New Deal Court as
wholly an offshoot of only legal realism might be oversimplifying.
This returns us to the "a" component in the initial paragraph above:
commitment to at least a conditional form of judicial initiative in revis-
ing the law. Even if legal realism called for greater rationality in the law,
this did not, on its own, necessarily demand that the judiciary itself be
the institutional actor that was responsible for the rationalizing function
(as Justice Frankfurter argued, for example). Thus, the acceptance, at
least some of the time, of judicial initiative in this rationalizing task
among the post-New Deal Court speaks to a point distinct and separate
from the goal of merely desiring greater rationalization of the law.
Finding evidence of a judicial-rationalizing impulse during the New
Deal itself is not terribly difficult. A precedent was established by the
New Deal Democrats in utilizing the Court to dismantle an intricate, em-
bedded body of doctrine rooted in the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Due Process Clauses and the Commerce Clause. The consequence of
this choice during the 1930s and 1940s was that the New Deal transfor-
mation was ratified through "transformative judicial opinions" rather
than through Article V constitutional amendment.146 Regardless of what
the particular motivations may have been for the Justices voting in the
majority in these cases, and even if these judicial rulings may have been
seen or justified by some as a return to valid, pre-Lochner precedents,14 7
the lesson could hardly have been lost on future Justices that these trans-
formative rulings encompassed a dramatic revision of prevailing consti-
144. See WIECEK, LOST WORLD, supra note 137, at 12, 93.
145. WIECEK, MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note 136, at 8-9, 53, 57, 103, 111-14.
146. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 269 (1998) (emphasis omitted).
For a discussion on the institutional design implications of this method of constitutional transfor-
mation, see id. at 403-18.
147. See Morton J. Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825, 1829 (1987); see also
Harrison, supra note 10, at 204-05.
[Vol. 92: 170
2014] THE IDEOLOGY BEHIND BROWN V. BOARD
tutional doctrine.148 By harnessing the Court's authority to the goal of
dismantling and repudiating core elements of the old, pre-New Deal con-
stitutional order, a potential precedent was set for future Supreme Courts
to similarly undertake transformative revisions with respect to other very
well-established constitutional doctrines. Though I discuss it in more
detail in the next Part, such an impulse is apparent in the wholesale dis-
mantling of prior doctrine with the Brown ruling.149
Finally, in the same way that a commitment to judicial-
rationalization might be usefully distinguished from legal realism, the
former might also be usefully distinguished from a categorical commit-
ment to "judicial activism." Judicial initiative of any kind is of course a
form of judicial activism. Yet, to assert that a judicial-rationalizing im-
pulse underlay New Deal Democratic ideology and Brown is not to claim
that a judicial activist impulse was a categorical commitment within the
Brown Court or among New Deal Democrats. Rather than exhibiting
uniform views on the matter, the New Deal appointees as a group-most
notably Justice Frankfurter and Justice Black-exhibited very well-
known divisions with respect to their broad views on the uses and justifi-
cations for judicial review.'50 Indeed, the distinction between a commit-
ment to judicial rationalizing and a categorical commitment to judicial
activism is at least partly indicated by how Justice Frankfurter and Jus-
tice Black-the only "systematic thinkers" on the Court in 1945-1950
according to Wiecek'5 1-strongly diverged on the judicial activism di-
mension while nevertheless converging in actions and arguments that
also spoke to the appropriateness, at certain times, of the judiciary revis-
ing and rationalizing the law. Let me conclude this section by briefly
discussing both Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter's jurisprudential
philosophy and the receptivity of both to judicial rationalizing of the law.
In the case of Justice Black, his articulated judicial philosophy was
not explicitly tied to any rationalizing judicial function. For him the basis
for interpretation for a judge was simply and only the constitutional text
and original intent.152 At least explicitly, this was a philosophy that as-
pired to a form of judicial restraint, in foreclosing judicial policy-making
impulses and in forcing judicial interpretations to stick closely to demo-
cratically validated legal commands.'53 Yet the irony of this philosophy
is that it nevertheless encompassed a potentially expansive judicial au-
148. See, e.g., Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
149. See infra Part 11.
150. See infra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
151. WIECEK, MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note 136, at 440-41.
152. See MELVIN 1. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER STONE
AND VINSON, 1941-1953, at 88 (1997); WIECEK, MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note 136, at 77-
78.
153. See UROFSKY, supra note 152, at 88; WIECEK, MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note 136,
at 77-78.
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thority; a judge working in this mold would feel little hesitation in revis-
ing or discarding established judicial precedents, if such precedents cut
against that judge's interpretation of text or intent.154 Thus, even if a Jus-
tice Black-inspired judge felt himself or herself confined to only text and
intent, the power that such a judge could wield within the confines of
textual and historical interpretation could allow for an extremely "ener-
getic" form of judging.
Combine this judicial philosophy with Justice Black's strong popu-
list political leanings-informed by the political context of his native
Alabama-and it is easy to see how his actions, if not his explicit argu-
ments, ultimately led him to judicial results that reflected a rationalizing
impulse. Justice Black's worldview was informed by class political con-
cerns of societal segmentation and the oppression of the common people
by elites.155 Such fears informed his views as a New Deal politician, of
course, and they informed his receptivity to federal governmental statist
solutions on economic matters. Furthermore, such political leanings also
informed his receptivity to protecting civil liberties in cases where he
viewed state power as functioning in an oppressive manner against indi-
viduals.156 While Justice Black's explicit judicial philosophy did not nec-
essarily contemplate a strong rationalizing role for the federal judiciary,
his chosen constitutional methodology, combined with his sympathy for
class political themes, led him to judicial outcomes that were strongly
protective of individual rights and that had the clear effect of revising
and discarding much constitutional doctrine that was simply incongruent
with emergent social and political views. 157
Similarly, Justice Frankfurter's judicial philosophy also sits oddly at
first glance with a view of the Court as a rationalizing agent, given his
intellectual and doctrinal prominence among the FDR appointees as an
advocate of judicial restraint. Ideally for Justice Frankfurter, judicial
rationalization of the law would be a less common occurrence, due to his
strong philosophical preference for having the legislature stand out as the
primary actor responsible for revising the law toward the goal of social
reform.158
The more cautious judicial role envisioned by Justice Frankfurter
did not stem from any legal formalist beliefs in a broad, categorical,
154. MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS: FELIX FRANKFURTER, HUGO BLACK, AND
THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 130 (1984); UROFSKY, supra note 152, at 17-18, 88,
214-16; WIECEK, MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note 136, at 77-78.
155. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 154, at 91, 93-95; UROFSKY, supra note 152, at 17-18; WIECEK,
MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note 136, at 72-73, 488.
156. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 154, at 91-92, 126, 130; WIECEK, MODERN CONSTITUTION,
supra note 136, at 76, 488-90.
157. UROFSKY, supra note 152, at 86; WIECEK, MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note 136, at
80-81.
158. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 154, at 83; UROFSKY, supra note 152, at 91-92; WIECEK,
MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note 136, at 84-85, 87.
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timelessness to the law itself. To the contrary, he believed in the legal
realist tenets that the law should be responsive to changing social
needs.59 Rather, his preference for judicial restraint stemmed from a
well-worked-out theory of institutional roles and legal process. This also
implied, however, that when the "proper" conditions were met for him-
i.e., when legislation failed a rationality test and when judging took place
in the proper, disinterested manner-Justice Frankfurter endorsed the
notion of judges revising the doctrine in allowing for adaptations over
time.160 This aspect of his thought appears most prominently, if only im-
plicitly, in the context of incorporation. Contrary to Justice Black's en-
dorsement of "total incorporation," Justice Frankfurter's "fundamental
fairness" approach inescapably encompassed the granting of tremendous
discretion to judges to determine what particular rights to enforce against
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
(though Justice Frankfurter claimed that this discretion would be con-
strained by adherence to judicial norms).'6 ' In the proper context then,
Justice Frankfurter's philosophy of judging and the judicial role could
indeed be quite hospitable to a rationalizing function for the Court.
II. IDEOLOGY AND THE JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS ON BROWN
With these four ideological themes in mind, let us return to the
Brown ruling for a closer look at the substance and timing of this deci-
sion. The various primary sources illuminating the Court's deliberations
on Brown in both 1952 and 1953 have been closely examined and com-
mented on by a number of scholars. In light of the subsequent commen-
tary, it seems fair to say the deliberations are subject to at least a limited
range of interpretations with different areas of emphasis. Most secondary
accounts, however, have emphasized the severe divisions among the
Court members on the Brown case in their 1952 conference. Such inter-
pretations, in turn, allow for greater emphasis-whether intended or
159. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to
the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them."); see also
SILVERSTEIN, supra note 154, at 66-67, 143; WIECEK, MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note 136, at
88, 478-79. Though to be sure, Justice Frankfurter endorsed a kind of adaptation within the law that
would be consistent with certain core, enduring constitutional principles. SILVERSTEIN, supra note
154, at 71, 88-89.
160. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 154, at 55; WIECEK, MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note 136, at
476, 482.
161. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 154, at 158-59; UROFSKY, supra note 152, at 91-92; WIECEK,
MODERN CONSTITUTION, supra note 136, at 469-70, 495, 508-10, 514-16, 518-19. Justice Frank-
furter believed that judicial discretion could be limited under his approach. Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("But neither does the application of the Due
Process Clause imply that judges are wholly at large. The judicial judgment in applying the Due
Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based
upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. The fact that judges among themselves may
differ whether in a particular case a trial offends accepted notions of justice is not disproof that
general rather than idiosyncratic standards are applied. An important safeguard against such merely
individual judgment is an alert deference to the judgment of the State court under review.") over-
ruledin part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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not-on individual personalities and maneuvering on the Court. 62
would place emphasis, however, on another theme that is apparent in the
deliberationsl63 and that generally underlies the secondary accounts as
well: the presence of a quasi-gravitational pull on the Court towards
overruling Plessy. It is the presence of such an underlying influence that
is most suggestive of deeper, structural forces at work in this particular
ruling. And such a force was noticeably at work for the two FDR appoin-
tees most closely identified with a judicial restraint sensibility, and for
whom the Brown litigation posed particular difficulties: Justice Jackson
and Justice Frankfurter.
Under the conventional interpretation of events surrounding the
Brown decision, the Justices-aside from Justice Reed-converged to
overrule Jim Crow only in the subsequent 1953 conference after Chief
Justice Warren had joined the Court.16 Kluger notes that in the aftermath
of the earlier 1952 conference, when Chief Justice Vinson was still on
the Court, Justice Frankfurter thought the Court stood at a 5-4 majority
in favor of reversing Plessy's separate-but-equal rule; Justice Burton
speculated that there was a 6-3 majority in favor of reversing; and Jus-
tice Jackson put the split among the Court somewhere between 5-4 to 7-
2 in favor of reversing.165 Additionally, Justice Douglas speculated that
the votes in 1952 would have been 5-4 in favor of upholding segregated
schooling in the states; and 5-4 in favor of discarding segregated school-
ing in the District of Columbia-with Justice Frankfurter the swing
vote.1
Still, in light of the Court's subsequent unanimity on Brown (aided
perhaps by Chief Justice Vinson's departure from the Court) and in light
of the Court's earlier unanimous rulings against segregation in the higher
education context in Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, one could plausibly wonder about the reliability of these con-
ference notes for ascertaining the true preferences of the various Justices.
That is, perhaps some of the Justices' qualms about reversing Plessy may
have been overstated.
162. Perhaps in sympathy with my interpretation, Tushnet notes how his interpretation of the
Brown deliberations is driven, in part, by a critical reevaluation of Justice Frankfurter's importance
and influence in the deliberations. See Mark Tushnet with Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in
Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1883-84, 1894, 1920-21, 1929-30 (1991).
163. My own examination of the conference deliberations is based upon an edited version of
the Justices' notes presented in THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 644-71 (Del Dickson ed., 2001)
[hereinafter COURT IN CONFERENCE].
164. KLARMAN, supra note 2, at 294-95, 300-01; KLUGER, supra note 4, at 682-85; BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 77,
88-89 (1983); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme
Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 36, 39-40 (1979).
165. KLUGER, supra note 4, at 614.
166. Justice Douglas' speculation of the vote count is mentioned in a memo dated May 17,
1954, that is reprinted in COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 163, at 660-61. See also KLARMAN,
supra note 2, at 300-01.
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Further, one might wonder how exactly these conference sentiments
and speculative vote tallies would have translated into a judicial opinion
immediately after the 1952 conference deliberations. There seems to be a
relatively clear convergence among scholars on Justice Reed's skepti-
cism towards overruling Plessy.167 But with respect to the remaining Jus-
tices, the task might be more difficult to separate their respective senti-
ments on the substantive merits of the case from the distinct question
about how the Court should proceed on the segregation issue.
To this end, in Mark Tushnet's interpretation of the Court's deliber-
ations in 1952, he asserts that with the exception of Justice Reed, all of
the Justices "had indicated a willingness to 'go along' with a desegrega-
tion decision that allowed for gradual compliance." 6 8 And Tushnet ar-
gues that even Justice Reed's stance had left an opening to such a result
in 1952. The stark divisions among the Justices were not so much about
the substantive result, he argues, but rather about "how to justify the re-
sult."l 69
One who is inclined toward Tushnet's interpretation need not whol-
ly reject or dismiss the alternative interpretations of a highly divided
Court in 1952; Tushnet may be read to merely emphasize those areas
where there was emerging agreement on the Court.170 And more general-
ly, it should not be surprising that different take-away themes might be
extracted from the earlier 1952 conference deliberations. At this early
stage of the Court's deliberations, when the universe of potential judicial
decisions remained relatively open and unconstrained, there were a
greater number of ways in which the diverse sets of preferences among
the Justices might be mapped out and reflected in a judicial opinion or
opinions. To take the example of Chief Justice Vinson, even if he may
have been leaning toward upholding Plessy in some form in 1952, such a
preference might still have lost out in his internal calculations in favor of
an alternative choice-a conditional preference to overrule Plessy, if a
majority of the Court was inclined to do so. And such a majority may
very well have existed, independent of Chief Justice Vinson after the
1952 conference deliberations.'7 '
167. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 2, at 294-95, 300; KLUGER, supra note 4, at 598-99.
168. Tushnet, supra note 162, at 1907.
169. Id. at 1907-09. The authors also argue that his convergence was arguably a little stronger
by the 1953 conference deliberations as well. Id. at 1912-1914, 1930. The article is now part of
Chapters 13, 14, and 15 in MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994).
170. Thus, in commenting on Kluger's assertion that Chief Justice Vinson was not prepared to
reverse Plessy, Tushnet says that with respect to his own alternative interpretation of Chief Justice
Vinson, "there is not much difference, aside from emphasis, between Kluger's cautious conclusion
and my own." Tushnet, supra note 162, at 1904 n.172.
171. Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton thought there was at least a bare majority for
reversing Plessy in 1952, though Klarman expresses a qualified skepticism on this point. KLARMAN,
supra note 2, at 301-02.
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A. Structural Influences in the Brown Deliberations
One general theme does emerge from most of these secondary ac-
counts that is pressed most emphatically in the Tushnet interpretation; at
least by the early 1950s, it was becoming clear that Jim Crow faced an
increasingly uncertain fate in the federal judiciary. Thus, it was apparent
even in the 1952 deliberations that among the five Justices who were not
among the very clear votes to overrule Plessy-each inted at an aware-
ness of the infirmities of Jim Crow either as a normative matter or as a
172
pragmatic matter.
To the extent the segregation issue continued to confront the Court
in the absence of prior resolution by the elected branches during these
years, the Court's recognition of the growing infirmities of Jim Crow
increased the odds that the federal judiciary would actually initiate a di-
rect assault on Jim Crow.173 This basic theme, in turn, strongly suggests a
structural explanation for the Brown outcome. But beyond mentioning
this more elementary point, I would suggest an additional point: that the
structural dynamic present in these deliberations was clearly ideological
in nature.
By way of supporting the latter point, consider in particular the
votes of Justice Jackson and Justice Frankfurter. Their participation in
the Brown deliberations is of interest for our purposes, since these were
two FDR appointees who were deeply, philosophically inclined toward
judicial restraint and who converged on similar concerns about judicial
caution in this case. Notwithstanding such philosophical concerns, how-
ever, their votes were apparently driven at least in part by fidelity to class
political themes and an endorsement of judicial rationalization.
172. The five Justices were Frankfurter, Jackson, Vinson, Reed, and Clark. The ambivalence of
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson was obvious in 1952. Chief Justice Vinson expressed various and
significant reservations about immediate desegregation in his comments, and included the line-
subsequent o his recounting of some of those reservations-that "[b]oldness is essential, but wis-
dom is indispensable." COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 163, at 647 (quoting Justice Clark's
notes). This line suggests perhaps that Vinson was open to the idea of a desegregation ruling. See id.
at 647 n.41; Tushnet, supra note 162, at 1902-04. Kluger, however, is somewhat more skeptical on
Vinson's openness to such a ruling. See KLUGER, supra note 4, at 593. Justice Clark's comments do
not express a strong position either way, but his endorsement of giving "the lower courts the oppor-
tunity to withhold relief in light of troubles" suggests at least his consideration of a desegregation
result. COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 163, at 653; KLARMAN, supra note 2, at 297. Finally,
even Justice Reed, the most consistent opponent to desegregation across the Brown deliberations,
registered the view that "[s]egregation is gradually disappearing." COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra
note 163, at 649. This is a point he would repeat in the 1953 conference deliberations as well. Id. at
656.
173. Klarman concurs with this point, though he emphasizes that an anti-Plessy ruling was not
inevitable in 1954. KLARMAN, supra note 2, at 310-11. See Graber, supra note 14, at 63-64, for a
discussion on the absence of legislative resolution on segregation prior to Brown.
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B. Justice Jackson
In the case of Justice Jackson's ambivalence during the Brown de-
liberations,174 at least part of what ultimately moved him to the side of
desegregation was precisely his recognition of the incongruities and in-
firmities of Jim Crow within the broader legal and political structure. As
he stated in a draft opinion, written in early 1954,175 he was:
[P]redisposed to the conclusion that segregation ... has outlived
whatever justification it may have had. The practice seems marked
for early extinction. Whatever we might say today, within a genera-
tion [Plessy] will be outlawed by decision of this Court because of
the forces of mortality and replacement which operate upon it.176
Hence, by 1954, Justice Jackson felt, as others on the Court undoubtedly
felt as well, that segregation's eventual end was inevitable.
These observations dovetailed with his ultimate conclusion of over-
ruling Plessy because the underlying factual assumptions of Jim Crow
had eroded by that date.177 Regardless of whether social conditions in the
pre-Brown era may or may not have justified a regime of racial segrega-
tion, it was abundantly clear to Justice Jackson that such a regime could
not be justified by the mid-twentieth century.178 To quote from
Schwartz's reproduction of the draft opinion (language in quotes are Jus-
tice Jackson's text):
"Negro progress under segregation has been spectacular and, tested
by the pace of history, his rise is one of the swiftest and most dra-
matic advances in the annals of man. It is that, indeed, which has en-
abled him to outgrow the system and to overcome the presumptions
on which it was based."
. . . "The handicap of inheritance and environment has been too
widely overcome today to warrant these earlier presumptions based
on race alone." Black advances, the draft went on, "require me to say
that mere possession of colored blood, in whole or in part, no longer
174. Different scholars have characterized this ambivalence in different, though important
ways. See KLARMAN, supra note 2, at 300, 303; KLUGER, supra note 4, at 609-11; Tushnet, supra
note 162, at 1878-80, 1896, 1907, 1911-12. The interpretation most inclined toward characterizing
Justice Jackson as opposed to Plessy is probably Schwartz, who argues that Justice Jackson was
never inclined to uphold Plessy during these deliberations. "Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's con-
trary assertion, Justice Jackson's actions during the Brown decision process indicate that he did not
'think Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be re-affirmed.' What did concern Jackson was the
question of how a proper opinion striking down segregation could be written." Bernard Schwartz,
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice Jackson, and the Brown Case, 1988 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 250 (1988)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist's memorandum on Brown). Also crucial for
Justice Jackson was the enforcement question. Id.
175. Schwartz asserts that Justice Jackson indeed viewed this draft opinion "seriously as a
potential concurring opinion." Schwartz, supra note 174, at 264.
176. Id. at 255 (internal quotation mark omitted); Tushnet, supra note 162, at 1915.
177. Tushnet, supra note 162, at 1889, 1907, 1915-17.
178. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 261-62.
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affords a reasonable basis for a classification for education purposes
and that each individual must be rated on his own merit."
179
Because of these changed conditions, and because constitutional inter-
pretation should be responsive to these changes, he concluded that segre-
gated public education should be held unconstitutional:80
"It is neither novel nor radical doctrine," Jackson affirmed, "that stat-
utes once held constitutional may become invalid by reason of chang-
ing conditions, and those held to be good in one state of facts may be
held to be bad in another. A multitude of cases, going back far into
judicial history, attest to this doctrine."'8 '
C. Justice Frankfurter
Similarly, Justice Frankfurter's concerns about judicial modesty
translated into a strong preference for judicial gradualism with respect to
a desegregation remedy. But most of the secondary accounts agree there
was never a substantial possibility that Justice Frankfurter would vote to
uphold Plessy.182 Justice Frankfurter counted himself among a five vote
majority in favor of overruling Plessy after the 1952 conference.'8 ' The
primary concern for Justice Frankfurter was apparently to find the proper
and most strategically sound manner of actually doing so with respect to
the remedy question.
Justice Frankfurter's relatively consistent position on overturning
Plessy, combined with his consistent pro-civil rights votes in earlier
equal protection cases involving African-Americans, suggests the
ideological pull of both class political ideals and the notion of the Court
as a rationalizing agent-notwithstanding his explicit commitment to
judicial restraint.186 More substantial support for this view stems from a
memo Justice Frankfurter wrote subsequent to the Court's conference
deliberations in 1953, where he gave explicit voice to such rationalizing
considerations in critiquing Jim Crow:
Equally so [a judge] cannot write into our Constitution a belief in the
Negro's natural inferiority or his personal belief in the desirability of
segregating white and colored children during their most formative
years. To attribute such a view to science, as is sometimes done, is to
179. Id. at 262.
180. Id. at 263.
181. Id.
182. KLUGER, supra note 4, at 684; SCHWARTZ, supra note 174, at 76-77; Tushnet, supra note
162, at 1872, 1893, 1918. Klarman might be more cautious or skeptical on this point, however. See
KLARMAN, supra note 2, at 301-03.
183. KLUGER, supra note 4, at 614.
184. Id. at 602-04, 618; Tushnet, supra note 162, at 1873, 1918, 1923, 1925-26.
185. MELVIN 1. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTIES 131-32 (1991).
186. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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reject the very basis of science, namely, the process of reaching veri-
fiable conclusions. The abstract and absolutist claims both for and
against segregation have been falsified by experience, especially the
great changes in the relations between white and colored people since
the first World War.18 7
Justice Frankfurter's memo, while also giving voice to judicial restraint
concerns, concluded on a note emphasizing a dynamic judicial interpreta-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause: "Law must respond to transfor-
mation of views as well as to that of outward circumstances. The effect
of changes in men's feelings for what is right and just is equally relevant
in determining whether a discrimination denies the equal protection of
the laws."'8 8
The prospect of validating Jim Crow legal doctrines simply because
of the pull of established precedent was likely not a real option for Jus-
tice Frankfurter; by the early 1950s at least, given the increasing social
and political incongruity of Jim Crow, doing such a thing would have
undermined any role for the Court as a rationalizing agent within the
broader polity. Judicial actions upholding Jim Crow would have stamped
the latter with federal judicial approval.'
In examining these dynamics behind the Brown decision then, it is
instructive that the two most intellectually prominent advocates of judi-
cial restraint among the FDR appointees somehow reached a point by the
early 1950s where it became increasingly implausible that they would
not initiate an assault on Jim Crow. That such a judicial outcome became
increasingly plausible, though perhaps not imperative, by this time sug-
gests certain ideological structures had become so accepted and promi-
nent that they could ultimately outweigh the more explicit commitment
of both Justices to judicial restraint.
III. JURISPRUDENTIAL BUNDLING AND OTHER IMPLICATIONS
Assuming I have successfully made my case for certain ideological
linkages between the New Deal and Brown, several implications follow
from this finding. First, and most obviously, I am suggesting these four
ideological elements help account for Brown as a matter of legal and
political development. I am suggesting the influence of these ideological
elements on Brown substantially stems from the appointments mecha-
nism-since these core ideas were components of the very New Deal
principles that dictated the appointments of almost all members of the
Brown Court. Thus in a sense, my argument is an elaboration on an ap-
187. KLUGER, supra note 4, at 684 (quoting an undated memorandum from Justice Frankfurter,
found in the Frankfurter Papers at Harvard University) (internal quotation mark omitted).
188. Id. at 685 (quoting an undated memorandum from Justice Frankfurter, found in the Frank-
furter Papers at Harvard University) (internal quotation mark omitted).
189. Tushnet, supra note 162, at 1872-75.
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pointments theory of judicial behavior, though my focus is on a second-
order consequence of the appointments mechanism. Judicial appoint-
ments processes driven by liberal economic goals had the effect of not
only selecting judges sympathetic to the New Deal economic reforms,
but also the ancillary effect of selecting judges who would be receptive
to racially egalitarian goals as well.1 90
The claim is that these four ideological elements provided, at some
level, a conceptual or ideational structure within which discrete political,
institutional, and social forces might have been interpreted, filtered, and
translated into judicial actions and justifications. These ideological ele-
ments provided a fundamental or more abstract view of society, govern-
mental authority, and the judicial role that speak to how the Brown Court
understood its own actions.
A second implication of the preceding Parts regards how we might
view Brown in the broader stream of American constitutional develop-
ment. While its direct assault on Jim Crow undoubtedly constitutes a
critical juncture in constitutional development, there is also much about
the ruling that speaks to continuities. Perhaps this is not terribly surpris-
ing, given that on its surface Brown sought to interpret and apply the
commands of the Equal Protection Clause-a constitutional commitment
enshrined nearly a hundred years before Brown. Yet, the argument in the
preceding Parts suggests the continuities between the Brown outcome
and prior ideological commitments are broader than a mere connection
between the 1950s and the Reconstruction Amendments. Rather, the
ideological continuities embedded in Brown bear connections to policy
domains beyond those of race (such as labor) and to political constituen-
cies that likely would not have been sympathetic to the ending of segre-
gated public schooling (such as the Populists). Third, and related to the
preceding point, these four ideological links between the New Deal and
Brown also point to continuities between New Deal era progressive
thought and the subsequent rights revolution that began with Brown-
and that would also ultimately extend to subsequent jurisprudential ad-
vances toward equality in other contexts including gender and sexual
orientation.
A. Jurisprudential Bundling
A final implication of the preceding Parts points to a broader claim:
that in the judicial context, certain ideological structures may have suffi-
cient internal clarity and cohesion that we might attribute some degree of
190. Describing my argument as a variation on the appointments mechanism is somewhat more
attenuated in the context of my third ideational consideration: the northern-sectional outlook. In one
sense, this idea was indeed present in New Deal era judicial appointments calculations. Yet, in
another sense, the content of a northern-sectional outlook undoubtedly changed in a more Northern
direction through the 1940s and 1950s. In this latter sense, this ideational component can be under-
stood as, in part, a post-appointments dynamic as well.
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independent influence to the ideas themselves in shaping judicial actions
and arguments. Stated in more general terms, the juxtaposition of the
New Deal appointments with the outcome of Brown presents this situa-
tion: a clear majority of the Court-indeed nearly the entire Court in this
case-were appointed because they all, at minimum, fulfilled a precondi-
tion of being faithful to some set of legal and political principles (PA) at a
point in time, (TI). PA was sufficiently definite, coherent, and politically
entrenched such that one might say it encompassed a distinct legal and
political regime within some set of policy area(s). Subsequent to these
appointments, however, this same set of judicial appointees noticeably
and consistently converged upon a distinct set of principles (PB) at (T2).
We can confidently say that these latter principles were not a clear
item for consideration in the prior appointments. Further, in the time
between T, and T2, there were no additional judicial appointments made
with PB being an item of concern for either the President or the confirm-
ing Senate. There was likewise no extra-legal regime change in support
of PB either, such that we might suspect a judicial "switch-in-time" anal-
ogous, arguably, to the Court's capitulation to the New Deal in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish'91 or NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. 192 The phenomenon that emerges, prompting inquiry, is whether
the judicial convergence on PA has anything to tell us about the subse-
quent judicial convergence on PB?
Traditional theories of judicial behavior and appointments offer lit-
tle help here, in finding a link between PA and PB and/or in explaining the
subsequent judicial convergence at PB-given the conditions stated
above. As a result and not surprisingly, most historical explanations of
Brown-a case that fits this template-bypass any ambition to find a link
between the two instances of judicial convergence. As noted before, the
scholarly emphasis in explaining Brown has instead been on discrete
events, significant social and institutional forces, and particular judicial
personalities that may have affected legal development in the period of
time subsequent to TI, but prior to T2-193
Building upon the preceding Parts, however, I would propose a
more general theory of "jurisprudential bundling" that is capable of illu-
minating how these two moments of judicial convergence might be
linked through a common ideological structure. In addition, it is also
capable of illuminating how intervening events, occurring between T,
191. 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937).
192. 301 U.S. 1, 47-49 (1937).
193. See supra notes 4-8, 162 and accompanying text. More generally, Epstein et al. have
emphasized the possibility of legal change without membership changes to the Court by focusing on
the dynamic of "ideological drift," or the possibility of shifts within a particular Justice's ideological
orientation. Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drifi Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and
How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1483, 1485-87 (2007).
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and T2, may interact with this common ideological structure and exert an
influence on the judicial convergence upon PB.
To return to the case of Brown, the ideological continuities between
the New Deal and the post-WWII transformation in race and constitu-
tional equal protection suggests that there might have been, at least in
this particular historical period, some kind of basic ideological affinity
between racial and economic liberalism.194 If that is indeed the case, we
can conceive of how the four ideological elements noted in Part I al-
lowed economic and racial liberalism to be bundled such that a Justice's
endorsement of the former had positive implications for that same Jus-
tice's approach to the latter.
Further, while my more specific claim is to suggest the existence of
a jurisprudential bundling of economic and racial liberalism for the post-
New Deal Court, a focus on the broader possibilities for ideological bun-
dling suggests a more general role for ideas in the judicial context. Most
tend to accept the claim of appointments-theorists of judicial behavior
that at least some of the time, in clear-cut cases, certain ideas will find
their way into Court rulings if those ideas have been selected for in the
nomination and confirmation process.
My argument suggests there may be, in general, a second dimension
to such theories of judicial behavior and legal development. Certain ideas
may indeed influence the Court if they have been directly examined dur-
ing the appointments process. But beyond that, secondary ideas that have
been bundled with the ideas and principles directly considered may also
end up influencing legal development as well. Thus, coherent ideological
structures-if validated by the polity through the appointments process-
can influence and help dictate judicial actions across a range of issues
that presidents and senators, without the benefit of perfect foresight, are
unable to address during the initial appointment of a Justice.
This is not to claim that the result in Brown was wholly determined
by ideological factors. After all, the aforementioned elements of party
ideology were present among the Democrats in various forms, sometimes
for decades prior to the Brown ruling, without any analogous dismantling
of Jim Crow. At the same time, there were also elements of Democratic
Party ideology in the first half of the twentieth century, discussed above,
that pressed in a decidedly anti-egalitarian direction.195 Why the Court
both seized on these four particular ideological strands as opposed to
others and utilized these ideas towards a racially egalitarian result in
194. Though my argument is limited to the jurisprudential context, Eric Schickler's recent
work on New Deal era public opinion polls suggests that a positive correlation between the two can
be found in that context as well. See Eric Schickler, New Deal Liberalism and Racial Liberalism in
the Mass Public, 1937-1968, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 75, 76-78 (2013).
195. See supra notes 72, 113-14, 130.
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1954, demands an explanation that necessarily must lie beyond ideologi-
cal dynamics.
Though this argument has been largely implicit in the preceding
sections, I view the jurisprudential bundling dynamic as both shaped by
broader political and social effects and constitutive of legal and political
developments. With regard to the influence of broader political and so-
cial forces-such as the NAACP's litigation strategy, changing electoral
dynamics, changes in public opinion, presidential-institutional influences
upon the Court, foreign policy considerations-these political conditions
were crucial to driving legal developments like Brown for at least two
reasons. First, they helped dictate the emergence of certain party ideolog-
ical elements as themes of concern and importance for political and judi-
cial elites. That is, these conditions helped determine which strands of
party ideology would become attractive or politically viable to important
political and judicial actors at that moment in time.
Second, these political conditions also helped determine which in-
stitutional venues would emerge as attractive or convenient forums for
the promotion of certain policy objectives. In the case of Brown, for ex-
ample, the continuing influence of Southern Democrats in the elected
branches-an important political condition at the time-helped to make
the Court a relatively more attractive forum for racially egalitarian policy
objectives. Accordingly, in such a context where political conditions
facilitated a greater policy-making role for the Court, there was a corre-
sponding importance to those ideas that were central to prior judicial
appointments, that aligned with emergent political and social forces and
that were susceptible to further elaboration into other policy domains via
a bundling dynamic.
Yet, even if external forces help facilitate a given instance of juris-
prudential bundling, the ideas themselves also influence political devel-
opment. External forces may provide openings for the Court to act, but
those forces do not necessarily explain why the Court itself will or will
not seize certain opportunities. Jurisprudential bundling, I suspect, pro-
vides the answer to this question. Bundling provides a supplemental ju-
dicial motive to seize such opportunities to shape political and legal de-
velopment, and it provides a set of foundational principles within which
judges may justify their actions, both to themselves and others, in a man-
ner consistent with the judicial role. In short, the ideas at play with juris-
prudential bundling provide a means for judges to justify and understand
their own actions within a broader framework of political principles that,
due to certain supportive political conditions, are viewed at the time as
attractive and legitimate principles.'96
196. In thinking about how to understand the Brown Court along the dimensions of judicial
activism or deference, Kevin McMahon emphasizes that the key element of New Deal Democrat
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Thus, if a wide array of political circumstances sympathetic to mi-
nority rights in the early 1950s had been absent, I am indeed skeptical
that the above-noted ideological elements would still have been powerful
enough to prompt a judicial assault on Jim Crow. Rather, my claim is
that given political circumstances in the 1950s, the Court was presented
with a set of party-ideological themes that resonated with judicial elites
and enough political actors that allowed for jurisprudential bundling to
occur and helped effect and legally justify an outcome such as the Brown
ruling.
Further, while it is certainly conceivable that Jim Crow could have
been upheld by the Court at some point in the post-New Deal years, there
is little doubt that such an outcome would have been seen as more incon-
sistent than consistent with broader political forces and the broader juris-
prudential orientation of the Court during those years.197 For the Court,
the gravitational pull of the ideological commitments from the New Deal
era onward clearly pressed in the opposite direction. Stated more broadly
then, my claim is also that ideological structures-if they are sufficiently
coherent and anchored to broadly-agreed-upon legal and political out-
comes by the Justices-may generally be capable of exerting some de-
gree of a gravitational pull toward those legal outcomes and principles
that possess greater consistency with the ideological structure.
B. General Definition ofJurisprudential Bundling
With the preceding points on the table, let me state a more general
definition of jurisprudential bundling: bundling occurs when a set of
principles has a strong enough bearing on two (or more) doctrinal areas
such that the judicial endorsement of those common principles will have
consequences for doctrinal shifts in both bodies of doctrine.
ideology that had bearing on the Supreme Court and the judicial role was not an ideal of judicial
impotence. Rather, the Roosevelt administration was most interested in appointing Supreme Court
Justices who would exhibit deference to presidential ambitions. Thus, when Roosevelt and Truman
subsequently decided to pursue racial equality with more zeal, they would be able to count on having
appointees on the Court who would be willing to act energetically on behalf of those presidential
ambitions. McMAHON, supra note 7, at 13-14, 17, 20-21, 142-43. That said, McMahon is also
careful not to overreach in claiming a sole, direct causal relationship between Roosevelt's appoint-
ment considerations and the Brown result. Id. at 142. While he chooses to emphasize the efficacy of
presidential-institutional strategies and actions in the development of civil rights law and the occur-
rence of Brown, he is careful to acknowledge the relevance of other factors in this development as
well. Id at 4, 8. In terms of where my argument diverges from McMahon's, while I see his argument
as quite plausible, I see my own argument as addressing one set of influences upon the judiciary
more internal to that institution, which operated alongside the powerful influences he discusses that
were established by presidential actions. As such, again, the argument here offers relatively more
emphasis on both the element of judicial initiative in the Brown decision, and how the Court under-
stood its own actions within established ideological structures.
197. 1 qualify this assertion because one notable principle would indeed have rationalized the
New Deal with a pro-Jim Crow result quite well: the principle of judicial restraint, which both Jus-
tices Frankfurter and Jackson struggled with in their deliberations on Brown. See supra Part II.B-C.
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In articulating this definition, bundling has a clear relationship to
two other well-known kinds of judicial behavior: analogical reasoning
and "constitutional borrowing." Briefly defined, when employed by
judges, analogical reasoning occurs when the similarity of legally rele-
vant facts or characteristics between Case A and Case B accordingly
influences a judge to apply the legal reasoning and conclusions of Case
A to Case B.19 8 A related, yet distinct, judicial action is constitutional
borrowing which Tebbe and Tsai describe as follows:
A person engages in borrowing when, in the course of trying to per-
suade someone to adopt a reading of the Constitution, that person
draws on one domain of constitutional knowledge in order to inter-
pret, bolster, or otherwise illuminate another domain. It is, in other
words, an interpretative practice characterized by a deliberate effort
to bridge disparate constitutional fields for persuasive ends. 199
Similar to both kinds of legal reasoning or judicial behavior, bun-
dling is a phenomenon that emphasizes the structural connections be-
tween at least two legal contexts, or two relatively well-defined and dis-
tinct doctrinal areas. Indeed, one might even say that bundling, borrow-
ing, and analogical reasoning-when evaluated descriptively-converge
at least superficially on a basic notion of inter-doctrinal continuity and
coherence. Furthermore, I am also inclined to suspect these dynamics can
quite often converge and overlap in a particular instance of inter-
doctrinal dynamics.200
Still, in some crucial respects bundling might be usefully distin-
guished from borrowing and analogical reasoning as well. Most im-
portantly, the ideological dynamic at work with jurisprudential bundling
is not one where an idea migrates from one case to another or where a
legal principle migrates from one doctrinal context to another. Bundling
198. See, e.g., Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 501,
501-502 (1948); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 745 (1993).
For normative defenses of analogical reasoning in the law, see id., at 767-90, and Emily Sherwin, A
Defense ofAnalogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1186-87 (1999).
199. Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 463
(2010) (footnote omitted).
200. Arguably, the Court's gender equality rulings in the 1970s might be such an instance of
the convergence of analogical reasoning and jurisprudential bundling. Siegel notes that the Court's
gender equality rulings in the 1970s represent a doctrinal shift that cannot easily be explained by
appointments-centered or regime-centered theories of constitutional change. See Reva B. Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1336 (2006). She subsequently attributes this instance of legal
development to the influence of constitutional cultural mechanisms. See id. Others, however, attrib-
ute these doctrinal shifts to the Court engaging in analogical reasoning between the race and gender
contexts. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Interpreting the Women 's Movement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1421,
1430-36 (2006). If the race-gender analogy was t work here, perhaps these gender equality rulings
were influenced, in turn, by the same four ideological commitments discussed above that were
implicated in the transformative change symbolized by Brown. For an extremely detailed historical
analysis of the race-gender analogy, as deployed by feminist legal advocates, see generally SERENA
MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINIsM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2011).
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of the kind seen in Brown is an instance where an initial set of ideas or
principles ultimately had an impact in multiple doctrinal areas. That is to
say, the shift in Brown-the P2 shift-was less the product of the New
Deal case itself-P1-and more the product of the four ideological com-
mitments articulated in Part I that underlay both doctrinal shifts.
How do we know this to be the case with Brown? Why could not
the source of the P2 shift have been the result of Pi itself? The text of the
Brown opinion, along with what we know about the conference delibera-
tions surrounding Brown, makes it quite clear that no explicit or near-
explicit borrowing from the New Deal economic cases occurred. This
was not a clear case of the kind of strategic or purposive idea appropria-
tion by judges that Tebbe and Tsai describe in the context of constitu-
tional borrowing.201 Furthermore, no clear analogizing between the race
context and the economic/labor context is apparent in Brown or its delib-
erations that might suggest this ruling was the product of judicial analog-
ical reasoning either. Noting the latter point is hardly surprising, of
course. I will say more about this in a subsequent section, but more than
half a century of Democratic Party ideology had been premised upon the
notion that economic and labor matters were distinct-and thus not anal-
202
ogous-to racial matters.
My claim then is that an inter-doctrinal relationship did exist be-
tween the New Deal doctrinal shift on economic matters and the shift on
racial equality in Brown, but this relationship is something distinct from
either borrowing or analogical reasoning. It is certainly a structural rela-
tionship that is less apparent on the surface, and this is due, I believe, to
how the common ideological links between these two doctrinal shifts
were more submerged, abstract, basic, and foundational. The dynamic
with bundling is thus more idea-driven as opposed to strategic actor-
driven. Still, when a bundling dynamic is at work, it seems plausible that
it might also manifest itself in an instance of analogical reasoning or bor-
rowing. Indeed, we might speculate that a bundling dynamic may be at
work when, within a particular doctrinal area, certain kinds of analogical
connections or a particular form of borrowing is consistently and reliably
made by judges. A jurisprudential bundling dynamic might constitute a
structural force that is so powerful that a particular form of analogical
reasoning or a particular instance of borrowing reliably and consistently
becomes almost unquestionably attractive, or "reasonable," or "on the
wall" (as opposed to off of it) 20 3 to some significant portion of the legal
academic and professional elite.
201. See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 199, at 464.
202. See infra Part III.E.
203. See Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE
L.J. 1407, 1444-47 (2001).
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C. The Relative Insignificance ofldeas?
Having stated my general claims on bundling, let me conclude this
Part with three potential critiques in the next three sections-each of
which will hopefully aid in further illuminating the concept and how it
bears on the case of the New Deal and Brown. The first critique concerns
possible skepticism about emphasizing the role of ideas in the legal de-
velopments represented by Brown. Given the broad and varying set of
causal influences upon that particular ruling, why should we expect ideo-
logical frameworks to matter at all?
More pointedly, it is also noteworthy that the ideological themes of
class politics and a rationalizing Court had arguably been joined within
Democratic Party ideology decades before the 1950s. If I am correct
about their influence on the outcome in Brown, one might ask why a
ruling striking down segregated schooling did not happen sooner. Indeed,
perhaps the more important causal forces here were nothing more com-
plicated than changing social and political values in the aftermath of the
New Deal-changes perhaps as simple as increasing sympathy among
whites for racial minorities. These types of causal forces would also have
the virtue of illuminating why Brown happened in 1954, and not a dec-
*204ade or two earlier.
As I have previously noted, intervening events and changes in social
trends, such as greater sympathy among white elites for minority rights,
undoubtedly played a key causal role in influencing the Brown ruling.
More generally, such social-cultural forces will likely play some kind of
causal role in most important constitutional developments as well.205
Still, a focus on jurisprudential bundling-and the ideological frame-
works that underlie instances of bundling-is worthy of our attention for
at least one key reason: to the extent that events or social trends can drive
doctrinal change, the influence of such intervening events or broader
social developments must often be mediated or influenced by how those
events or developments interact with well-established conceptual and
ideational categories employed by judges. That is, even if changing pop-
ular attitudes on a given issue appear to be crucial in driving a particular
instance of doctrinal change, such attitudes must often be first linked to
broader political and legal worldviews before they can be formulated in
new doctrines that judges and portions of the broader legal elite will find
plausible and acceptable.
Consider that for a Supreme Court Justice in 1954 inclined to sym-
pathize with minority rights, before such a sympathy could actually be
204. Scholars like Klarman have emphasized the importance of changing social and political
values, particularly among social and political elites, in influencing judicial decisions. And he has
indeed emphasized the significance of changed, more sympathetic white attitudes toward African
Americans as a crucial influence in the Brown ruling. KLARMAN, supra note 2, at 308-10.
205. See id.; Siegel, supra note 200, at 1418-19.
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employed by this Justice toward legally justifying an attack on Jim Crow,
one presumes this person would have to possess-at least at some level
of understanding-a belief about the basic framework of American soci-
ety and its primary ills (are there entrenched social classes or are they
more fluid?), and how those ills might be corrected by the state (should
they be corrected? by the state or federal governments?). More signifi-
cantly, a judge would also need to possess a basic notion about what ju-
dicial power entails in relation to both the elected branches and to prior
established legal doctrines (when can the judiciary move ahead of the
elected branches? when can doctrine be discarded?). It is precisely such
basic ideological assumptions that are furnished by the elements of New
Deal party ideology noted above.
In addition, a focus on ideological frameworks also has value for
tracking and providing theoretical coherence to the array of intervening
events and social trends that may be relevant in a particular instance of
legal development. This is one implication of the discussion on a non-
southern sectional slant on class politics in Part I-where I argued that
the content of that particular ideological commitment was substantially
informed by partisan developments. Again, the importance of these parti-
san trends lies to an important degree with how they influenced and re-
shaped a deeper ideological conception of class within the Democratic
Party.
D. Possibilities for Ideological Influences in the Judicial Context
Assuming one agrees that ideological frameworks are worthy of at-
tention in a historical examination of Brown, a second, and closely relat-
ed critique arises; perhaps the frameworks themselves are wholly epi-
phenomenal and are nothing more than a reflection of broader social,
political, and institutional forces. If that is the case, even if ideological
frameworks can be identified in the background context of Brown, do
they merit examination on their own terms? Or should an examination of
ideas ultimately be an examination of ideas-as-politics through other
means?
Though I deal with a more specific form of this critique in the next
section, in its broader form, this critique grows out of the skepticism
some scholars of party politics and coalition-building express toward the
view that position-bundling in electoral politics is necessarily linked to
ideological dynamics themselves. To the contrary, they tend to credit
such bundling more to the interests of party elites in cobbling together
various electoral constituencies for the purpose of winning elections.206
Admittedly, such critiques do make sense when one is confronted with
conspicuous odd couples in American party politics such as the familiar
206. See DAVID KAROL, PARTY POSITION CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS: COALITION
MANAGEMENT 15 (2009).
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example of southern Democrats joining with African-American voters in
the New Deal coalition, and social conservatives and libertarians joining
together in the modern Republican Party.
Yet, even if ideologically-driven bundling may prompt skepticism
in the realm of electoral politics and in the creation of party ideologies, at
least one consideration suggests that forces more internal to the ideas
themselves may have a greater role to play in the judicial context: elec-
toral coalition management is simply not a concern for Supreme Court
Justices. If bundling occurs with respect to jurisprudential concerns, and
if we understand Supreme Court Justices to be engaging in their tasks in
good faith, principled ways (and not, say, deciding every case with a
base partisan concern toward making the road to electoral victory mar-
ginally easier for their party of choice in the next election), some other
dynamic must be at work to bring about ideological convergences of the
type seen in Brown.
Finally, one might critique my argument by proposing that it is in-
stead basic partisan considerations driving legal development, rather than
ideas, by emphasizing informal social-cultural mechanisms. The argu-
ment might be this: perhaps Justices adopt-subsequent to their ap-
pointment-partisan-driven changes in their preferred party ideology for
the purpose of staying aligned with friends and peer groups that the Jus-
tices self-identify with. 20 7 In this way, ideological-bundling on the Court
would be linked, if only indirectly, to partisan-driven position-bundling
in the electoral arena.
To some extent, it seems possible that such a dynamic could have
played a role with some of the Justices on the Brown Court. Further, such
a dynamic, though not wholly ideological in nature, could be encom-
passed within my own argument that the Brown ruling was motivated in
part by a less-southern sectional outlook that did change, to a degree,
subsequent o some of the Brown Court appointments. That said, I am
skeptical that such a dynamic can wholly account for Brown or that it can
wholly displace any role for the ideas themselves in influencing judicial
behavior. At most, this sort of dynamic might account for a growing
sympathy for African-American rights on the Court, given the growing
importance of African-American voters for Democratic Party electoral
success. However, this dynamic might not as easily account for the
Court's willingness to move first on the civil rights issue, nor would it
necessarily account for the Court's willingness to overcome the pull of
stare decisis and initiate a very dramatic reversal on established constitu-
tional doctrine.
207. See Schickler, supra note 194, at 85-87 (suggesting the possibility of this sort of dynamic
occurring for partisan-bundling in the electorate).
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E. The Juxtaposition ofEconomic and Racial Liberalism and the Possi-
bility ofldeological Transformation
A more specific form of the ideas-are-epiphenomenal critique might
be restated as follows: to the extent that I am claiming an ideological
affinity of sorts between racial and economic liberalism, the Populists
and multiple generations of southern Democrats suggest the opposite
conclusion. Indeed, the political ideologies of both were, in a significant
way, premised upon the diferentiation between, or "unbundling" of,
racial and economic liberalism. William Jennings Bryan himself is the
perfect example of this unbundling, with his liberalism on the latter, and
his concession to Jim Crow on the former.20 8 Similarly, Katznelson, et
al.'s examination of congressional roll call votes offers support for an-
other historical example of the unbundling of the two issues, with respect
to the New Deal and post-New Deal era southern Democrats.209 They
note a strong convergence between southern and non-southern Demo-
crats on matters related to federal statism on economic affairs, while also
noting two prominent points of divergence between these two wings of
the Democratic Party with respect to matters of race and (after a time) on
labor as well.2 10 In light of the quite striking historical juxtaposition of
the Progressive Era southern Democrats to the Brown Court, this sug-
gests that conceptions of class and federal governmental statism are par-
ticularly malleable in relation to broader political forces. At least with
respect to these particular ideas, this suggests that perhaps the ideas ulti-
mately possess little autonomous influence.
Substantively unpacking the status of economic and racial liberal-
ism from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century is a
major task that requires much greater in-depth examination elsewhere. At
least for the present argument, I think a sufficient justification for treat-
ing these ideas on their own terms might be drawn from arguments pre-
sented above regarding the framing or mediating influence of conceptual
frameworks and the relative autonomy of such frameworks, in the judi-
cial context. Having said that, let me conclude on a mildly speculative
note on how, even with the example of the Populists and the progressive
southern Democrats in mind, an analytical space might still be carved out
for the relative autonomy of more liberal racial and economic ideas.
As a preliminary point, it is hard to dispute the fact that basic politi-
cal forces are much of the reason why more liberal racial and economic
ideologies were bundled together in the post-New Deal Democratic Party
and why they were unbundled for the southern Democrats in the decades
before. Indeed, this is a point of relative emphasis in the preceding argu-
208. See KAZIN, supra note 43, at 93-94; SANDERS, supra note 79, at 156-57; SARASOHN,
supra note 51, at 18-19.
209. Katznelson, Geiger & Kryder, supra note 72, at 285-86, 288, 292-94, 299.
210. Id.
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ment in Part I and my discussion of the gradually less-southern orienta-
tion of conceptions of class in the Democratic Party.211 One crucial dis-
tinction between the ideological context of Brown and the ideological
context of the populists and Progressive Era southern Democrats is pre-
cisely that the southern Democrats and the Populists still fundamentally
conceived of class politics in economic and regional terms due to their
southern-sectional biases.212 Approaching class political ideals freed
from those biases, post-New Deal Democratic Party ideology was capa-
ble of generating more racially progressive outcomes that ultimately
gained momentum in the middle of the twentieth century. Quite clearly
then, abstract political ideas such as "class" or "equality" or "democra-
cy" can be described as somewhat-unfilled vessels that are given content
by strategic political actors.
In these respects the ideological dynamics underlying class speak to
related arguments put forth separately by Balkin and Skowronek. Balkin,
for his part, has emphasized a dynamic of "ideological drift" where legal
theories or principles may acquire new political valences and new politi-
cal meanings when actors deploy them in new contexts.213 An example of
this dynamic at work would be the notion of the "colorblind" constitu-
tional view of racial equality; as Balkin recounts, this concept was de-
ployed as a progressive critique of Jim Crow in Justice Harlan's dissent
in Plessy v. Ferguson, but in the modern legal context, it is more often
used by those considered to be on the right of the political spectrum.2 14
Relatedly, the evolution of class politics within the Democratic Par-
ty speaks to an ideological dynamic Skowronek has examined in the con-
text of the political thought of Woodrow Wilson. Specifically, he traces
how Wilson creatively and cleverly appropriated ideas such as "national-
ism" and "democracy" in the service of a broader political outlook that
aligned well with Wilson's sympathies toward southern racial hierar-
chy.215 Further, and even more directly tied to the preceding discussion,
Skowronek discusses how these ideas developed by Wilson later came to
be appropriated by defenders of modern American liberalism. 2 16 Skow-
ronek refers to this phenomenon as the re-association of ideas with dif-
ferent programmatic purposes.2 17
211. See supra Part I.C.
212. See supra notes 41-44, 79-103 and accompanying text.
213. J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869, 871
(1993).
214. Id. at 871; see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Balkin notes that the phenomenon of drift might be understood in either of two senses: first, an
idea's meaning or valence may change as a consequence of the idea having a different political
consequence in a different context. Separately, an idea's meaning or valence may change as a conse-
quence of the idea's content changing within a new context. Balkin, supra note 213, at 871-72.
215. Skowronek, supra note 95, at 393-95.
216. Id. at 388-89, 398-99.
217. See id. at 398-400.
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Both Balkin and Skowronek are attentive to how the political mean-
ing and valence of ideas is subject to the pull of broader social and politi-
cal forces. Yet, both theories are also attentive to a qualified kind of au-
tonomy that ideas enjoy as well, and that justify an examination of ideas
on their own terms. Balkin emphasizes that even if the meaning of ideas
is constituted by political actors, ideas also function to constitute political
actors as well-in shaping what those actors will find to be reasonable or
unreasonable.2 18 Likewise, Skowronek emphasizes how the "re[-
]association of ideas and purposes" can be an enormously consequential
act of ideological appropriation, where genuinely new facets of the
American political tradition may be created.219 As Skowronek states in
reference to Wilson:
Staking a reactionary cause on democratic principles may be a
purely instrumental act, but it is not for that an inconsequential one.
The vocabulary of democracy can be constitutive in its own right. To
the extent that the ideational foundation of the cause shifts, new
meanings will be generated, meanings with implications that will re-
flect back on principles and causes alike.220
Likewise, the juxtaposition of earlier southern Democrats to the
Brown Court is particularly instructive for illuminating how even if ideas
are politically influenced at their inception and afterward, the ideas may
still exert an autonomous force in the form of the logic and grammar that
develops and emanates from the concept itself. Consider a preliminary
point: the initial irony aside, it is perhaps not at all surprising that Popu-
lists and southern Democrats in the Progressive Era would be joined to
New Deal era Democrats in embracing notions of class politics or, in
certain contexts, federal statism as well. (And, one might assume that the
former would probably have few reservations about a judiciary willing to
approach the law in more instrumental, pragmatic terms too-at least
with respect to economic matters.) These ideas are, at their root, ulti-
mately about protecting the rights and advancing the interests of minority
groups through state power, and as such, will always be attractive ideo-
logical tools for those on the margins, or who fear being on the margins,
of social and political power-but who have sufficient political clout to
articulate their grievances in mainstream political discourse. It is no sur-
prise then that such ideas (though only applied to white men) would be
so strongly embraced in the South, where fears of sectional oppression
have historically run high. More significantly, it is no surprise that such
ideas would be attractive to the Populists at the turn of the century seek-
ing progressive goals of economic reform. And finally, it should be of no
218. Balkin, supra note 213, at 877-80.
219. Skowronek, supra note 95, at 385-86, 388, 398-400.
220. Id. at 399.
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surprise that such ideas would prove equally useful and powerful in the
service of progressive goals for racial minority rights.
I would propose that there is perhaps something in the conceptual
structure of class differentiation, and how that concept has been deployed
over time, that speaks to both the political influence of new partisan
alignments and the autonomous influence of the concept itself. How such
a transformation in the concept of class occurs over time is, of course,
primarily a function of political party dynamics. For an idea to undergo
such a transformation within a political party's ideology, there must be a
change or shift in the relative power of that party's core constituencies in
order to destabilize accepted meanings and understandings of the con-
cept. In addition, there must also be an element of continuity among the-
se party constituencies as well, so that the party's grammar and basic
concepts are maintained, even as they are deployed toward new purpos-
es. These are the most obvious "political" elements involved in a trans-
formational shift in a party's ideological commitments, and they speak to
the influence of external political forces upon the content of political
ideas.
Yet, the consistent deployment of the concept of class on behalf of
well-defined "outsider" constituencies within the Democratic Party over
time speaks to the attractiveness and influence of the concept and its rhe-
torical structure to those affiliated with that party as well. And for the
present argument with respect to Brown, the very long-running status of
the concept of class and its rhetorical structure within the Democratic
Party raises the suspicion that the familiarity of the concept to the largely
Democratic appointees of the Brown Court may have aided that outcome,
in some manner.
That is, when one considers the increasing judicial sympathy for ra-
cial minorities in the constitutional doctrine that culminates in
221Brown -sympathies that occurred ahead of the elected branches and
without the benefit of a decisive, contemporaneous political regime
change on racial matters-one suspects that Democratic judicial appoin-
tees, long comfortable with the grammar of class politics, may have con-
sequently found it more plausible, and relatively less troubling, being in
the vanguard on the dismantling of Jim Crow. Even if the rights revolu-
tion encompassed a major redefinition of which classes were worthy of
state protection, the enterprise of employing state power to protect cer-
tain, disfavored classes had been an idea central to the Democratic Party
for at least a half-century by the time Brown was decided. Drawing on
221. Just with respect to cases in the education context, see, for example, McLaurin v. Okla-
homa State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,
634-636 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349-50 (1938).
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Balkin's point, the concept of class was constitutive in how these particu-
lar political actors perceived, ordered, and responded to their context.22 2
Finally, the significance of the bundling of racial and economic lib-
eralism for members of the Brown Court stems not just from the immedi-
ate consequence of the Brown ruling, but from the new grammar and
ideology that followed from it. In the same manner that Skowronek
views Woodrow Wilson's appropriation and reformulation of key com-
ponents of the American political tradition as a deeply creative act,
something similar might be said regarding the reconceptualization of
class in the 1930s that culminated in the Brown decision.2 23 The grammar
of the Populists and southern Democrats of the Progressive Era, once
shed of its distinctive regional affiliation with the South, has become the
dominant grammar of modem equal protection and social status.
CONCLUSION
In illuminating a shared ideological foundation between Brown and
the New Deal, this Article pursues three core goals. First, it sheds light
on the ideological factors behind the Brown ruling, one of the oddest
cases in constitutional development. Second, it highlights the strong but
less-than-obvious ideological linkages between the New Deal and the
mid-twentieth century Rights Revolution. Third, the Article's investiga-
tion of jurisprudential bundling offers an initial and focused examination
of how party ideologies, broader political developments, and Supreme
Court appointments dynamics intersect and allow for ideas to influence
the development of constitutional doctrine.
222. Cf Balkin, supra note 213, at 871-72 (examining the concept of ideological drift).
223. Cf Skowronek, supra note 95, at 398-400 (examining the process of how racist and
liberal ideas became mutually constitutive in arguments set forth by Woodrow Wilson and John C.
Calhoun).
94 [Vol. 92:1
ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCE AND THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE
BY GRACE M. GIESELt
ABSTRACT
The United States legal system has a new player: the alternative liti-
gation finance (ALF) entity. In recent years ALF entities have begun
providing financing for small-scale matters and also complex commer-
cial matters involving millions of dollars. The recent success of ALF has
been assisted by the fact that at least in some jurisdictions it is now clear
that perceived historical barriers to ALF such as champerty, usury, and
ethics precepts do not, in fact, block ALF. With ALF arrangements be-
coming more commonplace, questions have emerged about the effect the
integration of ALF entities into attorney-client relationships has on the
attorney-client privilege.
This Article explores traditional attorney-client privilege doctrine to
determine whether the privilege protects communications involving ALF
entities. This Article concludes that ALF entities cannot benefit from the
joint client doctrine because they, in fact, are not joint clients. Even if
ALF entities sought o be joint clients, ethical principles likely would not
allow joint client status in the investment decision stage of the relation-
ship and might not allow it in the monitoring stage of the relationship.
ALF entities likely cannot benefit from the allied party-common interest
doctrine for communications in the investment decision stage but might
be able to avail themselves of this doctrine for communications in the
monitoring stage if the particular court involved uses a broad definition
of common interest. In addition, an ALF entity would not likely be found
to be an agent of the client or lawyer such that privilege protection would
include it. Ultimately, this Article concludes that privilege doctrine
should not be stretched to reach the ALF scenario because to do so
would damage the privilege itself. Rather, if the involvement of ALF
entities in the legal market is sufficiently beneficial and if there is a suf-
ficient need for privilege protection, an independent ALF privilege might
be the best solution.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States' legal system has a new player: the alternative lit-
igation finance (ALF) entity.' Funding of litigation by an entity that is
not a party to the litigation has long existed in the United States in the
form of attorney funding through contingent fees2 and insurer funding
through the typical liability insurance contract.3 In situations in which
those two avenues of third-party funding have not been available, parties,
large and small, sophisticated and not, often have struggled to fund their
own litigation. Today such parties have an additional option: ALF. ALF
refers to funding of litigation "by entities other than the parties them-
selves, their counsel, or other entities with a preexisting contractual rela-
tionship with one of the parties."4 ALF entities have no interest or in-
volvement in the matter before providing funding but provide funding for
the litigation and reap a return if the funded party is successful.
ALF entities have been successful in other countries for many
years.s In the last decade or so, ALF entities in the United States have
funded small matters such as personal injury claims.6 And in the last five
I. For a sampling of matters in which ALF entities have been involved, see Devon IT, Inc. v.
IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.l (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012), concerning a fraud
action between two commercial entities, S & T Oil Equip. & Mach., Ltd. v. Juridica invs. Ltd., 456
F. App'x 481, 482-84 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), involving international arbitration, and Shanks v.
Morgan & Meyers, P.L.C., No. 302725, 2012 WL 1314094, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2012)
(per curiam), in which a personal injury plaintiff received funding from two ALF entities.
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2013) (stating ethical guidelines for
contingency fees); see also Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 99
(2011) (noting that all U.S. jurisdictions recognize contingency fees). Though the attorney is inter-
ested in the litigation, he or she funds the litigation but is not a party. Thus, the attorney is a third-
party funder.
3. Insurers are interested in the litigation involving the insured but are not a party to the
litigation so they are third-party funders. See Anthony J. Sebok & W. Bradley Wendel, Duty in the
Litigation-Investment Agreement: The Choice Between Tort and Contract Norms when the Deal
Breaks Down, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1831, 1833-34 (2013) (noting similarity of ALF entities and insur-
ers).
4. AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 1 (2012) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics2020/20111212ethics2020a
If whitepaper final hod informational report.authcheckdam.pdf; see also STEVEN GARBER,
RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE LAW, FIN., AND CAPITAL MKTS. PROGRAM, ALTERNATIVE
LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS ix (2010),
available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasionalpapers/2010/RAND OP306.pdf.
5. The United Kingdom and Australia have been ahead of the United States in the establish-
ment and acceptance of alternative litigation funding. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of
Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171, 178, 185 (2014); see also MICHAEL LEGG, U.S. CHAMBER
INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA: IDENTIFYING AND
ADDRESSING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR LAWYERS 3 (2012), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/l/LitigationFundinginAustralia.pdf (dis-
cussing IMF and the Australian experience). In the United Kingdom, a voluntary code of conduct
has been created along with an Association of Litigation Funders of England and Wales. See Caro-
line Binham, Code of Conduct Set Up for Litigation Funders, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 23, 2011,
at 4.
6. See, e.g., Kelly, Grossman & Flanagan, LLP v. Quick Cash, Inc., No. 04283-2011, 2012
WL 1087341 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 2012) (an example of a typical situation); see also Maya
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years or so, ALF entities, some of which are offshoots of successful enti-
ties in the United Kingdom or Australia,7 began providing financing in
the United States for large commercial matters.8 A sophisticated market
of litigation investing has emerged in which ALF entities invest in mat-
ters such as contract disputes, real estate disputes, trade secret disputes,
and environmental disputes.9 These ALF entities are answering a need.'0
Some of these entities are answering that need in a manner that allows
for quite a profitable return.11
The recent success of ALF has been assisted by the fact that at least
in some jurisdictions it is now clear that perceived historical barriers to
ALF such as champerty, usury, and ethics precepts do not, in fact, block
ALF activities. In recent times, many jurisdictions have viewed champer-
ty, the act of "maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the
Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268,
1277 (2011) (discussing the small scale type of ALF).
7. For example, Juridica Investments, Ltd. and Burford Capital, LLC, financing entities
investing in litigation in the United States, are traded on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)
which is a part of the London Stock Exchange. See Richard Lloyd, The New, New Thing, AM. LAW.
(May 17, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202457711273; see also Jason
Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding ofAmerican Litigation, 58 UCLA L.
REv. 571, 573 (2010) (discussing Burford and Juridica). Australian veteran funder IMF launched a
United States subsidiary in 2011, Bentham Capital LLC. See LEGG, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing
IMF).
8. See Catherine Ho, Investment Firms Playing Role in Legal Field, WASH. POST, Dec. 12,
2011, at A14 (discussing ALF entities BlackRobe, Burford, and Juridica); Leigh Jones, Another
Litigation Finance Firm Opens Its Doors, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 8, 2013,
http://www.nationallawjoumal.com/id=1202595145560? ("Three prominent lawyers and a hedge-
fund manager have launched [Gerchen Keller Capital LLC, an ALF] with $100 million in capital.").
9. See Jones, supra note 8 (noting that Gerchen Keller Capital LLC averages investments of
$5 million); Eileen Malloy, Third-Party Financing for U.S. Litigation Profitable Endeavor for U.K.
Funding Firm, 28 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 229 (Apr. 11, 2012) (discussing the
success of one such funder of sophisticated commercial disputes, Burford); Molot, supra note 5, at
178 ("Burford has committed more than $ 300 million in capital across more than fifty deals involv-
ing commercial disputes in the United States, the United Kingdom, and international arbitration.").
For an example of ALF involvement in a trade secret litigation matter, see Miller UK Ltd. v. Cater-
pillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
10. Before ALF entities, a corporation might dedicate significant corporate resources to fund
litigation matters. This use might infringe on the resources available to achieve other important
corporate objectives. With the ALF market, corporations seek to involve ALF entities to fund litiga-
tion and yet avoid the diversion of corporate resources. The ALF entity funds the litigation. In addi-
tion, because ALF entities are not repaid absent a successful result, corporations using ALF can
avoid, at least in part, the risk of pouring money into an unsuccessful itigation. In its Annual Report
released in April 2011, ALF entity Burford noted "[w]hile uncertain economic conditions, rising
litigation costs and shrinking corporate [legal] budgets have helped generate interest in Burford's
proposition, the fundamental driver of [Burford's] success ... has simply been a thirst for financial
options." See Malloy, supra note 9 (quoting BURFORD ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 4 (2012),
http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/burford-arl1.pdf) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
11. For example, in April of 2012, Burford reported a $15.9 million profit for 2011 and noted
that it had committed $280 million in investments. Id. Juridica has also shown signs of being in-
volved in a profitable endeavor. In January of 2012, it announced a stock payout as a result of suc-
cess in seven antitrust and patent matters. See Alex Spence, The £8m Slice of Courtroom Winnings,
with More to Come; Juridica to Pay Out Special Dividend Next Month, TIMES (London), Jan. 5,
2012, at 39.
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outcome," 2 with great suspicion13 and have not recognized it as a crime
or a tortl4 or even a contract defense.5 An example of the typical recep-
tion for a champerty claim is in a case in which ALF arrangements were
at issue. The court stated:
[O]ur Courts have held for at least a century that an outsider's in-
volvement in a lawsuit does not constitute champerty or maintenance
merely because the outsider provides financial assistance to a litigant
and shares in the recovery. Rather, "a contract or agreement will not
be held within the condemnation of the principle[s] . . . unless the in-
terference is clearly officious and for the purpose of stirring up 'strife
and continuing litigation."' 6
The ABA's Commission on Ethics 20/20 agreed in 2012 that chain-
perty was not a barrier to ALF in many states. 17 The Commission clari-
fied that if a jurisdiction allows any sort of investment in litigation, an
ALF arrangement would not be champertous in such a jurisdiction if the
matter is not frivolous litigation, the ALF entity has no improper motive,
and the ALF entity does not exercise control over strategic decisions.'8
ALF investments are motivated by a desire to create profit, so it is un-
likely that an ALF entity would invest in frivolous litigation' 9 or be mo-
tivated by any otherwise improper motive. In addition, an ALF entity
desiring to maximize profit would not jeopardize the investment by seek-
12. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978). This case also defined maintenance and
barratry, two doctrines related to champerty. "(M]aintenance is helping another prosecute a suit." Id.
"[B]arratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or champerty." Id.
13. See Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011) ("The
consistent trend across the country is toward limiting, not expanding, champerty's reach."); see also
Giambattista v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 586 P.2d 1180, 1186 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) ("In no state
are these doctrines and the laws relating to them preserved with their original rigor.").
14. See, e.g., Del Webb, 652 F.3d at 1154 (finding no tort); Sec. Underground Storage, Inc. v.
Anderson, 347 F.2d 964, 969 (10th Cir. 1965) (finding no tort); Hall v. State, 655 A.2d 827, 830-31
(Del. Super. Ct. 1994) (finding no champerty crime).
15. See, e.g., Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277-79 (S.C. 2000) (abol-
ishing champerty as a defense to contract enforcement); Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224,
1226-28 (Mass. 1997) (same); see also Sebok, supra note 2, at 98-99 (stating that at least twenty-
eight U.S. jurisdictions allow champerty in some form).
16. Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 775 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Smith v.
Hartsell, 63 S.E. 172, 174 (N.C. 1908)); see also Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d
711, 724-28 (N.D. 111. 2014) (rejecting application of champerty and maintenance to ALF setting,
stating "maintenance and champerty have been narrowed to a filament"); Core Funding Grp. v.
McIntire, No. 07-4273, 2011 WL 1795242, at *3-4 (E.D. La. May, 11, 2011) (holding that a loan to
attorneys to fund litigation was not champertous because it was not a loan to a party and not contin-
gent solely on the underlying litigation's outcome); Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No.
018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *6-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (finding no impermissible
champerty). But see Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 676, 678, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding an ALF arrangement champertous and not enforceable).
17. See ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at I1.
18. See ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at I1; see also Sebok, supra note 2, at 108-09 (discuss-
ing the various forms of champerty permitted and not permitted).
19. See William Alden, Looking to Make a Profit on Lawsuits, Firms Invest in Them, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2012, at B3 ("[ALF entities] insist they only invest in cases that they believe have
merit.").
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ing to exercise so much control over the matter that the arrangement
would be deemed champertous such that it would not be enforced.20
ALF arrangements also are permissible under usury laws. Usury
prohibitions apply only when there is a loan at an interest rate above that
allowed by usury law and the borrower agrees to repay the principal and
pay the interest without condition.21 ALF arrangements usually involve a
conditional obligation on behalf of the borrower to repay; the ALF entity
recovers its money only if the litigation resolves favorably.22 As a result,
most courts evaluating whether ALF arrangements are usurious have
concluded that the arrangements are investments, not loans, and are not
usurious.23
Repeatedly, ethics bodies have determined that ALF arrangements
are not per se unethical.24 These bodies raise caution flags, not stop signs,
as they note that attorneys must protect their independence in ALF ar-
rangements,25 that attorneys must guard against conflicts of interest,26
20. For example, Burford has stated that it "is simply a provider of investment capital and ...
the litigant retains control of its case." Malloy, supra note 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Michele DeStefano posits that a rule not allowing any ALF influence would not be realistic. Michele
DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2796 (2012).
21. See Lloyd v. Scott, 29 U.S. 205, 226 (1830) ("Where a loan is made to be returned at a
fixed day with more than the legal rate of interest, depending upon a casualty which hazards both
principal and interest, the contract is not usurious; but where the interest only is hazarded, it is usu-
ry."). See generally Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles,
I DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 85, 89-92, 96 (2002) (discussing the history of usury laws and how
modem usury laws apply to litigation financing).
22. See Douglas R. Richmond, Other People's Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56
MERCER L. REV. 649, 665 (2005).
23. See, e.g., Kelly, Grossman & Flanagan, LLP v. Quick Cash, Inc., No. 04283-2011, 2012
WL 1087341, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 2012) ("[T]he Defendants were always at risk of no
recourse whenever one of the underlying cases went to trial and resulted in no recovery. Such cir-
cumstances simply cannot be stated to constitute a 'loan."'); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v.
Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 97 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that borrowers had no obligation to repay so
"as a matter of law, the agreements cannot be usurious"). A few courts have disagreed. See, e.g.,
Lawsuit Fin., LLC v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam) (ALF ar-
rangement entered into after the favorable jury verdict so repayment was certain); Echeverria v.
Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (holding
that the claim was a "sure thing" so the repayment was certain to occur and the arrangement was
usurious (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767,
777-79 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the advance was usurious). See generally Jenna Wims
Hashway, Litigation Loansharks: A History of Litigation Lending and a Proposal to Bring Litigation
Advances Within the Protection of Usury Laws, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 750, 761-62, 769-
72 (2012) (discussing the relationship of litigation lending to usury laws).
24. See, e.g., Del. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. 2006-2 (2006), available at
http://media.dsba.org/ethics/pdfs/2006-2.pdf ("[T]the Attorney may comply with such an arrange-
ment under the proper circumstances."); State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Ethics
Op. RI-336 (2005), available at http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered-opinions/ri-
336.cfm ("The various State Bar ethics opinions have concluded that litigation-financing arrange-
ments similar to those described above are permissible, as long as it is the lawyer, and not the client,
who is the obligor on the loan, and there is full disclosure to the client.").
25. See, e.g., Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2012-3 (2012), available
at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/AdvisoryOpinions/2012/Op_1 2-003.pdf
("[T]he lawyer must ensure that the ALF provider does not attempt to dictate the lawyer's represen-
tation of the client."); N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 (2011), availa-
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and that attorneys must be ever vigilant to protect confidential client in-
formation at all times in the ALF setting.27
With ALF arrangements becoming more commonplace at all levels
of litigation, questions have emerged about the effect the involvement of
an ALF entity in a litigation matter has on the work product doctrine and
the attorney-client privilege.28 The courts have not yet fleshed out these
2 0issues. 9 Commentators have not engaged in in-depth analysis either.30
Because these two doctrines are not creatures of state professional re-
sponsibility rules, state ethics opinions do not definitively address the
application of these doctrines, but rather, note that lawyers should ex-
plain to clients that disclosure to ALF entities may waive the attorney-
client privilege or the work product doctrine. 31 Obviously, these doc-
ble at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/20 I1-opinions/1159-formal-opinion-201 1-
02 ("While a client may agree to permit a financing company to direct the strategy or other aspects
of a lawsuit, absent client consent, a lawyer may not permit the company to influence his or her
professional judgment in determining the course or strategy of the litigation, including the decisions
of whether to settle or the amount to accept in any settlement."). Several Model Rules prohibit
improper interference. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013) (stating that "a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice"); id. R. 5.4(c)
(stating that a lawyer shall not allow interference); id. R. 1.8(f)(2) (stating that a third party can pay
only if there is no improper interference).
26. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 (2011), available
at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/20 11-opinions/1159-formal-opinion-2011-02
(cautioning about conflicts of interest); Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 191 (2006), available
at
http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic=mebaroverseers thicsopinions&id=8734
8&v=article (instructing lawyers to "be wary of conflicts of interest"). Model Rule 1.7 prohibits,
absent informed consent, a representation if there is a "significant risk" that the lawyer's representa-
tion of the client will be "materially limited" by the lawyer's relationship with another such as the
ALF entity. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2013).
27. See, e.g., Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2012-3 (2012), available
at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/AdvisoryOpinions/2012/Op_12-003.pdf (pro-
hibiting disclosures to an ALF without client consent and instructing lawyers to warn clients about
the risk of waiver of the attomey-client privilege); N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, For-
mal Op. 2011-2 (2011), available at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/201 I-
opinions/I 159-formal-opinion-2011-02 (emphasizing that client consent is necessary before disclo-
sure); see also ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 31-32. Model Rule 1.6 requires informed consent
unless the disclosure is impliedly authorized or in certain very narrow situations of necessity.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2013).
28. See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 7, at 604 ("One largely unanswered question raised by oppo-
nents of third-party finance is how it affects attomey-client privilege and the work product rule.").
29. With regard to the work product doctrine, see Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F.
Supp. 3d 711, 734-39 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (applying the work product doctrine); Bray & Gillespie
Mgmt. LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 6:07-CV-222-Orl-35KRS, 2008 WL 5054695, at *4 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 17, 2008) (holding that the work product doctrine did not apply because claimant did not
make specific claims in accord with court's standing order regarding privilege); Mondis Tech., Ltd.
v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2:08-CV-478-TJW, 2011 WL 1714304, at *2-3
(E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011) (applying the work product doctrine).
30. Commentators have noted the issues but have not fully analyzed the application of the
doctrines in the ALF setting. Compare Steinitz, supra note 6, at 1324 ("Client communication with
the financier . . . breaks the attomey-client privilege."), with Richmond, supra note 22, at 675 ("it is
far from certain that an attorney's disclosure of client confidences to a litigation funding company
will waive the attomey-client privilege") and Sebok & Wendel, supra note 3, at 1837 n. 11 (noting
uncertainty).
31. See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. E-432 (2011), available at
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics_opinions/kba_e432.pdf
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trines protect certain material from disclosure and that protection is vital-
ly important to the attorney-client team and to the ALF entity consider-
ing an investment or an ALF entity already invested in a matter.32 Re-
gardless of the stage of the ALF entity involvement, it is likely that the
matter's value is maximized by the protection these doctrines offer.
Thus, the attomey-client team and the ALF entity must have as a goal the
preservation of the protection. This goal should affect attorney, client,
and ALF entity conduct in any one matter and should affect how the
ALF market operates as well.
The application of the work product doctrine and the attorney-client
privilege must be evaluated in light of the sharing of information that
might be typical when an ALF entity is involved. First, an ALF entity
must have access to information about a matter so that the entity can
decide whether to invest in the matter or, rather, to walk away from the
matter.33 Few ALF entities would be willing to make a significant in-
vestment absent some level of due diligence activity.34 In fact, estab-
lished ALF entities have detailed due diligence procedures that include
analysis of the claim's potential for success, the claim's potential value
after adjudication, the ability to collect a judgment if the matter is suc-
cessful, the litigation's potential cost, the time span involved to obtain a
final judgment, and the likelihood and timing of settlement.35 In addition,
the ALF entity, if it decides to invest, will desire access to information
("Any consultation should include a discussion of the possible effects of disclosure of confidential
information to the non-lawyer, including the risk of waiver of the attomey-client privilege.").
32. For example, the managing director of Juris Capital Corporation, an ALF entity, in 2009
noted:
[I]n every conversation I have with a litigant or their counsel, we advise them not to share
the information which is or may be subject to a privilege. We never ask for, nor do we re-
ceive, any privileged information that if disclosed to us might constitute a waiver of the
attomey-client privilege.
Jennifer Banzaca, In Turbulent Markets, Hedge Fund Managers Turn to Litigation Funding for
Absolute, Uncorrelated Returns, HEDGE FUND L. REP., June 24, 2009 (internal quotation mark
omitted), available at
http://www.juriscapitalcorp.com/images/Hedge%20Fund%2OLaw%20Report%20Article.pdf (dis-
cussing Juridica, Juris, and CaseFunding); see also Mathew Andrews, Note, The Growth of Litiga-
tion Finance in DOJ Whistleblower Suits: Implications and Recommendations, 123 YALE L.J. 2422,
2443-44 (2014).
33. Jonathan Molot, chair of the investment committee at Burford, describes this process as
follows:
Litigants approach Burford's team of legal professionals asking whether their cases are
financeable. Burford's legal team then conducts extensive diligence that includes an ex-
amination of the facts of the dispute, the governing law and forum, the quality of the legal
team the litigant has hired or proposes to hire, and the respective financial resources of
the parties.
Molot, supra note 5, at 178; see also Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160,
at *1 n.l (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012) (describing sharing information with the ALF entity in the eval-
uation process).
34. See Andrews, supra note 32, at 2437 ("Funders have argued that the quickest road to
bankruptcy is funding suits without a reasonable chance of success.").
35. See Andrews, supra note 32, at 2437-38; Banzaca, supra note 32.
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about the matter so that it may monitor its investment as the matter pro-
ceeds.
In a recent article I attempted to fill the analysis void with regard to
the work product doctrine and concluded that materials created specifi-
cally for the ALF entity likely enjoy work product doctrine protection,37
and that sharing materials otherwise protected by the work product doc-
trine with the ALF entity likely does not result in a waiver of the work
product doctrine.38 Thus, I ultimately concluded that the work product
doctrine would not significantly affect the nature of ALF involvement in
the attorney-client relationship and would not significantly affect the
ALF market in general.
I now turn to the effect of ALF entity involvement on the attorney-
client privilege. In a simplistic analysis, involving an ALF entity in at-
torney-client communications destroys the privilege because a person
other than the attorney and client is present40 and any communication
with an ALF entity is not a communication between attorney and client,
the type of communication the privilege protects.4 1 Likewise, in a sim-
plistic analysis, any attorney-client communications privileged when
made but shared with an ALF entity loses the privilege's protection be-
cause the communication is shared with someone other than attorney and
client.42
But the question of the attorney-client privilege's application to sit-
uations involving ALF entities is not so simple. After a brief discussion
of the privilege's parameters in Part I, this Article identifies four ways
the attorney-client privilege might protect communications involving or
shared with ALF entities. In Part II, this Article examines whether the
ALF entity and the client are the attorney's joint clients such that the
privilege protects the communications involving or shared with the ALF
entity. In Part III the Article discusses whether ALF entities and clients,
though not joint clients, share a common interest such that the allied par-
ty-common interest doctrine protects communications involving ALF
entities from compelled disclosure. Part IV evaluates whether ALF enti-
ties are the clients' agents under the functional equivalent agent doctrine,
36. See Michelle Boardman, Insurers Defend and Third Parties Fund: A Comparison of
Litigation Participation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POLY 673, 677-78 (2012) (discussing monitoring role).
37. Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work-Product Doctrine, 47
wAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1126-29 (2012).
38. Id. at 1137-39.
39. Id. at 1140.
40. See WebXchange Inc. v. Dell Inc., 264 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Del. 2010) ("A communica-
tion is not made in confidence, and in turn is not privileged, if persons other than the client, its
attorney, or their agents are present.").
41. See infra Part LA for a discussion of the parameters of the privilege.
42. See Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 705, 718 (E.D. Va. 2010) ("[Tlhe
voluntary production of a privileged document to a third party waives the privilege."); WebXchange,
264 F.R.D. at 126 ("[I]f a client shares an otherwise privileged communication with a third party,
then the communication is no longer confidential and the client has waived the privilege.").
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or the clients' agents or the lawyers' agents under the Kovel agency doc-
trine4 3 such that the communications involving ALF entities enjoy the
privilege's protection. The Article examines, in Part V, whether existing
privilege doctrine should be modified to reach the ALF scenario to the
extent it does not reach it now.
The Article concludes that the only claim of privilege that might be
successful, and then only in some courts, is the claim that the privilege
applies to protect communications involving ALF entities in the monitor-
ing stage as a result of the allied lawyer-common interest doctrine. ALF
entities cannot benefit from the joint client doctrine because they, in fact,
are not joint clients. Even if ALF entities sought to be joint clients, ethi-
cal principles likely would not allow joint client status in the relation-
ship's investment decision stage and might not allow it in the relation-
ship's monitoring stage. ALF entities likely cannot benefit from the al-
lied party-common interest doctrine for communications in the invest-
ment decision stage but might be able to avail themselves of this doctrine
for communications in the monitoring stage if the particular court in-
volved uses a broad definition of common interest. ALF entities would
not likely be able to benefit from the functional equivalent agent doctrine
or the Kovel agency doctrine. Ultimately, this Article concludes that giv-
en that the current privilege doctrine does not protect communications
involving ALF entities, the doctrine should not be stretched to reach the
ALF scenario because to do so would damage the privilege itself. Rather,
the Article posits that a free-standing ALF privilege might be called for if
the involvement of ALF entities in the legal market is sufficiently bene-
ficial and if there is a sufficient need for privilege protection.
I. THE PRIVILEGE
A. Parameters and Rationale of the Privilege
The modem attorney-client privilege protects certain communica-
tions from compelled disclosure." The privilege protects confidential
communications between clients and their lawyers if the communications
are for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice and are not in
furtherance of a crime or fraud.45 Some courts state the privilege's defini-
43. 1 name this doctrine after the case most often associated with it, United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
44. See Kerner v. Superior Ct., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 504, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) ("The privi-
lege is absolute and prevents disclosure of the communication regardless of its relevance, necessity
or other circumstances peculiar to the case."); Batra v. Wolf, 922 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010) ("Privileged attorney-client communications are absolutely immune from disclosure.").
45. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
Judge Wyzanski in United Shoe defined the privilege as follows:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to be-
come a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of
the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was in-
formed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of secur-
104 [Vol. 92:1
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tion slightly differently or provide more detail, but as one court has stat-
ed: "Five elements are common to all definitions of the attorney-client
privilege: (1) an attorney, (2) a client, (3) a communication, (4) confiden-
tiality anticipated and preserved, and (5) legal advice or assistance being
the purpose of the communication."4
Courts recognize that the application of the privilege may impede
truth-finding, and so courts often warn that the privilege must be con-
strued narrowly.47
The privilege exists to encourage clients to communicate fully and
completely with their lawyers. The reasoning is that clients will be more
likely to confide in their lawyers if they know that what they tell their
lawyers is protected from compelled disclosure. Only with a client's
complete disclosure can an attorney render competent and proper legal
48advice and assistance. And only with that advice and assistance can
clients structure their conduct to better abide by the bounds of the law.
B. The Problem Created by an ALF Entity's Involvement
Modern definitions of the attorney-client privilege note that the
privilege protects communications that are confidential and stay confi-
ing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some
legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id.; see also Chase v. Nova Se. Univ., Inc., No. 1-61290-ClV, 2012 WL 2285915, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
June 18, 2012) (applying the United Shoe test); Go v. Rockefeller Univ., 280 F.R.D. 165, 173
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying the United Shoe test). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 68-86 (2000) (defining the scope and duration of the attorney client
privilege). Some jurisdictions such as New York have codified the privilege. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R.
4503(a) (Consol. 2014).
46. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795 (E.D. La. 2007).
47. See, e.g., In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[B]ecause ...
this rule 'contravene[s] the fundamental principle that the public has a right to every man's evi-
dence,' we construe it narrowly to serve its purposes." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980))).
48. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) ("[The privilege] is founded upon the
necessity, in the interest and administration ofjustice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the
law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free
from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure."); Castellani v. Scranton Times, LP, 956
A.2d 937, 951 (Pa. 2008) ("The attorney-client privilege, on the other hand, renders an attorney
incompetent to testify as to communications made to him by his client in order to promote a free
flow of information only between attorney and his or her client so that the attorney can better repre-
sent the client.").
49. In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1980), the Supreme Court stated the privi-
lege's purpose as follows:
[The] purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and admin-
istration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully in-
formed by the client.
Id at 389; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985)
("[T]he attorney-client privilege serves the function of promoting full and frank communications
between attorneys and their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the
administration ofjustice.").
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dential.so In its narrowest sense, a confidential communication is one
between an attorney and a client and one that does not escape beyond
those two entities.51 A conversation that does not involve an attorney and
client is not protected regardless of confidentiality. A conversation in the
presence of others is not confidential5 nor is a conversation between an
attorney and client that is later shared with another.53 So, as an initial
matter, an ALF entity's presence in the midst of attorney-client commu-
nications seems to prevent the privilege from attaching to the communi-
cations. Likewise, sharing any privileged communications with an ALF
entity would seem to destroy the privilege's protection. Any communica-
tion with an ALF entity by an attorney or client, therefore, would not
appear to be a communication between attorney and client and, thus,
would not enjoy the privilege's protections.
Yet, there are some wrinkles to the privilege that may make such
conclusions suspect. If one views the ALF entity and the client as the
lawyer's joint clients pursuing a common interest, including the ALF
entity in communications or sharing communications with the ALF enti-
ty does not destroy the privilege's protection. Second, if the relevant
court recognizes that the ALF entity and the client share a common inter-
est, including the ALF entity in communications or sharing communica-
tions with the ALF entity does not destroy the privilege's protection.
Third, if the ALF entity is a special type of agent of the lawyer or client,
including the ALF entity in communications or sharing communications
with the ALF entity does not destroy the privilege's protection.
50. See 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:18
(4th ed. 2013); 1 PAUL R. RICE, AT7ORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 6:1 (2013-
2014 ed. 2013).
51. See WebXchange Inc. v. Dell Inc., 264 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Del. 2010) ("A communica-
tion is not made in confidence, and in turn is not privileged, if persons other than the client, its
attorney, or their agents are present."); see also In re Condemnation in 16.2626 Acre Area, 981 A.2d
391, 397 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) ("Confidentiality is key to the privilege, and the presence of a
third-party during attorney-client communications will generally negate the privilege.").
52. See, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 650 F.3d 276, 289 (3d Cir. 2011) ("[1]f persons other than
the client, its attorney, or their agents are present, the communication is not made in confidence, and
the privilege does not attach." (quoting In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 361 (3d Cir.
2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
53. See In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[V]oluntarily
disclosing privileged documents to third parties will generally destroy the privilege."); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings Oct. 12, 1995, 78 F.3d 251, 254 (6th Cir. 1996) ("By voluntarily disclosing her
attorney's advice to a third party, . . . a client is held to have waived the privilege because the disclo-
sure runs counter to the notion of confidentiality."); United States v. Ghavami, 882 F. Supp. 2d 532,
537 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("It is well-established that voluntary disclosure of confidential material to a
third party generally results in forfeiture of any applicable attorney-client privilege.").
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II. JOINT CLIENT DOCTRINE
A. What Are Joint Clients?
The law has long recognized that a lawyer may represent two or
more parties with regard to the same matter.54 The parties may desire to
proceed together as a unit, as a way to capture efficiency of tasks and
cost. These parties seek representation by the same attorney, and they
seek a shared representation.55 In a shared or common representation,
often called a joint or co-client representation, the attorney represents
the clients as a group, and they agree to be jointly represented for pur-
poses of a common matter. All parties share all information.
In addition to the inherent limitation that parties do not want a joint
representation unless the interests of the parties closely align, ethics rules
limit joint representations because an attorney cannot ethically represent
multiple parties jointly in a matter unless the parties' interests are similar.
Rule 1.7 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognizes a
conflict if an attorney represents two parties, separately or jointly, if the
parties are "directly adverse" or "there is a significant risk that the repre-
sentation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client."59 In such a conflict situation an attor-
ney, to handle the representation, must obtain the parties' informed con-
sent.60 Even then, the lawyer cannot represent the parties unless the at-
torney "reasonably believes" that he or she can "provide competent and
54. See Magnetar Techs. Corp. v. Six Flags Theme Park Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 466, 479 (D.
Del. 2012) ("The rules governing attorney-client privilege have evolved to cover the representation
of two or more people by a single lawyer, a joint representation. In a joint representation, the joint
privilege applies when multiple clients hire the same counsel to represent them on a matter of com-
mon interest."). The practice has long occurred. See, e.g., Lessing v. Gibbons, 45 P.2d 258, 261 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1935) (explaining that representing clients jointly is "common practice"); Rice v.
Rice, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 335, 335-36 (1854); Gulick v. Gulick, 39 N.J. Eq. 516, 516-17 (1885).
See generally Debra Lyn Bassett, Three's a Crowd: A Proposal to Abolish Joint Representation, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 387, 395 (2001) ("Joint representation has been a longstanding practice in which the
potential benefits have been emphasized, while the potential dangers have been downplayed.").
55. Clients see a joint representation as cost-effective, and it allows for an amicable relation-
ship with the joint client and facilitates a "united front" approach to the matter. Teresa Stanton
Collett, The Promise and Peril of Multiple Representation, 16 REV. LITIG. 567, 577 (1997) ("[T]he
ability to present a united front to a common foe presents substantial tactical advantages that cannot
be ignored."); see also Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of
Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV.
211, 226-27 (1982) (noting the advantage of a "united front").
56. See, e.g., RICE, supra note 50, § 4:30 (explaining "joint clients"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (2000) (defining the privilege of "co-clients").
57. See Maplewood Partners, LP v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 295 F.R.D. 550, 594 (S.D. Fla.
2013) ("There is no need to evaluate whether the legal interests of such co-clients are in common or
aligned because the clients are joint clients of a single attorney."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 cmt. c (2000) (discussing the creation of the joint client
representation).
58. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. 1 (2000)
("Sharing of information among the co-clients with respect to the matter involved in the representa-
tion is normal and typically expected.").
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2013).
60. Id. R. 1.7(b)(4).
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diligent representation to each affected client," no law prohibits the rep-
resentation, and no client is asserting a claim against another client in a
proceeding before a tribunal.6 '
A comment to Rule 1.7 cautions any attorney considering a joint
representation to "advise each client that information will be shared and
that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some mat-
ter material to the representation should be kept from the other." 62 The
lawyer also should explain that he or she may not favor one joint client
over the other.63
Parties logically should not seek joint representation if their inter-
ests do not converge. Rule 1.7 provides a conflict of interest threshold of
commonality. The disclosure discussed in the Rule's commentary makes
it more likely that the parties will understand the situation so that they
can more properly evaluate whether their interests converge to the extent
that a joint representation would be desirable.
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Joint Clients
The attorney-client privilege protects communications involving
joint clients and the lawyer from compelled disclosure when the commu-
nication is about the joint representation and the one seeking the disclo-
sure is a third-party to the joint representationi4 If one of the clients
communicates with the lawyer about the matter of shared representation,
the privilege attaches even though another joint client is present. If one
of the clients communicates with the lawyer about the matter of shared
representation and later shares that communication with another joint
client, there is no waiver of privilege. In effect, in these two situations,
the communication is confidential and retains its confidential status be-
cause it is not being shared with an outsider to the relationship of attor-
61. Id. R. 1.7(b); see id. R. 1.7 cmts. 29-32.
62. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 31 (noting that in special situations clients can agree that the attorney will
not share certain information).
63. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 32.
64. See Vicor Corp. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 674 F.3d 1, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2012) ("Thus, when a
lawyer represents multiple clients having a common interest, communications between the lawyer
and any one (or more) of the clients are privileged as to outsiders[] but not inter sese." (quoting
FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mag-
netar Techs. Corp. v. Six Flags Theme Park Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 466, 479 (D. Del. 2012) ("The
rules governing attorney-client privilege have evolved to cover the representation of two or more
people by a single lawyer, a joint representation. In a joint representation, the joint privilege applies
when multiple clients hire the same counsel to represent them on a matter of common interest.").
This has long been settled law. See Marcuse v. Kramer, 5 Teiss. 247, 250 (La. Ct. App. 1908) ("Two
or more persons sometimes address a lawyer as a common agent. So far as concerns strangers, these
communications are privileged, but not as between themselves." (quoting EDWARD P. WEEKS, A
TREATISE ON ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW § 175 (2d ed. 1892)); 1 FRANCIS WHARTON,
A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ISSUES § 587 (1877) ("It is easy to conceive of
cases in which two or more persons address a lawyer as their common agent. So far as concerns a
stranger, their communications to the lawyer would be privileged.").
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ney and client.65 The flip side of this is that a joint client cannot claim
privilege against the other joint clients if the joint clients become adver-
saries at some time after the joint representation ends.66 In addition, one
of the joint clients cannot waive the privilege without the approval of all,
though one of the group can waive the privilege as to his or her own
communications but only to the extent that the disclosure does not reveal
protected communications of other joint clients.67
C. Is an ALF Entity a Joint Client?
While an ALF entity might seek to be an attorney's joint client
along with the client whose matter the ALF is financing, the descriptions
of ALF entity activity to date do not indicate that ALF entities seek or
desire a joint client relationship or any client relationship at all. 8 Indeed,
a study of ALF entities in Australia has noted that "[n]one of the Austral-
ian professional litigation funders approached . .. retain legal practition-
ers as clients."69 Strategically, an ALF entity might request such a repre-
sentation in the future so as to capture the benefit of the privilege's pro-
tection.
If an ALF entity seeks to be the attorney's joint client in the invest-
ment decision stage, it is not likely the attorney ethically could represent
the original client and the ALF entity. The ALF entity and the original
client have very divergent goals and interests at that stage. The ALF enti-
ty's interest is in critically evaluating the litigation matter so that the enti-
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75(1) (2000) ("If two
or more persons are jointly represented by the same lawyer in a matter, a communication of either
co-client that otherwise qualifies as privileged under §§ 68-72 and relates to matters of common
interest is privileged as against third persons, and any co-client may invoke the privilege, unless it
has been waived by the client who made the communication.").
66. See FDIC, 202 F.3d at 461 ("But it will often happen that the two original clients will fall
out between themselves and become engaged in a controversy in which the communications at their
joint consultation with the lawyer may be vitally material. In such a controversy it is clear that the
privilege is inapplicable." (quoting I KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 91,
at 335-36 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75(2) (explaining that no privilege can
be claimed in an adversarial action between joint clients).
67. In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 363 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[A] client may
unilaterally waive the privilege as to its own communications with a joint attorney, so long as those
communications concern only the waiving client; it may not, however, unilaterally waive the privi-
lege as to any of the other joint clients' communications or as to any of its communications that
relate to other joint clients."); Maplewood Partners, LP v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 295 F.R.D. 550,
605-06 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (stating that a client may reveal his or her own statements but not those of
others).
68. See Boardman, supra note 36, at 687-88 ("Third-party litigation funders vary in their
stated and probable involvement in the underlying litigation. Given the newness of the funding in the
United States, it is not clear what the precise relationship between the plaintiff and the funder is
meant to be or how it actually manifests. The funder and the plaintiff, though, are clearly not co-
clients of the plaintiffs lawyer.").
69. Vicki Waye, Conflicts ofInterests Between Claimholders, Lawyers and Litigation Entre-
preneurs, 19 BOND L. REV. 225, 236 (2007). "[T]he funder does not fall within the definition of
'client' set out in the [Australian] Model rules, nor is the funder a client under general law princi-
ple." Id. at 234 (footnote omitted).
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ty can decide whether investing meshes with its profit maximization
goals whereas the client's interest is to obtain financing so that the litiga-
tion matter can ultimately be resolved successfully. The two parties may
very well be viewed as "directly adverse" such that the attorney would
have a concurrent conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a)(1).7 0 The situa-
tion is definitely an arm's length transaction. There is no doubt that at the
very least there is a "significant risk" that the representation of one or the
other client "will be materially limited" by the lawyer's representation of
the other client such that there is a concurrent conflict of interest under
Rule 1.7(a)(2).71 The conflict may be such that Rule 1.7(b) does not al-
low the representation under any circumstance; informed consent cannot
solve the problem because the lawyer cannot "reasonably believe[] that
the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation"
to each client.72
The more likely result with regard to the investment decision stage
is that the lawyer ethically could not jointly represent he ALF entity and
the original client nor would either desire such representation. Thus, the
situation could not benefit from the privilege's protection.
If the ALF entity seeks a joint representation after the ALF entity
has decided to invest in the matter and thus when the ALF entity is simp-
ly monitoring its investment, the ALF entity's interests and the original
client's interests may intertwine sufficiently that the attorney could ethi-
cally handle the representation, as an attorney often represents an insurer
and an insured as joint clients.7 3 At this stage of the relationship, the ALF
entity and the original client share the goal of litigation success. If the
ALF entity and the original client were the lawyer's joint clients, the
privilege would protect all communications in pursuit of the common
interest from disclosure if those communications otherwise fell within
the privilege's definition.
Thus, communications in the relationship's monitoring stage could
be privileged if the parties and the lawyer agreed that the representation
is a joint one. In contrast, joint representation at the investment decision
stage is not likely ethically proper and thus cannot occur. With no joint
representation the privilege's benefits cannot be captured.
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2013).
71. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2).
72. See id. R. 1.7(b)(1).
73. Courts generally view the insurer and insured as joint clients of the attorney in a typical
liability insurance defense representation. See, e.g., Maplewood Partners, LP v. Indian Harbor Ins.
Co., 295 F.R.D. 550, 595-96 (S.D. Fla. 2013); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsi-
bility, Formal Op. 08-450, at 3 (2008) ("In certain jurisdictions, a lawyer engaged by an insurance
carrier to defend an insured is deemed to represent both the insured and the insurer . . . .").
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III. ALLIED PARTY-COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE
A. The Privilege as Applied to Allied Parties Represented by Separate
Attorneys
1. General Definition
Many jurisdictions in modem times recognize that the attorney-
client privilege protects certain communications among parties and their
attorneys even if the parties are separately represented when the parties
have a common interest.74 This doctrine provides an exception to the rule
that including a third party in the midst of an attorney-client communica-
tion destroys the privilege and also an exception to the rule that sharing a
communication otherwise privileged with a third party waives the privi-
lege.
This allied party-common interest doctrine was first recognized in
Chahoon v. Commonwealth76 in 1871. In Chahoon, a criminal matter, the
Virginia Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege protected
communications by one of the defendants to or in the presence of a law-
yer for one of the other defendants.7 The court stated that "it was natural
and reasonable, if not necessary, that these parties, thus charged with the
same crimes, should meet together in consultation with their counsel,
communicate to the latter all that might be deemed proper for them to
know, and to make all necessary arrangements for the defence."7  The
court concluded that these communications, which the defendants had a
right to have, must be privileged, "[o]therwise what would such right of
consultation be worth?"79 A more modern court has exhibited the same
sentiment, stating: "The common interest doctrine protects that free flow
of information by providing that 'clients and their respective attorneys
sharing common litigation interests may exchange information freely
74. See generally Grace M. Giesel, End the Experiment: The Attorney-Client Privilege Should
Not Protect Communications in the Allied Lawyer Setting, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 475, 519-28 (2011-
2012) (explaining the history of the attomey-client privilege among parties with common interests);
Katharine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: Why the Common Interest Doctrine Does Not
Work and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49, 58-62 (2005) (explaining the
evolution and use of the joint defense and common interest doctrines).
75. See United States v. Ghavami, 882 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("[D]isclosure
does not result in forfeiture of the attorney-client privilege when the privilege holder and the third
party share a common legal interest."); Roe v. Catholic Health Initiatives Colo., 281 F.R.D. 632, 638
(D. Colo. 2012) ("The 'joint defense' or 'common interest' doctrine is really an exception to the rule
that the attorney-client privilege is waived when the communication at issue was made in the pres-
ence of a third-party.").
76. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
77. Id. at 843. In Chahoon three men were indicted for conspiracy to defraud an estate and for
forging a note as part of the conspiracy. Id. at 834-35. After they were indicted, the three men met
with two attorneys; each of the attorneys represented one of the indicted defendants. Id. at 835. At
trial, one of the attorneys was questioned about what the third defendant had said at the meeting. The
court found any such statements privileged. Id. at 839-40.
78. Id. at 839.
79. Id. at 842.
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among themselves without fear that by their exchange they will forfeit
the protection of the [attorney-client] privilege."'80
Though other courts were slow to adopt the doctrine at first,81 many
jurisdictions now recognize some form of the doctrine82 and the issue is
frequently before the courts.83 Courts and commentators refer to the doc-
trine as the "common interest doctrine,"84 the "joint defense privilege,"85
the "community of interest" doctrine,86 the "allied lawyer" doctrine, or
some similar term.88 Just as there is disagreement about the doctrine's
name, there is also disagreement about the doctrine's parameters." The
Chahoon court first recognized the doctrine in a joint defense criminal
setting.90 Modern courts recognize it also in the civil setting.91 While
80. In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc., 489 B.R. 451, 470 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013)
(alteration in original) (quoting Indiantown Realty Partners, Ltd. v. Law Offices of Carla L. Brown-
Harward (In re Indiantown Realty Partners, Ltd.), 270 B.R. 532, 539 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001)).
81. The next published opinion in the United States in which the doctrine was applied was not
until 1942. Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1942) overruled on other grounds by Leer v.
Chi., Milw., St. P. & Pac. Ry. Co., 308 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1981). In Schmitt, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court applied the doctrine not in a criminal matter as in Chahoon but in a civil matter involv-
ing an automobile collision. Id. at 414. One defendant shared a report with the other defendants so
that the parties could brief admissibility as ordered by the court. The court determined that the shar-
ing of the report did not waive the privilege because the defendants were "maintaining substantially
the same cause." Id at 417. Two other courts applied the doctrine in the 1960s. See Hunydee v.
United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965) (explaining that the privilege applies if the state-
ments "concern common issues and are intended to facilitate representation in possible subsequent
proceedings"); Cont'l Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir. 1964) (finding that the
privilege applied though no formal legal proceedings had begun).
82. See, e.g., In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 50-53 (Tex. 2012) (applying Texas
law); Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 280 P.3d 240, 245-46 (Mont.
2012) (applying Montana law); Titan Inv. Fund II, LP v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., No. 09C-10-259
WCC, 2011 WL 532011, at *4-5 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2011) (applying Delaware law).
83. For example, in the first six months of 2013, three reported federal district or bankruptcy
level cases address the issue. See Costello v. Poisella, 291 F.R.D. 224, 231 (N.D. Ill. 2013); In re
Fundamental Long Term Care, 489 B.R. at 470-71; Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 433-
34 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
84. See, e.g., Am. Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Dep't of the Army, 703 F.3d 724, 732-33 (4th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 62 (2013).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2012), amended by
No. 10-10310, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2900 (9th Cir. 2012).
86. See, e.g., Santella v. Grizzly Indus., Inc., 286 F.R.D. 478, 483 (D. Or. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
87. See, e.g., 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 5493 (1986 & Supp. 2013).
88. See, e.g., In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012) (referring to the
"'common interest' or 'joint defense' rule"); In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex.
2012) (referring to the "allied litigant doctrine"). With regard to the confusion of terminology, see
Lugosch v. Congel, 219 F.R.D. 220 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd sub nom, Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of
Onondaga, 435 F.3d I10 (2d Cir. 2006), in which the court stated, "[The] joint defense privilege has
many monikers such as the common interest doctrine, common interest arrangement doctrine, or
pooled information doctrine. Unfortunately, courts, commentators, and attorneys use these terms
interchangeably even when they do not serve the same purpose." Id. at 236.
89. See Giesel, supra note 74, at 531; Schaffzin, supra note 74, at 65.
90. Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 839-42 (1871) (considering commu-
nications involving a defendant charged with conspiracy to defraud an estate and forgery and a
lawyer representing a co-defendant).
91. See, e.g., Am. Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Dep't of the Army, 703 F.3d 724, 732-33 (4th Cir.
2013) (involving a dispute between corporate entities regarding the provision of housing to members
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some courts require at least a threat of litigation,92 other courts and the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (Restatement) do not
require a litigation context.93 If the context is litigation, plaintiffs as well
as defendants can benefit from the doctrine.9 4
Some courts require the parties to have agreed to cooperate in the
litigation95 while other courts do not focus such a showing.96 The courts
also disagree about he required degree of involvement of attorneys.
Some courts require the communication to have involved at least one
lawyer while others are less exacting.97 The Restatement does not require
of the military), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 62 (2013); Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 433-34
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (involving a civil defamation suit).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 525 (5th Cir. 2002) (requiring the threat
of litigation); MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515 (D. Del. 2012) (hold-
ing that litigation must be anticipated); In re XL Specialty, 373 S.W.3d at 51-52 ("Texas requires
that the communications be made in the context of a pending action."); see also TEX. R. EVID.
503(b)(1)(C) (requiring that the communication be "to a lawyer ... representing another party in a
pending action"); HAW. R. EVID. 503(b)(3) (containing the same "pending action" requirement); ME.
R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (containing the same "pending action" requirement). One court defends the
pending action requirement by noting that such a requirement limits the privilege "to situations
where the benefit and the necessity are at their highest, and . . . restrict[s] the opportunity for mis-
use." United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 214 F.R.D. 383, 388 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
93. The Third Circuit in In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345 (3d Cir. 2007),
stated, "[The doctrine] applies in civil and criminal litigation, and even in purely transactional con-
texts." Id. at 364; see also United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 & n.6 (7th Cir.
2007) (explaining that litigation need not be actual or imminent); United States v. Gumbaytay, 276
F.R.D. 671, 674 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (stating that the privilege applies in litigated or nonlitigated mat-
ters); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (2000) (applying the
privilege to "a litigated or nonlitigated matter").
94. See United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2002)
("[W]hether the jointly interested persons are defendants or plaintiffs ... the rationale for the joint
defense rule remains unchanged." (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
95. See, e.g., Am. Mgmt. Servs., 703 F.3d at 733 ("[T]here must be an agreement or a meeting
of the minds. '[M]ere "indicia" of joint strategy as of a particular point in time are insufficient to
demonstrate that a common interest agreement has been formed." (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 285 (4th Cir. 2010)));
In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[A] shared desire to see the same
outcome in a legal matter is insufficient to bring a communication between two parties within this
exception, Instead, the parties must make the communication in pursuit of a joint strategy in accord-
ance with some form of agreement-whether written or unwritten." (citation omitted)). The Re-
statement seems to require an agreement in that it states that he parties "agree." See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(l) (2000). Yet, comment c to that section clarifies
that the agreement need not be a formal one. See id. § 76 cmt. c ("Exchanging communications may
be predicated on an express agreement, but formality is not required.").
96. See, e.g., BDO Seidman, 492 F.3d at 815-16 (containing no mention of agreement);
Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965) (containing no discussion of agree-
ment).
97. See In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 365 (discussing the requirement of
attorney involvement as a preventer of abuse since if attorneys are involved there will be sharing
only when coordination is needed); see also United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 535, 545 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) ("The defendants would extend the application of the joint defense privilege to conversations
among the defendants themselves even in the absence of any attorney during the course of those
conversations. Such an extension is supported neither in law nor in logic and is rejected."); In re XL
Specialty, 373 S.W.3d at 52-53 ("The allied litigant doctrine protects communications made be-
tween a client, or the client's lawyer, to another party's lawyer, not to the other party itself."). But
see Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gucci, No. 07 Civ. 6820(RMB)(JCF), 2008 WL 5251989, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 15, 2008) ("If information that is otherwise privileged is shared between parties that have a
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that the communication involve a lawyer but it does require that any
communication must be "made for the purpose of communicating with a
privileged person."98 The Restatement defines a privileged person to
include the client, the client's lawyer, agents of the two who facilitate the
communication, and agents of the lawyer who facilitate the representa-
tion.99
2. The Common Interest Requirement
All courts agree that the privilege only applies if there is a common
interest,00 but formulations of the parameters of what that interest must
be vary.o'0 Many courts use the definition of common interest stated in
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,'0 2 which requires "that the nature
of the interest be identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely commer-
cial." 103
The Restatement espouses a less strict definition of common inter-
est. It requires that the communication relate to the common interest,
"which may be either legal, factual, or strategic in character. The inter-
ests of the separately represented clients need not be entirely congru-
ent."'0
Some courts stake out positions somewhere between the Duplan
standard and that of the Restatement.05 For example, in Egiazaryan v.
Zalmayev,106 the court noted that the parties "must share a common legal
interest" and that a "'personal or business oriented' interest shared with
another party is insufficient."' 07 The Egiazaryan court continued by stat-
ing that "[t]here must be a substantial showing by parties attempting to
invoke the protections of the privilege of the need for a common defense
common legal interest, the privilege is not forfeited even though no attorney either creates or re-
ceives that communication.").
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. d.
99. Id. § 70.
100. See In re Teleglobe Commc ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 364 (discussing the common interest
requirement). See generally RICE, supra note 50, § 4:35.
101. See RICE, supra note 50, § 4:36 ("There is no clear standard for measuring the community
of interests that must exist for the privilege to apply."); see also In re Fundamental Long Term Care,
Inc., 489 B.R. 451, 470 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013) ("There is some dispute over how similar the inter-
ests must be for the common interest doctrine to apply.").
102. 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974).
103. Id. at 1172 ("A community of interest exists among different persons or separate corpora-
tions where they have an identical legal interest with respect to the subject matter of a communica-
tion between an attorney and a client concerning legal advice."); see also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 284 F.R.D. 132, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that the interest must
be "identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely commercial" (quoting N. River Ins. Co. v. Colum-
bia Cas. Co., No. 90 Civ. 2518(MJL)(JCF), 1995 WL 5792, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1995) (internal
quotation mark omitted)); RICE, supra note 50, § 4:36 (noting that many courts use this definition).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. e (2000).
105. See, e.g., Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 433-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Mo-
bileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515 (D. Del. 2012).
106. 290 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
107. Id. at 434 (citing Yemini v. Goldberg, 821 N.Y.S.2d 384, 384 (Sup. Ct. 2006)).
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as opposed to the mere existence of a common problem."'08 While the
court did not require a "total identity of interest," it did require that "a
limited common purpose necessitates disclosure to certain parties."
Another court has required a "substantially similar legal interest, that is
not solely commercial.""0
Yet other courts add teeth to the common interest requirement by
stating that the communication must be made "in pursuit of a joint strate-
gy."II For example, in Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Great Ameri-
can Insurance Co. of New York,'l2 the court required that there not only
be "a common legal, rather than commercial interest," but also that "any
exchange of privileged information was 'made in the course of formulat-
ing a common legal strategy.""'3
B. The ALF Allied Party-Common Interest Doctrine Case Law
Given the different positions taken by courts with regard to apply-
ing the allied party-common interest doctrine, the only certainty regard-
ing the doctrine's application in the ALF setting is uncertainty. Any pre-
diction of how a court might apply the common interest doctrine to a
communication among an ALF entity, the client, the client's lawyer, and
perhaps a lawyer for the ALF entity is a matter of speculation at best.
There is some guidance, however, in the form of a few court opinions in
which courts have addressed the issue with regard to ALF entities and
also in the form of court opinions applying the allied party-common in-
terest doctrine in similar, though not identical, settings.
Several reported cases involve ALF entities and claims of privilege
involving the allied party-common interest doctrine. In Leader Technol-
ogies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.,'14 a patent infringement action, a court
evaluated whether a magistrate judge had erred by denying privilege
protection to communications involving an ALF entity."'5 The communi-
cations occurred when the ALF entity was deciding whether to invest in
108. Id. (quoting Finkelman v. Klaus, No. 5257/05, 2007 WL 4303538, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 28, 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. (quoting Eugenia VI Venture Holdings, Ltd. v. Chabra, No. 05 Civ. 5277 DAB DFE,
2006 WL 1096825, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. MobileMedia, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 515.
111. E.g., In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012).
112. 284 F.R.D. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
113. Id. at 139-40 (quoting Sokol v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 8442(SHS)(KNF), 2008 WL
3166662, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Bevill,
Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[T]he party asserting
the privilege must show that (1) the communications were made in the course of a joint defense
effort, (2) the statements were designed to further the effort, and (3) the privilege has not been
waived."); Shukh v. Seagate Tech., LLC, 872 F. Supp. 2d 851, 855 (D. Minn. 2012) (requiring a
common legal interest and disclosure in the "course of formulating a common legal strategy" (citing
Merck Eprova AG v. ProThera, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 201, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)) (internal quotation
mark omitted)).
114. 719 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Del. 2010).
115. Id. at 375.
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the litigation matter; Leader shared certain documents with the ALF enti-
ty so that it could better evaluate whether it wished to invest." 6 Ultimate-
ly, the funder did not invest.'"7 The court stated that the magistrate had
noted "that the state of the law regarding common interest is unsettled
and that this case presented a close question,""8 yet, the court agreed
with the magistrate that Leader had not proved a common interest and so
the attorney-client privilege did not protect the shared documents."9 The
court applied a common interest test requiring the interests to be "identi-
cal, not similar, and be legal, not solely commercial." 20
In contrast, in Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp.,121 a court evaluated
whether the work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege applied
to documents shared with an ALF entity, Burford Group LLC.1 22 Devon
shared documents with Burford so that Burford could evaluate whether
to invest in the matter.123 Before the sharing, Burford entered into a
"Common Interest and Non-Disclosure Agreement" with Devon. Bur-
ford ultimately decided to invest.125 The court determined that the shared
documents were protected by the work product doctrine and also by the
attorney-client privilege.'2 6 Sharing the documents with Burford did not
waive the privilege because Burford and Devon "now [had] a common
interest in the successful outcome of the litigation which otherwise Dev-
on may not have been able to pursue without the financial assistance of
Burford."l 27
Interestingly, the Devon court determined that the privilege applied
in a situation in which the ALF entity ultimately decided to invest and be
a continuing litigation team member, noting that as of the time of the
writing of the opinion, the ALF entity and the litigation client "now"
share a common interest. 28 The court reached this result though the shar-
116. Id. at 376.
117. See Nate Raymond, Ruling Highlights Chink in Armor of Litigation Funding, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 28, 2011, at 2.
118. Leader, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
119. Id. at 377.
120. Id. at 376 (quoting In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390 (Fed. Cir.
1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012).





127. Id. The issue was raised in the context of disclosure to investors in Mondis Technology,
Ltd. v. LG Electronics, Inc., Nos. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2:08-CV-478-TJW, 2011 WL 1714304
(E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011). The court decided that the shared documents were protected by the work
product doctrine and did not reach the question of attorney-client privilege protection. Id. at *3; see
also Bray & Gillespie Mgmt. LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 6:07-CV-222-Orl-35KRS, 2008 WL
5054695 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2008) (holding that the work product doctrine did not apply and that
claimant did not make specific claims in accord with court's standing order and so there was no
privilege).
128. Devon lT, 2012 WL 4748160, at * In.1.
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ing took place in the relationship's investment evaluation stage.129 This is
in direct conflict with the result in the Leader case, in which the court
determined that he privilege did not apply to documents shared in the
relationship's investment decision stage.13 0 The only real difference be-
tween the Devon and Leader situations is that in Devon the relationship
ripened past the investment decision stage and in Leader the relationship
did not. In both cases, there was little common interest at the time of the
sharing.
The most complete treatment to date of the question of whether
communications involving ALF entities are privileged is in Miller UK
Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc.1 31 In a protracted litigation matter dealing with
allegations of theft of trade secrets,'32 Miller sought funding from several
ALF entities and ultimately secured a funding relationship with one of
the entities.133 In response to Caterpillar's request that all materials
shared with the ALF entities be produced, Miller claimed the protection
of the attorney-client privilege.' 34
The Miller court concluded that the funding documents were shared
as part of a "commercial or financial" transaction and thus the attorney-
client privilege did not apply.135 The court continued its analysis, howev-
er, by assuming "arguendo, that Miller has sustained its burden of show-
ing that the materials it provided to its lawyers for further submission to
prospective funders were protected by the attorney-client privilege and
proceed[ing] to the question of waiver."' 36 The court then addressed the
question of whether sharing with the ALF entities waived the privi-
lege.137
Miller asserted that disclosure to ALF entities did not waive the
privilege because the entities and Miller shared a common interest.
The court stated: "In this, as in most Circuits, the 'common interest' doc-
trine will only apply 'where the parties undertake a joint effort with re-
spect to a common legal interest, and the doctrine is limited strictly to
those communications made to further an ongoing enterprise.""'3 9 The
129. Id
130. Leader, 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376-77 (D. Del. 2010).
131. 17 F. Supp. 3d 711 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
132. Id. at 717.
133. Id. at 719.
134. Id. The court stated: "For example, on an application for funding form, Miller redacted its
response to a question that asked Miller to provide an estimate of the prospect of success of its
lawsuit, and to give the amount of its attorneys fees." Id. at 721.




139. Id. at 732 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d
806, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2007)).
117
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
court then concluded that "[a] shared rooting interest in the 'successful
outcome of a case' . . . is not a common legal interest."'40
Acknowledging that the allied party-common interest doctrine's
purpose is to aid parties who share a legal interest in obtaining legal ad-
vice,14 1 the court noted that in the situation before it, "there was no legal
planning with third party funders to insure compliance with the law, liti-
gation was not to be averted, as it was well underway, and[] Miller was
looking for money from prospective funders, not legal advice or litiga-
tion strategies."42 Thus, the allied party-common interest doctrine did
not apply and documents shared with any ALF entity lost privilege pro-
tection.43
C. Analogous Situations
Courts' determinations regarding the allied party-common interest
doctrine in analogous but not identical situations also provide guidance.
Cases dealing with disclosures when one party is deciding to invest in
another party's matter provide guidance as to how a court might treat a
disclosure to an ALF entity when an ALF entity is deciding whether or
not to invest in the litigation matter at hand. Cases dealing with disclo-
sures when parties are negotiating sales of businesses or assets are also
useful. Cases dealing with disclosures in the context of continuing rela-
tionships provide guidance when speculating about how a court might
view a disclosure to an ALF entity when the entity has already invested
and is simply overseeing the litigation as a way of monitoring the in-
vestment.
1. Situations Similar to the ALF Investment Decision Stage
Some courts have declined to find a common interest when the dis-
closures occur in the midst of a negotiation such as a negotiation about
whether to invest or purchase an entity or asset.'" Such courts thus do
not find that the attorney-privilege applies.14 5 Other courts have reached
146 147
a contrary result. In Santella v. Grizzly Industrial, Inc., 1 the holder of
140. Id
141. Id.
142. Id. at 732-33 (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 733.
144. See, e.g., Coming Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, LLC, 223 F.R.D. 189, 190 (D. Del. 2004)
(declining to find a common interest where the sharing occurred during negotiations for one party to
invest in the other).
145. See, e.g., Nidec Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 249 F.R.D. 575, 577-79 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(finding no common interest where a party disclosed information about patents held in an attempt to
interest investors because there was no possibility of joint litigation and the communications at issue
did not further the joint effort); Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 197 F.R.D. 342, 349 (N.D. Ohio
1999) (concluding that the defendant "sought commercial gain, not legal advantage, through disclo-
sure of its lawyer's advice to [third parties]"; this was a negotiation of an agreement for one party to
make and another party to buy a product made by the other party; "[t]he parties were formulating not
a 'common legal' strategy, but a joint commercial venture.").
146. See infra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
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the inventions and patents disclosed information relating to the inven-
tions and patents to a potential investor in the holder.148 The court de-
clined to find a common interest and thus declined to find that the attor-
ney-client privilege protected the communications.149 The court noted
that the privilege's purpose was to "encourage full disclosure to one's
attorney in order to obtain informed legal assistance,, 5 and "that pur-
pose would not be enhanced by protecting [the communications] because
that disclosure was not made for the purpose of securing representation,
either for themselves or for their potential investors, but instead was
made to solicit investment capital."'5 '
In a similar setting, in Net2Phone, Inc. v. eBay, Inc.,152 the court re-
fused to find a common interest and thus denied attorney-client protec-
tion when parties shared information during the negotiation of a loan that
was to be repaid from the proceeds of licensing and enforcing patents. '3
The court determined that "the purpose of the communications during the
negotiations were [sic] to entice a third-party to loan plaintiff money and
not to further a then-shared legal interest." 54 The court observed the lack
of proof of a confidentiality agreement as well as the fact that the parties
did not share "the prospect of imminent litigation."'55 The court noted
that if the negotiation had been successful and an agreement between the
parties had "come to pass, then communications to further the enforce-
ment activity may have been protectable."'56 This statement supports the
notion that in the ALF scenario, courts may recognize a common interest
after the investment decision but not before.
In Mondis Technology, Ltd. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 57 the court
evaluated whether the privilege protected disclosures about the effect of
a German patent office decision.58 The disclosures were made when the
parties were negotiating the price one of the parties would pay the other
for the patent.59 The court noted that "the parties were negotiating their
147. 286 F.R.D. 478 (D. Or. 2012).
148. Id. at 482-83.
149. Id. at 484.
150. Id (alteration to original) (quoting In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th
Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that there was no threat that the
investors would become parties to the litigation. Id at 483-84.
151. Id at 484.
152. No. 06-2469 (KSH), 2008 WL 8183817 (D.N.J. June 26, 2008).
153. Id. at *8-10.
154. Id at *10.
155. Id. ("There was neither a threat of impending legal action against them nor was there a
common adversary.").
156. Id.
157. Nos. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2:08-CV-478-TJW, 2011 WL 1714304 (E.D. Tex. May 4,
2011). The Mondis court also dealt with a privilege claim regarding an ALF entity but decided the
issue on the basis of the work product doctrine, not the attorney-client privilege. Id at *3.
158. Id. at *4.
159. Id
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rights and relationships with each other, which is not covered by the
common interest doctrine." 60
Other courts have disagreed and have found a common interest in
scenarios involving investment negotiations or decisions.161 For example,
in William F. Shea, LLC v. Bonutti Research, Inc., 162 a court determined
that the privilege applied to material shared as part of "an arms-length
negotiation" as to the price one party would pay for patent-related assets
because the parties shared a common interest even though an agreement
was not reached until after the sharing occurred.163 The court pointed out
that the parties shared an interest in certain patents and in "commencing
or continuing litigation" regarding those patents.6
Similarly, in High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,16 5 during a
negotiation a party disclosed documents to parties interested in the sale
or licensing of certain patents.'66 The court found a sufficient common
interest for the privilege to apply, stating:
Although [one of the parties] and the other companies had adversarial
interests when they were negotiating the possible transfer of the pa-
tents, they still had a common legal interest in the validity, enforcea-
bility, and potential infringement of the patents-in-suit. This is suffi-
cient to establish their common interest in the communications ex-
changed. 167
Likewise, in In re Regents of University of California,168 an inventor
and patentee shared information about patents with a potential licen-
see. 1 The court found that the activity's purpose was "to support com-
mercial activity" but that the interests were intertwined and the legal
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., William F. Shea, LLC v, Bonutti Research, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-615, 2013 WL
1386005, at *2-4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 2013); High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-
CM-DJW, 2012 WL 234024, at *9 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 2012); see also Morvil Tech., LLC v. Ablation
Frontiers, Inc., No. 10-CV-2088-BEN (BGS), 2012 WL 760603, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2012)
(concluding that materials shared during negotiations for one entity to acquire assets of another
entity along with related intellectual property were protected by the privilege and that the parties
shared a common interest because "both parties were committed to the transaction and working
towards its successful completion"); La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Sealed Air Corp., 253
F.R.D. 300, 310 (D.N.J. 2008) ("Defendant has established that pre-transaction they anticipated the
same claims and shared a common-interest in defending against those claims."); BriteSmile, Inc. v.
Discus Dental Inc., No. C 02-3220 JSW (JL), 2004 WL 2271589, *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2004)
(concluding that disclosure to seller by buyer in an attempt to understand the technology being
purchased in the transaction did not destroy privilege because both parties shared a common interest
in the analysis of the technology).
162. No. 2:10-CV-615, 2013 WL 1386005 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 4,2013).
163. Id. at *2-3.
164. Id. at *3.
165. No. 09-2269-CM-DJW, 2012 WL 234024 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 2012).
166. Id. at *5.
167. Id. at *9.
168. 101 F.3d 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
169. Id at 1389.
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interest was sufficient for recognition of a common interest.170 Accord-
ingly, the parties had "substantially identical" legal interests in the com-
munication's subject, which the court identified as valid and enforceable
patents because of the "potentially and ultimately exclusive nature of the
[parties'] license agreement."7 1
2. Situations Similar to the ALF Monitoring Stage
At the relationship's monitoring stage, the ALF entity has decided
to invest and has aligned itself financially with the client. The ALF entity
likely will want to monitor that investment by monitoring the litiga-
tion.172 Communications may occur that involve the ALF entity and oth-
erwise privileged material may be shared with the ALF entity as part of
that monitoring process. Some courts addressing the allied party-
common interest doctrine in similar settings have found a common inter-
est and so have found that the doctrine applies such that the attorney-
client privilege protects the communications at issue. 173
a. Xerox Corporation v. Google Inc.
A most helpful case is Xerox Corp. v. Google Inc.,174 in which the
patent holder shared information about the patents with the entity the
patent holder had contracted with for the patents' licensing, commercial-
170. Id. at 1390.
171. Id. Perhaps some courts finding a common interest and applying the privilege in situations
that are arms' length or close to it are less concerned about the effect of a broadly applied privilege
and more concerned about promoting commercial goals. One court seems to make this plain by its
own words. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308 (N.D. Cal. 1987), in-
volved the negotiation of a sale of a business. During the negotiation the seller disclosed an attorney
opinion letter regarding a patent's validity to a prospective buyer. Id. at 308. The sale ultimately did
not occur. Id. at 310. The court determined that the privilege protected the opinion letter from disclo-
sure as the result of the allied party-common interest doctrine. See id. at 310-12. The court recog-
nized a common interest, noting that if the deal was successful, the seller would be defending its
marketing of the patent before the sale and the buyer would be defending the marketing after the
sale. Id. at 310. The court stated:
This court also is concerned about the effect that finding waiver too freely might have on
the sort of business transaction i which defendant and GEC were involved. Holding that
this kind of disclosure constitutes a waiver could make it appreciably more difficult to
negotiate sales of businesses and products that arguably involve interests protected by
laws relating to intellectual property. Unless it serves some significant interest courts
should not create procedural doctrine that restricts communication between buyers and
sellers, erects barriers to business deals, and increases the risk that prospective buyers
will not have access to important information that could play key roles in assessing the
value of the business or product they are considering buying.
Id. at 311.
172. See Boardman, supra note 36, at 677 ("The open question is whether the lawyers remain
involved with the borrower's case after making the initial loan.").
173. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. Google Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303-04 (D. Del. 2011) (find-
ing that the holder of the patent and the licensee have a common interest in the success of litigation
regarding the patents such that the privilege applied); Lectrolarm Custom Sys., Inc. v. Pelco Sales,
Inc., 212 F.R.D. 567, 571-72 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding that an insurer and insured have a com-
mon interest such that the privilege applied).
174. 801 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D. Del. 2011).
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ization, and enforcement.175 In this context of a continuing, stable, con-
tractual relationship, the court recognized a sufficient common interest
shared by the patent holder and the entity such that the allied party-
common interest doctrine applied and the attorney-client privilege pro-
tected the shared materials from compelled disclosure.17 6 The court not-
ed: "Because [the entity's] compensation from Xerox is based on a con-
tingency fee, Xerox and [the entity] share a common interest in Xerox
prevailing in the instant litigation and the two companies have operated
with the expectation that any shared privileged communications would
be kept confidential and protected from disclosure."1 77
Interestingly, the court distinguished the facts before it from those
of Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., which involved an ALF
entity.78 With regard to the Leader case the court noted that "the docu-
ments as to which privilege was being asserted were created at a time
when the patentee and the potential investors were negotiating at arms-
length; at that time, no common interest existed."7 9 The Xerox court then
noted that "by contrast, the documents over which Xerox is asserting
privilege relate exclusively to a time frame in which [the entity to which
there was a disclosure] was already retained by, and working for and
with, Xerox."'80 Thus, the Xerox court might not find a common interest
in the investment decision stage, but perhaps would find a common in-
terest in the monitoring stage.
b. The Insurer-Insured Situation
Cases involving the application of the allied party-common interest
doctrine to the situation of insurers and insureds could be helpful because
the ALF entity in the relationship's monitoring stage is in a similar posi-
tion to an insurer providing coverage for liability and a defense to an
insured.'8 ' However, many courts recognize that in the typical insurer,
insured, attorney triangle of liability insurance, in which the insurer has
the contractual duty to provide the insured with a defense, selects defense
counsel, and exercises a degree of control over the defense raised, the
lawyer represents the insured and the insurer.'82 Because these courts
recognize insureds and insurers as joint clients, the courts also recognize
175. Id at 303-04.
176. Id. at 303.
177. Id. at 303-04.
178. Id. at 304; see also discussion supra Part III.B.
179. Xerox, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
180. Id.
181. See generally Boardman, supra note 36, at 673-75, 681-89 (discussing similarities and
differences); Charles Silver, Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance. What 's the Difference?,
63 DEPAUL L. REV. 617, 617-31 (2014) (discussing similarities and differences).
182. See, e.g., Lamar Adver. of S.D., Inc. v. Kay, 267 F.R.D. 568, 581 (D.S.D. 2010)
("[W]here an insurer has agreed that it has a duty to defend and to indemnify its insured, both the
insured and insurer may be considered clients of the insured's lawyer."). While not all courts agree,
many courts so hold. See Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company
or the Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583, 1603 (1994) (noting the disagreement).
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that the attorney-client privilege protects communications within the
triangle as communications among joint clients and their common coun-
sel.'83 Nonetheless, ALF entities are not joint clients with the litigation
parties,'84 and so much of the insurer-insured case law is not useful.
Occasionally, however, courts have evaluated the attorney-client
privilege's application in insurance settings in which the insured and
insurer are not quite so aligned as to be joint clients. In these cases the
insured has separate counsel because the insurer provides the defense
with a reservation of rights or the matter involves directors' and officers'
insurance in which the insurer funds the defense but does not choose the
attorney or exercise the same degree of control as insurers do in the gen-
eral liability setting. Many of these cases evaluate the privilege's ap-
plication not in disputes involving third parties, but rather, in disputes
between insurers and insureds.'8 6 The insurers claim that the insureds (or
other insurers) cannot assert the privilege with regard to communications
involving the insureds and the insured's attorneys because the insureds
and the insurers share a common interest. The common interest notion is
being used in these cases as a "sword" to obtain communications.'8 7 Be-
cause of the sword posture, these cases are less analogous to the ALF
setting in which the opposing party to the litigation, a stranger to the
communication, seeks disclosure of material shared with the ALF entity.
More analogous and thus more useful are cases in which the claim of
183. See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Superior Court of Orange Cnty., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 526,
531 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) ("When an insurer retains counsel to defend its insured, a tripartite attor-
ney-client relationship arises among the insurer, insured, and counsel. As a consequence, confiden-
tial communications between either the insurer or the insured and counsel are protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege, and both the insurer and insured are holders of the privilege."). See generally
RICE, supra note 50, § 4:29 (discussing the application of the privilege to the insurance triangle
setting).
184. See discussion supra Part II.C.
185. See, e.g., In re Imperial Corp. of Am., 167 F.R.D. 447, 451 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (evaluating
common interest in directors' and officers' insurance setting and reservation of rights); Waste
Mgmt., Inc. v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 327-29 (Ill. 1991) (considering whether
there was a common interest shared between insured and insurer such that no privilege could later be
asserted against parties to that common interest where insurers indemnified defense costs but did not
select the attorney and did not direct the defense). See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Independent
Counsel in Insurance, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 888-903 (2011) (discussing independent counsel
and its relationship to the insurer); Lindsay Fisher, Comment, D&O Insurance: The Tension Be-
tween Cooperating with the Insurance Company and Protecting Privileged Information from Third
Party Plaintiffs, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 201, 203-10 (2008) (discussing directors' and officers'
liability insurance defense setting).
186. See, e.g., Allianz Ins. Co. v. Guidant Corp., 869 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (111. App. Ct. 2007)
(insurer sought access to communications between insured and attorney); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v.
Tonka Corp., 140 F.R.D. 381, 382 (D. Minn. 1992) (insurer sought communications between insured
and attorney on basis of common interest); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d
153, 159-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (insurer claimed it was not barred by the privilege from communi-
cations between insured and counsel because it shared a common interest with the insured).
187. Fisher, supra note 185, at 216; see also James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client Privilege
Meets the Common Interest Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging Information
for Mutual Gain, 16 REV. LITIG. 631, 637 (1997) (discussing "sword" characterization).
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common interest occurs in a "shield" posture to block disclosure to a
party outside the insurer, insured, attorney triangle.'88
A case that is particularly analogous is Lectrolarm Custom Systems,
Inc. v. Pelco Sales, Inc.' 89 In Lectrolarm, the court reviewed a claim of
common interest in a shield posture. A third party to the insurance rela-
tionship, Lectrolarm, sought access to communications involving the
insured and the insurer.190 Lectrolarm had brought suit against Pelco
making patent infringement and related claims.'9 1 Fireman's Fund Insur-
ance Company provided a defense to Pelco under a reservation of rights
and so Pelco had independent counsel but shared some claim-related
information with Fireman's Fund.192 Lectrolarm sought access to what
Pelco shared on the theory that the sharing waived any attorney-client
privilege.19 3 The court determined that the attorney-client privilege pro-
tected the communications from disclosure by application of the allied
party-common interest doctrine, noting that though Pelco's independent
counsel did not represent Fireman's Fund, the insurer, Pelco and the in-
surer did share a common interest such that the privilege protected
shared communications from disclosure to third parties such as Lec-
trolarm.194
D. Applying the Allied Party-Common Interest Doctrine to ALF Entities
While the small number of courts that have addressed the attorney-
client privilege's application to disclosures to ALF entities in the midst
of investment decisions means there is little certainty as to how other
courts might view such sharing, the decisions certainly cast doubt on
whether the privilege protects materials shared with an ALF entity. The
court in Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., the only court to delve deeply
into the privilege application, distinguished Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp.,
the case in which the court applied the privilege to materials shared with
a funder in the investment decision stage,'9 5 and determined that he al-
lied party-common interest doctrine did not immunize the sharing from
waiving the privilege.'9 6 Though with little analysis, the court in Leader
188. See Fischer, supra note 187, at 637 (discussing "shield" characterization).
189. 212 F.R.D. 567 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
190. Id. at 568-69.
191. Id. at 568.
192. Id. at 568-70.
193. Id. at 569.
194. Id. at 572 ("The Court finds that the common interest doctrine applies to protect at least
those communications between Pelco and Fireman's Fund relating to the claims and defenses in the
underlying lawsuit. As to these communications, there is a commonality of interest and the attorney
client privilege and the attorney work product privilege are not waived by the disclosure to Fire-
man's Fund.").
195. See Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 27, 2012); see also discussion supra Part III.B. The Miller court noted that the Devon ITopin-
ion was a one-sentence order with the privilege discussion in a footnote to that single sentence.
Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 733 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
196. See Miller UK, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 734.
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Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. also denied the privilege's applica-
tion to materials shared with funders in the relationship's investment
decision stage.'97
The Miller and Leader courts reached the results consistent with the
existing privilege law and particularly the existing alliedparty-common
interest doctrine. Because the ALF entity in Devon IT ultimately chose to
invest, the court seemed to view the sharing more like a sharing in the
monitoring setting because by the time of the litigation the ALF entity
and the litigation client shared a common interest.'9 8 In determining
whether the privilege should apply, rather than focusing on the relation-
ship's end result as the court did in Devon IT, a more appropriate analy-
sis should focus on the stage of the relationship in which the parties share
communications.'99
The variety of results and reasoning used by the courts in settings
similar to the ALF investment decision setting make clear that this is not
an area of the law in which there are definitive conclusions. While some
courts may recognize a common interest and thus find disclosures pro-
tected by the privilege, a significant portion of courts would be unwilling
to recognize that the client and the ALF entity share a common interest
in the investment decision stage's arm's length setting.
In contrast, courts are much more likely to find sharing in the moni-
toring stage to be privileged and thus not subject to compelled disclosure.
If a court views the monitoring stage to be one in which the ALF entity
and the client are in a stable, confidential relationship of shared objec-
tives, then that court might very well follow the Xerox court's path in the
analogous setting of patent licensing.200 The Xerox court applied the priv-
ilege to communications involving a patent holder and the entity entrust-
ed contractually with the patents' commercialization and enforcement.20'
The Xerox court expressly found the situation when the communications
occurred not to be an arm's length situation but rather one in which the
parties were working together with common interest.202
The ALF entity's situation in the monitoring stage is similar to the
position of an insurer who is financially responsible for an insured's de-
fense but who is not controlling the defense and not selecting the in-
197. See Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (D. Del. 2010); see
also discussion supra Part III.B.
198. Devon IT, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1; see discussion supra Part III.B.
199. See RICE, supra note 50, § 4:38 (espousing the position that the application of the allied
party-common interest doctrine depends on the reason the communications are shared).
200. See Xerox Corp. v. Google Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303-04 (D. Del. 2011); see also
discussion supra Part Ii.C.2.a.
201. 801 F. Supp. at 303.
202. Id. at 304.
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sured's counsel.203 The ALF entity has an interest in the litigation's result
but generally does not exercise control.2 04 If a court follows the path of
the Lectrolarm case, a case involving such limited involvement by the
insurer, that court may find a common interest though the ALF entity is
not intimately involved in the matter's defense but is involved monetari-
ly. Such a court may be willing to recognize a common interest among
the ALF entity, the client, and the attorney. The cooperative relationship,
along with the financial interest in the litigation result, may be a suffi-
cient commonality. Such a court would then be willing to apply the privi-
lege to communications involving ALF entities in the monitoring stage.
Whether a court is willing to apply the privilege will depend on the
strictness with which that court views the requirement of joint involve-
ment. For example, a court that views a common interest as only present
when two parties are both at risk of an adverse judgment in a litigation
205
matter will not find a common interest in a matter involving an ALF.
A court willing to recognize a common interest even though the ALF
entity's interest in the litigation's result is limited to the effect result has
on the ALF's ability to recover its investment will find a common inter-
est in the typical ALF situation. Thus, such a court will conclude that the
attorney-client privilege protects communications involving an ALF enti-
ty.
V. AGENCY DOCTRINE
In addition to the joint client and allied party-common interest doc-
trine exceptions to the rule that attorney and client communications in-
volving third parties are not privileged,20 6 courts have recognized that the
privilege does apply even in the presence of third parties in certain cir-
cumstances by application of agency principles. First, when the client is
a corporation or other organization, communications involving nonem-
203. The similarity of the ALF entity in the monitoring stage and an insurer paying for a de-
fense is emphasized by contrasting the situation of a public relations firm assisting with litigation. In
Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), the court evaluated a claim of privilege
for communications shared with a public relations firm assisting with litigation. Id. at 425-26. The
litigating party claimed that the public relations firm shared a common interest with the litigating
party and his counsel such that communications within the group were privileged as the result of the
allied party-common interest doctrine. Id at 433. The court disagreed, noting that "the doctrine does
not contemplate that an agent's desire for its principal to win a lawsuit is an interest sufficient to
prevent waiver of privilege inasmuch as it does not reflect a common defense or legal strategy." Id.
at 434.
204. Jasminka Kalajdzic, Peter Cashman & Alana Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Compara-
tive Analysis ofAustralian, Canadian and US. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L.
93, 137 (2013) (noting ALF entity disclaimers of interest in control); see also Boardman, supra note
36, at 695 (stating that litigation funding will be less intrusive than insurer involvement in defense
actions).
205. See, e.g., Egiazaryan, 290 F.R.D. at 434-35 (noting that the public relations firm was not
a party to the lawsuit and "has no need to develop a common litigation strategy").
206. See In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 361 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[I]f persons
other than the client, its attorney, or their agents are present, the communication is not made in
confidence, and the privilege does not attach.").
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ployee third parties can enjoy the privilege if those nonemployee third
parties are functional equivalents of corporate employees.207 Theoretical-
ly, no third party is present because the functional equivalent party is the
agent through whom the corporation acts. Might an ALF entity be a
functional equivalent of a corporate litigating party such that the ALF
entity's involvement does not waive the privilege's protection?
Second, courts recognize that third parties who are agents of the
lawyer or the client can be involved in communications without a loss of
privilege if the third party is sufficiently necessary to the communica-
tion.208 Might an ALF entity be sufficiently necessary such that the ALF
entity can be involved in communications and yet the privilege apply? Or
might an ALF entity be sufficiently necessary so that disclosure to the
ALF entity of otherwise privileged communications does not waive the
privilege?
If an ALF entity fits either of these agent categories, then including
the ALF entity in attorney-client communications does not prevent the
privilege from attaching and disclosing otherwise privileged material to
the ALF entity does not waive the privilege. While courts have exhibited
209quite a bit of confusion in applying these agency concepts, it is not
likely that even in the midst of the confusion a court would find commu-
nications involving an ALF entity to be privileged.
A. Might an ALF Entity Be a Functional Equivalent of the Client?
1. Upjohn v. United States
The United States Supreme Court clarified in Upjohn v. United
States2 10 that the attorney-client privilege applies to communications with
corporations as it applies to communications with individual clients.2 1
Since a corporation can only act by way of agents, one of the issues be-
fore the Upjohn Court was the test for determining which communica-
tions between corporate employees and the attorney representing the
corporation were privileged.
207. See, e.g., In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 937-38 (8th Cir. 1994); Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp. v. Marvel Enters., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 3016 (AGS)(HBP), 2002 WL 31556383, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2002). The Restatement recognizes that a third party who is not an employee can
be a corporation's representative for purposes of the privilege. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 (2000).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1961).
209. See Michele DeStefano Beardslee, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Third-Rate
Doctrine for Third-Party Consultants, 62 SMU L. REV. 727, 731 (2009) (discussing the courts'
confusion).
210. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
211. See id. at 391. This principle was not new with the Upjohn decision. See United States v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915). See generally Grace M. Giesel, The Legal
Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Special Problem for In-House Counsel and
Outside Attorneys Representing Corporations, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1169, 1183-86 (1997) (discuss-
ing the Upjohn decision).
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In Upjohn the corporation's attorney conducted an internal investi-
gation to determine whether any illegal payments on the corporation's
behalf had been made to foreign governments.2 12 The Internal Revenue
Service later demanded that investigation materials be produced.213 The
corporation claimed privilege.2 14 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit determined that the privilege could apply only to com-
munications between the corporation's control group and the lawyer.2 15
The control group's members were people who could control the corpo-
rate response to the lawyer's advice or who could be significantly in-
216
volved in designing that response. Another test used by the courts be-
fore the Supreme Court's Upjohn decision was a test that came to be
known as the subject matter test.217 With this test, an employee, no mat-
ter how lowly, speaks for the corporation and thus the communication
enjoyed the privilege's protection if "the subject matter upon which the
attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the com-
munication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his em-
ployment" and "the employee makes the communication at the direction
of his superiors in the corporation."2 18 The Supreme Court in Upjohn
rejected the control group test but did not explicitly adopt the subject
matter test.219 The Court found the communications privileged, noting
that they were necessary for counsel to advise the corporation, that the
communications occurred because superiors directed that they occur, that
everyone knew they were for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, that
the communications related to the employees' duties at the corporation,
and the communications were otherwise within the privilege's protection
because they were treated as confidential.2 20
While Upjohn dealt with federal common law,221 many states now
use some variation of the subject matter test.222 Generally, courts apply
the privilege to communications between the lawyer and the corpora-
212. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 387.
213. Id. at 387-88.
214. Id. at 388.
215. Id. at 388-89.
216. See Glen Weissenberger, Toward Precision in the Application of the Attorney-Client
Privilege for Corporations, 65 IOWA L. REV. 899, 908 (1980); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for
Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424,424, 429-30 (1970).
217. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 50, § 5:2 1; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
87, § 5483 (discussing subject matter test).
218. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam), affd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (per curiam).
219. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389-95 ("[I]t will frequently be employees beyond the control
group ... who will possess the information needed by the corporation's lawyers").
220. Id at 394-95.
221. See id. at 389.
222. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Dep't of Conservation & Natural Res., 859 So. 2d 1096, 1104-
06 (Ala. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that privilege attaches to the control group and employees
whose jobs relate to the matter about which the communications relate); S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1383 (Fla. 1994) (adopting the subject matter standard).
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tion's "natural spokesperson"-the party who has the information needed
by the lawyer to advise the client corporation.223
2. The Extension to Third Parties Who Are Not the Corporation's
Employees
Following the Upjohn opinion's logic, some courts have held that
the privilege applies when the corporation's agent communicating with
counsel is not the corporation's employee.2 24 These courts recognize that
the attorney-client privilege can apply even if the attorney is dealing with
a third party who is not an employee if the third party is the functional
equivalent of a corporate employee. The rationale is that a corpora-
tion's agent may have information an attorney needs to render advice to
the corporation regardless of official employment status or artificial con-
cepts of enterprise bounds.226 Likewise, such an agent, at least theoreti-
cally, may be situated to act upon the attorney's advice on the corpora-
tion's behalf.
An often referenced case with regard to determining when a
nonemployee third party is a functional equivalent for privilege purposes
is In re Bieter Co., 2 27 decided by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. The Bieter Company was formed to develop a parcel
228
of land. A nonemployee third party was intimately involved in the
project and the ensuing litigation, providing guidance and advice.22 9 The
third party rendered his services pursuant a contract-at least initially. 23 0
In the midst of litigation regarding the land project, the opposing party
sought access to communications that had included the third party or that
later had been disclosed to the third party.231 The court found that the
223. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 50, § 5:21 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(coining term "natural spokesperson").
224. See generally RICE, supra note 50, § 4:19 (discussing case law interpreting the scope of
the privilege concerning corporations, employees, and agents).
225. See, e.g., United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding the third
party was a functional equivalent, the court stated: "[w]e find the reasoning in Bieter persuasive and
adopt its principles in the Ninth Circuit."); In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938-40 (8th Cir. 1994)
(finding the third party a functional equivalent); Digital Vending Servs. Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Phx.,
Inc., No. 2:09cv555, 2013 WL 1560212, at *9-10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2013) (finding that the privi-
lege applied because party was the functional equivalent of a member of the Board of Directors); In
re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. I 1-CV-2509-LHK-PSG, 2013 WL 772668, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 28, 2013) (finding that the privilege applied because third party advisor was the functional
equivalent of an employee).
226. See John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443, 498 (1982) ("There is no reason to differentiate between an account-
ant-employee and a regularly retained outside accountant when both occupy the same extremely
sensitive and continuing position as financial adviser, reviewer, and agent: both possess information
of equal importance to the lawyer."); see also Beardslee, supra note 209, at 748 (discussing the
functional equivalent doctrine).
227. 16 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 1994).
228. Id at 930.
229. Id. at 933-34.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 931.
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privilege protected the communications including or disclosed to the
third party, stating:
There is no principled basis to distinguish [the third party's] role
from that of an employee, and his involvement in the subject of the
litigation makes him precisely the sort of person with whom a lawyer
would wish to confer confidentially in order to understand Bieter's
reasons for seeking representation. . . . [H]e was in all relevant re-
spects the functional equivalent of an employee.232
In Bieter, the functional equivalent third party's involvement was
extensive and continuing, and the tasks he performed were indeed typical
233 234
of an employee.233 Similarly, in In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation, the
nonemployee third party was an independent consultant for a pharmaceu-
tical company who was "an integrated member of the brand maturation
team."23 5 The Flonase court accepted that the third party was a functional
equivalent but noted that it could not determine whether particular com-
munications were privileged without looking at each document and con-
firming that the communication was for the purpose of providing or ob-
236taining legal advice.
Courts have found third parties to be functional equivalents in less
standard settings as well. For example, in In re High-Tech Employee
Antitrust Litigation,237 the court found an "executive whisperer" who
advised Google's top management to be a functional equivalent, stating
that "[h]is high-level position and advisory role suggests that a blanket
denial of the attorney-client privilege would undermine . . . the ability of
the corporation both to provide information to its counsel and to obtain
guidance from its counsel."238 In Digital Vending Services International,
232. Id. at 938 (citations omitted). The Bieter court referred to McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132
F.R.D. 234 (N.D. Cal. 1990) for guidance as well as Sexton, supra note 226. Bieter, 16 F.3d at 938.
233. Bieter, 16 F.3d at 938. In explaining the nature of the third party's involvement, the Bieter
court stated:
[The third party] has been involved on a daily basis with the principals of Bieter and on
Bieter's behalf in the unsuccessful development that serves as the basis for this litigation.
Bieter was formed with a single objective and [the third party] has been intimately in-
volved in the attempt to achieve that objective. As Bieter's sole representative at meet-
ings with potential tenants and with local officials, he likely possesses information that is
possessed by no other. As the initial retainer agreement he entered into with Bieter indi-
cates, it retained him "to provide advice and guidance regarding commercial and retail
development based upon [his] knowledge of commercial and retail business in the State
of Minnesota," just as one would retain an outside accountant for her knowledge of, say,
the proper accounting practices and taxation concerns of partnerships.
Id. But see Freeport-McMoran Sulphur, LLC v. Mike Mullen Energy Equip. Res., Inc., Nos. Civ.A.
03-1496, Civ.A. 03-1664, 2004 WL 1237450, at *5-6 (E.D. La. June 2, 2004) (finding no privilege
where the third party did not hold himself out as the entity's representative though he had worked for
the client for twenty-five years).
234. 879 F. Supp. 2d 454 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
235. Id. at 454, 460.
236. Id. at 460.
237. No. I l-CV-2509-LHK-PSG, 2013 WL 772668 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2013).
238. Id. at * 1, *4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Inc. v. University of Phoenix, Inc.,239 the court applied the functional
equivalent concept not to find a functional equivalent of an employee,
but rather to find a third party to be a functional equivalent of a member
of the Board of Directors.240 The court justified its decision by noting
that the third party had a "need to know counsel's advice as he was part
of the strategic decision making for [the entity]."24'
In some cases the relationship between the nonemployee third party
and the entity is even more abbreviated.24 2 For example, in A.H. ex rel.
Hadjih v. Evenflo Co.,243 the court found the third party, a public rela-
tions firm brought in to assist Evenflo in the recall of a product, was a
functional equivalent of an employee for purposes of the privilege's ap-
plication.244 The court noted that the communications were "primarily or
predominately of a legal character and therefore would be considered
privileged attorney-client communications if the [third party individuals]
were technically employees of Evenflo."245 Likewise, in In re Copper
Market Antitrust Litigation, the court held that the privilege protected
communications to and from a "crisis management" public relations firm
engaged to help a corporation handle a copper trading scandal.247 In so
holding the court stated: "[i]n applying the principles set forth by the
Supreme Court in Upjohn, there is no reason to distinguish between a
person on the corporation's payroll and a consultant hired by the corpo-
ration if each acts for the corporation and possesses the information
needed by attorneys in rendering legal advice."24 8 The Copper Market
court continued: "for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, [the public
relations firm] can fairly be equated with the [corporation] for purposes
of analyzing the availability of the attorney-client privilege to protect
communications to which [the public relations firm] was a party concern-
ing its scandal-related duties."249
The case law is rather short on clear statements of the test the courts
apply to determine whether a third party is a functional equivalent to a
corporation's employee, but some courts such as Export-Import Bank of
the United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co.,250 note several factors: (1)
whether the third party had a "key corporate job"; (2) "whether there was
239. No. 2:09cv555, 2013 WL 1560212 (E.D. Va. April 12, 2013).
240. Id. at *10.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enters., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 3016
(AGS)(HGB), 2002 WL 31556383, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2002) (involving disclosure to
independent contractors engaged to create movie).
243. No. 10-CV-02435-RBJ-KMT, 2012 WL 1957302 (D. Colo. May 31, 2012).
244. Id. at *4-5.
245. Id. at *5.
246. 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
247. Id. at 215-16, 220 (internal quotation marks omitted).
248. Id. at 219.
249. Id
250. 232 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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a continuous and close working relationship between the consultant and
the company's principals on matters critical to the company's position in
litigation"; and (3) "whether the consultant is likely to possess infor-
mation possessed by no one else at the company."2 51
Courts have accepted the functional equivalent agent concept with
regard to communications with third parties because it is consistent with
Upjohn's rationale. Communications between attorneys for the entity and
certain nonemployee third parties must be privileged so that lawyers can
access information necessary to provide the best possible representation
to the client corporation.
In contrast, there is usually no reason consistent with the privilege
for otherwise privileged communications that did not include a third par-
ty to be shared with that third party and retain the privilege's protection.
In LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,25 2 the court refused to
find such communications with a third party marketing entity privileged
because there was no need consistent with the privilege's rationale; the
corporation could receive the attorney-client privileged communication
and screen it.253
3. Application of the Functional Equivalent Agent Doctrine to ALF
Entities
As an initial matter, this functional equivalent agent doctrine is a
creature of the narrow area of law dealing with applying the privilege to
corporations; in any matter in which the client is not a corporation or
similar entity, it has no application.254 In situations involving corpora-
tions, the question is whether the third party, the ALF entity, acts as the
agent of the corporate entity in the communications with counsel. A rare
court might find an ALF entity to be the functional equivalent of a corpo-
rate employee, but the vast majority of courts will not so find.
251. Id. at 113; see also A.H. ex rel. Hadjih v. Evenflo Co., No. 10-CV-02435-RBJ-KMT,
2012 WL 1957302, at *3 (D. Colo. May 31, 2012) (quoting three-factor test); LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc.
v. Whirlpool Corp., 661 F. Supp. 2d 958, 963-65 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (quoting three-factor test but
stopping short of accepting functional equivalent concept).
252. 661 F. Supp. 2d 958 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
253. Id. at 964-65; see also RICE, supra note 50, § 4:19 (discussing the Special Master's Opin-
ion in In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La. 2007), which states that he
privilege should not apply to communications to the third parties unless the third parties can act on
the corporation's behalf without screening and approval). But see Digital Vending Servs. Int'l, Inc.
v. Univ. of Phx., Inc., No. 2:09cv555, 2013 WL 1560212, at *10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2013) (applying
the privilege to communications which flowed to the third party because the functional equivalent
"had a need to know counsel's advice as he was part of the strategic decision making for [the enti-
ty]"). See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried & Andrew Amoroso, The Application of the Attorney-
Client Privilege to Interactions Among Clients, Attorneys, and Experts in the Age of Consultants:
The Need for a More Precise, Fundamental Analysis, 48 HOuS. L. REv. 265, 292-93, 310-13 (2011)
(discussing the scope of the privilege when consulting third-party experts).
254. In Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), the court distinguished the
functional equivalent analysis used in In re Copper Market Antitrust Litigation, 200 F.R.D. 213
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), noting that the case before the court did not involve a corporation. Egiazaryan, 290
F.R.D. at 433 ("Here, there is no corporation involved .... .").
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An ALF entity at the investment decision stage or at the monitoring
stage is not serving the same role as an employee might; it is not a third
party performing a task that an employee might if the corporation had not
chosen to outsource the task. The ALF entity is thus not like the employ-
ee in Bieter, whose involvement in the real estate venture that was the
litigation's subject matter was extensive and continuing.255
The ALF entity also is not the source of information necessary to
the attorney in advising the corporate client. In Bieter the third party was
the natural person who knew the details of the venture that was the sub-
ject of the litigation just as an employee who managed the venture would
have been knowledgeable of the venture's details.256 An ALF entity is
not such a source of information. Rather, the ALF entity is simply the
receiver of information from the client or attorney; the ALF entity is not
involved in the underlying litigation's subject matter at all.
Some courts, such as the Evenflo and Copper Market courts, have
been willing to find that a third party is a functional equivalent even
when the third party is engaged on a less continuing basis and even when
the third party is engaged to advise the corporation at a time when litiga-
tion looms. 25 7 An ALF entity's time of involvement is when litigation is
anticipated and when it is occurring. In this way, an ALF entity's posi-
tion is similar to the public relations firms in the Evenflo and Copper
Market cases.
Yet, an ALF entity does not advise or assist the client or the attor-
ney at the investment decision stage. If one accepts that an ALF entity
does advise and assist to some degree in the monitoring stage, then it is
possible that a court could find an ALF entity to be a functional equiva-
lent such that communications involving the ALF entity would be privi-
leged just as the In re High-Tech court found communications with the
"executive whisperer" to be privileged.258 However, even the reasoning
of the High-Tech decision would not support finding communications
with an ALF entity to be privileged because that court focused on the
fact that denying the privilege to the "executive whisperer" would "un-
dermine . . . the ability of the corporation both to provide information to
its counsel and to obtain guidance from its counsel."259 In contrast, an
255. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 1994); see also discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
256. Bieter, 16 F.3d at 938 ("[H]is involvement in the subject of the litigation makes him
precisely the sort of person with whom a lawyer would wish to confer confidentially in order to
understand Bieter's reasons for seeking representation.").
257. See A.H. ex rel. Hadjih v. Evenflo Co., No. 10-CV-02435-RBJ-KMT, 2012 WL 1957302,
at *11-12, *14 (D. Colo. May 31, 2012) (involving a public relations firm engaged to assist with the
issues surrounding the recall of a product); Copper Market, 200 F.R.D. at 215-16, 219 (involving a
"crisis management" public relations firm engaged to assist with issues surrounding a scandal (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
258. In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. I 1-CV-2509-LHK-PSG, 2013 WL 772668, at
*1, *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
259. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ALF entity does not assist the corporation in providing information to
counsel and certainly does not assist the corporation in obtaining guid-
ance from counsel.
If a court applies the three factors noted in Export-Import Bank260 to
an ALF entity's situation, such a court must conclude that communica-
tions involving the ALF entity are not privileged because the ALF entity
is not the functional equivalent of a corporate employee. The ALF entity
does not have a "key corporate job" in either the investment decision or
monitoring stage.26 1 In addition, it would be difficult to conclude that the
ALF entity had a "continuous and close working relationship" with "the
company's principals on matters critical to the company's position in
litigation." 2 62 Finally, the ALF definitely does not "possess information
possessed by no one else at the company."263 The nature of the ALF enti-
ty's involvement is simply not that of a functional equivalent to an em-
ployee of the corporate litigation party.
B. Might Communications Involving ALF Entities Be Privileged Under
the Kovel Agency Doctrine?
1. The Kovel Agency Doctrine
Aside from a nonemployee third party who is the functional equiva-
lent of an entity employee and therefore may speak for the entity for
privilege's purposes, some communications involving third parties to the
attorney-client relationship retain their privileged status if the third party
is a particular kind of agent of the client or the attorney.264 Courts have
long applied the privilege to communications involving agents of either
the client or the lawyer if those agents facilitate what would be an other-
wise privileged communication between attorney and client. So the in-
volvement of office personnel such as "administrative assistants, recep-
tionists, and messengers" does not affect the application of the privi-
265lege. Courts have held that the involvement of agents such as law
260. Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D. 103, 113 (S.D.N.Y.
2005). The factors are as follows: (1) whether the third party had a "key corporate job"; (2) "whether
there was a continuous and close working relationship between the consultant and the company's
principals on matters critical to the company's position in litigation"; and (3) "whether the consultant




264. Beardslee, supra note 209, at 731 (discussing this agency notion).
265. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 50, § 5:15, at 516-17; see also Edward J. lmwin-
kelried, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-Testifying Experts: Reestablishing
the Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Protection, 68 WASH.
U. L.Q. 19, 25-26 (1990) ("All courts and commentators agree that clerks and secretaries fall within
the definition. They are convenient intermediaries for communication between the attorney and
client, and society would gain nothing by forcing attorneys to communicate face-to-face with clients
and forego the use of such intermediaries." (footnotes omitted)).
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clerks, investigators, and paralegals also does not destroy the privilege.2 66
Courts and commentators accept that interpreters do not destroy the priv-
ilege because they act as a conduit of the communication to or from the
client.267
The seminal case involving an agent who was not a receptionist or
other basic conduit of attorney-client communication is United States v.
Kovel,268 a case involving an accountant employed by a law firm and his
communications with the client of one of the law firm's attorneys.269
Using an analogy to a language translator who transforms the client's
statements into a language the client's counsel can comprehend, the
Kovel opinion states that the same is true for an accountant who makes
the client's story comprehensible to the client's counsel.270 In finding that
the communications involving the accountant enjoyed the privilege, the
court stated:
[T]he presence of an accountant, whether hired by the lawyer
or by the client, while the client is relating a complicated tax
story to the lawyer, ought not destroy the privilege, any more
than would that of the linguist . . ; the presence of the ac-
countant is necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effec-
tive consultation between the client and the lawyer which the
privilege is designed to permit. By the same token, if the law-
yer has directed the client, either in the specific case or gener-
ally, to tell his story in the first instance to an accountant en-
gaged by the lawyer, who is then to interpret it so that the
lawyer may better give legal advice, communications by the
client reasonably related to that purpose ought fall within the
privilege .... What is vital to the privilege is that the commu-
nication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice from the lawyer. If what is sought is not legal ad-
vice but only accounting service, . . . or if the advice sought is
the accountant's rather than the lawyer's, no privilege ex-
ists.271
266. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 50, § 5:15; RICE, supra note 50, § 3:3; see, e.g.,
Owens v. First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 840, 848 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (holding that a
paralegal is covered by the privilege); Am. Nat'l Watermattress Corp. v. Manville, 642 P.2d 1330,
1334 (Alaska 1982) (holding that an investigator is covered by the privilege).
267. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 87, § 5486; Imwinkelried, supra note 265, at 26; see
also People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (N.Y. 1989); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 cmt. f, illus. 2 (2000).
268. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). In recognizing the settled law regarding communication
agents, the court noted, "[i]ndeed, the Government does not here dispute that the privilege covers
communications to non-lawyer employees with 'a menial or ministerial responsibility that involves
relating communications to an attorney."' Id. at 921.
269. Id. at 919.
270. Id. at 921-22.
271. Id. at 922 (footnote omitted).
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2. Courts' Application of the Kovel Agency Doctrine
272While there are exceptions, courts generally have applied the
Kovel principle narrowly, not expansively.2 73  For example, in
Egiazaryan, the court refused to apply the privilege to communications
involving a public relations firm the plaintiff had engaged to assist re-
garding his claims of defamation and injurious falsehood.274 The court
stated that to benefit from the privilege one must show "(1) . . . a reason-
able expectation of confidentiality under the circumstances, and (2) [that]
disclosure to the third party was necessary for the client to obtain in-
formed legal advice."275 The court explained that "[tihe 'necessity' ele-
ment means more than just useful and convenient, but rather requires that
the involvement of the third party be nearly indispensable or serve some
specialized purpose in facilitating the attorney-client communica-
11276tions. The court continued: "Thus, where the third party's presence is
merely useful but not necessary, the privilege is lost."2 77 While the plain-
tiff claimed that the public relations firm was retained to "[d]evelop a set
of key messages and compelling narrative in support of the legal cases"
and "participate[ ] in the development of legal strategy"278 and advised
the plaintiff about the benefits of legal action, the court denied the privi-
lege because the plaintiff did not show the firm's involvement "was nec-
essary to facilitate communications between himself and his counsel."279
Thus, the Egiazaryan court applied a high standard of necessity and a
narrow notion of facilitation by limiting the acceptable facilitation to
facilitation of communications between attorney and client, not facilita-
tion of legal representation in general.
Similarly, in Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. 275 Washington Street
28028Corp., a court refused to find communications privileged281 that in-
volved a real estate agent hired by a trust client to find a tenant for a va-
272. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(applying the privilege to communications involving public relations firm because it assisted the
attorney in influencing the prosecution and regulators regarding the indictment decision);
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 476-77 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (applying the
privilege to a consultant).
273. See, e.g., Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. 275 Wash. St. Corp., No. 09-l1343-NMG, 2012 WL
1247756, at *7 (D. Mass. Apr. 12, 2012); United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139-40 (2d Cir.
1999).
274. Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 431-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
275. Id. at 431 (alterations in original) (quoting Don v. Singer, No. 105584/06, 2008 WL
2229743, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
276. Id. (quoting Nat'l Educ. Training Grp., Inc. v. Skillsoft Corp., No. M8-85(WHP), 1999
WL 378337, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
277. Id. (quoting Allied Irish Banks, P.L.C. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 240 F.R.D. 96, 104
(S.D.N.Y. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
278. Id (alterations in original) (quoting exhibits from the record) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
279. Id.
280. No. 09-I 1343-NMG, 2012 WL 1247756 (D. Mass. Apr. 12, 2012).
281. Id. at *7.
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cant space.282 The court stated that the third party must be "necessary for
the effective consultation between client and attorney"283  and
"[s]ignificantly, this "'necessity" element means more than just useful
and convenient. The involvement of the third party must be nearly indis-
pensable or serve some specialized purpose in facilitating the attorney-
client communications. Mere convenience is not sufficient."'2 4 The
court continued, saying that "the exception applies only to communica-
tions in which the third party plays an interpretive role. In other words,
the third party's communication must serve to translate information be-
tween the client and the attorney."285 The court also pointed out that the
advice provided by the third party was business advice, not legal ad-
vice.286
A narrow application of the Kovel principle is typical. Courts com-
monly have found privilege only when the third party plays an interpre-
tive role. In United States v. Ackert,288 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, the same court that authored the Kovel opin-
ion, refused to find communications involving an investment banker to
be privileged because the attorney dealing with the investment banker
did not rely on the investment banker "to translate or interpret infor-
mation given to [the attorney]."289 And in In re Refco Securities Litiga-
290
tion, the court refused to apply the privilege to communications in-
282. Id at *1.
283. Id at *7 (alterations in original) (quoting Comm'r of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 901
N.E.2d I 85, 1197 (Mass. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
284. Id. (quoting Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 249 (1st Cir. 2002)).
285. Id at *8 (quoting Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 714 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228 (D. Mass.
2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
286. Id.; see also Lluberes v. Uncommon Prods., LLC, 663 F.3d 6, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2011)
(refusing to find communications involving a factchecker privileged where the factchecker was hired
because such a consultation was necessary to assist the attorney in obtaining insurance for the cli-
ent's documentary film project).
287. In Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., No. 07 Civ. 5898(RJS)(JCF), 2010 WL 3835149
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2010), the court refused to apply the privilege to communications involving
third party experts engaged to render opinions about the qualities of a dietary supplement because
the experts "were not acting as 'interpreters' of scientific concepts for [the attorney]." Id. at *1-3.
The Merck court stated: "when an attorney seeks out a third party to provide information rather than
to act as a translator for client communications, the communications between the attorney and the
third party are not privileged." Id. at *2 (citing United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139-40 (2d
Cir. 1999)); see also Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, No. 10-CV-00569, 2012 WL 3527935, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 15, 2012) (denying privilege because consultant's contact with documents was not to "improve
the comprehension of the communications between [the attorney] and [the client]" (quoting Ackert,
169 F.3d at 139)) (internal quotation marks omitted); AVX Corp. v. Horry Land Co., No. 4:07-CV-
3299-TLW-TER, 2010 WL 4884903, at *9-10 (D.S.C. Nov. 24, 2010) (denying privilege to com-
munications involving an environmental consultant because the consultants "were not simply putting
into usable form information obtained from the client; rather, they were independently gathering
their own data, conducting testing, engaging in remedial measures and rendering opinions" and thus
there was no showing "that the communication involved gathering information from client confi-
dences or providing information from the client through the consultant to the attorney for the pur-
pose of assisting the attorney in giving legal advice").
288. 169 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999).
289. Id. at 139.
290. 280 F.R.D. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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volving a third party consultant, stating that "there is no evidence sug-
gesting [the attorney] relied on [the consultant] to translate or interpret
information given to him by his clients."291
Even in a case in which the court applied the privilege to communi-
cations involving a public relations firm, the court required a significant
showing regarding the third party's importance and role.292 In In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas,2 93 the defense of a target in a high-profile inves-
tigation engaged a public relations firm to assist with a media message to
convince the prosecution and regulators not to indict the target.294 After
noting that "the ability of lawyers to perform some of their most funda-
mental client functions . . . would be undermined seriously if lawyers
were not able to engage in frank discussions of facts and strategies with
the lawyers' public relations consultants,"295 the court found that com-
munications involving the public relations firm were privileged, stating:
In consequence, this Court holds that (1) confidential communica-
tions (2) between lawyers and public relations consultants (3) hired
by the lawyers to assist them in dealing with the media in cases such
as this (4) that are made for the purpose of giving or receiving advice
(5) directed at handling the client's legal problems are protected by
the attorney-client privilege.296
Interestingly, the court, with regard to particular communications, was
concerned with whether the communication "has a nexus sufficiently
close to the provision or receipt of legal advice."2 97 Evidently, the court
determined that some communications involving the public relations firm
did have this nexus generally since it determined that the privilege ap-
plied,298 though the court denied the privilege on the basis of a lack of
"nexus" to other communications between the client and the public rela-
tions firm. 299
Rather than applying the Kovel agency doctrine as developed in
other cases, this court seemed to recognize an independent privilege for
291. Id. at 105 ("What does not appear, however, is any evidence that here was information
[the attorney] could not understand without [the consultant] translating or interpreting the raw data
for him.").
292. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
293. 265 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
294. Id at 323. The high profile client was Martha Stewart. Ann M. Murphy, Spin Control and
the High-Profile Client-Should the Attorney-Client Privilege Extend to Communications with
Public Relations Consultants?, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 545, 562 (2005).
295. Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
296. Id. at 331.
297. Id. at 332. The court also noted that communications involving jury consultants "and
personal communication consultants come within the attorney-client privilege, as they have a close
nexus to the attorney's role in advocating the client's cause before a court or other decision-making
body." Id. at 326.
298. Id. at 331.
299. Id. at 332 ("[T]here has been no showing that it has a nexus sufficiently close to the provi-
sion or receipt of legal advice.").
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public relations firms in some situations. Many courts, when dealing with
the question of privilege when public relations firms have been involved,
have not gone so far, and like the Egiazaryan court, have denied the priv-
ilege.3 00
3. Applying the Kovel Agency Doctrine to ALF Entities
Communications involving ALF entities that occur in the invest-
ment decision stage or in the monitoring stage are not conduit communi-
cations in which the ALF entity is in a role akin to a secretary, law clerk,
or investigator. Nor is an ALF entity in the same interpretive role as the
accountant in the Kovel case.30' An ALF entity's role is not to assist
communication between attorney and client so any communication in-
volving an ALF entity cannot be "necessary to facilitate communications
between [client] and his counsel."302 Nor is an ALF entity "nearly indis-
pensable or serve[ing] some specialized purpose in facilitating the attor-
ney-client communications.'"303 An ALF entity does not interpret or
translate in any way. Any analogy to a translator or interpreter fails as
does a looser analogy to a third party such as the accountant in Kovel.
Any court that requires the third party to be in "an interpretive role"04
would reject any claim of privilege summarily.305
The only port in the storm for an ALF entity is the argument that
communications involving it are necessary for the rendering of legal ad-
vice because without funding there can be no legal advice. As is obvious
from this Article's discussion of a sampling of court opinions, many
courts would not apply the privilege because they do not have such an
expansive view of the Kovel doctrine. A court such as the Grand Jury
Subpoenas court might be receptive to this claim of privilege, but even
that result is highly speculative. From its application of the privilege to a
public relations firm based on the firm's services that were essential to
rendering legal advice, it is clear that the Grand Jury Subpoenas court
was not constrained by the interpreter analogy. Rather, a kindred court
may be willing to extend the privilege's protection when the court be-
lieves "the ability of lawyers to perform some of their most fundamental
client functions . . . would be undermined seriously if lawyers were not
able to engage in frank discussions of facts and strategies with"306 ALF
entities. Yet, that court did require "a nexus sufficiently close to the pro-
300. See Murphy, supra note 294, at 570; see also Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner,
198 F.R.D. 53, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 243 (D.D.C. 1999);
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611, 616, 619 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
301. See discussion supra Part IV.B. I.
302. Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (emphasis in original).
303. Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. 275 Wash. St. Corp., No. 09-11343-NMG, 2012 WL 1247756, at
*7 (D. Mass. Apr. 12, 2012) (quoting Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 249 (1st Cir. 2002)).
304. Id. at *8 (quoting Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 714 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228 (D. Mass.
2010)).
305. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
306. Id. at 330.
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vision or receipt of legal advice."307 Even though funding of a representa-
tion is related to the provision of legal advice, perhaps even the Grand
Jury Subpoenas court would not find that "nexus" to be "sufficiently
close."308
Thus, courts' past treatment of claims of privilege under the Kovel
doctrine signals that a claim that communications involving an ALF enti-
ty should benefit from the privilege will not be accepted by all but the
rare court.
VI. SHOULD COMMUNICATIONS INVOLVING ALF ENTITIES BE
PRIVILEGED?
This Article has concluded that ALF entities cannot avail them-
selves of the joint client doctrine. It has also concluded that ALF entities
cannot successfully claim privilege via the common interest doctrine for
communications in the investment decision stage, and that such a claim
for communications in the monitoring stage is questionable at best. In
addition, this Article has concluded that courts applying the attorney-
client privilege, in accord with its bounds as current law defines those
bounds, would not likely find communications with ALF entities to be
privileged under the functional equivalent agent doctrine or the Kovel
agency doctrine. The next logical question is whether the current attor-
ney-client privilege doctrine should be stretched beyond its current
boundaries to reach the ALF scenario.
There may be very good policy arguments for creating a special
privilege for ALF entities.309 This Article expresses no opinion about the
wisdom or folly of such arguments.
Yet, the existing attorney-client privilege doctrine and all of its sub-
doctrines (joint client doctrine, allied party-common interest doctrine,
functional equivalent agent doctrine, and Kovel agency doctrine) should
not be modified to encompass communications with ALF entities.
307. Id at 332.
308. Id.; see also Douglas R. Richmond, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated Confi-
dentiality Concerns in the Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 381, 399 (2005). Richmond states
that for communications with a public relations firm to be privileged "there must be a clear nexus
between the public relations consultant's work and the attorney's role in representing the client. In
other words, the client must show that communications with a public relations consultant were made
so that the client could obtain legal advice from his attorney." Id. (footnote omitted).
309. See Molot, supra note 5, at 186 (arguing that communications involving ALF entities
should be privileged because ALF "level[s] the playing field" in litigation). See generally DeStefa-
no, supra note 20, at 2797 (arguing that barriers to the involvement of third parties in the provision
of legal services should be mitigated because the involvement of some third parties, such as ALF
entities, is beneficial). Others have posited that there should not be barriers to third parties of other
sorts. See, e.g., Spencer Rand, Hearing Stories Already Told: Successfully Incorporating Third Party
Professionals into the Attorney-Client Relationship, 80 TENN. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (2012) (discussing
inclusion, for example, of therapists in domestic violence matters and social workers in elder law
and other matters).
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No reason consistent with the attorney-client privilege's modem
raison d'etre exists for extending the privilege to communications in-
volving ALF entities. In Upjohn the Supreme Court provided a statement
of the attorney-client privilege's modern purpose:
[The] purpose [of the privilege] is to encourage full and frank com-
munication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and [the] admin-
istration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice
or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy de-
pends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.310
An assumption at work in this rationale is that clients will not be candid
and thus the legal advice rendered by the attorney will be less than sound
if the opposition can access communications between the attorney and
the client.31' The privilege allows for the free flow of information be-
tween attorney and client because the client is not fearful of such disclo-
sure.
Involving an ALF entity in attorney-client communications is nec-
essary to the rendering of sound legal advice in the general sense that the
ALF entity's involvement provides the funding that makes the legal ad-
vice possible. Yet, including an ALF entity is not necessary, in a more
specific sense, to ensure that the "full and frank communication between
312attorneys and their clients" occurs. ALF entities do not assist clients in
communicating with counsel and do not assist counsel in rendering
sound legal advice. Thus, extending the attorney-client privilege to ALF
entities is inconsistent with the rationale behind the attorney-client privi-
lege and is at odds with the accepted notion that the privilege should
remain narrow to limit its perhaps deleterious effect on truth finding.3 13
In addition, extending the privilege is not wise for the privilege's
health. Pulling the privilege away from its moorings, its rationale, means
that courts will become even more confused than they might already be
about when and how to apply it.3 14 Such confusion adds uncertainty to
the privilege's application. Uncertainty destroys the privilege's value.
The value of the privilege is that a client knows, at the time of communi-
310. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
311. For example, in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998), the Court noted
that "it seems quite plausible that [the client], perhaps already contemplating suicide, may not have
sought legal advice from [the lawyer] if he had not been assured the conversation was privileged."
Id. at 408.
312. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
313. See discussion supra Part II.A.
314. More specifically, the common interest doctrine is already an amazing confusion and
would only suffer more by a recognition that an ALF entity shares a sufficient common interest at
the investment decision stage. See discussion supra Part III.A. Likewise, courts are confused by the
functional equivalent concept and when it should be used. See discussion supra Part IV.A. In addi-
tion, courts are uncertain about the appropriate reach of the Kovel agency doctrine. See discussion
supra Part IV.B.
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cating, that the communication will be protected. Only with that certainty
does the privilege encourage "full and frank" disclosure to the attor-
ney.315 In Upjohn, the Supreme Court stated:
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the at-
torney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certain-
ty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at
all. 31
6
Stretching and modifying the attorney-client privilege and its subdoc-
trines to encompass communications involving ALF entities would not
be a positive development for the privilege itself.
CONCLUSION
ALF has become a reality in the United States in recent years. With
the growing popularity of ALfF and as perceived barriers have faded
away, the need for an understanding of the attorney-client privilege's
application to communications involving ALF entities has become ap-
parent.
While ALF entities could perhaps become joint clients of the lawyer
involved and thus share the privilege's protection, to date, they have not
sought joint client status. Even if ALF entities wanted to be joint clients
in the future, such a representation could not occur if the arrangement
yielded an ethically impermissible conflict of interest, a result very likely
in the relationship's investment decision stage and certainly possible in
the relationship's monitoring stage.
Nor is it likely that ALF entities can successfully claim privilege via
the allied party-common interest doctrine for communications in the rela-
tionship's investment decision stage. It is simply not likely that courts
will find that at that stage the litigating party and the ALF entity share an
appropriate common interest. While a claim of privilege based on a
common interest is more plausible with communications in the relation-
ship's monitoring stage, even with these communications, the privilege's
protection is uncertain because of the variety of standards applied by the
courts to this subdoctrine of the privilege.
Similarly, courts likely would not find communications involving
ALF entities to be protected by the privilege as a result of the functional
equivalent agent doctrine or the Kovel agency doctrine. Courts to date
315. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
316. Id. at 393; see also Giesel, supra note 74, at 502-03. Indeed, in Swidler & Berlin, the
Court refused to apply a balancing test to determine when the privilege might apply to the statements
of a dead client, stating that use of such a test "introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege's
application." Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409.
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have applied those doctrines in ways that would exclude communications
involving ALF entities from privilege protection.
While the existing attorney-client privilege may not protect com-
munications involving ALF entities, the privilege and its subdoctrines
should not be stretched to encompass the ALF scenario because to do so
is inconsistent with the privilege's rationale and will add uncertainty and
confusion to an area of the law that thrives when there is certainty. If the
presence of ALF entities in the United States' legal market creates a suf-
ficient benefit, and if that benefit cannot be captured if including ALF
entities in communications or revealing otherwise privileged communi-
cations destroys the application of the privilege, perhaps the best path is
to establish a free-standing privilege not dependent upon existing attor-
ney-client privilege doctrine.

ADDRESSING WEALTH DISPARITIES: REIMAGINING
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ABSTRACT
In the past three decades, research has indicated that the building of
personal assets can have a sustainable impact on well-being. Yet to the
extent that the tax system has incorporated this insight, it has been done
in a piecemeal, ad hoc fashion, disproportionately benefiting those with
wealth and further reinforcing wealth inequality. This Article argues that
while reducing wealth concentrations is important, there should be an
increased emphasis on how our tax system can build wealth or, put dif-
ferently, level up. While the problem of wealth disparities may be too
large for any one part of the federal policy toolkit to solve, I argue that
the tax system can and should play a vital role.
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INTRODUCTION
The Great Recession and the Occupy Movement thrust issues of
wealth and income inequality to the forefront of the national conscious-
ness. Many fear that the continuing concentration of wealth at the top
and the resulting gulf between the "haves" and the "have-nots" will un-
dermine American democratic principles by creating a plutocratic class
that captures the government. Through this lens, wealth inequality
threatens fundamental American values, including equality and oppor-
tunity for mobility. In several ways this concern is similar to that of Pro-
gressives at the turn of the twentieth century. Then, the rise of the manu-
facturing sector and a large number of mergers sparked fears that the
government had been captured by corporations and a few wealthy fami-
lies.1
To combat this feared consolidation, Progressive reformers argued
that the nation's tax burdens should be redistributed, and they succeeded.
The system of regressive duties and taxes gave way to a progressive in-
come tax and an estate tax.2 Both largely applied to the wealthiest mem-
bers of society, and to the extent that they redistributed wealth, were
aimed at reducing wealth concentrations or, in other words, leveling
down. The estate tax has continued to focus on leveling down wealth,
despite indications that it has done so poorly, while the income tax sys-
tem is often critiqued for leveling down too much.
This Article argues that while reducing wealth concentrations is im-
portant, law can and should also build wealth or, in other words, level
1. See, e.g., Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety
Years and Counting, 27 SOI BULL. 118, 120 (2007).
2. See Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era




up. While the problem of wealth disparities may be too large for any one
part of the federal policy toolkit to solve, I argue that the tax system can
and should play a vital role. In the past three decades, research has indi-
cated that individual asset accumulation can have a sustainable impact on
well-being.4 Yet to the extent that the tax system has incorporated this
insight, it has been done in a piecemeal, ad hoc fashion, disproportionate-
ly benefiting those with wealth and further reinforcing wealth inequali-
ty.5  Now is the time to develop a systemic approach aimed at reducing
wealth disparities.
The current debate about taxing wealth has largely focused on the
estate tax, the primary policy directed at redistributing wealth. At the
heart of the political disagreement lies a long-disputed philosophical
question: is wealth a natural right or a social privilege?6 Estate tax aboli-
tionists have argued that the government has no right to "double tax" its
citizens, while Progressives have argued that the government can legit-
imately tax inheritance to ensure equality of opportunity for its citizens.
Almost a century after the enactment of the modern estate tax, this disa-
greement is no closer to being resolved. Unfortunately, this now en-
trenched division about the federal estate tax, along with the absence of a
comprehensive wealth taxation policy, has obscured the wealth accumu-
lation realities of the U.S. tax system as a whole. Yet while the estate tax
3. See Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV.
469, 470-72 (2007) ("[R]esource equality requires not only 'leveling down' through inheritance
taxation to reduce private inheritance but also 'leveling up' through a public inheritance that helps
give every individual the financial means to start adult life from a position of equality. Conventional
discussions of inheritance taxation, by contrast, typically consider only leveling down.").
4. See, e.g., MICHAEL SHERRADEN, ASSETS AND THE POOR: A NEW AMERICA WELFARE
POLICY 148 & fig.8.1 (1991) (arguing that assets "[i]mprove household stability," "[c]reate an orien-
tation toward the future," "[s]timulate development of other assets," increase civic participation, and
enhance the well-being of children); Caroline O.N. Moser, The Asset Vulnerability Framework:
Reassessing Urban Poverty Reduction Strategies, 26 WORLD DEV. 1, 5 (1998).
5. See generally THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN:
How WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 133-35, 193-98 (2004).
6. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *10-13 ("Wills, therefore, and
testaments, rights of inheritance and successions, are all of them creatures of the civil or municipal
laws, and, accordingly, are in all respects regulated by them."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 6 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3-4
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) ("'[T]hat the earth belongs in usufruct to the living;' that the dead
have neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by any individual ceases to be his when
himself ceases to be, and reverts to society." (emphasis omitted)). But see, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk. 1, ch. 9, § 88, at 207 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1698) ("Men are not Proprietors of what they have meerly for themselves, their Children
have a Title to part of it, and have their Kind of Right joyn'd with their Parents, in the Possession
which comes to be wholly theirs, when death having put an end to their Parents use of it, hath taken
them from their Possessions, and this we call Inheritance.").
7. See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, A Brieffor the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1215, 1217-27 (1984); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation,
104 YALE L.J. 283, 300-02 (1994).
8. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259,
274-78 (1983); John G. Steinkamp, A Case for Federal Transfer Taxation, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1, 77-
81 (2002).
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has reduced wealth concentrations only minimally,9 the income tax has
provided robust subsidies for those with wealth to accumulate further
assets.10
In order for the tax system to more effectively address wealth dis-
parities that threaten equal opportunity, the needs of the poor and non-
wealthy must be more fully incorporated into all of its policies, including
the income tax system. Scholars have made important contributions by
(1) defending income support for the poor through the tax system," (2)
suggesting improvements to our savings subsidies for low income tax-
payers,'2 and (3) criticizing subsidies for homeownership that dispropor-
tionately benefit those with higher incomes.13 No scholarship, however,
connects these goals with attempts to reduce wealth concentration while
offering a comprehensive view of the effects of our tax policy on wealth
accumulation and preservation.
This Article fills that void, arguing the current conception of wealth
taxation must change to meet the demands of the twenty-first century,
much like reformers reimagined our system of taxation at the beginning
of the twentieth century. To date our system of wealth taxations has fo-
cused on (1) reducing concentrations of wealth, (2) encouraging wealth
building by the upper income classes, and (3) treating the estate and in-
come tax regimes as disconnected. What is needed instead are income
and estate tax policies that are sensitive to the vital role of wealth build-
ing in changing long-term outcomes for the poor and nonwealthy.
To this end, this Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly defines
wealth for the purposes of this analysis, underscoring its importance be-
cause of its long-lasting nature. Part I then presents asset-building re-
search and examines the importance of assets for wealth accumulation. I
show that a lack of assets translates into vulnerability during times of
9. Compare Edward J. McCaffery, Distracted from Distraction by Distraction: Reimagining
Estate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1235, 1236 (2013) (arguing that the estate tax has become
largely irrelevant), with Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate
Tax to Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2013) (arguing
that the "estate tax is a particularly apt reform vehicle" for combating inequality).
10. Michael Sherraden, Asset-Building Policy and Programs for the Poor, in ASSETS FOR THE
POOR: THE BENEFITS OF SPREADING ASSET OWNERSHIP 302, 304 (Thomas M. Shapiro & Edward N.
Wolff eds., 2001).
I1. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
790 (2007) (arguing that earned income tax credit is vulnerable because of its perception as welfare
for blacks); Francine J. Lipman, The Working Poor Are Paying for Government Benefits: Fixing the
Hole in the Anti-Poverty Purse, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 461, 466 (analyzing the shift in earned income
tax credit benefits away from the working poor).
12. See, e.g., EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 159-160 (2007).
13. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 329,
343-45 (2009) (arguing that low-income homeowners are least likely to take advantage of the mort-
gage interest deduction); Lily Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 187 (2013) (arguing that the subsidies for home sales rest on questionable policy justifications
and should be repealed).
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economic crisis like the Great Recession. It also means less money in the
bank for an education and less funds on which to retire. As such, Part I
argues that asset building should play a central role in addressing wealth
inequality.
Part II proceeds to describe the estate tax, emphasizing its purported
goal of leveling down wealth. High exemptions and proliferating loop-
holes have resulted in a levy that taxes less than one percent of estates,
reducing wealth concentration only at the margins. This is in stark con-
trast to the income tax, which incorporates robust asset-building, but only
for the upper classes, thus undermining the goal of leveling down wealth.
Part II therefore illustrates how the estate tax and income tax combine to
reinforce wealth disparities.
Part III proposes two policies that can expand our system of wealth
taxation to benefit the poor and nonwealthy. The first is a refundable
income tax credit for asset-building accounts that would incentivize asset
building by the nonwealthy. This would provide a structural opportunity
for those with lower incomes to build wealth. The second is a more tar-
geted estate tax charitable deduction that would reward bequests to
wealth-building activities. This would change the current unlimited de-
duction and incorporate asset-building policies into the estate tax. Part III
then concludes by arguing that these policies would move the current
system in the direction of increased egalitarianism.
I. WEALTH INEQUALITY AND CURRENT RESEARCH
This Part defines wealth as an asset-based concept and sketches the
now familiar problem of wealth inequality. To underscore the central
role of government policies in wealth accumulation, I also present asset-
building research and provide examples of asset-building policies that
date back to the nineteenth century.
A. Understanding Wealth and Wealth Inequality
Because of its everyday connotations, wealth can be a difficult con-
cept to discuss and understand. It is usually thought to be an "abundance
of valuable material possessions or resources."l4 We think of someone
who is wealthy as being someone who is quite rich. This became a topic
for national conversation when President Barack Obama defined the
wealth line at $250,000, a decision which was questioned by some upper
middle class taxpayers.'5 Scholars have also differed on how to define
wealth.'6 In this Article I am interested in a more general definition of
14. Wealth Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/wealth (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
15. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Rich and Sort of Rich, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2011, at
WKI.
16. Compare, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979) (defining wealth as "the value in dollars or dollar equivalents ... of
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wealth-anything of value. For this purpose, wealth is defined as an in-
dividual's economic assets or net worth. Thus, wealth is measured as an
individual's assets minus his or her debts.17 Assets can be bank accounts,
houses, stock, 401(k)s, etc. Debts include mortgages, vehicle loans, cred-
it card balances, etc.'8 Of course, there are noneconomic components to
wealth that may be even more important than assets.19 For example, so-
cial networks can be vital to both status attainment and asset accumula-
tion.20 However, because of factors such as the sanctity of private owner-
ship and respect for family privacy, it is more difficult to address these
noneconomic factors through government policy.2 1
The asset-based efinition of wealth is important because tradition-
ally the story of economic inequality in the United States has dispropor-
22tionately focused on income. Income refers to the flow of dollars over a
everything in society"), with D. Bruce Johnsen, Wealth Is Value, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 268 (1986)
(criticizing Posner's definition of wealth for only accounting for values at a given point of time
instead of considering flows of value through time).
17. A more sophisticated way of saying this is the net value of all goods available for an
individual's exclusive use through time discounted to the present at the appropriate interest rate.
18. See MEIZHU LuI ET AL., THE COLOR OF WEALTH: THE STORY BEHIND THE U.S. RACIAL
WEALTH DIVIDE 1-2 (2006) (examining racial wealth disparities between white and non-white in
the United States); SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN ET AL., URBAN INST., LESS THAN EQUAL: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN WEALTH ACCUMULATION 1, 6 n.l (2013), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412802-Less-Than-Equal-Racial-Disparities-in-Wealth-
Accumulation.pdf (arguing that income inequality understates the size between whites and non-
whites in the United States).
19. These noneconomic components of wealth include social networks, love, integrity, and
family morale, which make it difficult to reach unless society is prepared to compromise its com-
mitment to privacy of the family and private ownership.
20. See, e.g., Nan Lin, Social Networks and Status Attainment, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 467, 470-
72 (1999) (tracing the development of social resources theory, which argues that social capital en-
hances chances of attaining better statuses and is contingent on initial positions in the social hierar-
chy).
21. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation,
19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 504 (1952) ("[T]he gravest source of inequality of opportunity in our society
is not economic but rather what is called cultural inheritance."); see also LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS
NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 158-59 (2002) (noting that this source of
inequality may be more important than inherited wealth and yet it may be impossible to eliminate).
22. Lisa A. Keister & Stephanie Moller, Wealth Inequality in the United States, 26 ANN. REV.
Soc. 63, 64 (2000). One important exception to this disproportionate focus on income is the repara-
tions literature. See, e.g., BORIS 1. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 128-37 (1973);
Roy L. Brooks, Rehabilitative Reparations for the Judicial Process, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
475, 483 (2003); Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slav-
ery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 536 (2003); Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural War Over
Reparations for Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1181, 1193 (2004); Lisa A. Crooms, Remembering the
Days of Slavery: Plantations, Contracts, and Reparations, 26 U. HAW. L. REv. 405, 412 (2004);
Adrienne Davis, Reparations and the Slave Trade, 101 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 285, 286 (2007);
Maria Grahn-Farley, The Master Norm: On the Question of Redressing Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
1215, 1219-20 (2004); Kevin Hopkins, Forgive US. Our Debts? Righting the Wrongs ofSlavery, 89
GEO. L.J. 2531, 2550 (2001); Stephen Kershnar, Reparations for Slavery and Justice, 33 U. MEM. L.
REV. 277, 287-88 (2003); Albert Mosley, Affirmative Action as a Form ofReparations, 33 U. MEM.
L. REV. 353, 364-65 (2003); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Reparations for the Children of Slaves: Litigat-
ing the Issues, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 245, 257-58 (2003); George Schedler, Responsibility for and
Estimation of the Damages of American Slavery, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 307, 338-39 (2003); Watson
Branch, Comment, Reparations for Slavery: A Dream Deferred, 3 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 177, 196
(2002); Lee A. Harris, Note, "Reparations" as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Repara-
tions, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 409, 424 (2003). But see Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against Black
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period of time. These are usually derived from salaries, wages, invest-
ments, alimony, government transfers, etc. Income data is easier to ob-
tain from pay stubs, bank records, and tax returns, for example, whereas
wealth is harder to measure, with individuals often underestimating their
holdings.23 As such, income is often used as a proxy for wealth and the
two concepts can be conflated. A useful way to think about the differ-
ence is that income is more sensitive to life's ups and downs. Thus, an
individual may lose her job-her source of income-but still have sub-
stantial investments-her source of wealth-to survive until she finds a
new job. Wealth usually changes over longer periods of time and can
reach across generations. Income is unequally distributed but much less
so than wealth.24 Therefore, observing income alone does not capture the
degree of wealth concentration in the United States.
Despite these difficulties in measuring wealth, there are some clear
data regarding relative wealth disparities in the United States.2 Wealth
disparities and inequalities in the United States are by no means a new
phenomenon. However, the inequality has worsened in recent decades.
For the past century, wealth has been concentrated in the hands of a
small minority. By the 1920s, the top 1% of wealth holders owned an
average of 30% of the nation's wealth.26 This number decreased during
the Great Depression and in the post-World War II period, but began to
27rise again in the 1970s. On the other hand, over 10% of the population
has no wealth at all.28
The intergenerational reach of wealth is important because it un-
dermines equality of opportunity. Despite its widespread embrace, equal
opportunity remains a thorny concept. While it may be impossible to
achieve true equality of opportunity, it endures as a goal of our society. It
is flexible and slippery enough to be embraced by conservatives and lib-
erals alike. Resource egalitarians argue that equality of opportunity
would require that each individual have equal wealth at the beginning of
life and that opportunities to accumulate further wealth be equal
Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1185-86 (2004); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Repara-
tions for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 692 (2003). For a re-
sponse directly towards Posner and Vermeule, see Roy L. Brooks, Getting Reparations for Slavery
Right-A Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 251, 255-56 (2004).
23. See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 58-59 (2006) ("Surveys of assets and wealth invariably
underrepresent the upper levels, primarily because of the difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of
enough very wealthy subjects. Thus random field surveys conservatively understate the magnitude
of wealth inequality." (footnote omitted)).
24. See, e.g., Marco Cagetti & Mariachristina De Nardi, Wealth Inequality: Data and Models,
12 MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS 285, 286 (2008).
25. See, e.g., Detailed Tables on Wealth and Asset Ownership, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
http://www.census.gov/people/wealth/data/dtables.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).
26. Keister & Moller, supra note 22, at 63.
27. Cagetti & De Nardi, supra note 24, at 292.
28. Id. at 288.
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throughout life.29 According to political philosophers Liam Murphy and
Thomas Nagel, "The most clearly unacceptable sources of inequality in a
social order are deliberately imposed caste systems or other explicit bar-
riers, by which members of certain racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual
categories are excluded from desirable positions in political, social, or
economic life.',30 This view would place prime importance on ridding the
nation of explicit, de jure, barriers such as Jim Crow laws.
Wealth disparities pose a more nuanced problem. Their legacy part-
ly continues because of the intergenerational nature of wealth. Disparities
would probably fall into the second category of unacceptable equality
that Murphy and Nagel identify.3 1 This consists of "hereditary class strat-
ification, under which people are born with very unequal life prospects
and opportunities simply by virtue of the success or luck of their parents
and grandparents, and the society does nothing to repair this."32 Because
of the importance of wealth, the average poor person in America is still
living under a system wherein she faces unequal life prospects solely as a
result of her ancestry.
B. Addressing Wealth Inequality through Asset Building and Develop-
ment
The focus on income inequality has also had an impact on our
equality enhancing policies. The nation's social development policies
have focused almost exclusively on income support. Social safety net
policies such as welfare and the earned income tax credit (EITC) are
vitally important in helping individuals provide for basic necessities and
alleviate suffering. However, they provide an incomplete solution be-
cause evidence suggests that income support policies do not have lasting
effects and do not solve the long-term problem of poverty.33 Ultimately,
income does not have the intergenerational reach that wealth does, and
income does not insure against difficult times like wealth does.
The focus on income support policies has begun to shift in the past
three decades. The interest in asset development as a strategy to promote
social and economic development has grown because, as compared to
income, assets may have a more sustainable impact on well-being.34
Well-being has become a central consideration for policymakers. For
29. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 21, at 120.
30. Id. at 56-57.
31. Id. at 20.
32. Id. at 57.
33. See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role of the
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1651-52 (2005) (arguing
that developing countries need to look beyond their systems of income taxation to reduce wealth
inequality).
34. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., John F. Helliwell, Well-Being, Social Capital and Public Policy: What's New?,
116 ECON. J. C34, C34 (2006) (summarizing empirical research on life satisfaction and well-being,
areas which have been under-analyzed in classical economics).
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example, the insight of psychologists as to how human beings value
goods, services, and social conditions are now taken into account by
standard economics.36
The policy shift toward asset building has been supported by both
theoretical and empirical foundations. The theoretical models have sug-
gested that asset ownership may lead to better economic, psychological,
social, civic, political, and intergenerational outcomes.37 Empirical re-
search has provided some evidence to support the theoretical models.3 8
Specifically, empirical research has found connections between asset
ownership and positive outcomes including: increased wealth,39 political
participation,40 educational attainment,41 and health.42 However, more
work still remains to be done on the long-term efficacy of these poli-
-43cies.
Despite the potential benefits of asset holding, many families have
little savings, especially families headed by members of racial and ethnic
minorities.44 Perhaps the most obvious explanation for the wealth gap is
36. See, e.g., BRUNO S. FREY ET AL., HAPPINESS: A REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS 13-14, 154-
62 (2008) (tracing major developments of happiness research in economics and describing how the
government can provide the conditions for people to achieve well-being).
37. See, e.g., Sherraden, supra note 10, at 310.
38. Asset building also has positive effects for women. Control and ownership of assets
increases their bargaining power in the household. See, e.g., Bina Agarwal, "Bargaining" and Gen-
der Relations: Within and Beyond the Household, 3 FEMINIST ECON. 1, 8 (1997); Kathleen Beegle,
Elizabeth Frankenberg & Duncan Thomas, Bargaining Power Within Couples and Use of Prenatal
and Delivery Care in Indonesia, 32 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 130, 134 (2001). It also provides better
prospects for female education, see Forum for African Women Educationists, What Can We Do To
Fight Poverty and Therefore Curb Dropout Among Girls?, FAWE NEWS, July-Sept. 2000, at 13,
available at http://www.fawe.org/Files/fawenews_8-3.pdf, and increases female autonomy and
empowerment, see, e.g., Pradeep Panda & Bina Agarwal, Marital Violence, Human Development
and Women's Property Status in India, 33 WORLD DEV. 823, 842 (2005).
Child well-being in general is improved among children whose parents own assets. See,
e.g., Joanna Armstrong Schellenberg et al., Inequities Among the Very Poor: Health Care for Chil-
dren in Rural Southern Tanzania, 361 LANCET 561, 566 (2003). When mothers own assets, children
have better outcomes because their nutrition is better and they benefit from increased spending on
education and clothing. See, e.g., Agnes R. Quisumbing & John A. Maluccio, IntrahouseholdAllo-
cation and Gender Relations: New Empirical Evidence from Four Developing Countries 24-29
(Food Consumption and Nutrition Div., Int'l Food Policy Research Inst., Discussion Paper No. 84,
2000).
39. See, e.g., Mark Schreiner et al., Assets and the Poor: Evidence from Individual Develop-
ment Accounts, in INCLUSION IN THE AMERICAN DREAM: ASSETS, POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
185, 198 (Michael Sherraden ed., 2005).
40. See, e.g., SHERRADEN,supra note 4, at 165-66.
41. Id at 151-52.
42. See, e.g., Deon Filmer, Fever and its Treatment Among the More and Less Poor in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 20 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 337, 344 (2005).
43. Researchers till do not agree on the effectiveness of these programs. For example, a study
of a matched savings program for low and moderate-income adults showed that it moderately in-
creased homeownership rates among renters, but did not have an effect on other types of assets or
net worth. Gregory Mills et al., Effects of Individual Development Accounts on Asset Purchases and
Saving Behavior: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1509, 1519-24 (2008).
44. The median value of financial assets held by nonwhites is $9,000. Brian K. Bucks et al.,
Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances, 95 FED. RES. BULL. Al, A19 (2009). The issue of the racial wealth gap is a complicated one
and is beyond the scope of this Article.
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the difference in consumption and saving patterns.4 5 That is, the average
lower income family has a poor future orientation.46 As such, they rely
on instant gratification and save less. One study by two economists ex-
amined savings by race and found no evidence that blacks have a lower
savings rate than whites.47 But a more recent study found that the racial
wealth gap would have narrowed if blacks devoted as high a share of
their income to savings as whites.48 However, much of this difference
stemmed from the fact that saving rates rise with incomes and blacks
have lower incomes than whites.49 The savings rate difference was not
significant when the authors controlled for income.50
Instead, this low level of saving suggests inadequate institutional
support for asset accumulation. While individual characteristics and be-
havior are closely tied to asset accumulation, several studies have found
that institutional constructs such as access and information also play an
important role.51 That is, once the poor and nonwealthy have institutional
support, such as financial literacy classes and matching funds, they save.
1. Historical Asset-Building Policies
Asset-building policies have been utilized throughout the nation's
history. The Homestead Acts gave nearly 1.5 million American families
title to 287 million acres of land, which is more than half the size of the
state of Alaska.52 The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), created
during the Depression,53 also encouraged asset development.54 It incen
tivized homeownership by improving housing standards, providing an
adequate home financing system, and stabilizing the mortgage market.
Finally, the G.I. Bill provided a range of benefits to World War II veter-
ans including low-cost mortgages, low-interest loans to start a business,
cash payments of tuition and living expenses to attend college, high
45. Kerwin Kofi Charles, Erik Hurst & Nikolai Roussanov, Conspicuous Consumption and
Race, 124 Q.J. ECON. 425, 436 (2009) (showing that Blacks and Hispanics devote a larger shares of
expenditures to visible goods).
46. See Marcia Shobe & Deborah Page-Adams, Assets, Future Orientation, and Well-Being:
Exploring and Extending Sherraden 's Framework, 28 J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 109, 119 (2001).
47. Francine D. Blau & John W. Graham, Black-White Diferences in Wealth and Asset Com-
position, 105 Q.J. ECON. 321, 332, 338 (1990). Blau and Graham found that "[e]ven after controlling
for racial differences in income and other demographic factors, as much as three quarters of the
wealth gap remains unexplained." Id. at 321.
48. Maury Gittleman & Edward N. Wolff, Racial Differences in Patterns of Wealth Accumu-
lation, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 193, 195 (2004).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 195-96.
51. See Sondra G. Beverly & Michael Sherraden, Institutional Determinants of Saving: Impli-
cations for Low-Income Households and Public Policy, 28 J. Socio-ECON. 457, 466 (1999).
52. See, e.g., Trina Williams Shanks, The Homestead Act: A Major Asset-Building Policy in
American History, in INCLUSION IN THE AMERICAN DREAM: ASSETS, POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
20, 29, 31 (Michael Sherraden ed., 2005).
53. National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246.
54. See, e.g., James Midgley, Asset-Based Policy in Historical and International Perspective,
in INCLUSION IN THE AMERICAN DREAM: ASSETS, POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 42, 49-50 (Mi-
chael Sherraden ed., 2005).
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school or vocational education, and one year of unemployment insur-
55ance.
Because of the intergenerational nature of wealth, the effect of these
policies continues to be felt to this day. For example, one study estimates
that about 46 million American adults are homestead descendants.5 ' This
means that up to one-quarter of U.S. adults (based on 2005 estimates)
can trace their legacy of property ownership, class status, and economic
mobility to this federal government policy.57
2. Lump-sum Transfers
In the late 1990s, Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott presented an
ambitious asset-building proposal that would move our society closer to
providing genuine equality of opportunity.58 The concept was built on the
idea that an individual should have a stake or feel invested in all aspects
of society.5 9 As previously noted, research to this point has shown that
building assets does more than just add money to bank accounts.6 0
Ackerman and Alstott proposed that, upon either entering college or
turning 21, every American would receive $20,000 a year for four years,
to use as they would like.61 The $80,000 was thought by the authors to
give a genuine head start to every young person, regardless of his or her
62parents' wealth or parenting abilities. Those who did not graduate from
high school would receive a smaller amount.63 Acceptance of the money
would be optional, but those who accepted it would become stakeholders
and would be responsible for giving back to the fund in later years.
Alstott and Ackerman's proposal was never adopted at the federal
level. Despite the attractiveness of providing funds for individuals to get
an education and start a small business, the idea of providing lump-sum
deposits upon entering college or turning 21 may not be the best policy
prescription. An economic study of lottery winners found that those who
won more than $15,000 significantly drew down the amount held in re-
tirement accounts, mutual funds, and general savings.65 The lump-sum
55. Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284.
56. Shanks, supra note 52, at 32. Blacks were largely excluded from this asset-building poli-
cy. Id. at 35. When the Homestead Act of 1862 was passed the prospect of black ownership was
questionable. After the Civil War, black codes were put into place to prevent blacks from acquiring
property. Id The Freedmen's Bureau invalidated these codes, but they had a substantial impact
nevertheless. Id.
57. Id. at 32.
58. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999).
59. Id at 44.
60. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
61. ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 58, at 4-8.
62. Id. at 23-31.
63. Id. at 38.
64. Id. at 78.
65. Guido W. Imbens, Donald B. Rubin & Bruce 1. Sacerdote, Estimating the Effect of Un-
earned Income on Labor Earnings, Savings and Consumption: Evidence from a Survey of Lottery
Players, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 778, 779, 784, 791-92 (2001) (finding that unearned income reduces
2014] 155
DENVER UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW
amounts encouraged increased consumption.66 Instead of lump-sum de-
posits, social development scholars have suggested long-term and sys-
tematic accumulation into accounts beginning at birth.67 These kinds
programs have been studied in several countries for the past two dec-
ades.
3. Individual Development Accounts
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are the first and largest
modem policy initiative in asset building for the poor.6 9 They were
spearheaded by social work scholar Michael Sherraden, who wrote As-
sets and the Poor in 1991, and supported by several national foundations
and policy groups.70 IDAs reward savings by asset-poor families aiming
to buy their first home, finance higher education, or start a small busi-
ness.71 For every dollar a family saves, matching funds from a variety of
private and public sources provide an incentive to save.72 IDAs were
usually managed by a community-based organization with accounts held
at local financial institutions.73 Unlike other subsidized savings accounts
such as IRAs or 401(k) plans, IDAs are targeted to the poor and provide
subsidies through matches rather than tax breaks.74 They also require
participants to attend financial education because it has been shown that
access to information increases savings rates among the nonwealthy.
The American Dream Demonstration (ADD), launched in 1997,
was the first large demonstration and evaluation of IDA programs.7 6 The
ADD experiment ran from 1998 to 2003, with 1,103 low-income partici-
pants randomly assigned to experimental and control groups for three
years.n Experimental group members received access to an IDA as well
as financial education and case management.78 The findings revealed that
labor savings); see also William Darity, Jr. & Dania Frank, The Economics of Reparations, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 326, 328 (2003) ("We find that reparations payments that either mandate or provide
incentives for blacks to spend on goods and services produced by nonblacks will raise the relative
incomes of nonblacks. Without significant productive capacity in place prior to reparations, a lump-
sum payment actually could result in an absolute decline in black income. Thus, the structure of a
reparations program is critical if it is to close the black-white economic gap in the United States.").
66. Imbens et al., supra note 65, at 791.
67. See, e.g., Sherraden, supra note 10, at 319 n.4.
68. For comparative studies of several countries, including Canada, Sweden, and Australia,
see generally ASSET-BASED WELFARE: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES (Sue Regan & Will Paxton
eds., 2001).
69. SHERRADEN,supra note 4, at 220.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 221.
72. Id. at 222.
73. Id at 225.
74. Id. at 224.
75. See Beverly & Sherraden, supra note 51, at 464.
76. Sherraden, supra note 10, at 312.
77. MARK SCHREINER, MARGARET CLANCY & MICHAEL SHERRADEN, CTR. FOR Soc. DEV.,
FINAL REPORT: SAVING PERFORMANCE IN THE AMERICAN DREAM DEMONSTRATION 58 (2002),
available at http://www.usc.eduldept/chepa/IDApays/publications/ADDReport2002.pdf
78. Id. at iii, 51.
156 [Vol. 92:1
ADDRESSING WEALTH DISPARITIES
the program had a positive, statistically significant impact on homeown-
ership rates.79 In addition, evidence suggests positive psychological, cog-
nitive, behavioral, and economic effects.80 Contrary to what was believed
about the ability of the poor to save, the program provided some empiri-
cal evidence that poor families sacrifice to put money aside to create
better lives for themselves.8 '
IDAs have proven to be popular and have garnered bipartisan sup-
port. The Assets for Independence Act was passed in 1998 and provided
federal funding to support IDA programs.82 The Assets for Independence
(AFI) Program is now the largest funding source of IDA programs. There
are currently AFI-sponsored programs in 49 states and the District of
Columbia.83 From 1999 to 2009, the programs provided about $180 mil-
lion in competitive grants, assisting more than 72,000 low-income partic-
ipants, and resulting in more than 29,000 asset purchases.84 Most recent-
ly, the Obama administration has proposed a Saver's Bonus, which
would provide a tax credit to match low-income individuals' savings.85
Although there is federal interest in IDAs, the government's investment
in them is dwarfed by the almost $400 billion spent on asset-building
programs for those with higher incomes.
4. Child Development Accounts
Child Development Accounts (CDAs) or Child Savings Accounts
(CSAs) are savings accounts for children that provide a structured oppor-
79. Mills et al., supra note 43, at 1510; see also Michal Grinstein-Weiss et al., Fostering Low-
Income Homeownership Through Individual Development Accounts: A Longitudinal, Randomized
Experiment, 19 HOUS. POL'Y DEBATE 711, 731 (2008).
80. For example, asset building has been shown to "have a positive effect on expectations and
confidence about the future; influence people to make specific plans with regard to work and family;
induce more prudent and protective personal behaviors; and lead to greater social connectedness
with relatives, neighbors, and organizations." ROBERT LERMAN & SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN,
URBAN INST., THE EFFECTS OF HOLDING ASSETS ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES OF
FAMILIES: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND EVIDENCE 22 (2008) available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/PoorFinances/Effects/index.shtml; see, e.g., MARGARET SHERRARD
SHERRADEN & AMANDA MOORE MCBRIDE WITH SONDRA G. BEVERLY, STRIVING TO SAVE:
CREATING POLICIES FOR FINANCIAL SECURITY OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 209 (2010); Margaret S.
Sherraden et al., Short-Term and Long-Term Savings in Low-Income Households: Evidence from
Individual Development Accounts, 13 J. INCOME DISTRIBUTION 76, 93 (2004-2005).
81. See Mills et al., supra note 43.
82. Community Opportunities, Accountability, and Training and Educational Services Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-285, § 404, 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1998).
83. Assets for Independence: A Factsheet for Domestic Violence Service Providers, ASSETS
FOR INDEPENDENCE RESOURCE CENTER,
http://idaresources.acf.hhs.gov/page?pageid=a047000000Bo2R2AAJ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
84. ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: ASSETS FOR INDEPENDENCE PROGRAM STATUS AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE TENTH YEAR, at v, 41 (2010), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocs/afitenth-reporttocongress_0.pdf.
85. See Reid Cramer, The Saver's Bonus: A Proposal to Support Savings by Working Fami-
lies at Tax Time, NEW AMERICAN FOUNDATION (Dec. 2010),
http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/thesavers-bonus.
86. See infra Part II.B.
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tunity to save and accumulate assets.87 They have been implemented in
several countries including Canada, Singapore, South Korea, and the
United Kingdom.88 CDAs can be structured in a number of ways. For
example the government could provide an initial deposit to the account
upon birth. Additional yearly deposits could be encouraged. Acquiring
financial literacy throughout the school years could also be a program
component. The government could match contributions for low-income
parents. There usually would be restrictions on the withdrawal of funds.
After graduation from high school, account holders could use the funds
for higher education or training. If funds remain at age 25 or older, they
could be used for small business capitalization or a first time home pur-
chase. If funds remain by retirement age they could be used to cover re-
tirement expenses or be passed on to the next generation.
Interest in CDAs has grown in the United States, but they are not
yet a part of federal social policy. There has been legislative discussion
of several CDA proposals including the America Saving for Personal
Investment, Retirement, and Education (ASPIRE) Act, 40lKids Ac-
counts, and Baby Bonds.89 There is a paucity of research on the long-
term impact of these accounts, but that is changing. In 2007 the govern-
ment of Oklahoma randomly selected families with newborns across the
state for a study.90 Half of the families received $1,000 in a special SEED
OK account in the Oklahoma College Savings Plan.9' SEED OK is a
92study of a universal CDA. Its progressivity stems from its focus on
incentivizing the savings of low- and moderate-income families.93 To
date the findings are promising. They show that the automatic account
opening has a positive impact.9 4 On the other hand, the levels of individ-
ual savings have not been significant.95 This may partly be explained by
the recent economic downturn. The question going forward will be how
SEED OK affects final development outcomes and attitudes.
As will be discussed in Part II of the Article, the federal government
has administered several popular asset-building policies through the in-
87. See, e.g., Sherraden, supra note 10, at 309.
88. See Vernon Loke & Michael Sherraden, Building Assets from Birth: A Global Compari-
son of Child Development Account Policies, 18 INT'L J. SOC. WORK 119, 119 (2009).
89. See Reid Cramer & David Newville, Children 's Savings Accounts: The Case for Creating
a Lifelong Savings Platform at Birth as a Foundation for a "Save-and-Invest" Economy, NEW
AMERICA FOUNDATION 2 (Dec. 2009),
http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/CSAPolicyRationaleO.pdf.
90. See Welcome to SEED for Oklahoma Kids!, OKLAHOMA STATE TREASURER,
http://www.ok.gov/treasurer/SEEDOK/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
91. Id
92. Yunju Nam et al., Do Child Development Accounts Promote Account Holding, Saving,
and Asset Accumulation for Children's Future? Evidence from a Statewide Randomized Experiment,
32 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 6,7 (2013).
93. Id.
94. Id at 9.
95. Id. at 26 ("The treatment effect for individual savings is also statistically significant, but
the effect size is small. . . .")
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come tax system. However, instead of utilizing asset building to further
economic development and equality, these policies have disproportion-
ately favored the wealthy.
II.OUR CURRENT SYSTEM OF WEALTH TAXATION: REINFORCING
WEALTH DISPARITIES
This Part focuses on our current wealth taxation policies, which en-
compass both the estate and income taxes. I divide the discussion into
three parts. First, I describe the estate tax, its policy rationale of reducing
wealth concentration, and its porous nature because of an alarming num-
ber of loopholes and exclusions. Second, I describe income tax expendi-
tures, which represent subsidies of almost half a trillion dollars, but
which largely ignore the poor. Finally, I show how together these poli-
cies reinforce wealth disparities.
A. Estate Tax: History, Mechanics, and Loopholes
What is usually referred to as the estate tax is technically three lev-
ies working in conjunction: the Estate Tax, the Gift Tax,97 and the Tax
on Generation-Skipping Transfers (GST).98 In order to understand why
the estate tax, despite its purported goal of reducing concentrations of
wealth, has not significantly diminished wealth disparities requires some
historical perspective and an understanding of how the tax works.
1. A Historical Overview
The federal taxation system in the nineteenth century had mainly
consisted of indirect taxes such as import duties and regressive excise
taxes on alcohol and tobacco.99 As the nation began to establish itself as
a world power these taxes provided inadequate funds to meet the increas-
ing revenue needs of the federal government.00 This regressive taxation,
which burdened the working classes disproportionately, along with the
rise of the holding company, and the "unprecedented number of mergers
in the manufacturing sector," resulted in wealth becoming increasingly
concentrated in the hands of the few.'0
Progressives continued to press for both a progressive income tax
and a tax on inheritances to decrease wealth concentration or level down
wealth.102 This eventually led to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment
96. 1.R.C. §§ 2001-2209 (2012).
97. Id. §§ 2501-2524.
98. Id. §§ 2601-2663. Special valuation rules relating to these taxes are included in §§ 2701-
2704. Section 2801 contains rules regarding gifts from expatriates.
99. Mehrotra, supra note 2, at 1803.
100. Id. at 1809.
101. Jacobson et al., supra note 1, at 119.
102. See Mehrotra, supra note 2, at 1800 (contending that a particular group of academics help
bring about a radical transformation in the United States public finance system). For a comprehen-
sive account of the forces that brought about the progressive income tax, see generally id.
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and the enactment of the modern estate tax.103 The estate tax was passed
as a part of a comprehensive tax reform package in 1916.'0 The First
World War led to a sharp reduction of tariff revenue at a time when the
government needed funds for its military buildup.05 The tax package
transformed the income tax "into the foremost instrument for federal
taxation," imposed a significant tax on corporate profits, and included an
excess-profits tax.106
Although the estate tax was a revenue raiser, this was not the only
reason for its enactment; the federal government also wished to redistrib-
ute the tax burden and reduce the concentrations of wealth.07 Because
the levy could be avoided by giving away property during life, a gift tax
was eventually added, becoming a permanent fixture of the wealth trans-
fer system in 1932.108 The Progressive impulses influenced tax policy
through the end of World War 11.109 President Franklin Roosevelt viewed
wealth accumulation as a distinctly social phenomenon.1 0 For Roosevelt,
the wealthy owed a debt to the communities from which they drew their
fortunes, and the control of an ever-widening spectrum of industry by a
limited number of wealthy individuals stood in contrast to fundamental
American values of competition and civil society."'
After World War II Progressive ideals held less sway in tax policy
and the estate tax basically remained the same until 1976. That year
Congress unified the estate and gift taxes into a single rate, since the
lower gift tax rate encouraged individuals to give away their wealth dur-
ing life to avoid the higher estate tax rate.1 12 The generation-skipping tax
was also added in 1976 in response to tax planning that allowed a dece-
dent's children to avoid paying taxes upon their death.113 In 1981 Con-
gress lowered the estate tax rate, made the marital deduction more tax-
payer friendly, and raised the exemption from $175,000 to $600,000.114
The 1990s saw the rise of the estate tax abolitionists, who presented
a sustained challenge to the policy of reducing wealth concentration. In
103. Id. at 1856.
104. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 1, 39 Stat. 756, 756.
105. History of the Finance Committee, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE,
http://www.finance.senate.gov/aboutihistory/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
106. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 62 (2d ed. 1996).
107. David Joulfaian, The Federal Estate Tax: History, Law, and Economics 1-1 to 1-2 (June
14, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1 579829.
108. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 501, 47 Stat. 169, 245. The gift tax was first introduced
in 1924, but repealed in 1926. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319-324, 43 Stat. 253, 313-16;
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200, 44 Stat. 9, 125 (repealing the gift tax).
109. BROWNLEE, supra note 106, at 5-6.
110. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Tax Revision, (June 19, 1935),
transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid= 15088.
Ill. Id.
112. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520.
113. Id. § 2006.
114. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 401, 95 Stat. 172, 299.
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1999 and 2000, Congress passed bills to permanently repeal the estate
tax, but President Bill Clinton vetoed them both. 15 In 2001, after efforts
for permanent repeal failed, President George W. Bush signed into law
sweeping changes to the estate tax." 6 These further undermined attempts
to level down wealth. The estate tax rate was lowered to 45% and the
exemption increased between 2001 and 2009 incrementally to $3.5 mil-
lion.117 The estate tax was then repealed in 2010, returning in 2011 with a
$1 million exemption."8
At the end of 2010, President Obama reached a compromise with
Congress that further decreased the reach of the estate tax.119 The law,
which expired after two years, lowered the estate tax rate to 35% and
increased the exemption to $5 million.120 In 2013, the estate tax was
again made permanent, with e tax rate increased to 40%, and the $5
million exemption (indexed for inflation) retained.121 It was estimated
that in 2013 the share of estates paying the estate tax, a number which
had historically been between 1 and 2%, would be 0.14%.122
2. The Mechanics of the Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping
Taxes12 3
As stated in the historical overview above, the estate tax was the
first of the three wealth transfer taxes enacted. The estate tax serves as
the main tax, while the gift tax and generation-skipping taxes were meant
to prevent taxpayers from avoiding it. The mechanics of these taxes help
minimize their impact on wealth concentrations. While the top statutory
estate tax rate is 40%, the average effective rate is less than 17%.124 In
addition, Congress has long exempted a certain amount of property from
115. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, President Vetoes Effort to Repeal Taxes on Estates, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 1, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/01/us/president-vetoes-effort-to-repeal-taxes-
on-estates.html.
116. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§
501-581, 115 Stat. 38.
117. Id.§§511,521.
118. Id §§ 901,521(b).
119. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302, 124 Stat. 3296, 3302.
120. Id.
121. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313, 2318
(2013).
122. Table T13-0019: Estate Tax Returns and Liability Under Current Law and Various Re-
form Proposals, 2011-2022, TAX POLICY CENTER (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/TI3-0019.pdf [hereinafter TAX POLICY
CENTER, Estate Tax Returns and Liability].
123. For an accessible introduction see STEPHANIE J. WILLBANKS, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE (3d ed. 2004).
124. Table T13-0020: Current Law Distribution of Gross Estate and Net Estate Tax by Size of
Gross Estate, 2013, TAX POLICY CENTER (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/TI3-0020.pdf [hereinafter TAX POLICY
CENTER, Gross and Net Estate Tax].
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wealth transfer taxation.125 Only after this amount is exhausted are assets
taxed at the current 40% rate.126 Since 2010, this exemption amount has
been $5 million, indexed for inflation.127 This means that for 2013 an
individual can pass on $5.25 million ($10.5 million for a married couple)
of wealth tax free to the next generation. Bequests to spouses2 8 and to
charities129 are not taxed.
a. The Gift Tax
The easiest way for an individual to avoid the estate tax altogether
would be to transfer all assets before death, the point at which the estate
tax is imposed. The gift tax works to prevent this. Gratuitous transfers'30
are subtracted from the $5.25 million exemption amount, which means
that, theoretically, transfers during life and death are treated the same.
However, there are exceptions. Tuition payments and medical expenses
paid on the behalf of any person are excluded from the gift tax.'3 ' The
only requirement is that the donor must make the payment directly to the
service provider.132 This allows parents, grandparents, and other extend-
ed family members to make substantial gifts free of gift taxation and
represents a substantial intergenerational transfer of wealth.3 3
In order to prevent taxpayers from having to report numerous small
gifts, Congress also excluded an amount from gift taxation each year.134
125. This amount is known as the "unified credit" or the "applicable exclusion amount." See
I.R.C. § 2010 (2012). From 1942-1972 the exemption was fixed at $60,000. Federal Estate and Gift
Tax Rates, Exemptions, and Exclusions, 1916-2014, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2014),
http://taxfoundation.org/article/federal-estate-and-gift-tax-rates-exemptions-and-exclusions-1916-
2014 [hereinafter Federal Estate and Gifi Tax Rates]. By 1987 the figure increased to $600,000. Id.
Since 1997, the amount increased in a series of steps to $5 million. Id.
126. I.R.C. § 2001(c).
127. Id. § 2010(c)(3). The exemption was increased in the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insur-
ance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302(c)(2), 124 Stat.
3296, 3301.
128. I.R.C. § 2056. This marital deduction is unlimited and based on the premise that the
spouses are one economic unit, and as such transfers between them should not be taxed. But see
Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301, 305 (1995) (critiquing Congress' rationale for creating qualified termina-
ble interest property trusts as paternalistic and degrading to women).
129. I.R.C. § 2055. For more information on the structure and rationale for the charitable
deduction, see generally Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Contributions in an Ideal Estate Tax,
60 TAX L. REv. 263 (2007).
130. Section 2501(a) imposes a tax on "transfer[s] of property by gift," but the term is never
defined. Generally courts have held that a gratuitous transfer is subject to gift taxation if the donor
has relinquished all "dominion and control" over the property. See, e.g., Sanford's Estate v. Comm'r,
308 U.S. 39, 49 (1939); see also Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 181 (1943); Bumet v. Gug-
genheim, 288 U.S. 280, 283 (1933).
131. I.R.C. § 2503(e).
132. Id
133. See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission,
86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 730 (1988) (arguing that education is the main occasion for wealth transmis-
sion in the United States).
134. H.R. REP. No. 72-708, at 29 (1932) ("Such exemption ... is to obviate the necessity of
keeping an account of and reporting numerous small gifts, and . . . to fix the amount sufficiently
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This is known as the annual exclusion amount.'35 No gift tax applies until
a gift exceeds the annual exclusion.136 For 2013 the annual exclusion
amount is $14,000.'13 The annual exclusion applies separately to each
individual donee.'3 ' Thus, for example, on December 31, 2013, a married
couple (whose exclusion is combined)'39 could give each of their three
children $28,000 without any gift tax applying.140 On January 1, 2014,
the couple could give each child another $28,000. Any additional gifts
given in 2014 would then be subject to gift tax. However, the exemption
amount would likely prevent any gift tax from actually being owed. Gift
taxes are not paid until the $5.25 million exemption amount is exhausted.
Using very conservative estimates, a couple with three children could
pass over $14 million of wealth tax free to the next generation.141
Although theoretically transfers during life and death are treated the
same by our wealth transfer taxes, there are advantages to lifetime gifts.
For tax purposes, gifts are valued on the date of the gift,1 42 and property
in the gross estate is valued on the date of the decedent's death.14 3 By
making a gift during life, the donor can remove any subsequent apprecia-
tion in the property's value. Thus, we can imagine a single mother gifting
property to her child valued at $2 million on the date of the gift, and val-
ued at $10 million at the time of her death in 2013. By gifting the proper-
ty during life she was able to transfer it tax free, with $3.25 million of
her lifetime exemption remaining. Thus, the $8 million in appreciation
escaped wealth transfer taxation. If she had kept the property in her es-
tate, the amount over the exemption amount, $4.75 million, would have
been subject to the estate tax, resulting in a tax bill of $1.9 million.'"
large to cover in most cases wedding and Christmas gifts and occasionally gifts of relatively small
amounts.").
135. See I.R.C. § 2503(b).
136. Id.
I37. Id.; Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rates, supra note 125. The annual exclusion amount was
$5,000 from 1932 to 1938, $4,000 from 1938 to 1941, and $3,000 from 1942 to 1981. Id. The Eco-
nomic Recovery Act of 1981 raised the exclusion amount to $10,000 and adjusted it for inflation in
multiples of $1,000. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 441 95 Stat. 175.
See infra note 114.
138. I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1).
139. Each spouse could write a separate check, or one spouse could write a $28,000 check,
with the other's consent. These two situations are treated the same because the gift tax specifically
allows for gift splitting. 1.R.C. § 2513.
140. This example assumes that the couple had not given their children any gifts during the rest
of the year.
141. This example does not take inflation into account. It assumes a $10.5 million exemption,
an annual exclusion of $28,000 for the couple, and gifts over a 40-year period (28,000 X 40 =
1,1200,000). It also assumes that each child attends a four-year college with a $30,000/year tuition,
and three years of graduate school with a $50,000/year tuition. Finally, medical expenses of $50,000
are assumed.
142. I.R.C. § 2512.
143. Id. § 2031. The estate is allowed to choose a date of valuation six months after the death
of the decedent, if it lowers the gross estate and tax. Id. § 2032.
144. There is the additional advantage of lifetime gifts that the calculation of gift taxes is tax
exclusive, whereas estate taxes are tax inclusive. Thus, gift taxes do not take into account the tax
itself, but estate taxes do.
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b. The Estate Tax
In simplified terms, the estate tax is due on the net value of proper-
ty, over the exemption amount, transferred at death. The first step in cal-
culating the estate tax is calculating the gross estate.14 5 This is a broad
term that is meant to include any and all property over which the dece-
dent had substantial control.146 The meaning of the term has been com-
plicated because, since the inception of the tax, estates have claimed that
the decedent did not have an "interest"l47 in certain property and, as such,
it should not be subject to the tax.14 8 The estate tax attempts to reach any
economic benefit transferred at death regardless of how the interest is
treated for state law purposes.
The gross estate includes, among other things: (1) the decedent's
probate estate;14 9 (2) dower and curtesy interests;150 (3) certain gifts made
within three years of the decedent's death;'5 ' (4) gift tax on gifts made
during three years before the decedent's death;152 (5) transfers with re-
tained rights or powers;153 (6) transfers taking effect at death;154 (7) revo-
cable transfers;'55 (8) annuities;156 (9) joint tenancy interests;157 (10)
powers of appointment; 15 and (11) proceeds of life insurance policies.1
59
Several deductions are then taken from the gross estate, including:
(1) expenses, indebtedness, and taxes;'6 0 (2) losses incurred during the
settlement of the estate;161 (3) transfers for public, charitable, and reli-
gious uses;162 (4) bequests to a surviving spouse;'63 and (5) state death
145. See id. § 2031.
146. See id. §§ 2033-2044.
147. Id. § 2033 ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent . . . .").
148. See e.g., Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 591, 595-97 (2d Cir. 1993) (Includ-
ing the value of a house in the estate of a parent who sold her house to her son but retained a life
estate).
149. Id
150. Id § 2034. The rights of dower and curtesy are a set of rules relating to division of marital
property, providing a surviving spouse with a means of support upon the death of the other spouse.
Dower and curtesy rights arise upon the death of a spouse. Dower is a wife's interest in her hus-
band's property upon his death. It is a portion of a deceased husband's real property, usually one-
third, that a widow is legally entitled to use during her lifetime to support herself and their children.
These have largely been abolished and replaced by the elective or forced share. See Lawrence W.
Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code's Elective Share: Time for a Reassessment, 37 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM, 1, 2-4(2003).
151. I.R.C. § 2035.
152. Id.
153. Id § 2036.
154. Id. § 2037.
155. Id § 2038.
156. Id § 2039.
157. Id. § 2040.
158. Id §2041.
159. Id § 2042.
160. Id § 2053.
161. Id § 2054.
162. Id § 2055.
163. Id § 2056.
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taxes.164 The resulting amount is known as "the taxable estate."66 To this
taxable estate, any taxable gifts' 66 are added and the tax rate is applied.6 7
Finally, various credits are applied,168 the most important of which re-
lates to the $5.25 million exemption amount.169 The resulting amount is
due to government nine months after the date of the decedent's death.170
c. The Tax on Generation-Skipping Transfers
For the purposes of this Article I will not describe the mechanics of
the generation-skipping transfer tax, which can be complicated. The GST
tax was meant to limit the use of dynasty trusts.'7  Dynasty trusts allow
families of great wealth to minimize or avoid estate taxes that would be
applied at each generation. Until 1986, a wealthy person could avoid
estate taxes by setting up a succession of life estates.12 Because the es-
tate tax applies only to property transferred at death, and a life estate
ends at death, no tax would apply. For example, 0 could create a trust for
the benefit of his children for their lives, then to the children's children
for their lives, then to the grandchildren's children for their lives, and so
forth limited only by the Rule Against Perpetuities. 173 Gift tax may apply
when 0 first creates the trust, but no estate tax would subsequently ap-
ply. 174
The GST tax intervenes by subjecting these kinds of arrangements
to a tax at each generation.175 Hence, transmission either outright or in
trust directly to a grandchild is subject to the GST tax. However, each
individual has a $5.25 million exemption from GST taxes.177 This, along
with the abolishment or modification of the Rule Against Perpetuities by
most states, still allows for significant wealth to be passed on through the
use of dynasty trusts and thus undermines the policy goal of reducing
wealth concentration.178
164. Id. § 2058.
165. Id. § 2051.
166. More precisely, gifts made after 1976, which are known as "adjusted taxable gifts." Id §
2001(b).
167. Id § 2001.
168. See id. §§ 2010-2016.
169. Id § 2010(c)(3). This is known as the unified credit. Id. § 2010.
170. Id. § 6075(a).
171. See Brian Layman, Comment, Perpetual Dynasty Trusts: One of the Most Powerful Tools
in the Estate Planner's Arsenal, 32 AKRON L. REV. 747, 754-55 (1999).
172. See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, MARTIN B. DICKINSON & WILLIAM J. TURNIER, TAXATION OF
ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 722-24 (22d ed. 2002); JEFFREY N. PENNELL, FEDERAL WEALTH
TRANSFER TAXATION 981-83 (4th ed. 2003).
173. See CAMPFIELD, DICKINSON & TURNIER, supra note 172, at 722.
174. See id.
175. I.R.C. § 2601.
176. Id. §§ 2611-2613.
177. Id. § 2631.
178. See Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. REV.
215, 232 (2011) (noting that Congress made a mistake by depending on the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties when crafting the GST tax exemption); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdic-
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d. Common Estate Planning Techniques
Ever since the inception of wealth transfer taxation, taxpayers and
their planners have found ways to minimize the tax liability. Taxpayers
have to right to avoid, reduce, or minimize their taxes.'7 9 This serves to
further minimize the potential of the estate tax to level down wealth. To
help explain why the estate tax is so porous, I will describe two common
estate planning techniques. These are by no means the most sophisticated
180planning techniques, which can result in more significant tax savings.
The Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust (ILIT) uses a combination of
gift and estate tax rules to avoid estate taxes and provide liquidity to the
grantor's estate. Although the details can vary on the margins, the
planning technique is achieved as follows. The trust is funded with a life
insurance policy on the life of the grantor. The beneficiaries are family
members of the grantor. The trust is irrevocable, so it is considered a
completed gift.18 2 The insurance policy is now controlled by a trustee and
the grantor has no control over it, so it is out of his estate.' 83 Because the
insurance policy has not been paid up, the gift of the policy is not sub-
stantial enough to trigger tax implications.
To pay up the policy, the grantor transfers an amount equal to the
annual exclusion (currently $14,000) each year. These amounts are not
eligible for the exclusion unless they are present interests, which the ben-
eficiary could enjoy right away.1" To meet this requirement the donor
gives each beneficiary a discretionary right to withdraw the amount for a
few days.185 The yearly transfers continue for the life of the donor and
can result in life insurance policies valued at several million dollars.
tional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis ofPerpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J.
356, 359, 362-63 (2005) (finding that roughly $100 billion was moved to take advantage of the
abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities). But see Mary Louise Fellows, Why the Generation-
Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpetual Trusts, 27 CARDOZo L. REv. 2511, 2511 (2006) ("[T]he
GST tax exemption put a 'spark' to the dynastic impulse already present.").
179. See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)
("Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase
one's taxes.").
180. For example, Mitt Romney's estate planning became an issue after his tax returns showed
that he'd gifted his heirs $100 million tax free. He used an Intentionally Defective Grantor Trust
(IDGT). Jesse Drucker, Romney 'I Dig It' Trust Gives Heirs Triple Benefit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27,
2012, 2:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-27/romney-i-dig-it-trust-gives-
heirs-triple-benefit. See generally, Dwight Drake, Transitioning the Family Business, 83 WASH. L.
REV. 123, 127-28 (2008) (describing several advanced estate planning techniques and why they may
be inadvisable for family businesses).
181. See William S. Huff, The Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust, 38 ARK. L. REV. 139, 139-41
(1984).
182. See supra note 130 (defining a completed gift).
183. See I.R.C. § 2042.
184. Fondren v. Comm'r, 324 U.S. 18, 20 (1945).
185. This power has come to be known as a Crummey power after the taxpayer who brought
the case that upheld the technique. Crummey v. Comm'r, 397 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir. 1968).
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When he dies, the value of the policy is not included in his estate because
he did not possess "any of the incidents of ownership." 86
Family limited entities are also commonly used to move wealth
from one generation to another while minimizing estate taxes.'7 This
technique relies on gift and estate tax valuation rules. Although most
families use partnerships, LLCs and Subchapter S corporations can
achieve the same result.'88 The fair market value of an asset for estate
and gift tax purposes is "the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge
of relevant facts."'89 The family limited partnership (FLP) works because
of two factors: (1) parents often want to keep their business in the family
and as such place restrictions on transfer, and (2) an asset with re-
strictions on transfer is not worth as much as one without.190
The FLP is usually formed by a parent who transfers most of her
property to the partnership in exchange for limited partnership interests.
The general partner is often a corporation owned by the individual and
her children. Note that the FLP need not be an actual business; many
FLPs only contain stocks and cash. When the parent transfers these part-
nership interests they have to be discounted to reflect a lack of marketa-
bility and control.'9 ' Thus, for example, assume that the parent had prop-
erty worth $10 million. If she did nothing with this property she would
be liable for tax on the amount over her lifetime exemption, $4.75 mil-
lion. If she instead used an FLP to transfer the property, that $10 million
could perhaps be discounted 35% because the interest has restrictions on
transfer and it cannot be easily sold on the market. The property value
could then be further reduced by another discount of 15% because the
general partner (the corporation owned by the family) controls all the
decisions. Thus, if the interest were to be sold, the buyer would have no
control of the partnership. After these discounts the $10 million property
would be valued at $5.525 million and taxes would only be due on
$275,000.
It may not seem logical to be able to discount an asset by just
changing its form like this, but this technique has been used for over two
decades.192 At first the IRS contended that the separate interests in the
186. 1.R.C. § 2042(2).
187. See, e.g., Drake, supra note 180, at 191.
188. Subchapter C corporations are avoided because they are taxed at the entity level. I.R.C.
§ 11.
189. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965).
190. See Drake, supra note 180, at 191, 199-200.
191. See Courtney Lieb, Comment, The IRS Wages War on the Family Limited Partnership:
How to Establish a Family Limited Partnership That Will Withstand Attack, 71 UMKC L. REV. 887,
893 (2003).
192. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Brier & Joseph B. Darby, 111, Family Limited Partnerships: Decant-
ing Family Investment Assets into New Bottles, 49 TAX LAW. 127, 162-63 (1995).
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FLP should be aggregated for valuation purposes, but it eventually aban-
doned this position.'93 The IRS closely scrutinizes FLPs, but taxpayers
have generally been successful in court.19 4
The ILIT and FLP are just two common examples of the many es-
tate planning techniques that undermine efforts to reduce concentrations
of wealth. While the estate tax only minimally levels down wealth, the
next section will show how the income tax substantially helps the
wealthy build more wealth.
B. Income Tax Subsidies for Asset Building
The use of the federal income tax system to administer asset-
building policies has increased substantially since 1970, but these bene-
fits have not inured to the poor. Several of these tax-based policies, such
as individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and medical savings accounts
are familiar to current employees. Others, like 401(k)s and 403(b)s, are
just as ubiquitous and are named after the tax section that defines them.
Even if some of these are labeled "private," they receive substantial gov-
ernment subsidies and are defined by government enactments.195 The
growth of and reliance on asset accounts as a form of social policy has
been unmatched in recent decades.'9 6 Edward Zelinsky has described this
paradigm shift as "a revolution without a mastermind and without a cata-
clysmic event, but a revolution nonetheless which has, step-by-step,
without fanfare, cumulatively transformed tax and social policy in fun-
damental ways."'97
As has been emphasized since Stanley Surrey's seminal article in
1970,198 the government can provide a benefit in two ways: (1) through
direct expenditures: collecting taxes and then distributing funds; or (2)
tax expenditures: deciding not to collect taxes in the first place.'99 There
may be reasons to prefer one over the other but both are economically
equivalent.2oo Tax expenditures can be seen as hidden social benefits,
though the annual Tax Expenditure Budget, which includes revenue loss-
es attributable to tax expenditures, has made them more visible.2 01 Ac-
cording to one estimate, tax expenditures account for about a quarter of
193. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202.
194. See, e.g., Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 270 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that there




197. ZELINSKY, supra note 12, at xiii.
198. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705, 713-14 (1970).
199. See, e.g., id.
200. Surrey argued that direct expenditures were preferable because they were more equitable
and easier to develop and administer. See id. at 723-24, 728-30.
201. This is required by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(a)(3), 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2011)).
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all social policy spending.202 Of these, over half were directed to asset
building, including "home ownership, retirement accounts, and invest-
ments."203 These three categories track asset accumulation patterns in the
United States. About 70% of U.S. household wealth in 1998 was held in
homes, pension accounts, and business capital.204
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES TO INDIVIDUALS, FISCAL
YEAR 2013205
Type Amount Spent (billions)
Asset Building
Home ownership: mortgage interest, exclusion of $115.3
capital gains, and so on
Retirement accounts: exclusions of pension contri- $117.2
butions, individual retirement accounts, Keoghs,
and so on
Investments and business property: capital gains $158.7
rates and exclusions, exclusion of interest on gov-
ernment bonds, and so on
Total asset-building expenditures to individuals $391.2
Unfortunately, as social development scholars have noted, the shift
toward asset-building policies has been more regressive than social in-
surance and other means-tested income transfer policies.206 There are two
main reasons for this. First, poorer Americans do not have enough assets
to buy into these programs and as such are excluded. Second, because
taxpayers are progressively taxed at higher rates, those who are wealthier
disproportionately benefit from asset building through tax expendi-
207
tures.20 This "upside down" nature of income tax subsidies offers few
benefits for the poor. As such, the current asset-based policies may fur-
ther exacerbate wealth inequality.
202. Sherraden, supra note 10, at 303 (discussing tax expenditures for 1990 and estimated
expenditures for 2000). This includes "education, employment, social services, health care, income
security, housing and nutrition." Id.
203. Id. at 303-04.
204. See Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, From 1983 to 1998, in
ASSETS FOR THE POOR: THE BENEFITS OF SPREADING ASSET OWNERSHIP 34, 44 (Thomas M.
Shapiro & Edward N. Wolff eds., 2001).
205. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2017, at 33-35, 39-40 (Comm. Print 2013). The format of
this table is based on Sherraden, supra note 10, at 303.
206. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 192-93.
207. David Joulfaian & David Richardson, Who Takes Advantage of Tax-Deferred Savings
Programs? Evidence from Federal Income Tax Data, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 669, 687-88 (2001).
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Taken together, the evidence supports the conclusion that a majority
of the tax expenditures go to the upper classes. For example, more than
half of $47 billion mortgage interest deductions in 1998 went to those
with incomes over $100,000.208 Homeowners with incomes of over
$50,000 received 91% of all the homeownership tax expenditures.2 09 The
1998 numbers for retirement tax expenditures are similar.2 10 Of all these
benefits 67% went to households earning more than $100,000 and 93%
to those earning more than $50,000.211
C. The Tax System Reinforces Wealth Disparities
Although there have been vigorous debates about the estate tax and
its effect on concentrations of wealth, in actuality the estate tax has had a
relatively small impact on the distribution of resources. The estimated
estate tax revenue for 2013 is less than $15 billion.2 12 By comparison, the
income tax system will provide almost $400 billion in wealth-building
subsidies, which disproportionately benefit the wealthy.213
By focusing on justice, fairness, and equitable distribution of the tax
burden, Progressives have underscored the symbolic value of income and
wealth taxation. It is important that the tax system be perceived as pro-
gressive. Reuven Avi-Yonah put it succinctly when he stated: "To a large
extent, current U.S. dissatisfaction with the income tax stems from the
perception that it is not progressive enough-that is, that the rich can
avoid paying their 'fair share."'2 14 As such, the Alternative Minimum
Tax and reductions of the top rate can be viewed as unsuccessful at-
215
tempts to get the rich to pay their fair share. Ultimately, a successful
tax system depends on buy-in from citizens. A perception of fairness is
linked to compliance.216
The symbolic nature of progressive taxation can obscure its reali-
217
ties. 2 The tax system itself has not substantially leveled down wealth.
Wealth disparities have persisted and are on the rise.2 18 This gap between
the appearance of fairness and the reality of wealth inequality was ana-
lyzed by Roberto Unger and Cornel West:




2 12. TAX POLICY CENTER, Estate Tax Returns and Liability, supra note 122.
213. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 205.
214. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 20 (2006).
215. Id. at 21.
216. Id
217. See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 919, 991 (1997) (arguing that the debate over progressivity has ignored the possibility that the
poor have positive rights and responsibilities they owe to society).
218. See Graetz, supra note 8, at 271.
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[I]t matters less how fair the raising of revenue is than how much the
government takes if it can use what it takes to help the people who
most need help. The United States has on paper one of the most pro-
gressive tax systems in the industrialized world, and the greatest lev-
els of social and economic inequality. . . . American progressives to-
day prefer to genuflect to progressive pieties than to achieve progres-
sive results.219
A results-based focus would be welcome since it would acknowledge
that, given the history of the United States and the way formal equality
has worked in practice, results matter.
Looking at the estate tax from the perspective of the least wealthy
reveals that it is in many ways a symbolic levy. This symbolism has
some benefits, but it does little to change economic realities. The effec-
tive estate tax rate is currently less than 20%220 and only 0.14% of estates
are taxed.22 ' Meanwhile, the income tax system has provided substantial
benefits to those at the top of the wealth distribution. When the two taxes
are taken together, it follows that the American tax system has at best
reinforced wealth disparities and at worst exacerbated them. If redistribu-
tion is one of the goals of the tax system, an intuitive sense that progres-
sive rates and the estate tax will result in distributive justice does not
suffice. Instead, a more inclusive asset-building tax policy is necessary.
III. TOWARD A MORE INCLUSIVE SYSTEM OF WEALTH BUILDING
THROUGH THE TAx SYSTEM
This Part presents two proposals that would allow the nonwealthy to
benefit from current tax expenditures that disproportionately aid the
wealthy. The first is a revamped estate tax charitable deduction, which
would privilege bequests for wealth-building activities. The second is a
refundable tax credit for asset-building accounts, which would provide
systematic asset account accumulation for the nonwealthy.
A. A Revamped Estate Tax Charitable Deduction
1. The Current Estate Tax Charitable Deduction
As previously discussed, the estate tax includes a deduction for be-
quests made to charity. The original estate statute enacted in 1916 did not
contain this deduction. It was added by the Revenue Act of 1918.222 The
current provision is section 2055,223 which is in some ways similar to the
more familiar section 170 income tax deduction provision, but differs in
219. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER & CORNEL WEST, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
PROGRESSIVISM 61 (1998).
220. See TAX POLICY CENTER, Gross and Net Estate Tax, supra note 124.
221. See TAX POLICY CENTER, Estate Tax Returns and Liability, supra note 122.
222. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a)(1 1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1068.
223. I.R.C. § 2055 (2012).
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others. The income tax charitable deduction is limited based on the do-
nor's income, the nature of the donee organization, and the asset donat-
ed.224 It is possible for a contribution to qualify for one deduction and not
the other.225 More importantly, the estate tax deduction is unlimited in
the sense that it is not subject to the percentage limitations applicable to
the income tax deduction.226 As such, no estate tax is due if the entirety
of the estate is left to qualifying charitable organizations.
Section 2055 assumes that charitable organizations perform services
that are beneficial to the nation and would otherwise have to be paid out
of tax revenues. Only organizations that are enumerated in section 2055
are eligible for the deduction. Thus, a bequest to a poor or indigent indi-
vidual will not qualify.227 Also, the deduction is not assured merely be-
cause a portion of the decedent's wealth reaches a qualified organization.
It must get there by way of bequest, legacy devise, or transfer dece-
dent.228 The five general classes of recipients to which deductible be-
quests can be made are: (1) the U.S. government, the states, and political
subdivisions;229 (2) corporations "organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes";2 30 (3)
trusts and certain fraternal organizations as long as the money is used
exclusively for charitable and related purposes;231 (4) veterans' organiza-
tions; 232 and (5) employee Stock Ownership Plans under certain limited
circumstances.233
Some wealthy decedents prefer to leave their wealth to fund private
foundations. In the most basic terms, a private foundation is a charitable
organization that is funded primarily by a single donor or a small number
of major donors.234 While the income tax deduction for private donations
to private foundations is limited to 30% of adjusted gross income, it is
224. See id § 170(b).
225. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. United States, 681 F.2d 534, 539-40 (8th Cir.
1982) (holding that a bequest to a cemetery association is not deductible for purposes of § 2055
despite being eligible for a § 170 deduction).
226. Compare I.R.C. § 2055 with id. § 170(b). Pursuant to § 170, contributions to charitable
organizations may be deducted up to 50 percent of adjusted gross income. Contributions to certain
private foundations, veterans organizations, fraternal societies, and cemetery organizations are
limited to 30 percent adjusted gross income. Section 2055 does not contain such percentage limita-
tions.
227. Compare I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-30-008 (Apr. 22, 1996) (allowing a deductible bequest
to fund college scholarships for graduates of one high school), with I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-31-
004 (Apr. 30, 1996) (establishing a nondeductible bequest to provide scholarships for students with a
particular family name who attend one of two universities where only 603 families had such a
name).
228. For example, if the executor had discretion to give the property to a private person, no
charitable deduction is allowed even though the property passes to charity. Estate of Marine v.
Comm'r, 990 F.2d 136, 139-40 (4th Cir. 1993).
229. I.R.C. § 2055(a)(1).
230. Id. § 2055(a)(2).
231. Id. § 2055(a)(3).
232. Id. § 2055(a)(4).
233. Id. § 2055(a)(5).




unlimited for estate tax purposes subject to some limitations. These
foundations allow wealthy donors to immortalize their names, while con-
tinuing to make donations to a variety of organizations for many years
after death.236 The Rockefeller, Ford, Carnegie, and more recently, Gates
Foundations are all emblematic.
2. An Asset-Building Estate Tax Charitable Deduction
Several policy rationales have been offered for the charitable deduc-
237tion. For example, Miranda Perry Fleischer's exploration of the nor-
mative bases for the estate tax charitable deduction found that "while the
case for . .. [the] deduction is strong, the case for an unlimited deduction
is weak."238 According to Fleischer, "bequests to family-controlled chari-
ties allow a decedent to pass on economic or political power" because
the family can make decisions about which grants to award.239 A perfect
example of this was the power wielded by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. as the
president and later chairman of the Rockefeller Foundation.240 For this
reason, Fleischer argues that deductibility rules should depend on the
type of recipient organization because the proper treatment of a bequest
should depend on whether it benefits the wealthy or nonwealthy.24 1
One does not have to accept Fleischer's argument to reach the con-
clusion that the estate tax charitable deduction should be limited. Even if
the deduction is just instrumental, it should only be allowed to the extent
that it furthers federal government policy. Because the state tax is ex-
plicitly focused on wealth and providing equality of opportunity, I argue
that the charitable deduction should be more sensitive to the destination
of bequests. I propose that the current deduction be capped at 50%. This
would still allow a variety of charities to benefit from private funds. The
235. Id. § 4942(a); see id §§ 4940-4946 (taxing private foundations additionally if they do not
distribute income, have excessive business holdings, make investments that jeopardize their purpose,
etc.).
236. Donald Fisher, The Role of Philanthropic Foundations in the Reproduction and Produc-
tion of Hegemony: Rockefeller Foundations and the Social Sciences, 17 SOCIOLOGY 206, 223-24
(1983). For example, the Ford Foundation was established in 1936. In 2011 it reported a $10 billion
endowment and approved $413 million in grants. FORD FOUND., FINANCIAL STATEMENTS:
SEPTEMBER 30, 2011 AND 2010, at 3 (2011), available at
http://www.fordfoundation.org/pdfs/about/FFFYFinancialStatements_2011 .pdf.
237. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309, 360-62 (1972) (offering a base-defining rationale); Boris 1. Bittker, Charitable Contribu-
tions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37, 60 (1972) ("[S]omething can be
said for rewarding activities which in a certain sense are selfless, even if the reward serves no incen-
tive function."); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1393, 1394 (1988) (offering a social goods rationale); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 387, 411 (1998) (arguing that the deduction's "ongoing" nature also enhances decision
making).
238. Fleischer, supra note 120, at 268-69.
239. Id at 285-86.
240. Chelsea Clinton is now the Vice Chair of the Clinton Foundation and will likely carry on
her parents' work upon their death. About, Chelsea Clinton, CLINTON FOUND.,
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/about/chelsea-clinton (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).
241. Fleischer, supra note 129, at 297.
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estate tax deduction should only be unlimited or uncapped if the bequest
is targeted to help the nonwealthy build wealth.
As I have argued above, asset building for the poor is central to the
enterprise of lessening wealth disparities. The charitable deduction is a
good place for the federal government to incorporate asset building into
the estate tax. The unlimited deduction represents potential asset-
building funds that the government foregoes. While it may be desirable
for the government to encourage giving to a variety of organizations,
because of the importance of assets, it should tie the benefit of the deduc-
tion to the furtherance of wealth building.
Because deductions are privileges, the burden would be on the es-
tate to show that the bequest indeed furthers wealth-building activities.
This is by no means far-fetched, since many organizations already sup-
port wealth-building efforts.2 42 The charity would not have to solely sup-
port wealth building. Rather, the bequest could be worded to earmark the
money for those purposes.
Of course, there would be definitional and administrative problems,
but I do not believe that these are any worse than those that already exist.
The federal government could determine which activities promote wealth
from a varied menu of policies already in place. This could be done by
using a multi-factor test. For example, the bequest would qualify if it
supported activities that furthered either: (1) the purchase of a home; (2)
the payment of healthcare expenses; (3) the payment of educational ex-
penses; or (4) retirement savings for those below an income threshold of
$50,000. This is by no means an exclusive list, but it represents a good
start. In addition taxpayers would also be able to apply for private letter
rulings. As such, risk-averse taxpayers could ensure that their bequest
would qualify for the unlimited deduction.
There is also the possibility that this could lead to the difficult and
perhaps undesirable task of ranking charities. I do not believe that this
should defeat the proposal, however. I am only proposing one distinc-
tion: bequests that further wealth building among the nonwealthy and
bequests that do not. I think this is justifiable because the estate tax is
focused on wealth redistribution and equality of opportunity.243 This
would bring the tax closer to redistributing in a meaningful way.
Finally, as previously noted the income tax deduction is already
limited in several ways.244 As such, it would not be unprecedented to
make this change. Much of the early research and development of asset-
242. For example, by 2001, "[e]leven private foundations were funding research on individual
development accounts at thirteen community programs around the country." Sherraden, supra note
10, at 312.
243. See supra Part IL A. I.
244. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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building accounts for the poor has been funded by private foundations.245
Limiting the estate tax deduction in some ways should serve to further
nudge individual bequests in this socially desirable way.
B. Income Tax Credits for the Nonwealthy
The federal income tax currently includes a limited credit for the
low-income taxpayers who contribute to their retirement savings. This
section explains the details of this credit and argues for a more robust
asset-building credit.
1. The Current Retirement Savings Contribution Tax Credit
The Code includes a tax credit for low-income individuals who save
246for retirement. Also known as the Saver's Credit, this federal tax pro-
vision provides a credit of 10 to 50% of savings, depending on overall
247income and filing status. The credit is limited by a taxpayer's adjusted
gross income, adjusted for inflation.24 8 The income limits for 2013 are:
(1) $28,750 for a single taxpayer; (2) $43,125 for a head of household;
and (3) $57,500 for married taxpayers filing jointly. 249 The maximum
credit is $2,000 for unmarried filers and $4,000 for married filers.250
Although this credit does promote asset building by the nonwealthy,
it suffers from three obvious limitations. First, it only applies to retire-
ment contributions. While these are important, they are just one aspect of
asset building. The poor often cannot save for retirement because they
have to prioritize other, more immediate, savings needs.251 Thus, it is
unfortunate that if the nonwealthy taxpayer would like to save for a
home, a business, or an education, the credit does not apply. Second, the
credit is nonrefundable.2 52 As such, any individual with zero tax liability
receives no assistance because there is no liability to offset the credit.
This means that the poorest taxpayers, who are most in need of asset-
building assistance do not benefit. Finally, and related to the second limi-
tation, the credit includes no carryover provision. Thus, any unused por-
tion of the credit is lost.
245. Michael Sherraden, From Research to Policy: Lessons from Individual Development
Accounts, 34 J. CONSUMER AFF. 159, 164 (2000).
246. I.R.C. § 25B (2012).
247. Id The credit was made permanent by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-280, § 812, 120 Stat. 780.
248. I.R.C. § 25B.
249. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 8880 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
prior/f8880--2012.pdf.
250. I.R.C. § 25B(a).
251. See Shobe & Page-Adams, supra note 46, at 119.
252. PUBLICATION 590-A CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS
(IRAS), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., at 48 (2015).
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2. A Refundable Credit for Asset Building
Because of the disparity between tax expenditures for the wealthy
and nonwealthy, I propose expanding the coverage of the current Saver's
Credit. The credit would be refundable and would reward contributions
to any kind of asset-building account.253 Because the tax system's pro-
gressivity prevents low-income participants from benefiting from the
panoply of tax-favored accounts, these credits should continue to be
means tested. As is the case with the current Saver's Credit, the taxpayer
would have to file a tax return to show she qualifies. Unlike the current
nonrefundable Saver's Credit, however, the IRS would deposit the re-
fundable funds directly into a designated asset-building account. Because
the Saver's Credit infrastructure is already in place, this new credit
should not be as difficult to get off the ground.
Some would object that this proposal would be too costly, but it
would bring some much-needed equity to the tax system. As I have pre-
viously shown, the federal government expends substantial resources on
asset-building accounts for those with higher incomes.2 54 My proposal
only asks for government expenditures for those with low incomes. Of
course, the new credit would suffer from the same potential for error and
abuse that could plague other refundable credits, such as the EITC.255
This is no different than several other popular government programs like
Medicare and Medicaid.256 The most likely cause of the high error rate of
EITC payments is the complexity of the credit itself.2 57 This does not
make the EITC any less valuable to low-income citizens. Instead, it
points to some much-needed simplification of the rules.
Finally, there is also the potential that the credit for asset-building
accounts could become "raced" and be seen as another form of wel-
fare.258 While this is a danger, I am optimistic because of the wide, bipar-
tisan support that asset-building accounts have garnered. They have been
packaged as a more sustainable way of allowing individuals to improve
their economic position in the long term.
253. Edward Zelinsky has recommended that the credit be expanded to reward contributions to
HSAs, educational savings accounts and Section 529 programs. ZELINSKY, supra note 12, at 159-
61. 1 use the more general term "asset-building accounts" to include these as well as IDAs and
CDAs.
254. See supra Part II.B.
255. Lipman, supra note 11, at 465-67 (analyzing diminishing EITC benefits for the working
poor and showing the significant costs that tax practitioners exact for their services).
256. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMPROPER PAYMENTS: INSPECTOR GENERAL
REPORTING OF AGENCY COMPLIANCE UNDER THE IMPROPER PAYMENTS ELIMINATION AND
RECOVERY ACT 13 (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667332.pdf
257. Id. at 8.




I began by discussing the importance of wealth in our society and
presenting the problem of wealth inequality and disparities. A close in-
spection of the estate tax, the primary federal policy addressing wealth,
revealed that the estate tax has only reduced wealth concentration mini-
mally. Further, although research has revealed that asset building is of
vital importance for the poor, I demonstrated that the income tax system
has largely targeted its asset-building efforts toward the wealthy. As
such, our tax system has served to reinforce existing wealth disparities
rather than help poorer people build wealth.
Next, I presented two ways in which the government could promote
asset building in a more inclusive way. I noted that currently the gov-
ernment spends substantial funds building assets for those with higher
incomes and greater wealth. The federal government has done much less
to help the poor and nonwealthy acquire assets. The nation's focus on
income support, consumption support, and work incentives can and has
helped families to manage in the short term, but it has done little to im-
prove long-term financial stability and reduce wealth inequality. By pro-
posing a revamped estate tax charitable deduction and tax credits for
asset-building accounts, I argue that we could engage the tax system in
remedying wealth disparities.
Of course, wealth inequality is a difficult problem, and tax policies
alone will not suffice. Income support policies are still needed, as well as
debt reduction policies, and more robust support for healthcare expenses.
However, a continuation of our schizophrenic wealth tax policy will only
undermine those efforts. Whether it is because of market inefficiencies,
plutocratic concerns,2 59 or the increased possibility for social unrest, de-
creasing wealth disparities remains an important policy goal.
259. See generally LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE NEW GILDED AGE (2008).
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A FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
REMAND IN IMMIGRATION LAW
COLLIN SCHUELERt
ABSTRACT
This Article breaks new ground at the intersection of administrative
law and immigration law. One of the more important questions in both
fields is whether a reviewing court should resolve a legal issue in the first
instance or remand that issue to the agency. This Article advances the
novel claim that courts should use the modem framework for judicial
review of agency statutory interpretations to inform their resolution of
this remand question. Then, using this framework, the Article identifies
when remand is and is not appropriate in immigration cases. This critical
analysis, which urges a departure from conventional academic wisdom,
has significant implications for the larger theoretical debate over formal-
ism and functionalism in administrative law.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative law students and scholars have long wrestled with
the complex subject of judicial review of agency statutory interpreta-
tions.' This topic reached a turning point in 2001. At that time, the Su-
preme Court explained when an agency's interpretation of a statutory
provision is entitled to Chevron deference and when it is given Skidmore
deference.2 Since then, there is a step-by-step framework that reviewing
courts should use to determine how much deference to give to an agen-
*3cy's statutory interpretation.
1. See, e.g., Michael P. Healy, Reconciling Chevron, Mead, and the Review of Agency Dis-
cretion: Source of Law and the Standards of Judicial Review, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 1 (2011)
("[T]here have been longstanding questions about the application of the standards for reviewing
administrative action."); Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The
Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 3 (2013) (acknowledging the "decades of
prodigious . . . scholarship on judicial review of agency legal interpretations"); John G. Osborn,
Legal Philosophy and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
115, 118 (1999) (acknowledging "the great bulk of. . . scholarship relating to Chevron and judicial
review of agency statutory interpretation"); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution
Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Inter-
pretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 529 (2006) ("Administrative law scholarship is obsessed with
the appropriate scope of judicial review of agency decisions."); Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" is Too
Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143,
1144 (2012) ("Administrative law scholars have leveled a forest of trees exploring the mysteries of
the Chevron approach contemporary judges take to reviewing law-related aspects of administrative
action.").
2. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001).
3. See Healy, supra note 1, at 33 (discussing the framework for judicial review of agency
legal interpretations and ultimately "present[ing] a step-by-step approach to the review of agency
applications of law"); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skid-
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While courts have repeatedly applied this framework when review-
ing agency decisions, this Article argues that the framework also plays an
important, albeit unappreciated, secondary role in immigration law. Over
the past decade, the Supreme Court has decided a series of immigration
cases and, in doing so, articulated and applied what has become known
as the "ordinary remand rule."4 This Article analyzes the modem Court's
remand jurisprudence and uncovers a significant lesson: If a case turns
on the meaning of a statutory provision the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (BIA) either has not yet interpreted or has interpreted erroneously,
the reviewing court should use the framework for judicial review to de-
cide whether to answer the interpretive question in the first instance or
remand the issue to the agency. To be sure, the Court has not explicitly
referred to the framework for judicial review when deciding whether to
remand an unsettled interpretive issue to the BIA. Nevertheless, a close
look at the Court's opinions-especially its most recent decision in Ne-
gusie v. Holder5-shows that the framework helps us understand when
such a remand is appropriate.
After analyzing how the framework for judicial review plays a key
role in the remand context, this Article considers when a reviewing court
should and should not remand an unsettled interpretive issue to the BIA.
The Supreme Court has already identified one situation in which a re-
viewing court should ordinarily remand an unsettled interpretive issue to
the BIA: when, pursuant to the framework for judicial review, the court
determines that the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous and Con-
gress delegated power to the BIA to interpret that provision.6 In other
words, a remand is proper when the BIA's interpretation will be entitled
to Chevron deference on review.7 That said, the Court has not decided
whether a remand is proper outside this context.
This Article, therefore, picks up where the Supreme Court left off.
The Article examines whether a reviewing court should remand an unset-
tled interpretive issue to the BIA when the agency's interpretation will
not be entitled to Chevron deference on review-either because (1) the
relevant statutory provision is unambiguous or (2) the relevant statutory
provision is ambiguous, but Congress did not delegate power to the BIA
to interpret that provision. The goal of this exercise is to define the prop-
er balance of power between courts and the BIA when it comes to resolv-
ing outstanding statutory interpretation questions. Ultimately, the Article
argues that, if a reviewing court faces an unsettled interpretive issue and
more Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1246 (2007) (discussing "[t]he [d]eference [f]ramework"
and recognizing that, in light of Mead, "the current regime for judicial review of agency legal inter-
pretations includes both Chevron and Skidmore as separate standards of review").
4. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 524 (2009); Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 185
(2006) (per curiam); INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 18 (2002) (per curiam).
5. 555 U.S. at 516-17.
6. See infra Part II.C.(discussing Negusie).
7. This, of course, is provided the BIA actually exercises its delegated power.
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it determines that the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous, the court
should remand the matter to the BIA whether or not Congress delegated
lawmaking power to the agency. In other words, a remand is proper if the
BIA's interpretation will be entitled to either Chevron or Skidmore defer-
ence on review. This conclusion has significant implications for the larg-
er theoretical debate over formalism and functionalism in administrative
law.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Since this Article argues that the
framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations plays a
critical role in the remand context, Part I takes a step back and articulates
the framework and its underlying principles. Part II then examines the
Supreme Court's line of immigration decisions regarding the ordinary
remand rule, highlighting the important but understated role that the
framework for judicial review plays in a court's remand decision. Part III
then goes beyond the Court's case law and, using the framework for ju-
dicial review, identifies the circumstances under which reviewing courts
should and should not remand unsettled interpretive issues to the BIA. In
light of this analysis, Part IV outlines the proper balance of power be-
tween courts and the BIA when it comes to resolving outstanding statuto-
ry interpretation questions. This outline shows that formalist justifica-
tions for administrative remands are overstated-indeed, functionalist
justifications alone may warrant a remand. In the end, this Article helps
define the modem relationship between courts and the BIA.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS
This Article argues that the framework for judicial review of agency
statutory interpretations plays an important role in immigration law as
reviewing courts decide whether to remand unresolved interpretive issues
to the BIA. This Part lays a foundation for that discussion by briefly re-
viewing Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,8 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.,9 and United States v. Mead Corp. 0-the
three landmark Supreme Court cases that "function collectively as parts
of [the] comprehensive framework for judicial review of administrative
interpretations."" After examining these cases, including the principles
underlying each decision, this Part articulates the resulting framework
courts should apply when reviewing agency statutory interpretations.12
8. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
9. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
11. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1239.
12. See also Healy, supra note 1, at 33-50 (providing a clear "step-by-step approach to the
review of agency applications of law"); Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1239, 1246-50 (dis-
cussing "the analytical framework for judicial review of administrative interpretations" that now
applies in light of Skidmore, Chevron, and Mead).
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A. The Seminal Cases
1. Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
The first case that is usually associated with judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations is Skidmore.'3 There, the interpretive
issue was whether employee waiting time constituted "working time"
under the overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.1 4 The
Administrator of the relevant agency had "set forth his views of the ap-
plication of the Act under different circumstances in an interpretive bul-
letin and in informal rulings."'5 The trial court, however, did not consider
the Administrator's views in resolving the case and held as a matter of
law that waiting time did not constitute working time. 16
Although the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial
court,17 the Supreme Court reversed.'8 In a methodical decision, the
Court first noted that the statute was ambiguous because it did not clearly
bar waiting time from constituting working time.19 The Court then said
that Congress did not delegate lawmaking power to the agency "to de-
termine in the first instance whether particular cases fall within or with-
out the Act."2 0 Rather, Congress "put this responsibility on the courts."2
Nevertheless, the Court recognized that Congress created the Adminis-
trator's position and that the Administrator had gained "considerable
experience in the problems of ascertaining working time in employments
involving periods of inactivity and a knowledge of the customs prevail-
ing in reference to their solution."22 Thus, the Court said:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts
by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validi-
ty of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lack-
ing power to control.23
13. See Healy, supra note 1, at 4. This is true even though "[t]he case involved private litiga-
tion to enforce a federal statute, not the review of agency action as such." Strauss, supra note 1, at
1167.
14. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136 (1944).
15. Id. at 138.
16. Id. at 136, 140.
17. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 136 F.2d 112, 113 (5th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
18. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
19. See id. at 136-37 (citing Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944)).
20. Id. at 137.
21. Id. (citing Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 523 (1942)).
22. Id. at 137-38.
23. Id. at 140.
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In the end, the Court remanded the case to the trial court so it could
properly consider the Administrator's views.24
Ultimately, Skidmore makes it clear that when a statute is ambigu-
ous and Congress has not delegated lawmaking power to an agency to
interpret the statute, "a court must decide how the statute applies to the
uncertain circumstance."2 5 Nevertheless, in making this determination,
the court may consider "the interpretation adopted by the agency that
administers the statute."26 This is "not because the agency's interpreta-
tion is formally binding." 27 Instead, the court may consider the agency's
interpretation for functional reasons-that is, the agency's experience
and expertise "may be useful by providing 'guidance,' as the court itself
decides what the statute means when applying the statute in a particular
case."28
2. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
For almost four decades, Skidmore represented the Supreme Court's
leading statement on judicial review of agency statutory interpretations.2 9
Then, in 1984, the Court issued its landmark opinion in Chevron, estab-
lishing a two-step approach for courts to use when reviewing agency
decisions.30 The Court famously said:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, al-
ways, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give ef-
fect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construc-
tion on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an admin-
istrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
24. Id.
25. Healy, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing Skidmore).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140); see also Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present and
Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form and Function in Judicial Review ofAgency Interpretations
of Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REv. 633, 691 (2014) ("Skidmore review retains functionalism, be-
cause it accounts for the agency's experience and expertise in its consideration of the agency's
reasons for its interpretation. The agency's reasons for the interpretation, if they are persuasive
because they are grounded in expertise and experience, may provide strong support for the interpre-
tation and would accordingly be persuasive to a court ..... (footnote omitted)).
29. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1236 ("For forty years, the Supreme Court's
opinion in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. enjoyed prominence as perhaps the Supreme Court's best expres-
sion of its policy of judicial deference toward many if not most agency interpretations of law."
(footnote omitted)); id. at 1239 ("[F]or forty years before Chevron was decided, the Supreme Court's
opinion in Skidmore v. Swilt & Co. was a leading expression of the Court's policy toward judicial
review of most other administrative interpretations." (footnote omitted)).
30. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.3 '
The Court then elaborated on these two steps and in doing so, "estab-
lished the foundations for the modern understanding of judicial review of
agency legal interpretations."32
The Court explained that at step one the reviewing court must de-
cide whether Congress clearly resolved the relevant interpretive issue.33
The court makes this decision by "employing traditional tools of statuto-
ry construction,"34 including a consideration of the statute's text35 and
legislative history.36 If the court "ascertains that Congress had an inten-
tion on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be
given effect."37 But if the court decides that Congress did not clearly
resolve the relevant interpretive issue, then the court must proceed to the
second step.
The Court explained that at step two a reviewing court must defer to
the agency's statutory interpretation.39 The Court articulated both formal-
ist and functionalist justifications for according deference to agencies. 0
Most significantly, the Court espoused the formalist view that Congress
implicitly delegates interpretive power to an agency when it adopts an
ambiguous statute.4 In other words, as the Court later put it, reviewing
courts should defer to agencies at step two "because of a presumption
that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementa-
tion by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first
and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows."4 2
31. Id (footnotes omitted).
32. Healy, supra note 1, at 15.
33. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (noting that "[t]he judiciary is the final authority on
issues of statutory construction").
34. Id
35. See id. at 859-62 (reviewing the text of the Clean Air Act).
36. See id. at 862-64 (examining the Clean Air Act's legislative history).
37. Id. at 843 n.9.
38. See id. at 843.
39. See id. at 843-44.
40. See id. at 843-44, 865-66.
41. Id. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regu-
lation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particu-
lar question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own con-
struction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency." (footnote omitted)).
42. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 843-44); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) ("Def-
erence under Chevron to an agency's construction of a statute that it administers is premised on the
theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to
fill in the statutory gaps.").
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Although the Court's decision to defer to the agency was based al-
most exclusively on its formalist notion that Congress implicitly delegat-
ed interpretive authority to the agency when it adopted an ambiguous
statute,43 the Court also briefly suggested that it should defer for a func-
tionalist reason: the agency had experience and expertise in resolving
issues within its sphere of authority." In short, as one scholar put it,
"[T]he Court suggested that Chevron deference is motivated by the same
motivations that animated Skidmore deference: agency experience and
,,45
expertise.
In the end, the Court said that when an agency is entitled to defer-
ence at step two, a reviewing court "may not substitute its own construc-
tion of a statutory provision."46 Rather, the court must decide if the agen-
cy's interpretation "is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute."47 This means the court must uphold the agency's interpretation of
the relevant statutory provision as long as it is reasonable.4 8
Ultimately, Chevron is famous for its two-step approach to judicial
review of agency statutory interpretations.49 However, much attention
43. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
44. See id. at 865. Indeed, in saying that the agency's interpretation was "entitled to defer-
ence," the Court noted that "the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered
the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting
policies." Id. (footnotes omitted). The Court then said Congress may have intentionally wanted the
agency to interpret the relevant statutory provision, "thinking that those with great expertise and
charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so."
Id.
45. Healy, supra note 1, at 17-18; see also Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1271, 1286-87 (2008) ("In Chevron, the ... Court marshaled ... expertise-based arguments in
support of flexible agency administration."); Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign
Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 100-01 (2009) (claiming that "[f]unctionalism lies at the
heart of Chevron" because the Court considered "functional, institutional competence justifications"
including "agency expertise"); Leading Cases, Preemption ofState Law Enforcement, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 322, 330 (2009) (arguing that "Chevron rests on . . . functional arguments," including the
notion "that agencies possess the necessary expertise to carry out congressional orders").
46. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see also id at 843 n. II ("The court need not conclude that the
agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction,
or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial
proceeding.").
47. Id. at 843.
48. See id at 844 (stating that, at the second step, a reviewing court must not disturb "a rea-
sonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency"); see also Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No.
89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89 (2007) ("[I]f the language of the statute is open or ambigu-
ous-that is, if Congress left a 'gap' for the agency to fill-then we must uphold the Secretary's
interpretation as long as it is reasonable.") (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
49. See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, PAUL M. VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.4, at 399 (5th ed. 2009) ("The Court has applied the Chev-
ron two-step in over one hundred cases decided since 1984, and circuit courts have applied it in
thousands of cases."); Healy, supra note 1, at 15 ("The decision is most famous for defining the two-
step approach for reviewing agency legal determinations." (foomote omitted)); Hickman & Krueger,
supra note 3, at 1241 ("The Chevron decision is best known for articulating the Court's two-part test
for evaluating agency interpretations of law. . . ."); Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The
Making of an Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398, 415 (Peter L. Strauss
ed. 2006) ("Chevron is most famous . . . [for] the 'two-step' approach to review questions of law ...
."); Niki R. Ford, Article, Easy on the MAYO Please: Why Judicial Deference Should Not Be Ex-
tended to Regulations that Violate the Administrative Procedure Act, 50 DUQ. L. REv. 799, 820
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has also been paid to the Court's formalist view that Congress implicitly
delegates interpretive power to an agency when it enacts an ambiguous
statute.o One pair of scholars has even argued that the "application of
compulsory judicial deference to so-called implicit delegations, more
than the two-part test, is what made Chevron revolutionary."5 ' Unfortu-
nately, as these scholars also point out, "Chevron did not make clear
when exactly courts should presume that Congress delegated interpretive
authority to the agency, or concomitantly, when Chevron's framework of
controlling deference was appropriate."52 The Supreme Court attempted
to answer these questions seventeen years later in Mead," the third and
final case to help shape the modem framework for judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations.54
3. United States v. Mead Corp.
Mead determined when an agency's interpretation of a statutory
provision is entitled to Chevron deference and when it is given Skidmore
deference.55 In making this determination, the Court expressed the for-
malist view that Congress defines the amount of deference reviewing
courts owe to an agency's statutory interpretation.56 With this in mind,
(2012) ("The upshot of Chevron is the famous two-part inquiry now ingrained in administrative law
50. See, e.g., Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron's Domain: Agency Interpretations ofStatu-
tory Procedural Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541, 563 (2007) ("Chevron broadened the scope
of mandatory deference from express delegations of interpretive authority to include instances of
'implied delegation' when Congress is silent or leaves language ambiguous in a statute that an agen-
cy is charged with administering. In Chevron, the Court announced that such statutory gaps and
ambiguities are implied delegations requiring deference." (footnote omitted)); Criddle, supra note
45, at 1284 ("Arguably the leading rationale for Chevron deference is the presumption that Congress
delegates interpretive authority to administrative agencies when it commits regulatory statutes to
agency administration."); Healy, supra note 1, at 16 ("The Court's motivation for granting deference
to agencies came from the Court's view that statutory ambiguity means that Congress has delegated
interpretive authority to agencies and not courts." (footnote omitted)).
51. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1242; see also Kristen E. Hickman, The Need for
Mead: Refecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1548 (2006)
[hereinafter Hickman, Need for Mead] ("The more revolutionary . . . aspect of Chevron is its call for
strong, mandatory deference not only where Congress specifically mandates regulations, but also
where Congress implicitly delegates rulemaking authority through the combination of statutory
ambiguity and administrative responsibility.. . . This extension of strong judicial deference from
explicit to so-called implicit delegations represents a transfer of interpretive power from the judicial
branch to administrative agencies. This, more than the two-part test, is the heart of the Chevron
doctrine." (footnote omitted)); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation
and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 203 (1992) ("If Chevron is a revolu-
tionary case, what makes it so is its apparent hospitality to implied delegations generally, and dele-
gations by ambiguity in particular.").
52. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1242-43.
53. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-38 (2001).
54. See Healy, supra note 1, at 18 (recognizing that Mead assists in "defining the modem
approach to judicial review of agency legal and discretionary determinations").
55. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35.
56. See id. ("We agree that a tariff classification has no claim to judicial deference under
Chevron, there being no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law, but
we hold that under Skidmore the ruling is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness."
(citation omitted)); see also Healy, supra note 1, at 18 ("[T]he Court reiterated its consistent view
that Congress has the authority to define the degree of deference owed to an agency decision."); id.
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the Court held "that administrative implementation of a particular statu-
tory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Con-
gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."57
The Court then elaborated on these elements, saying that a review-
ing court can generally assume Congress expects an agency to act with
the force of law when it permits the agency to engage in formal adjudica-
tions, notice-and-comment rulemaking, or where there is some other
indication that Congress intended to delegate lawmaking power to the
agency.58 The Court also recognized those agency determinations that
"are beyond the Chevron pale,"59 such as "interpretations contained in
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines."6 0 The
Court applied these principles to the facts of the case and decided that the
agency interpretation at issue should not be afforded Chevron defer-
ence.
Nevertheless, the Court held that the agency interpretation was enti-
tled to Skidmore deference.62 The Court explained that, as a functional
matter, "Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that an
agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form,
given the 'specialized experience and broader investigations and infor-
mation' available to the agency."63 Since the lower courts had not given
any deference to the relevant agency interpretation,6 the Court remanded
the case so that those courts could make a "Skidmore assessment."6 5
In short, Mead was principally a formalist, separation-of-powers-
driven decision.66 Indeed, the Court established that if Congress delegat-
ed lawmaking authority to the agency, and the agency interpreted the
at 21 ("Mead reinforced the principle that Congress determines the degree of deference courts owe
to agency legal interpretations.").
57. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
58. See id. at 227, 229-30.
59. Id. at 234.
60. See id (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
61. Id. at 231 ("There are ... ample reasons to deny Chevron deference here. The authoriza-
tion for classification rulings, and Customs's practice in making them, present a case far removed
not only from notice-and-comment process, but from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting
that Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them
here.").
62. See id at 234-35.
63. Id. at 234 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).
64. See id. at 225-26.
65. Id. at 238-39.
66. See, e.g., Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg, In Re Annandale and the Disconnections Between
Minnesota and Federal Agency Deference Doctrine, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1375, 1395 (2008)
(arguing that Chevron and Mead are "about judicial respect for the intent of Congress-in a phrase,
separation of powers"); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies,
120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1061-62 (2011) ("A conventional defense of [the Mead] holding ... is ground-
ed in ideas about the proper functioning of the branches of government.").
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relevant provision in an exercise of that authority, then the reviewing
court should give Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation.67 if,
however, Congress did not delegate lawmaking authority to the agency,
or the agency's interpretation was not made in an exercise of its delegat-
ed authority, then the reviewing court should independently interpret the
statutory provision.18 That said, in the latter situation, the reviewing court
should give Skidmore deference to the agency's interpretation because,
as a functional matter, the agency's interpretation may be rooted in its
experience and expertise.69 In the end, since "[t]he Mead analysis deter-
mines whether the Chevron regime or the Skidmore regime applies to
review of [an] agency decision,"70 the analysis serves as the heart of what
scholars now call "the analytical framework for judicial review of admin-
istrative interpretations."71
B. The Framework for Judicial Review
When reviewing an agency's statutory interpretation, a court should
first decide, pursuant to Chevron step one, "whether Congress has direct-
ly spoken to the precise question at issue."72 The court makes this deci-
67. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. In other words, as Professor Healy has explained:
Mead established . . . that there are two requirements for an agency to be seen as the
source of lawmaking power: Congress must have delegated lawmaking power to the
agency and the agency must actually have exercised that delegated lawmaking power.
The agency must have been able to make law and must have intended to make law.
Healy, supra note 1, at 40 (footnote omitted). He then recognized that, if these two requirements are
met, "the court accords Chevron step-two deference to the agency legal determination." Id. at 42.
68. See Healy, supra note 1, at 19-21. Professor Healy has said that, pursuant to Mead,
"[a]gency-defined law is not present if either the agency lacked the delegated authority to make
decisions with the force of law or the agency did not exercise its delegated lawmaking power." Id. at
19 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27). Professor Healy then pointed out that, in this situation, "the
court interprets the statute giving appropriate deference, under the circumstances, to the agency's
interpretation, but deciding for itself the meaning of the statute." Id. at 21; see also John W. Guen-
delsberger, Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions in Removal Proceedings in Light of INS v.
Ventura, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 605, 619 (2004) (stating that if Mead's two "requirements are not
met, Chevron deference is inapplicable, but Mead requires that the court, nonetheless, apply 'some
deference' to the agency's judgment as to the meaning of the law, according to its persuasiveness.")
(quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 234, in turn citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).
69. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
70. Healy, supra note 1, at 42 n.265; see also Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1247
("Mead ... articulates its own two-part inquiry for discerning which of these two standards of re-
view applies in any given case .... ); Magill & Vermeule, supra note 66, at 1061-62 ("Mead estab-
lishes the conditions under which an agency will be eligible for Chevron deference. . . . [The case]
creates two regimes, one where Chevron does not apply and one where it does . . . ."); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 807, 812 (2002) ("Mead ... emphatically reaffirms that the choice is not between Chevron or
no deference. If Chevron does not apply, courts nevertheless may be required to defer to agency
interpretations under Skidmore, which applies when the agency has some special claim to expertise
under the statute, but its interpretation is not legally binding."); Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary
Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1571
n.81 (2014) ("The Court's decision in United States v. Mead Corp. confirmed that Skidmore defer-
ence applies when Chevron does not." (citation omitted)).
71. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1239.
72. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); see
also Healy, supra note 1, at 33 (stating that a reviewing court should first "[d]etermin[e]
[wihether the [s]tatute [i]tself [c]learly [d]efines the [1]aw").
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sion by "employing traditional tools of statutory construction,"7 3 includ-
ing a consideration of the statute's text74 and legislative history. The
court should make this Chevron step-one determination up front because
"if Congress itself is the source of clear law that conflicts with the agen-
cy's interpretation, the law as defined by Congress governs and the con-
trary agency interpretation must be rejected."76 Indeed, the Chevron
Court stated plainly: "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."7 7 However, if the review-
ing court holds that "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue,"78 then the court should use "the Mead analysis" to decide
how much deference to give to the agency's interpretation.79
Pursuant to Mead, the reviewing court must ask: (1) whether "Con-
gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law,"80 and (2) whether "the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."" This is
because these two questions "provide a threshold inquiry to determine
which of two potential evaluative standards, Chevron or Skidmore, ap-
plies to . . . [the] case."82
If the court determines that Congress delegated lawmaking authori-
ty to the agency, and the agency interpreted the relevant statutory provi-
73. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
74. See id. at 859-62.
75. See id. at 862-64.
76. Healy, supra note 1, at 33; see also Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1247 ("[A]
reviewing court will not defer to an agency under either [Chevron or Skidmore] if the statute's mean-
ing is clear .... Thus, a court can engage in step one analysis before having to use Mead to make the
choice between Chevron and Skidmore.").
77. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see also id. at 843 n.9 ("If a court, employing traditional
tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at
issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.").
78. Id. at 843.
79. Healy, supra note 1, at 39 ("After the court has determined that the statute is ambiguous
regarding the legal issue resolved by the agency, the court must identify the review regime that
applies to the agency determination. This is the Mead analysis . . . ."); see also id at 39-42 (discuss-
ing "the Mead analysis" as the second step in his step-by-step framework for judicial review of
agency legal interpretations); Hickman, supra note 5 1, at 1600-01 ("Chevron and Skidmore are the
only two deference alternatives and . . . Mead offers the appropriate framework for choosing be-
tween them . . . ."); Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1247 (recognizing that reviewing courts
"use Meadto make the choice between Chevron and Skidmore").
80. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
81. Id. at 227; see also Merrill, supra note 70, at 813 ("The [Meadj Court held that a two part
inquiry should be undertaken in determining whether Chevron-style deference is in order. The court
should ask, first, whether Congress has delegated to an agency general authority to make rules with
the 'force of law.' If the answer is in the affirmative, the court should then ask whether the agency
has rendered its interpretation in the 'exercise of that authority."' (footnotes omitted) (quoting Mead,
533 U.S. at 227)).
82. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1247; see also Garrick B. Pursley, Avoiding Defer-
ence Questions, 44 TULSA L. REV. 557, 575 n. 141 (2009) ("[U]nder Mead, the threshold question in
the deference inquiry-the decision to apply Chevron or reject it in favor of Skidmore or independ-
ent judicial interpretation-requires determining where Congress intended to vest primary interpre-
tive authority.").
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sion in an exercise of that authority, then the reviewing court should give
Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation.83 There are multiple
justifications for granting Chevron deference to an agency under these
circumstances, including the formalist view that Congress intended the
agency to receive such deference, as well as the functionalist notion that
an agency has experience and expertise in resolving issues within its
sphere of authority.84 In the end, according Chevron deference to the
agency means that the court "must uphold the [agency's] interpretation
as long as it is reasonable."85
On the other hand, if the reviewing court conducts the Mead analy-
sis and determines that Congress did not delegate lawmaking authority to
the agency, or the agency's interpretation was not made in an exercise of
its delegated authority, then the court should independently interpret the
statutory provision.86 This is because, in a formal sense, Congress did not
intend the agency to receive Chevron deference. Nevertheless, the re-
viewing court should give Skidmore deference to the agency's interpreta-
tion because, as a functional matter, the agency's interpretation may be
rooted in its experience and expertise. Ultimately, according Skidmore
deference to the agency means the court "follows the agency interpreta-
tion only to the extent the court is persuaded by the agency's interpreta-
tion."8
83. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
84. See supra notes 44, 66-67 and accompanying text.
85. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89 (2007) (citing Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at
844 (stating that, at this second step, a reviewing court must not disturb "a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency").
Professor Healy has recognized that "accord[ing] Chevron step-two deference to the agency
legal determination" is akin to "engag[ing] solely in arbitrary or capricious review of the agency
determination." Healy, supra note 1, at 42. He explains that:
Step I of the analysis has already determined that the statute is ambiguous with respect
to the agency's substantive legal decision. This decision is equivalent to holding that the
agency has discretion under the statute to reach its substantive decision (because it is not
barred by the statute). Moreover, step 2 of the analysis has, we have assumed, yielded a
conclusion that the agency has been delegated by Congress and has exercised lawmaking
authority with regard to the determination being challenged. The remaining issue relating
to the legality of the agency position is, therefore, whether the agency has properly exer-
cised its discretion: the proper exercise of discretion is the subject of arbitrary or capri-
cious review.
Id. at 43. The Supreme Court and other scholars have echoed this point. See, e.g., Judulang v. Hold-
er, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) ("[U]nder Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpreta-
tion is 'arbitrary or capricious in substance."' (quoting Mayo Found, for Med. Educ. & Research v.
United States, 131 S. Ct, 704, 711 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted); James M. Puckett,
Embracing the Queen of Hearts. Deference to Retroactive Tax Rules, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 349,
362 (2013) ("When Chevron deference applies, the court's review virtually collapses into arbitrary
and capricious review.").
86. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (implicitly making this point).
88. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
89. Healy, supra note 1, at 2 n.5 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). With
this in mind, multiple scholars have argued that "Skidmore deference" is not really deference at all.
See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and
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II. UNCOVERING THE FRAMEWORK'S SECONDARY ROLE
In light of Mead, lower courts have applied the framework for judi-
cial review of agency statutory interpretations when reviewing agency
decisions.90 Although the framework exists to help reviewing courts de-
termine how much deference to give to an agency's statutory interpreta-
tion, this Part argues that the framework also plays an important, albeit
unappreciated, secondary role in immigration law.
Since issuing its opinion in Mead, the Supreme Court has decided a
series of immigration cases and, in doing so, articulated and applied what
has become known as the "ordinary remand rule." This Part analyzes the
three decisions in this series-INS v. Ventura,91 Gonzales v. Thomas,92
and Negusie v. Holder-and uncovers a significant lesson: If a case turns
on the meaning of a statutory provision the BIA either has not yet inter-
preted or has interpreted erroneously, the reviewing court should use the
framework for judicial review to decide whether to answer the interpre-
tive question in the first instance or remand the issue to the agency. It is
true that the Court has not explicitly referred to the framework for judi-
cial review when deciding whether to remand an unsettled interpretive
issue to the BIA. Nevertheless, a close examination of the Court's opin-
ions, particularly its most recent decision in Negusie, shows that the
framework helps us understand when such a remand is appropriate.
A. INS v. Ventura: Hinting at the Framework's Relevance in the Remand
Context
The modem Supreme Court first articulated immigration law's or-
dinary remand rule in INS v. Ventura, a decision issued less than eighteen
months after Mead.93 In Ventura, the BIA had determined that Fredy
Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 890 (2013) (observing that Skidmore deference
"really isn't 'deference' at all"); Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1467 n.155 (2005) ("[T]he phrase Skidmore 'deference' is
misleading. A court granting Skidmore deference does not actually relinquish interpretive power to
the agency but recognizes the agency as a kind of expert witness, particularly useful in rendering its
own interpretive judgment."); Healy, supra note 1, at 46 n.281 ("The text employs the common
expression of Skidmore deference, even though that expression is a misnomer. A more accurate
expression would be Skidmore guidance or Skidmore persuasion."); Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury
Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185, 198 n.80 (2004) ("Courts have commonly used
the phrase 'Skidmore deference' to refer to the amount of respect accorded agency interpretations
under Skidmore. This phrase, however, is an oxymoron.. .. [T]he court never technically defers to
the agency position under Skidmore even if the court ultimately adopts the position; the agency
position is mere evidence considered by the court in its attempt to determine the single best interpre-
tation." (citation omitted)); Strauss, supra note 1, at 1145 (arguing that the more appropriate phrase
would be "Skidmore weight" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
90. See, e.g., De Leon-Ochoa v. Attorney Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 348-49 (3d Cir. 2010).
91. 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam).
92. 547 U.S. 183, 185 (2006) (per curiam).
93. That said, some scholars have argued that the ordinary remand rule can actually be traced
to the Supreme Court's early decision in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80 (1943),
which was cited in each of the modern Court's decisions. See Walker, supra note 70, at 1561-79
("trac[ing] the remand rule from its Chenery origins through the trilogy of Supreme Court immigra-
tion adjudication cases in the 2000s that further refined the rule"); Patrick J. Glen, "To Remand or
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Orlando Ventura, a native and citizen of Guatemala, did not qualify for
asylum because any past persecution he suffered in Guatemala was not
"on account of a statutorily protected ground."94
The Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA's decision, as it held that Ventu-
ra had, in fact, suffered "past persecution on account of [an] imputed
political opinion." But instead of remanding the case to the BIA at that
point, the court "went on to consider an alternative argument hat the
Government had made before the [agency], namely, that . . . Ventura
failed to qualify for protection regardless of past persecution because
conditions in Guatemala had improved to the point where no realistic
threat of persecution currently existed."96 Although the BIA had not re-
solved this so-called "changed circumstances" matter,9 7 and both parties
asked the court to let the agency decide that issue in the first instance,9 8
the Ninth Circuit evaluated the Government's argument and rejected it.99
The Government then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari,
arguing the Ninth Circuit erred by resolving the changed circumstances
issue on its own rather than remanding that question to the BIA.1c" The
Court agreed and summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit. 101
The Court began its discussion with a formalist, Mead-like analy-
siS.102 Indeed, the Court quickly mentioned that Congress delegated pow-
Not to Remand": Ventura 's Ordinary Remand Rule and the Evolving Jurisprudence of Futility, 10
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 1, 3 (2010) ("This general rule pertaining to remand was enunciated in
the administrative context in the Chenery decision, and given specific weight in the immigration
context by the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in INS v. Ventura.").
94. Ventura v. INS, 264 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd per curiam, 537 U.S. 12
(2002). According to the Immigration and Nationality Act, an applicant for asylum must "establish
that the applicant is a refugee, within the meaning of section I l01(a)(42)(A)." Immigration and
Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § I158(b)(1)(B) (2012). A refugee is then defined as some-
one who can establish, among other things, "persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution [in his
home country] on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42).
95. See Ventura, 264 F.3d at 1157.
96. Ventura, 537 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added). Under the law, an asylum "applicant who has
been found to have established . . . past persecution shall also be presumed to have a well-founded
fear of persecution on the basis of the original [asylum] claim." 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2013).
However, the Government may rebut that presumption if it establishes, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that "[tlhere has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no
longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in the applicant's country of nationality." 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(1)(i) (2013).
97. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 13 ("[T]he BIA itself had not considered this ... claim."); id. at
15 ("[T]he BIA had not decided the 'changed circumstances' question . . . .").
98. See id at 13 ("[B]oth sides asked that the Ninth Circuit remand the case to the BIA so that
it might [consider the changed circumstances i sue].").
99. See id at 13-14. The Ninth Circuit held that the evidence in the record-particularly a
State Department report regarding human rights in Guatemala-failed to demonstrate a sufficient
change in circumstances. Therefore, the court concluded that Ventura was eligible for asylum. See
id. at 14-15.
100. See id. at 14 ("The Government, seeking certiorari here, argues that the Court of Appeals
exceeded its legal authority when it decided the 'changed circumstances' matter on its own.").
101. See id. ("We agree with the Government that the Court of Appeals should have remanded
the case to the BIA. And we summarily reverse its decision not to do so.").
102. See id at 16.
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er to "the agency to make the basic asylum eligibility decision here in
question."oM The Court then said that the BIA had not yet had the chance
to exercise its delegated power with respect to the changed circumstances
issue.'0 The Court said that under these circumstances the Ninth Circuit
should not have "intrude[d] upon the domain which Congress has exclu-
sively entrusted to an administrative agency."'05 Rather, it "should have
applied the ordinary 'remand' rule"106 which, according to the Court,
provides that, "[g]enerally speaking, a court of appeals should remand a
case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in
agency hands."0 7 Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit and remanded the case so that the BIA could resolve the
changed circumstances issue in the first instance.08
In sum, Ventura was the first case in which the modem Court ar-
ticulated and applied the ordinary remand rule.109 The case ultimately
stands for the proposition that a reviewing court must ordinarily remand
an unresolved and dispositive question to the agency when the agency
has the delegated power to decide the issue.''o Multiple scholars have
recognized this as Ventura's holding."' What has gone unrecognized,
however, is that the Court reached its remand decision by pulling from
the heart of the framework for judicial review and conducting a Mead-
like analysis.12 To be sure, the Court never cited Mead. However, the
Court certainly echoed Mead's formalist language when it emphasized
that Congress had delegated authority to the BIA to resolve the changed
circumstances issue, but the agency had not yet had the opportunity to
exercise its delegated power.113 While no literature has yet alluded to a
relationship between Ventura and Mead, one prominent scholar has
acknowledged that the Ventura Court based its decision mostly on for-
malist separation-of-powers principles,14 especially "congressional
103. Id.; see also Glen, supra note 93, at 15 ("The Supreme Court noted that the Immigration
and Nationality Act entrusts to the agency the decision of whether or not an alien is eligible for
asylum, and thus the agency has primacy in resolving that issue." (citing Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16)).
104. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 17 ("The BIA has not yet considered the 'changed circumstanc-
es' issue.").
105. Id. at 16 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943)) (internal
quotation mark omitted). Similarly, the Court also quoted Chenery I by saying that "a 'judicial
judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment."' Id (quoting Chenery 1, 318
U.S. at 88).
106. Id at 18.
107. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
108. See id. at 18 ("We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
insofar as it denies remand to the agency. And we remand the case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.").
109. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
110. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16-17.
111. See Glen, supra note 93, at 19; Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 636.
112. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16.
113. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
114. See Walker, supra note 70, at 1576 (noting that the Ventura Court articulated principles
that were "grounded in separation of powers"). That said, the Ventura Court also supported its deci-
sion with functionalist principles. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 17. For example, the Court noted that
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delegation to the agency to decide the issues, and the lack of con-
gressional delegation or other source of authority for the judicial
actor to decide the issue de novo." 5 These same principles, of course,
are at the core of the Mead decision.116
After Ventura, it remained to be seen how the Court would apply
the ordinary remand rule. Indeed, the case left "considerable room for
disagreement as to when remand for further agency review is re-
quired."'"7  While some commentators viewed Ventura as a rather lim-
ited decision," others saw the case as having much broader implica-
tions.19 For example, shortly after the Ventura decision, Ninth Circuit
Judge Alex Kozinski wrote:
While the Court was careful to limit its ruling to the facts presented,
its message to us was clear to anyone with eyes to see: Stop substitut-
ing your judgment for that of the BIA; give proper deference to ad-
ministrative factfinding; and do not adopt rules of law that take away
the agency's ability to do its job. In other words, stop fiddling with
the agency's decisions just because you don't like the result.
We could, of course, read . . . Ventura . . . as limited to the ques-
tion[] presented in [that] case[]. But this would be a big mis-
take.... The Court . . . gave us a gentle hint that we must revise our
mindset on the key question about who's the master when it comes to
immigration cases. We must come to understand and accept . . . that
"within broad limits the law entrusts the agency to make the basic
asylum eligibility decision." 20
remanding the changed circumstances issue to the BIA would allow the agency to "bring its exper-
tise to bear upon the matter . .. and . . . help a court later determine whether its decision exceeds the
leeway that the law provides." Id.
115. Walker, supra note 70, at 1576. After noting that these "are two distinct Article I separa-
tion of powers values," Professor Walker astutely recognized that "[lt]hese become Article II values
as well, as they intrude on the Executive's responsibility to execute the law." Id.
116. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing Mead).
I17. Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 644.
118. See Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the Courts?: The Supreme Court's Recent Chevron
Jurisprudence through an Immigration Lens, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 350 (2012) ("[S]ome com-
mentators assumed that the Court was merely saying that courts should send back to the agency
unresolved factual issues.").
119. See id. at 349-50 (noting that "Ventura is a brief, rather simple decision with broad impli-
cations," before arguing that the Court "significantly tilt[ed] deference toward the agency").
120. Jahed v. INS, 356 F.3d 991, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (quoting Ventura v. INS, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002) (per curiam)). Similarly, in another dissent-
ing opinion issued soon after the Ventura decision, Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Trott wrote:
Congress has charged the Attorney General, not us, with the primary responsibility for
administering the immigration laws. Our assigned limited role is to review the workings
of the BIA, not to run the INS. When we exceed our authority, separation and allocation
of powers in a constitutional sense are clearly implicated. "In this government of separat-
ed powers, it is not for the judiciary to usurp Congress' grant of authority to the Attorney
General by applying what approximates de novo appellate review."
Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 365, 397 (9th Cir. 2003) (Trott, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted) (quoting INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444,452 (1985)).
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Ultimately, Judge Kozinski's broad, formalist view of Ventura prevailed
as the Supreme Court kept applying the ordinary remand rule.121 Notably,
in doing so, the Court continued to echo the framework for judicial re-
view of agency statutory interpretations.
B. Gonzales v. Thomas: Continuing to Echo the Framework in the Re-
mand Context
Less than four years after Ventura, the Supreme Court reapplied the
ordinary remand rule in Gonzales v. Thomas.122 There, the BIA had de-
termined that Michelle Thomas and her family, natives and citizens of
South Africa, did not qualify for asylum because any past persecution
they suffered in South Africa was not on account of the statutorily pro-
tected grounds of either race or political opinion.123
The Thomases appealed their case to the Ninth Circuit,124 and the
court quickly recognized "that the BIA had not adequately considered the
Thomases' claim of persecution because of 'membership in a particular
social group, as relatives of Boss Ronnie,"'l25 Michelle's father-in-law
"who allegedly held racist views and mistreated black workers at the
company at which he was a foreman." 26 While the BIA had not reached
the particular social group issue, the Ninth Circuit eventually took the
case en banc and held, in the first instance, that "a family may constitute
a social group for the purposes of the refugee statutes,"27 and "that the
particular family at issue . .. fell within the scope of the statutory term
'particular social group.",1
28
The Government again petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari,
arguing that the Ninth Circuit "'erred in holding, in the first instance and
without prior resolution of the questions by the' relevant administrative
agency, 'that members of a family can and do constitute a "particular
social group," within the meaning of' the [Immigration and Nationality]
Act." 29 The Court agreed and, once more, summarily reversed the Ninth
Circuit.' 30
121. See Rana, supra note 118, at 349-53 (tracing the Court's evolving remand jurisprudence);
Walker, supra note 70, at 1575 (discussing "the evolution of the remand rule"); see also Glen, supra
note 93, at 13-19.
122. 547 U.S. 183, 185 (2006) (per curiam).
123. See id. at 184; see also supra note 94 (regarding the applicable law on asylum).
124. See Thomas v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004), affd on reh'g sub nom.
Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), vacated, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per
curiam).
125. Thomas, 547 U.S. at 184 (quoting Thomas, 359 F.3d at 1177).
126. Id.
127. Thomas, 409 F.3d at 1187.
128. Thomas, 547 U.S. at 184-85.
129. Id. at 185 (quoting the Solicitor General's petition for certiorari).
130. See id. ("[The Solicitor General] concludes that 'the Ninth Circuit's error is so obvious in
light of Ventura that summary reversal would be appropriate.' We agree with the Solicitor General."
(citation omitted)).
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The Court began by saying that "[t]he Ninth Circuit's failure to re-
mand is legally erroneous, and that error is 'obvious in light of Ventura,'
itself a summary reversal.""'3 The Court then quoted heavily from Ventu-
ra, especially those portions in which it had conducted the Mead-like
analysis.'32 Indeed, the Court repeated its formalist statement that Con-
gress delegated power to "the agency to make the basic asylum eligibility
decision."'3 3 The Court then said that the BIA had not yet had the chance
to exercise its delegated power with respect to the particular social group
issue.134 Therefore, the Court concluded that, "as in Ventura, the Court of
Appeals should have applied the 'ordinary "remand" rule.""35 Thus, the
Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case
so the BIA could resolve the particular social group issue in the first in-
stance.3 6
In sum, Thomas reaffirmed the principle that a reviewing court must
ordinarily remand an unresolved and dispositive question to the agency
when the agency has the delegated power to decide the issue.137 This
much is clear from the Court's opinion. What has once again gone
unrecognized, however, is that the Court reached its remand decision by
conducting an analysis very similar to that required by the framework for
judicial review. Indeed, in Mead-like fashion, the Court emphasized that
Congress had delegated authority to the BIA to resolve the particular
social group issue, but the agency had not yet had the opportunity to ex-
ercise its delegated power.'39
Thomas therefore reinforced the notion that when a reviewing court
is confronted with a dispositive issue the BIA has not yet had an oppor-
tunity to consider, the court should draw on the framework for judicial
review and conduct a Mead-like inquiry to determine whether Congress
delegated authority to the BIA to answer the relevant question. If Con-
gress did delegate such power to the BIA, then Ventura and Thomas both
indicate that the reviewing court should generally remand the unresolved
issue to the agency for a decision in the first instance.140 This is because
the ordinary remand rule provides that, "[g]enerally speaking, a court of
131. Id.
132. See id at 185-86.
133. Id. at 186 (quoting INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam)) (internal quota-
tion mark omitted).
134. See id. ("The agency has not yet considered whether Boss Ronnie's family presents the
kind of 'kinship ties' that constitute a 'particular social group."').
135. Id. at 187 (quoting Ventura, 537 U.S. at 18).
136. See id. ("We grant the petition for certiorari. We vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. And we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.").
137. See id. at 185-87.
138. See Glen, supra note 93, at 17 (discussing the Thomas decision).
139. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
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appeals should remand a case to an agency for a decision of a matter that
statutes place primarily in agency hands."41
After Thomas, it remained to be seen whether the Court would con-
tinue to echo, or even rely specifically upon, the framework for judicial
review in the remand context. The answer to this question came a few
years later when the Court directly confronted an unsettled statutory in-
terpretation issue.
C. Negusie v. Holder: The Framework Prompts the Court to Remand an
Outstanding Statutory Interpretation Question
The Supreme Court issued its most recent decision on the ordinary
remand rule in Negusie v. Holder. That case centered on a disagreement
over how to interpret the Immigration and Nationality Act's (INA's) so-
called "persecutor bar," 42 which provides that "[a]n alien who fears per-
secution in his homeland and seeks refugee status in this country is
barred from obtaining that relief if he has persecuted others."43 The key
statutory interpretation question in the case was whether "the persecutor
bar applies even if the alien's assistance in persecution was coerced or
otherwise the product of duress."l44
The BIA answered this question in the affirmative.145 The BIA's in-
terpretation, however, was based on its conclusion that the Supreme
Court had already resolved this issue in a previous decision.14 6 Similarly,
the Fifth Circuit relied on the same Supreme Court precedent to provide
the answer to the interpretive question.147
148
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and held that both the BIA
and the Fifth Circuit had misread its precedent "as mandating that an
alien's motivation and intent are irrelevant to the issue whether an alien
141. INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
142. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id. at 513 (emphasis added); see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8
U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42) (2012) ("The term 'refugee' does not include any person who ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.").
144. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514.
145. See id. In other words, the BIA had determined that "an alien's motivation and intent are
irrelevant to the issue of whether he 'assisted' in persecution . . . [I]t is the objective effect of an
alien's actions which is controlling." Id. at 516 (alteration in original) (quoting Fedorenko, 19 1. &
N. Dec. 57 (B.I.A. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. See id. at 514 ("[T]he BIA followed its earlier decisions that found Fedorenko v. United
States controlling." (citation omitted)); see also id at 521 ("The BIA deemed its interpretation to be
mandated by Fedorenko .... .").
147. Id. at 514 ("The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in affirming the agency, relied on
its precedent following the same reasoning."); see also id at 516 ("[T]he Court of Appeals agreed
with the BIA that whether an alien is compelled to assist in persecution is immaterial for persecutor-
bar purposes." (citing Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981)); id. at 518 (recog-
nizing that the Fifth Circuit "relie[d] on Fedorenko to provide the answer").
148. Negusie v. Mukasey, 552 U.S. 1255 (2008) (granting certiorari), rev'd sub nom. Negusie
v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
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assisted in persecution."1 49 The Court explained that, in fact, its prece-
dent "addressed a different statute enacted for a different purpose."so
Therefore, the Court concluded that its prior decision did "not control the
BIA's interpretation of this persecutor bar." 51
Having determined that the BIA's interpretation of the persecutor
bar was erroneous,152 the Court had to decide whether to resolve the in-
terpretive issue on its own or remand the matter to the agency for a deci-
sion in the first instance.153 Ultimately, as in Ventura and Thomas, the
framework for judicial review allows us to understand the Court's deter-
mination.
This Article does not mean to suggest that the Court proceeded in a
perfectly systematic manner, deciding first that the BIA botched its in-
terpretation of the persecutor bar and then analyzing the step-by-step
framework for judicial review in order to answer the remand question.
To be sure, the Court's analysis was more elastic, moving back and forth
between a discussion of the BIA's erroneous statutory interpretation and
the relevant judicial review cases, particularly Chevron.'54 That said, this
Article argues that once the Court determined that the BIA's statutory
interpretation was flawed, the framework for judicial review essentially
led the Court to remand the interpretive issue to the agency.
Indeed, in true framework-for-judicial-review fashion, the Court
considered whether the persecutor bar was ambiguous.15 5 The Court rec-
ognized that "[t]he question is whether the statutory text mandates that
coerced actions must be deemed assistance in persecution."56 On that
point, the Court said, "[T]he statute, in its precise terms, is not explic-
it." 5 7 The Court then added that Congress did not clearly have "an inten-
tion on the precise question at issue." 58 The Court also noted that there
was "substance to both [parties'] contentions" as to the meaning of the
statute.5 9 In short, the Court concluded that the statute was ambiguous
149. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 516.
150. Id. at 520; see also id. at 518-20 (discussing the differences between the Immigration and
Nationality Act, at issue in this case, and the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, at issue in Fedorenko).
151. Id. at 520.
152. See id. at 514, 521 (characterizing the BIA's statutory interpretation as an "error"); see
also Rana, supra note 118, at 352 ("[T]he majority of the [Negusie] Court decided that the immigra-
tion agency and the Fifth Circuit had legally erred by misapplying agency and Supreme Court prece-
dent on a similar issue to resolve the statutory interpretation issues at hand.").
153. See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 523.
154. See id. at 516-24; see also Healy, supra note 1, at 27 ("[T]he Court exhibited a great deal
of uncertainty in its approach."); id. (arguing that the Court's decision "reflected uncertainty regard-
ing the order and content of the analysis determining the applicability of Chevron deference").
155. See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 517-18.
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with respect to "whether coercion or duress is relevant in determining if
an alien assisted or otherwise participated in persecution."l6 0
Moreover, while the Court never cited Mead,161 it once again con-
ducted a formalist, Mead-like analysis.162 Indeed, the Court said that
Congress delegated power to the Attorney General to administer the
INA,1 6 3 and "[t]he Attorney General, in turn, has delegated to the BIA
the 'discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney General by
law' in the course of 'considering and determining cases before it.""6
Accordingly, the Court recognized that had the BIA interpreted the am-
biguous statute in an exercise of its delegated lawmaking authority, its
interpretation would have been given Chevron deference.1 65 But the
Court stressed that the BIA had not exercised its interpretive authority
because it mistakenly assumed that precedent controlled its interpreta-
S166tion.
160. Id. Justice Thomas dissented, writing that "the INA unambiguously precludes any inquiry
into whether the persecutor acted voluntarily, i.e., free from coercion or duress." Id. at 539 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that the majority made "no attempt to apply the 'traditional
tools of statutory construction' to the persecutor bar before retreating to ambiguity." Id. at 550.
Justice Thomas claimed that, in fact, "the traditional tools of statutory interpretation show with
'utmost clarity' that the statute applies regardless of the voluntariness of the alien who participates or
assists in persecution." Id at 551 (citation omitted).
161. See Healy, supra note 1, at 27 (recognizing that the Negusie Court proceeded "without
any citation to the Mead analysis").
162. See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 516-17 (majority opinion).
163. See id. at 516-17 ("Congress has charged the Attorney General with administering the
INA, and a 'ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be control-
ling."' (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § I103(a)(1) (2012)); see
also Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 620 ("Congress has expressly delegated to the Attorney
General the authority to administer and enforce the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.").
164. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted); Guendelsberger, supra note
68, at 620 ("Although the [BIA] is not created by Congress, the Board exercises authority to inter-
pret the immigration laws on behalf of the Attorney General through a formal adjudicative pro-
cess.").
165. See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 516 ("Consistent with the rule in Chevron, the BIA is entitled to
deference in interpreting ambiguous provisions of the INA." (citation omitted)); see also id. at 517
("[T]he BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms 'concrete
meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication."' (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Other courts and scholars have made the same point. See, e.g., Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558
F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009) ("The Board's interpretations of the INA made in the course of adjudi-
cating cases before it satisfy the first requirement for Chevron deference set forth in Mead: the
Board, through the Attorney General's delegation, is authorized to promulgate rules carrying the
force of law through a process of case-by-case adjudication and, thus, 'should be accorded Chevron
deference' as it exercises such authority to 'give[] ambiguous statutory terms "concrete meaning.""'
(alteration in original) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)); Omagah v.
Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254, 258 n.3 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Because the BIA interpreted the INA through
formal adjudication, we give its interpretation Chevron deference." (citing United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)); Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 620 ("Under Mead, the
Board's interpretation of the immigration law through formal adjudication is generally subject to
Chevron deference.").
166. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 521 ("The BIA deemed its interpretation to be mandated by Fe-
dorenko, and that error prevented it from a full consideration of the statutory question here present-
ed."); id at 522 ("[T]he BIA has not exercised its interpretive authority but, instead, has determined
that Fedorenko controls. This [is a] mistaken assumption .... ); id. at 523 ("[T]he BIA has not yet
exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in question .... ).
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Therefore, the Court ended up in the same place it had been in both
Ventura and Thomas: a situation in which the BIA had not yet had the
chance to exercise power delegated to it from Congress. The Court cited
and discussed Ventura and Thomas,'67 and said those cases "counsel a
similar result here."1 6 8 Therefore, the Court once again applied the ordi-
nary remand rule, saying: "Having concluded that the BIA has not yet
exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in question, 'the
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency
for additional investigation or explanation."'"
69
The Court then articulated both formalist and functionalist justifica-
tions for remanding the unresolved interpretive issue to the BIA.1 70 The
Court relied primarily on the formalist view that remanding to the BIA
was appropriate because "ambiguities in statutes within an agency's ju-
risdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill
the statutory gap in reasonable fashion."'7 1 In other words, the Court
emphasized that Congress delegated power to the agency to answer the
relevant interpretive question. Congress did not delegate that power to a
court. 172
The Court also briefly articulated a functionalist principle to support
its decision.73 The Court noted that remanding the unresolved interpre-
tive issue to the BIA would allow the agency to "bring its expertise to
bear upon the matter . .. and . . . help a court later determine whether its
decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides." 74 In other words, the
Court suggested that the BIA has superior expertise in resolving interpre-
tive issues that fall within its sphere of authority.175 In the end, after set-
ting out these justifications, the Court remanded the case "to the agency
for its initial determination of the statutory interpretation question and its
application to this case." 76
167. See id. at 523-24.
168. Id at 524.
169. Id at 523 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) (per curiam)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
170. See id. at 523-24.
171. Id. at 523 (emphasis added) (quoting Nat'l Cable & Telecomm'ns Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
172. Justice Scalia echoed this sentiment in his concurrence in Negusie, saying that he agreed
with the Court's decision to remand because "[i]t is to agency officials, not to the Members of this
Court, that Congress has given discretion to choose among permissible interpretations of the stat-
ute." Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 517 (majority opinion).
174. Id. at 524 (quoting Gonzales, 547 U.S. at 186-87 (internal quotation mark omitted)).
175. The Court also made this point by saying: "When the BIA has not spoken on 'a matter
that statutes place primarily in agency hands,' our ordinary rule is to remand to 'giv[e] the BIA the
opportunity to address the matter in the first instance in light ofits own expertise."' Id. at 517 (altera-
tion in original) (emphasis added) (quoting INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002) (per curi-
am)).
176. Id at 524.
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In sum, the Negusie Court applied the ordinary remand rule to an
unresolved statutory interpretation question.177 One prominent scholar
has accurately characterized Negusie as holding: "[I]f a question of inter-
pretation remains with respect to an ambiguous provision of a statute an
agency administers, the ordinary course is for the court to remand the
question to the agency, which Congress has authorized to be the statute's
authoritative interpreter."l7 8 This is clear from the Court's opinion.
That said, an important aspect of the Court's analysis has flown un-
der the radar. Once the Court decided that a dispositive statutory inter-
pretation question remained outstanding, the Court's decision to remand
turned on the fact that it had decided that the relevant statutory provision
was ambiguous and that Congress delegated power to the BIA to inter-
pret that provision.179 In other words, as in Ventura and Thomas, the Ne-
gusie Court reached its remand decision after conducting an analysis akin
to that set out in the framework for judicial review. To be sure, the Court
never expressly said it was applying the framework for judicial review in
order to answer the remand question. But the Court clearly decided to
remand the case to the BIA because the agency had "not yet exercised its
Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in question",18 _discretion that
the Court determined the agency did, indeed, possess.
In short, when Negusie is read in conjunction with Ventura and
Thomas, the Court's lesson for unresolved statutory interpretation issues
becomes clear: If a case turns on the meaning of a statutory provision the
BIA either has not yet interpreted or has interpreted erroneously, the re-
viewing court should use the framework for judicial review to decide
whether to answer the interpretive question in the first instance or re-
mand the issue to the agency.
III. USING THE FRAMEWORK TO FURTHER
DEFINE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE REMAND RULE
The preceding Part discovered that the framework for judicial re-
view of agency statutory interpretations plays an important secondary
role in immigration law. Taken together, the Supreme Court cases that
define the contours of the ordinary remand rule indicate that when a re-
viewing court faces an unsettled statutory interpretation question, the
court should use the framework to decide whether to resolve the interpre-
tive issue in the first instance or remand the question to the BIA.
Negusie illustrates when a reviewing court's analysis under the
framework should ordinarily lead to a remand. Recall that the Court de-
177. See id. at 523-24; see also Walker, supra note 70, at 1578 (recognizing that the Negusie
Court applied "the ordinary remand rule to questions of statutory interpretation").
178. Walker, supra note 70, at 1579 (emphasis added).
179. See supra notes 155-169 and accompanying text.
180. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 523.
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termined that an interpretive issue remained outstanding in the case.81
The Court had also ascertained that the relevant statutory provision was
ambiguous and that Congress had delegated power to the BIA to inter-
pret that provision.182 Thus, the Court located what Professor Strauss
calls "Chevron space."l83 This, of course, is "the area within which an
administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act in a manner
that creates legal obligations or constraints-that is, its delegated or allo-
cated authority."l84 Since the BIA had not yet acted within its "Chevron
space," the Court decided that it was appropriate to remand the case to
the agency. ss As the Court put it: "Having concluded that the BIA has
not yet exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in ques-
tion, 'the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the
agency for additional investigation or explanation.'"86
And why is it ordinarily proper for a reviewing court to remand an
unresolved interpretive issue to an agency with Chevron discretion? Ne-
gusie indicates that it is for the same formalist and functionalist reasons
that a reviewing court defers to an agency when the agency does exercise
its Chevron discretion. The formalist reason is that Congress delegated
lawmaking power to the agency to answer the interpretive question left
unresolved by the statute.188 The functionalist reason is that an agency
generally has greater experience and expertise in resolving interpretive
issues that fall within its sphere of authority. 89
Negusie therefore identifies one situation in which a reviewing court
should ordinarily remand an unsettled interpretive issue to the BIA:
when, pursuant to the framework for judicial review, the court deter-
mines that the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous and Congress
delegated power to the BIA to interpret that provision. In other words,
remand is appropriate when the agency possesses Chevron discretion.190
But suppose that, in considering whether to remand an outstanding statu-
tory interpretation question, a reviewing court determines that the BIA
does not possess Chevron discretion-either because (1) the relevant
statutory provision is unambiguous, or (2) the relevant statutory provi-
sion is ambiguous, but Congress did not delegate power to the BIA to
181. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text
182. See supra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
183. Strauss, supra note 1, at 1145 (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Id.
185. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 523-24.
186. Id. at 523 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) (per curiam)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Glen, supra note 93, at 3 ("[D]ecisions entrusted to the agency
must be made by the agency in the first instance prior to resolution by the courts of appeals. Accord-
ingly, if a decision must turn on a determination that the agency for some reason has not yet made,
the courts of appeals should generally remand the matter for determination by the agency in the first
instance rather than resolving that issue de novo during the appellate process.").
I87. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
I89. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
interpret that provision. Should the reviewing court remand the case to
the BIA in either of these situations? Unfortunately, Negusie does not
answer this question. This is because, as one prominent scholar points
out, Negusie only established that a reviewing court should remand un-
settled "questions of . .. law when such questions fall within the space
delegated to an agency."l91 NeguSie did not address whether a remand is
appropriate outside this context.
This Part, therefore, picks up where Negusie left off and considers
whether remand is appropriate in the two situations the Court has not yet
confronted. Having established that the framework for judicial review
plays a key role in the remand discussion, this Part now uses that frame-
work to identify those instances in which a reviewing court should re-
mand an unresolved interpretive issue to the BIA and those in which the
court should answer the question without remanding. Ultimately, the
goal of this exercise is to define the proper relationship between courts
and the BIA when it comes to resolving outstanding statutory interpreta-
tion questions.
A. The First Situation
1. The Problem: The Relevant Statutory Provision is Unambiguous
Suppose that a court is reviewing a decision from the BIA and
quickly discovers that the case turns on the meaning of a statutory provi-
sion the agency either has not yet interpreted or has interpreted errone-
ously. Assume further that the court draws on the framework for judicial
review in order to decide whether to answer the interpretive question in
the first instance or remand the issue to the BIA. The court "employ[s]
traditional tools of statutory construction,"l92 including a consideration of
the statute's textl 93 and legislative history,194 and, unlike Negusie, deter-
mines at Chevron step one that the relevant statutory provision is clear.
Should the court answer the interpretive question on its own or remand
the matter to the BIA for a decision in the first instance?
2. The Solution: The Reviewing Court Should Resolve the Interpre-
tive Issue
In this situation, the reviewing court should resolve the interpretive
issue on its own. This is because neither formalist nor functionalist justi-
fications warrant remanding the matter to the agency. With respect to
formalism, the Chevron Court made it clear that, "[i]f a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an
intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and
191. Walker, supra note 70, at 1579 (emphasis added).
192. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
193. See id. at 859-62.
194. See id at 862-64.
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must be given effect."l95 In other words, the court will have determined
that "Congress itself is the source of clear law."l 96 Since this obviously
means that Congress did not delegate lawmaking power to the agency to
interpret the relevant statutory provision,197 there would be no formalist
reason to remand the statutory interpretation question to the agency.
There would also be no functionalist reason to remand the interpre-
tive issue to the BIA. At this point, the reviewing court has already an-
swered the pertinent statutory interpretation question. Therefore, the
court should go ahead and "give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress."'99 Remanding the matter to the agency at this point
would serve no purpose other than to see if the agency agrees with the
court that the statute is unambiguous. Ultimately, however, it is up to the
court to decide whether Congress has clearly defined the law.20 0 If the
court has already made that determination, then there is no need for the
court to waste time and resources by remanding the matter to the agency.
After all, the conclusion would be forgone.
Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in Negusie is consistent with
the view that a reviewing court need not remand an otherwise outstand-
ing interpretive issue to an agency if the court decides the relevant statu-
tory provision is clear.20' Recall that, in Negusie, the majority held that
the BIA had erroneously deemed its interpretation of the INA's persecu-
tor bar to be controlled by Supreme Court precedent and thus, the inter-
pretive issue remained unsettled.20 2 Although the majority decided to
remand the matter to the agency for a decision in the first instance, Jus-
tice Thomas disagreed, writing:
The majority . . . holds that the INA is ambiguous as to "whether co-
ercion or duress is relevant in determining if an alien assisted or oth-
erwise participated in persecution" and that the agency, therefore,
should interpret the statute in the first instance to determine whether
it reasonably can be read to include a voluntariness requirement. I
195. Id. at 843 n.9 (emphasis added); see also Healy, supra note 1, at 15 ("When a court de-
termines that Congress has defined the law because of the law's clarity, that law governs." (footnote
omitted)).
196. Healy, supra note 1, at 33.
197. Id. at 40 ("If ... the statute is determined to be unambiguous at step 1, the agency has no
power to define the law.").
198. See also Walker, supra note 70, at 1570-71 ("[I]f the agency's interpretation fails at the
first step, there would be no reason to remand because the statutory provision at issue is unambigu-
ous and the agency would have no discretion to exercise . . . ."); id. at 1574 n. 100 ("[R]emand is not
necessary if the court concludes that ... the statutory provision is unambiguous and thus the agency
has no discretion to exercise (Chevron step one).").
199. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
200. See id at 843 n.9 ("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construc-
tion . . . ."); see also Healy, supra note 1, at 33 ("[T]he judiciary is the governmental institution that
plays the key role in discerning the content of the law that Congress has established."); id. at 33-34
("The judiciary determines the content of the law defined by Congress .... ).
201. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 538-54 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 518-20 (majority opinion).
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disagree .... Because the INA unambiguously precludes any inquiry
into whether the persecutor acted voluntarily, i.e., free from coercion
or duress, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
203
Justice Thomas was not particularly concerned about the BIA's reliance
on Supreme Court precedent to interpret the relevant statutory provi-
204Jutcwrtwa
sion. Indeed, Justice Thomas wrote that it was "largely irrelevant
whether the BIA properly relied on [Court precedent] in interpreting the
statute."205 This is because, as Justice Thomas succinctly and persuasive-
ly put it: "There is no reason to remand the question to the agency when
only one construction of the statute is permissible . . . ."206
In sum, if a reviewing court faces an unsettled statutory interpreta-
tion question, and it determines that the relevant statutory provision is
clear, then the court should resolve the interpretive issue in the first in-
stance. After all, neither formalist nor functionalist rationales justify re-
manding the matter to the BIA in this situation.
B. The Second Situation
1. The Problem: The Relevant Statutory Provision is Ambiguous,
But Congress Did Not Delegate Lawmaking Power to the Agen-
cy
Suppose, once again, that a reviewing court faces an outstanding
statutory interpretation question. Assume further that the court draws on
the framework for judicial review in order to decide whether to answer
the interpretive question in the first instance or remand the issue to the
BIA. But, this time, the court determines that the relevant statutory pro-
vision is ambiguous and that Congress did not delegate power to the BIA
to interpret that provision. Professor Guendelsberger has recognized that
an example of such an issue-that is, one falling "outside the [BIA's]
delegated domain"-would include "the meaning of provisions in state
or federal criminal statutes."207 This is because, although the BIA is
charged with interpreting ambiguous provisions of immigration law ,208
"[t]he courts are primarily responsible for statutory interpretation of the
203. Id. at 539 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also id at
550-51 ("The question before the Court . . . is whether Congress has provided an unambiguous
answer in the plain language that is chose to use. Here, . . . the traditional tools of statutory interpre-
tation show with 'utmost clarity' that the statute applies regardless of the voluntariness of the alien
who participates or assists in persecution." (citation omitted) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
329 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
204. See id. at 551 n.4.
205. Id. (citation omitted).
206. Id.
207. Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 644. Professor Guendelsberger is now a prominent
member of the BIA. See Board of Immigration Appeals Biographical Information, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/fs/biabios.htm#JohnW.Guendelsberger (last updated Mar.
2015).
208. See supra note 165.
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criminal grounds of removal, and other questions of law over which the
Board does not exercise primary interpretive responsibility."209 Using
this example, if a case turns on such an unresolved interpretive issue, it is
not immediately clear whether the reviewing court should answer the
interpretive question on its own or remand the case to the BIA so it can
address the issue in the first instance.
On the one hand, Mead established that when an agency lacks law-
making authority, the reviewing court must independently interpret the
statutory provision.210 In other words, "the court itself must determine a
substantive meaning of the ambiguous statute."211 Thus, it may seem
unnecessary for the court to remand the case to the BIA.
On the other hand, "[i]n reaching its judgment about the substance
of the law enacted by Congress, the court may be aided by the agency's
experience and expertise to the extent that the court finds them to be
,,212
helpful and persuasive. As one scholar has said: "This is the core of
Skidmore deference: the court is interpreting the statute, with the agency
offering assistance in understanding what the statute provides."213 Simi-
larly, another scholar has recognized that "'Skidmore weight' addresses
the possibility that an agency's view on a given statutory question may in
itself warrant respect by judges who themselves have ultimate interpre-
209. Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 649 (emphasis added). Several courts have echoed this
point. See, e.g., Ng v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 436 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2006) ("This case turns on a
question of pure statutory interpretation. Specifically, we must determine the meaning and applica-
tion of the term 'crime of violence,' as ... defined at 18 U.S.C. § 16 .... 'The BIA's interpretation
of 18 U.S.C. § 16 is not entitled to deference by this Court" because, among other things, it is "a
federal [criminal] provision outside the INA . . , ." (quoting Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 538
(3d Cir. 2006))); Patel v. Ashcroft, 401 F.3d 400, 407 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that Congress did
not charge the BIA with "interpreting state statutes and federal statutes unrelated to immigration");
Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that "the BIA's administrative role"
is to "interpret[] ... federal immigration laws, not state and federal criminal statutes"); Flores v.
Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that Congress did "not delegate any power
to the immigration bureaucracy . .. or to the Board of Immigration Appeals" to interpret the meaning
of the phrase "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16, a federal criminal statute); Garcia-Lopez v.
Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the BIA does not administer state criminal
statutes), overruled by Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2014); Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d
254, 258 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Determining a particular federal or state crime's elements lies beyond the
scope of the BIA's delegated power . . . ."); Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2001)
("Chevron instructs that we accord deference only to the BIA's 'construction of the statute which it
administers.' The BIA is not charged with administering 18 U.S.C. § 16, and that statute is not
transformed into an immigration law merely because it is incorporated into the INA by §
I l01(a)(43)(F). We therefore conclude that the BIA's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 16 is not entitled
to deference under Chevron." (citation omitted) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984))); Ming Lam Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105, 112-13 (2d Cir.
2001) (stating that he BIA "is not charged with the administration of [state or federal criminal]
laws"); Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 262 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he agency is not charged with the
administration of [state or federal criminal] laws.").
210. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
211. Healy, supra note 1, at 46.
212. Id. at 46-47.
213. Id. at 47 n.285.
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tive authority."2 14 In short, while "[t]he courts are primarily responsible
for statutory interpretation of the criminal grounds of removal, and other
questions of law over which the Board does not exercise primary inter-
pretive responsibility," those courts may apply "a Skidmore measure of
deference to the Board's reasoning."215 Therefore, the court might con-
sider remanding the case so the BIA could help the court determine the
meaning of the relevant statutory provision.
Professor Guendelsberger first highlighted this problem ten years
ago, shortly after Ventura, when he said:
When the issue not yet addressed by the agency is a purely
legal issue, there may be situations in which a court may re-
solve the question without the need for remand. . . . The re-
mand requirement might . .. be relaxed when the court faces a
question of statutory interpretation of an issue determined to be
outside the agency's domain ... . Whether the Mead reference
to Skidmore deference in lieu of Chevron deference should re-
quire a remand to the agency in such a situation remains un-
clear.216
While the Court's remand jurisprudence has developed over the last dec-
ade, the Court still has not decided the issue raised by Professor Guen-
delsberger. So, should a reviewing court remand a matter to the BIA
when doing so will only allow the agency to provide the court with an
interpretation worthy of Skidmore deference?
The limited scholarship on point suggests that the answer is no. Pro-
fessor Guendelsberger, for example, argued that "[f]or issues outside the
[BIA's] delegated domain, such as the meaning of provisions in state or
federal criminal statutes, the court should be permitted to consider the
agency analysis for its persuasive effect under Mead and Skidmore and
supplement otherwise insufficient agency analysis without the need for
remand."2 17 It appears that Professor Guendelsberger was persuaded by
214. Strauss, supra note I at 1145; see id. at 1143 ("'Skidmore weight' addresses the possibil-
ity that an agency's view on a given statutory question may in itself warrant the respect of judges
who are themselves unmistakably responsible for deciding the question of statutory meaning.").
215. Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 649.
216. Id. at 636 (emphasis added). Not long after Professor Guendelsberger wrote these words,
the Ninth Circuit said it was
reluctant to rule on the merits of an issue that the BIA has not itself addressed. In INS v.
Ventura, the Supreme Court instructed that "[g]enerally speaking, a court of appeals
should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in
agency hands."
Ray v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 582, 591 (9th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quot-
ing INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002) (per curiam)). That said, the Ninth Circuit went on to
"note that it may be appropriate for us to address the merits of purely legal claims . . . as to which we
would not 'intrude upon [a] domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative
agency."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
217. Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 644 (emphasis added).
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the formalist notion that, if Congress did not delegate lawmaking power
to the BIA, and thus the relevant interpretive issue falls outside the agen-
cy's "delegated domain," then the reviewing court has the authority to
resolve the issue and should do so in the first instance.218
A few other scholars have made passing comments that echo this
formalist view. One scholar, for example, has suggested that if, on re-
mand, the BIA will be addressing a matter "outside its own institutional
purview," then there may be "no compelling justifications for remand
and against judicial resolution of the issue in the first instance."2 19 Like-
wise, another scholar has said that "if the [reviewing] court concludes
that the agency lacks authority to interpret the statute . . . then only Skid-
more persuasive deference would apply and arguably there would be no
need to remand."220 In short, the limited scholarship on point suggests
that a reviewing court need not remand an unsettled statutory interpreta-
tion question to an agency when the issue falls outside the agency's
sphere of authority. Rather, these authorities suggest that the court can
and should resolve the interpretive matter on its own.
2. The Solution: The Reviewing Court Should Remand the Inter-
pretive Issue
Despite the scholarship to the contrary, a reviewing court should
generally remand an unsettled interpretive question to the BIA if the
agency's interpretation would be entitled to Skidmore deference on re-
view. This is because, although formalist principles do not support a re-
mand in this context, multiple functionalist rationales do warrant a re-
mand.
As an initial matter, it is worth recognizing that the resolution of an
interpretive issue may be important even if the issue falls outside the
BIA's "delegated domain."22 1 For example, the reviewing court's inter-
pretation of a criminal statute may be the key to determining whether a
218. Indeed, in considering whether a reviewing court should remand an unresolved interpre-
tive issue to an agency, Professor Guendelsberger focused on whether the issue fell "within the
domain of agency authority delegated by Congress." Id. With that in mind, Professor Guendels-
berger argued that, "[w]hen the issue involves statutory interpretation within the domain of agency
authority delegated by Congress, and the Board's reasoning is insufficient for meaningful review,
the court should remand for a reasoned agency decision on the legal point in question." Id. In other
words, Professor Guendelsberger argued that "the courts should permit the [BIA] to address unre-
solved issues involving interpretation of the immigration law before examining whether the Board's
interpretation is within the leeway permitted by Chevron and Mead." Id. at 649. Interestingly, Pro-
fessor Guendelsberger made these arguments almost five years before the Supreme Court's similar
holding in Negusie. See supra notes 142-80 and accompanying text (discussing Negusie).
219. Glen, supra note 93, at 46.
220. Walker, supra note 70, at 1571; see also id. at 1574 n.100 ("[R]emand is not necessary if
the court concludes that Congress did not delegate any Chevron discretion to the agency . . . ."); id
at 1579 ("[T]he ordinary remand rule applies broadly, and the only exceptions should be when there
are minor errors as to subsidiary issues that do not affect the agency's ultimate decision, or when the
agency lacks authority to decide the issue." (emphasis added)).
221. See Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 644.
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noncitizen should be removed from the United States. If the court makes
a mistake in interpreting the statute, the noncitizen could be wrongfully
removed or, alternatively, unjustly allowed to remain in the country.
Thus, the court should exercise great care in resolving such a significant
interpretive matter. With this in mind, a reviewing court should generally
remand an unsettled interpretive question to the BIA if the agency's in-
terpretation would be entitled to Skidmore deference on review.
To be sure, formalist principles do not justify a remand in this situa-
tion. Clearly, if Congress did not delegate power to the BIA to answer
the relevant interpretive question, then the reviewing court would have
the legal authority to resolve the issue on its own. After all, Mead estab-
lished that when an agency does not possess lawmaking power, the re-
viewing court is ultimately responsible for independently interpreting the
222
pertinent statute. Since, at the end of the day, the reviewing court will
have "to make its own independent judgment about the substance of the
congressional enactment,"22 3 formalist justifications do not point in the
direction of a remand.
Nevertheless, two functionalist rationales warrant a remand in this
situation. The first functionalist rationale is that remanding the unsettled
interpretive question to the BIA will allow the agency to bring its experi-
ence to bear to help the reviewing court determine the substantive mean-
ing of the relevant statute.224 Thus, if an immigration case turns on the
meaning of an ambiguous provision of a criminal statute, and the review-
ing court remands the interpretive issue to the BIA, then the agency can
use its considerable experience construing criminal statutes to offer an
interpretation that the court may find persuasive.
There is no doubt that the BIA has such experience. Although the
agency does not receive Chevron deference when it construes criminal
laws, it "routinely interprets criminal statutes because there are myriad
grounds for removal that are based upon a criminal conviction."225 In-
deed, as one prominent scholar has recognized, "the body of law that
concerns the impact of criminal activity on noncitizens is now vast."226
Thus, the BIA must regularly interpret criminal statutes in order to de-
termine whether a noncitizen should be removed from the United States
222. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
223. Healy, supra note 1, at 47; see also id at 48 (acknowledging that when Congress does not
delegate authority to an agency to resolve an interpretive issue, "the only law is the law that Con-
gress itself defined in the statute; the court is responsible for determining the content of that law");
id at 49 (recognizing that when an agency does not possess delegated power, "the court itself ...
[must] discern the substantive meaning of the ambiguous statute").
224. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
225. Mary Holper, Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing of Victim Protection Under
the Convention Against Torture, 88 OR. L. REV. 777, 825 (2009).
226. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 483 (2007).
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227or face some other adverse immigration consequence2. While Congress
may not have delegated power to the BIA to interpret ambiguous provi-
228sions of criminal statutes, there is no doubt that the agency interprets
such provisions on a regular basis.
Still, multiple courts have stressed that the BIA has no "special" or
"particular" expertise in interpreting criminal statutes. For example, one
court has said the BIA's interpretation of the phrase "crime of violence"
in 18 U.S.C. § 16 is not entitled to deference because, "as a federal
[criminal] provision outside the INA, it lies beyond the BIA's special
area of expertise."22 9 Similarly, another court has said the "BIA has no
particular expertise in construing federal and state criminal statutes,"
and, therefore, the agency's interpretation of such statutes is not afforded
deference.230
It is true that the BIA has no special or particular expertise in con-
struing ambiguous provisions of criminal statutes. But this criticism ap-
pears to relate to formalism and the fact that these interpretive issues fall
outside the BIA's congressionally "delegated domain," which is immi-
gration law. 23 ' And that only explains why the BIA should not receive
Chevron deference when it interprets an ambiguous provision of a crimi-
nal statute. It says nothing about the BIA's ability to persuade a court,
pursuant to Skidmore, as to the meaning of a statutory provision, given
the agency's experience.
Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Flores v. Ashcroft232 helps make the
point. In Flores, the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chevron deference
to the BIA's interpretation of "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. § 16.233
Citing Mead, Judge Easterbrook explained:
Chevron deference depends on delegation, and § 16(a) does
not delegate any power to the .. . Board of Immigration Ap-
peals. Section 16 is a criminal statute, and just as courts do not
defer to the Attorney General or United States Attorney when
§ 16 must be interpreted in a criminal prosecution, so there is
no reason for deference when the same statute must be con-
strued in a removal proceeding. Any delegation of interpretive
227. See also id. at 482-83 (discussing the many ways in which "a criminal conviction can
damage one's immigration status").
228. See supra note 209.
229. Ng v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 436 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting
Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 538 (3d Cir. 2006)).
230. Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
231. See Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 644.
232. 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003).
233. See id at 671 ("[T]he agency's interpretation ... has no binding effect along Chevron's
lines.").
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authority runs to the Judicial Branch rather than the Executive
Branch.2 34
That said, Judge Easterbrook expressly recognized that "the agency's
interpretation . . . may have persuasive force," and he then said, "we
must give it careful consideration."235
It is worth giving "careful consideration" to the BIA's interpretation
of an ambiguous provision of a criminal statute because the BIA has ex-
perience interpreting such provisions. Thus, if an immigration case turns
on such an unresolved interpretive issue, the reviewing court should re-
mand that issue to the BIA so that it can bring its experience to bear and
help the court make a more informed judgment about the meaning of the
statute.
A second functionalist rationale also justifies a remand in the Skid-
more situation. That rationale is that allowing the BIA to answer the stat-
utory interpretation question in the first instance will promote uniformity
across the circuits. In an immigration removal case, for example, if the
BIA construes an ambiguous provision of a criminal statute in the first
instance, then all of the circuits will have the benefit of the agency's
views. Therefore, each circuit court can consider the agency's interpreta-
tion and decide whether it is persuasive. Simply stated, the agency's in-
terpretation "can contribute to an efficient, predictable, and nationally
uniform understanding of the law." 236
It is true that, in the end, some circuits may not find the BIA's in-
terpretation persuasive. Nevertheless, the agency's interpretation will
increase the likelihood that the circuits will agree on the meaning of the
relevant statutory provision. As one scholar aptly put it, "national uni-
formity will still be promoted, though not guaranteed, by the courts
,,237
granting Skidmore deference to agency interpretations. At the very
least, the BIA's resolution of the interpretive issue in the first instance
will foster a uniformity of consideration in which each circuit can reflect
on the agency's initial interpretation and determine whether it is persua-
sive. In short, remanding an unsettled interpretive issue to the BIA for a
decision worthy of Skidmore deference will not guarantee national uni-
formity; however, remanding in this situation at least "allows for en-
234. Id. (citation omitted) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)).
235. Id. (emphases added). Ultimately, Judge Easterbrook decided that the agency's interpreta-
tion was "not persuasive." See id.
236. Strauss, supra note 1, at 1146.
237. Herz, supra note 51, at 197 n.57. Other scholars have also recognized that granting Skid-
more deference to an agency's statutory interpretation promotes national uniformity. See, e.g.,
Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1256 (mentioning, in the context of Skidmore, that "courts can
promote uniformity of the law and thereby promote the public good by harmonizing judicial inter-
pretations with administrative interpretations").
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hanced consistency in the application of statutes."23 8 This is obviously a
worthy functionalist goal.239
In conclusion, a reviewing court should generally remand an unset-
tled statutory interpretation question to the BIA if the agency's interpre-
tation would be entitled to Skidmore deference on review. To be sure,
formalist principles do not justify remanding in this context. However,
two functionalist rationales do warrant a remand. First, remanding the
outstanding interpretive issue to the BIA will allow the agency to bring
its experience to bear to help the court determine the substantive mean-
ing of the pertinent statutory provision. Second, remanding the unre-
solved matter will increase the chances that the circuits will agree on the
meaning of the relevant provision.
IV. AN OUTLINE OF THE PROPER BALANCE OF POWER
BETWEEN COURTS AND THE BIA
Taken together, the Supreme Court's decisions in Ventura, Thomas,
and Negusie teach an important lesson: If a case turns on the meaning of
a statutory provision the BIA either has not yet interpreted or has inter-
preted erroneously, the reviewing court should use the framework for
judicial review to decide whether to answer the interpretive question in
the first instance or remand the issue to the agency.240 With this in mind,
the previous Part used the framework to identify the circumstances under
which reviewing courts should and should not remand unsettled interpre-
tive issues to the BIA.241 This exercise creates an outline of the proper
balance of power between courts and the BIA when it comes to resolving
outstanding statutory interpretation questions.
At one end of the spectrum, a reviewing court may draw on the
framework for judicial review and decide that the relevant statutory pro-
vision is clear. In this situation, the court should answer the interpretive
question in the first instance. This is because neither formalist nor func-
tionalist justifications warrant remanding the matter to the BIA. 242
At the other end of the spectrum, a reviewing court may draw on the
framework for judicial review and decide that the relevant statutory pro-
238. Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of
Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1118 (2001) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 139-40 (1944)).
239. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1994) ("Both the Constitution's framers and
the Supreme Court have stressed that the articulation of nationally uniform interpretations of federal
law is an important objective of the federal adjudicatory process. Such uniform interpretation serves
several laudable goals of a coherent and legitimate judicial system." (footnotes omitted)). For a
discussion of the contrasting views on "[t]he importance of uniformity in [the interpretation of]
federal law," see Martha Dragich, Unformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the Circuit Doctrine, 56
Loy. L. REV. 535, 540-44 (2010).
240. See supra Part II.
241. See supra Part 111.
242. See supra Part IlIl.A.
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vision is ambiguous and that Congress delegated power to the BIA to
interpret that provision. In this situation, the BIA possesses Chevron dis-
cretion. Pursuant to the ordinary remand rule, a reviewing court should
generally remand an outstanding statutory interpretation question to an
agency with Chevron discretion. This is because both formalist and func-
tionalist justifications point in the direction of a remand.243
Perhaps the most difficult situation is when a reviewing court draws
on the framework for judicial review and decides that the relevant statu-
tory provision is ambiguous, but that Congress did not delegate power to
the BIA to interpret that provision. In this situation, an initial agency
interpretation would be entitled to Skidmore deference on review, not
Chevron deference. Under this circumstance, the reviewing court should
generally remand the interpretive issue to the BIA. This is because, alt-
hough formalist principles do not justify remanding in this context, mul-
tiple functionalist rationales do warrant a remand.24
In the end, the framework for judicial review is crucial to under-
standing when a reviewing court should answer an outstanding interpre-
tive question in the first instance and when the court should remand the
issue to the BIA. That said, if a reviewing court faces an unsettled inter-
pretive issue, and it determines that the relevant statutory provision is
ambiguous, the court may choose not to proceed any further with the
framework for judicial review. That is because remand will be the proper
course of action whether or not Congress delegated lawmaking power to
the BIA. After all, functionalist principles alone justify a remand even if
the BIA's interpretation will only be entitled to Skidmore deference on
review.
On that point, one final note is in order. If functionalist justifications
alone warrant a remand in the Skidmore context, then the formalist justi-
fications supporting a remand in the Chevron context are overstated. In
other words, although the Supreme Court has supported the ordinary
remand rule with both formalist and functionalist rationales,245 function-
alist principles by themselves can support the rule. After all, as the fore-
going analysis has demonstrated, a remand is appropriate even when
Congress did not delegate lawmaking power to the BIA and, thus, for-
malist justifications do not point in the direction of a remand.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that courts should use the framework for judicial
review primarily to decide how much deference to give to an agency's
statutory interpretation. This Article has demonstrated, however, that the
framework also plays an important secondary role in immigration law.
243. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text (discussing Negusie).
244. See supra Part III.B.
245. See supra notes 167-76 accompanying text (discussing Negusie).
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Indeed, if an immigration case turns on the meaning of a statutory provi-
sion the BIA either has not yet interpreted or has interpreted erroneously,
the reviewing court should draw on the framework for judicial review-
not to determine how much deference to give to the BIA, but rather to
decide whether to answer the interpretive question in the first instance or
remand the issue to the agency.
After recognizing that the framework for judicial review plays a
valuable role in the remand context, this Article used the framework to
identify those instances in which a reviewing court should remand an
unresolved interpretive issue to the BIA and those in which the court
should answer the question without remanding. Ultimately, the Article
argued that, when a reviewing court faces an unsettled interpretive issue,
and it decides, pursuant to the framework for judicial review, that the
relevant statutory provision is ambiguous, the court should remand the
matter to the BIA. This is true whether or not Congress delegated law-
making power to the BIA. Thus, a remand is proper if the BIA's interpre-
tation will be entitled to either Chevron or Skidmore deference on re-
view. In the end, this Article's analysis helps define the modem relation-
ship between courts and the BIA when it comes to resolving outstanding
statutory interpretation questions.

